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 Abstract 
 
This thesis argues that recurrent, if not systemic, shortcomings exist in university practice and 
procedure in the handling of student discipline. Such shortcomings especially (but not 
exclusively) relate to institutional adherence to norms of fair procedure. While these 
shortcomings may not be fatal to basic functioning of university discipline, the findings in this 
study advert to the need for serious, sustained and transparent attention to this area of quasi-
judicial administration.  
 
The thesis represents a legal and empirical investigation of student disciplinary decision-making 
in Australian public universities. It commences with contextual analysis of the history of the 
Australian university system and present public policy settings. The investigation then embarks 
on a study of the legal character of the student-university relationship, the nature of disciplinary 
action in respect of students in higher education (including its historical character), and 
reference to empirical literature on this subject-matter. Original findings on rates of student 
disciplinary action at selected Australian universities are also included. 
 
The central part of the empirical research comprises analysis of institutions‘ disciplinary 
measures and conduct as considered in respect of key legal standards applying to universities, 
notably the provision of procedural fairness to students. Additionally, the empirical analysis 
considers other issues of legality in disciplinary decision-making within the administrative law 
framework, as well as consideration of wider issues, such as the impact of university 
commercialisation on disciplinary systems.  
 
The thesis concludes with an overview of findings and results, with proposals for reform to 
university disciplinary arrangements and to mechanisms for review of university decisions.  
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 1 
Chapter 1 
A ‘Peculiar Public Institution’1: Issues of Legal Research into the 
Academy 
 
1.1 A ‘Socio-Legal’ Study and its Meanings 
 
This dissertation is a study of a particular type of decision-making (disciplinary action) in a 
particular type of public institution (university). The origins of this research project do not lie in 
the search for a subject-matter that might serve to further task of legal scholarship. I hope that it 
might do this in any case. Rather, its origins were more pragmatic, and did not necessarily begin 
with the discipline of law at all. For a number of years I had worked in the tertiary education 
sector (which, in Australia, encompasses both universities and Technical and Further Education 
(TAFE) colleges, or degree-granting and non-degree-granting institutions), primarily as a 
student advocate, assisting students with complaints and representing them in internal disputes, 
both academic and administrative. A great deal of problem-solving or dispute-resolution in the 
sector occurs informally, through negotiation, some form of conciliation, and/or advice and 
informal representations to internal decision-makers. As with any large and bureaucratic 
organization, high-volume and a diverse array of decisions are made on a daily basis, some 
reflecting solely internal rules or discretions (eg academic decisions), others affected by external 
obligations and/or pressures (eg fee-charging, admissions). My experiences with university 
decision-makers varied widely, and, over time, it struck me that little in the way of systemic 
analysis of university decision-making had ever been carried out. Hence, my emerging interest 
was in the university as a public institution and as an administrative entity. In this respect, the 
research problem was more akin to sociological study of large organizations and/or of public 
administration. Yet what particularly interested me also was that consideration and analysis of 
decision-making and internal practices were deeply affected, structured and focused on rules.
2
 
Rule-making, rule-application, and rule-interpretation have become a profound preoccupation 
within higher education institutions, and, in this inscription of rules in institutional action, the 
                                           
1
 Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99, 156 (Kirby J). 
2
 On the question of rules generally, see Robert Baldwin Rules and Government (Clarendon Press, 1995), 
chapter 2. Baldwin notes (7-8):  
A ‗rule‘ may be defined as ‗a general norm mandating or guiding conduct or action in a given type of 
situation‖… Governmental rules possess a number of properties or dimensions. Rule-makers, accordingly, have 
a number of variables to bear in mind when selecting rules and in assessing the appropriateness of rules for 
different purposes. Of special importance are the following rule dimensions:  
 Legal form or status. 
 Legal force or effect. 
 Associated prescription or sanction. 
 Specificity or precision. 
 Accessibility and intelligibility. 
 Scope or inclusiveness. 
 2 
circumstances of universities are consistent with general governmental conditions.
3
 In the 
intersection of decision-making and rules, it seemed obvious that the disciplinary perspective of 
law and legal scholarship would be valuable and necessary to a more systematic understanding 
of what was going on within these institutions.  
 
From the perspective of disciplinary and methodological approach, therefore, I was drawn 
toward law and that ‗sub-discipline‘ (or sub-disciplines) termed ‗socio-legal studies.‘ The 
parameters and criteria of socio-legal analysis are nebulous and the subject of some debate and 
controversy. As Banakar and Travers have remarked:
4
  
 
We have so far used ‗socio-legal research‘ as a general term for three types of research. Firstly, 
there is empirical research that addresses the questions asked about law by black-letter lawyers 
and practitioners. This often views social science instrumentally as something that can be used to 
address legal concerns… There is also the idea that one must acknowledge a wider context to 
law and legal institutions, but without engaging in the many theoretical and political debates in 
sociology about how to understand society. Secondly, there is the research conducted for 
government departments and agencies… finally, there is research that engages with central 
issues in social theory.  
 
Further, a major part of the complexity or difficulty in synthesizing law and social research is 
that many of the presumptions, techniques and objectives of the two are different, if not, as 
Banakar and Travers additionally argue, incommensurable.
5
 As these writers note, there is a 
long history and ‗tradition‘ (or various traditions) of establishing and expanding the intellectual 
and practical space in which precisely this synthesis operates and flourishes.  
 
If part of the spectrum of socio-legal research includes those approaches applying social 
research methods in an instrumental fashion to legal issues and those approaches that seek a 
more genuine interdisciplinarity between law and social science, the approach I have taken to 
the present study spans this space. My emphasis is on that ‗tradition‘ of socio-legal investigation 
concerned primarily with the inter-relationships of law (rules and norms) and behaviour 
(empirical practices and conduct). In the ‗synthetic‘ space of socio-legal analysis, the first of 
these categories emphasises the legal character of the equation; the second, the sociological 
dimension.  
 
                                           
3
 See Chapter 2, section 2.3, below. 
4
 Reza Banaker and Max Travers ‗Socio-Legal Research in the UK‘ in Reza Banaker and Max Travers 
(eds) Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart Publishing, 2005), 279. 
5
 Banaker and Travers ‗Law, Sociology and Method‘ in Reza Banaker and Max Travers (eds) Theory and 
Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart Publishing, 2005), 11-12: ‗In brief, law as a field of practice, and 
sociology as an academic discipline, relate themselves to society in fundamentally different ways and 
seek different ends… What does all this mean for sociological studies of law? It means that the field of 
the sociology of law is given the difficult (if not impossible) task of uniting two fundamentally different 
images of society…‘ 
 3 
On the instrumental side, my approach has included the use of social research methods in 
analysis of the practical application of rules and powers, both legal and non-legal. In this 
respect, my approach is similar to those that seek to investigate, test or elucidate the operation of 
law through empirical research techniques.
6
 The principal domain of legal doctrine investigated 
in the present research is administrative law, and in particular (although not exclusively) 
procedural fairness. That doctrine supplies an underpinning measure for institutional rules and 
conduct.  
 
Yet this is not a study of legal institutions, at least not directly. It is, if anything, a study of 
public administration, situated in higher education, from the perspective of legal and 
sociological content. It is an analysis of the university as an administrative-legal and 
sociological institution. In Banaker and Travers‘ schema above, this might be understood as an 
integration of law and ‗its wider context‘ (social phenomena), without extended and systematic 
regard to issues of social theory. Each of these disciplines contributes concepts, techniques and 
perspectives to the research project as a whole, and, in the final analysis, to a series of 
propositions on policy reform. Or to put this another way – and perhaps preferable way – this 
study is consistent with the investigation of law as normative and ‗routine structuring‘ of social 
relations:
7
 
 
This is a very different outlook from that of some older sociolegal approaches treating law 
purely as a policy-instrument acting on society. A view of law as an aspect of social experience 
makes redundant sociolegal efforts to trace causal connections between law and society, as if law 
existed as an asocial instrument of technique, external to social life. Instead, law itself, rather 
than law‘s effects or conditioning causes, becomes to centre of sociolegal attention: law as 
normative ideas embedded in social practices.
8
 
 
1.2 Subject-Matter: Discipline, Discretion and Decision-Making 
 
Investigation of the university raises the key theme of discretion and, by extension, the exercise 
of authoritative and legitimate power. Practical limits on the investigation of discretion in this 
institutional context were obviously needed, and hence the subject-matter of the study was 
constrained to disciplinary action taken by the university against students. There were a number 
of compelling reasons for this choice. First, in the wide constellation of decision-making 
undertaken by universities, disciplinary action is among the most formal and structured. Second, 
disciplinary action does not constitute a form of ‗mass‘ decision-making, in which scrutiny of 
individual decisions would be especially difficult. Third, disciplinary action against students is 
                                           
6
 See eg John Baldwin and Michael McConville Negotiated Justice: Pressures to Plead Guilty (Martin 
Robinson, 1977); Denis Galligan ‗Public Law‘ in Philip Thomas (ed) Socio-legal studies (Dartmouth 
Publishing Company, 1997). 
7
 Roger Cotterrell ‗Subverting Orthodoxy, Making Law Central: A View of Sociolegal Studies‘ (2002) 29 
Journal of Law and Society 4 632; compare Lon Fuller ‗Human Interaction and the Law‘ (1969) 14 
American Journal of Jurisprudence 1. 
 4 
neither exceptional nor rare; it occurs regularly, even on consistent cycle according to the 
academic year (eg following examination or assessment periods). Fourth, although relatively 
formal in character, disciplinary action is individualized and applies to discrete cases, in 
contrast, for example, to the legislative action of universities, which is collective and relatively 
ad hoc. There was the possibility, therefore, that disciplinary decision-making might prove 
sufficiently manageable and transparent to facilitate investigation. 
 
As Keith Hawkins has remarked,
9
 questions of discretion and decision-making are not 
necessarily the same and ought not necessarily to be conflated:  
 
Social scientists tend to see discretion not so much in terms of legal rules, as in terms of choices 
that may sometimes be made in circumstances where there are no discernable rules or standards. 
They think in terms of decision-making, rather than discretion, and this leads to differences in 
emphasis. Many social scientists share with lawyers a concern for how law can best be made to 
serve its purposes… But where lawyers think in terms of legal rules in achieving outcomes, 
social scientists tend to think rather in terms of decision goals or decision processes. 
 
A similar observation has been made by Baldwin in his substantial study of governmental rule-
making.
10
 While discretion encompasses a field of legitimated or effective action available to a 
legal actor, decision-making refers to a greater depth of field. It makes reference to sociological 
and political factors. Decision-making concerns social phenomena otherwise assumed or 
abstracted out of the field of analysis.  
 
The nature of discretion in a legal context has been comprehensively covered by writers such as 
Galligan.
11
 In the dialectical relation of discretion and (legal) rules, discretion is a terrain on 
which empirical (official) conduct and decision-making can be scrutinized. Discretion, of 
course, may operate at a range of levels, from wide legislative discretion to relatively narrow 
discretion accorded to lower-level administrators. In the university, the range of discretionary 
decision-making is wide. In respect of disciplinary action the exercise of discretion is tied to 
quite stringent rules deriving from various (and sometimes complex) sources, such as secondary 
legislation, the common law and administrative policy.  
 
                                                                                                                           
8
 Cotterrell ‗Subverting Orthodoxy, Making Law Central: A View of Sociolegal Studies‘, 640. 
9
 Keith Hawkins ‗The Use of Legal Discretion: Perspectives From Law and Social Science‘ in Keith 
Hawkins (ed) The Uses of Discretion (Clarendon Press, 1992), 14. 
10
 Robert Baldwin Rules and Government, 24: ‗A legalistic conception of decision-making underplays the 
complexity of decisions and tends to see the ―decision‖ as existing at a particular point in the 
administrative process, as an isolated event logically separable from its surroundings. This conception in 
turn produces a particular rule-centred view about the control of discretionary powers. Decisions, in short, 
are seen as simple discrete, and unproblematic as opposed to complex, subtle and woven into a broader 
process.‘ 
11
 Denis Galligan Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion (Clarendon Press, 1986). 
 5 
1.3 Hypothesis  
 
My desire in this research project is not only to investigate rules but additionally to gain insight 
into how those rules – and the discretion of decision-makers responsible for the interpretation 
and application of those rules – actually operate in practice. This is not an easy task, and it had 
to be crafted with some precision, both theoretically and methodologically.  
 
I refer above to the role of legal standards in formulation of the analytical approach to the 
research project. A key legal standard (or set of standards) available to analysis of university 
decision-making, especially in regards to the relatively formalized action of discipline, is the 
provision of natural justice to the student, or as is nowadays preferred, procedural fairness.
12
 
The rules of procedural fairness thereby became a central standard in the research.
13
 The 
function and value of this standard, however, is not abstract, or solely for jurisprudential value, 
but rather its value is more pragmatic (and, ultimately, policy-focused): that is, as a standard, 
indicator or measure of the quality of decision-making undertaken in the university.  
 
The hypothesis of this research project is that university decision-making, in respect of the 
general legal standard of fair procedure (as it applies to student disciplinary action), is, if not 
poor, affected by significant shortcomings. That hypothesis emerges from practical experience 
in the sector, reinforced by an apparent growth in student litigation and calls for improved 
university complaints-handling.
14
 To put this hypothesis in terms of key questions, the study 
asks: Is university decision-making in respect of student disciplinary decisionmaking of a 
satisfactory quality? If we equate quality with fairness, do universities as a general rule meet 
legal standards of fairness in their conduct, practice and procedure? Certain preliminary and 
ancillary questions arise in dealing with these issues: What standards of procedural fairness 
apply to disciplinary decision-making in respect of university students? What is the historical 
and policy context for disciplinary decision-making in the university setting? If universities 
meet standards of fairness, in what aspects of conduct, practice and procedure do they meet 
those standards? If not, where do the shortcomings in conduct, practice and procedure lie? 
Further, where limitations lie, what improvements or reforms might be made to university 
practice to bring it broadly into line with standards of fairness?  
 
                                           
12
 See eg Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 583-585 (Mason J). 
13
 For extended discussion of the concept of law as ‗standard,‘ and procedural fairness as establishing a 
‗fair treatment‘ standard, see Denis Galligan Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of 
Administrative Procedures (Clarendon Press, 1996), Chs 1, 2.  
14
 See Chapter 5, section 5.3, and Chapter 10, section 10.4, below. 
 6 
1.4 Methodological Challenges 
 
The analytic strategy I adopt considers both legal and empirical (sociological) issues. Beyond 
context, three main methodological challenges present themselves. The first of these is access to 
data. Decision-making in any large, diverse and bureaucratic institution is, no doubt, relatively 
opaque, and the university is no different in this regard. The problem of data sources is one 
reason why the research focuses on disciplinary decision-making. Available data sources are 
either publicly available (disciplinary rules) or access to them is negotiable with institutions. 
Other than published rules, the data sources ultimately available were statistical data on 
disciplinary action, discipline case file, and interviews with participants in the discipline process 
(student advocates). Access to one further source of information was attempted (interview with 
discipline panel members) but did not prove successful. The value of formality of disciplinary 
proceedings is evident in case-files. This data source contains considerable, if sometimes 
incomplete, information on the actual conduct of disciplinary proceedings, especially hearings. 
It is from this source, in particular, that further legal issues (ie questions of applicable legal 
standards) arise. Student advocate interviews are particularly valuable in gaining in-depth, 
indirect information on disciplinary action and also on the wider policy context in which 
decisions are being made.  
 
Aside from access to sources, a second challenge is management of data. Most data sources are 
qualitative, and this facet requires considerable interpretation and organization of information. 
In anticipation of this issue, limits are placed on ‗sample sizes,‘ such that the volume of data is 
manageable but at the same time a valid, representative sample is investigated. As may be seen 
from Table 1.1, the sample size in relevant cases is between 18% and 42% of those institutions 
conventionally considered to be ‗public‘ universities (as represented by membership of 
Universities Australia (UA), the peak body). The scope of institutions surveyed for case files is 
much lower (2 universities), primarily for practical reasons: capacity to access to university files 
is difficult, the number of files obtained per institutions is relatively high and sufficient for 
research purposes, and the density of information available from case files is considerable. As a 
representative sample, it is felt that access to files, in the numbers available, at the two 
participating institutions is satisfactory and manageable.  
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Table 1.1: Data sources and sample sizes, analysis of disciplinary action in Australian 
public universities 
 
Data source ‘Sample size’ Proportion of total 
potential sample size 
(n=38 UA members) 
Discipline proceedings statistics (one set 
per university) 
7 18.4% 
Discipline rules (one set per university) 16 42.1% 
Case files 38 NA 
Student advocate interviews (one per 
university) 
13 34.2% 
 
 
1.5 The Empirical Research Strategy: ‘Triangulation’ 
 
As the above comments indicate, the research strategy in its totality employs a combination of 
empirical research methods and traditional doctrinal legal research. Doctrinal analysis especially 
focuses on study of the student-university relationship and on relevant principles of 
administrative law.  
 
The main empirical research strategy seeks to accumulate, compare and contrast empirical data, 
collected by means of social-scientific methods: quantitative and qualitative surveys, interviews, 
and case analyses.  
 
This strategy is comparable to what is referred to in the literature on social-scientific research 
methods as ‗triangulation.‘ That methodological model is drawn, by analogy, from the method 
of identifying, observing and measuring position in mathematical and spatial sciences 
(trigonometry, surveying and cartography). The paradigmatic equivalence of observable and 
measurable position is assumed by some other form of objectifiable ‗variable.‘ The ‗variable‘ in 
the present case is institutional behaviour in respect of (disciplinary) decision-making. The 
‗base-point‘ around which investigative methodologies and empirical data-sources are 
organized is the relevant legal standard (primarily procedural fairness). The use of, or reference 
to, this type of methodological approach occurs in scholarly research in nursing,
15
 tourism
16
 and 
public policy
17
 research. It is also been employed in socio-legal investigation in fields such as 
                                           
15
 Eg Veronica Thurmond ‗The Point of Triangulation‘ (2001) 3 Journal of Nursing Scholarship 253; 
Cecily Begley ‗Using Triangulation in Nursing Research‘ (1996) 24 Journal of Advanced Nursing 122. 
16
 Eg Brian Davies ‗The Role of Quantitative and Qualitative Research in Industrial Studies of Tourism‘ 
(2003) 5 International Journal of Tourism Research 97; Martin Oppermann ‗Triangulation – A 
Methodological Discussion‘ (2000) 2 International Journal of Tourism Research 141. 
17
 Eg Alice Bloch ‗Carrying out a Survey of Refugees: Some Methodological Considerations and 
Guidelines‘ (1999) 12 Journal of Refugee Studies 4 367.  
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family law,
18
 corporate law,
19
 and criminal law.
20
 While the scientific analogy ought not to be 
overstated it provides an analytical mechanism of considerable value.  
 
The objective of triangulation in social research – as with the acquisition of greater precision, 
accuracy and validity of measurement in the spatial sciences – is validation of knowledge of 
(social) phenomena, through acquisition of discrete but comparable bodies of evidence. Green 
and McClintock remark on the objective of the strategy that  
 
The goal of triangulating methods is to strengthen the validity of the overall findings through 
congruence and/or complementarity of the results from each method. Congruence here means 
similarity, consistency, or convergence of results, whereas complementarity refers to one set of 
results enriching, expanding upon, clarifying or illustrating the other. Thus, the essence of the 
triangulation logic is that the methods represent independent assessments of the same 
phenomenon and contain offsetting kinds of bias and measurement error.
21
  
 
Other authors argue that triangulation is more correctly understood as a constituent feature of a 
wider methodological phenomenon, a ‗mixed-methods research process,‘22 in which researchers 
seek to establish an ‗expansive and creative form of research, not a limiting form of research… 
[that] suggests that researchers take an eclectic approach to method selection and the thinking 
about and conduct of research.‘23 As well as ‗eclectic,‘ these authors consider the approach 
‗philosophically‘ as a ‗pragmatic method,‘ employing methodological and inquisitorial tools as 
appropriate and available.
24
 The prevailing function of triangulation to interrogate subject-
matter complements, according to these authors, other aspects or functions of ‗mixed-methods‘ 
research, such as refinement of earlier research findings. 
 
Thurmond
25
 and Begley
26
 both note that the triangulation approach may actually proceed from 
three different types of research strategy: those employing multiple data sources, those 
employing multiple investigators, or those employing multiple research methodologies. For 
present purposes, the ‗triangulation strategy‘ employs multiple data-sources and research 
                                           
18
 Eg Helen Rhoades, Reg Graycar and Margaret Harrison ‗The First Three Years of the Family Law 
Reform Act 1995‘ (2001) 58 Family Matters 80, and see also the authors response to critics on the 
question of methodology: ‗Researching Family Law Reform: The Authors Respond‘ (2001) 59 Family 
Matters 68. 
19
 Eg Bryant Garth, Ilene Nagel and Sheldon Plager ‗Empirical Research and the Shareholder Derivative 
Suit: Toward a Better-Informed Debate‘ (1985) 48 Law and Contemporary Problems 3 137. 
20
 Eg Stephen Farrall, Jon Bannister, Jason Ditton and Elizabeth Gilchrist ‗Questioning the Measurement 
of the ―Fear Of Crime‖‘ (1997) 37 British Journal of Criminology 4 658. 
21
 Jennifer Greene and Charles McClintock ‗Triangulation Evaluation: Design and Analysis Issues‘ 
(1985) 9 Evaluation Review 5 523, 524. 
22
 R Burke Johnson and Anthony Onwuegbuzie ‗Mixed Methods Research: A Research Paradigm Whose 
Time Has Come‘ (2004) 33 Educational Researcher 7 21-22. 
23
 Johnson and Onwuegbuzie ‗Mixed Methods Research: A Research Paradigm Whose Time Has Come‘, 
17. 
24
 Johnson and Onwuegbuzie ‗Mixed Methods Research: A Research Paradigm Whose Time Has Come‘. 
25
 Thurmond ‗The Point of Triangulation‘.  
26
 Begley ‗Using Triangulation in Nursing Research‘. 
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methods. Consistent with the triangulation model, this approach to the research problem allows 
scrutiny of disciplinary decision-making conduct from the point of view of:  
 
 statistics on  disciplinary action,  
 official rules,  
 recorded evidence of the conduct of disciplinary hearings (including certain pre- and 
post-hearing information, such as notice and provision of reasons for decisions), and  
 information from indirect participant-observers in decision-making processes.  
 
Mixed-methods approach in these circumstances is not without its limitations. The most obvious 
limitation – and indeed, a key reason for seeking multiple data-sources in the first place – is 
opacity of the decision-making process, or in other words difficulty in obtaining data in relation 
to proceedings, personnel, decisions, reasoning for decisions, application of discipline rules, and 
so forth. By way of comparison, other studies on student disciplinary decision-making generally 
limit analysis to one form of data (excluding reported judicial opinion): disciplinary rules.
27
 In 
this respect, knowledge of disciplinary decision-making by universities is expanded as a result 
of the current approach. Yet, that advantage needs to be balanced against that fact that research 
in this thesis does not extend to direct evidence from decision-makers (eg discipline 
tribunal/panel members), nor from students directly affected by disciplinary action. Further, 
within the design of the research methods that are used, technical limitations arise. For example, 
while data is obtained from a reasonable proportion of institutions (ie obtains a ‗statistical 
validity‘), there is not necessarily straightforward overlap of investigated institutions in each 
‗data-set.‘ This question is more pertinent in regards to comparisons of qualitative data derived 
from analysis of discipline rules and the observations of advocates. In that instance, where 42% 
and 34% of all public universities were investigated respectively, overlap between investigated 
institutions occurs in respect of 7 institutions (or 18.4% of all public universities), out of 16 
institutions in which rules were analysed and out of 13 institutions at which advocates worked.  
 
Notwithstanding these limits in research methodology, the value of ‗triangulation,‘ or a ‗mixed-
methods‘ approach tends to be supported by the process and results in the present study. As 
Bloch notes,
28
 disparate data sources can, by their cumulative illumination of a given subject-
matter, establish trends that provide a basis for authentication of knowledge: ‗…the 
triangulation of data sources enabled the identification of patterns and trends within and 
between communities that acted as the basis for the selection of the case study groups.‘29 
Identification of patterns and trends in respect of fairness and legality in student disciplinary 
                                           
27
 See Chapter 5, section 5.1.2, below. More recently, complementary data on student complaints and 
litigation have been obtained and analysed: see Chapter 5, section 5.1.3, below. 
28
 Bloch ‗Carrying Out a Survey of Refugees: Some Methodological Considerations and Guidelines‘. 
29
 Bloch ‗Carrying Out a Survey of Refugees: Some Methodological Considerations and Guidelines‘, 370. 
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decision-making – across the three qualitative data-sources (survey of rules, case analysis, 
advocates‘ interviews) – likewise tends to validate the use of ‗triangulation‘ strategies in the 
present study. Quantitative data is more valuable for elaboration of the context of decision-
making, especially rates and nature of disciplinary action.  
 
Finally, it is worth remarking that ‗triangulation‘ in social research, including socio-legal 
research, is not without its critics. Criticism concerns use of positivistic notions of science in the 
investigation and analysis of social phenomena. It can be argued that reproduction of methods 
(in this case, trigonometry and surveying) and epistemological criteria (eg validity, bias, error, 
objectivity) from the natural sciences to social analysis is at best problematic, at worst 
misleading. Blaikie
30
 describes use of the triangulation metaphor in social sciences as 
‗inappropriate,‘ as it misunderstands the nature and organization of phenomena under 
investigation. In surveying or trigonometry, the method aims to identify, fix and measure the 
existence of the subject-matter (a spatial point); in social sciences, its purported aim is 
‗concerned with reducing error or bias.‘31 Additionally, he argues that importation of 
triangulation into social research also imports the problem of different, variable or 
incommensurate assumptions and perspectives, associated with discrete methods (for example, 
positivistic, hermeneutic or ethnological presuppositions), being conflated or ignored.
32
 
‗Triangulation‘ does seek to construct a unified analytical-strategic model from discrete (even 
disparate) sources and/or methodologies, possibly including both qualitative and quantitative 
methods. Blaikie‘s concern is not necessarily with ‗combinations of methods and data sources‘ 
in research, but rather with uncritical and inappropriate integration of methods and data-sources, 
‗in light of the incommensurability of ontological and epistemological assumptions of 
methodological perspectives.‘33 He concedes therefore that ‗It is legitimate, and it may be 
useful, to use multiple methods within a particular methodological perspective… or different 
data sources, provided they are used consistently within one perspective…‘  
 
His concern for consistent theoretical assumptions in research methodologies is reasonable. In 
the present case the approach is consistent. Focus on one object (or ‗object-domain‘), namely 
disciplinary decision-making, is achieved through various data-sources and technical methods 
but within the context of a singular set of methodological presuppositions: the positivistic, 
social-scientific paradigm of ‗orthodox‘ sociological (socio-legal) research. Alternative 
approaches would be possible, such as ethno-methodological analysis of communications 
and/or miscommunications in decision-making as it applies to various socio-economic or 
cultural groups (eg poorer students, Aboriginal students or international students), or 
                                           
30
 Norman Blaikie ‗A Critique of the Use of Triangulation in Social Research‘ (1991) 25 Quality and 
Quantity 115. 
31
 Blaikie ‗A Critique of the Use of Triangulation in Social Research‘, 122-123. 
32
 Blaikie ‗A Critique of the Use of Triangulation in Social Research‘, 123-130. 
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psychological analysis of motivations, cognition or identity in the decision-making process. 
Such research would extend knowledge of this type of academic-administrative practice, and I 
would concur with Blaikie that integrating these methodologies into a single research strategy 
would be problematic, not least because to do so would confuse the subject-matter and the a 
priori theoretical principles of the study. In the present study, the subject-matter is institutional 
decision-making within the context of legal discretion.
34
 
 
1.6 Outlining the Thesis and Chapter Contents 
 
Given these remarks, the concept of a research strategy applying multiple methodologies/data-
sources to an identified problem is an appropriate and valuable approach to socio-legal analysis. 
The university is a worthy recipient of such analytical attention. Sustained investigation of 
universities‘ treatment of their students is sparse, notwithstanding that higher education has 
become a mass phenomenon and ‗credentialism‘ central to the operation of the labour market.35 
The ‗inflationary‘ nature of university credentials is only reinforcing these trends.36 
Additionally, it has recently been proposed that 40% of 25-34 year-olds should possess a higher 
education qualification by 2020 (up from 29% in 2008).
37
 The pressures on institutions and on 
those enrolled, or enrolling, in university programs will likely grow.  
 
Students‘ interests may be affected by universities‘ decisions. Their interests may be seriously 
prejudiced by those decisions. In turn, it is imperative that universities can respond to actions 
that prejudice the institution‘s basic mission, such as damage to academic standards, as well as 
safeguard persons and property within its sphere of operations. Capacity for ‗domestic‘ 
discipline plays a role in the latter circumstances; obligations for fair conduct will be important 
to the former considerations. The research reported in this dissertation essentially deals with 
                                                                                                                           
33
 Blaikie ‗A Critique of the Use of Triangulation in Social Research‘, 131. 
34
 I would differ with Blaikie, however, that the notion of ‗triangulation‘ is an inappropriate metaphor for 
this ‗multiple-method‘ strategy. The key issue would appear to be to distinguish between a ‗technical‘ 
diversity or plurality in methodologies and/or data-sources (diversity in methodological content and 
procedure) and a wider ‗paradigmatic‘ plurality (diversity in theoretical principles and analytical objects). 
The analogy to triangulation operates on the former plane, not the latter. The distinction may also be 
explained by reference to the (scientific) analogy of ‗constant‘ and ‗variable‘ as it operates in spatial 
science. Triangulation is possible by deriving the unknown, ‗variable‘ point from the known, ‗constant‘ 
points. In effect, as I have noted above, without two ‗known‘ stable points the exercise is impossible. The 
content and procedure of investigative method may be ‗variable,‘ but the objects of analysis (eg exercise 
of discretion and commensurate legal rules) and their theoretical presuppositions (appropriate 
jurisprudence of rules and discretion) cannot, ideally, at the same time, be ‗variable.‘ This state of affairs 
appears to be where Blaikie‘s concerns primarily lie. If, for instance, various theories or theoretical 
models of jurisprudence were additionally applied to the analysis, the situation would indeed become 
‗confused,‘ if not increasingly strained and chaotic. In that situation, a new methodological paradigm 
would have to be found, and a new research strategy established.  
35
 See eg Simon Marginson ‗The Decline in the Standing of Educational Credentials in Australia‘ (1995) 
39 Australian Journal of Education 1 67. 
36
 Marginson ‗The Decline in the Value of Educational Credentials in Australia‘. 
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individualized circumstances in which students‘ and universities‘ interests are affected. On 
occasion, systemic or structural issues pertaining to university operations or student conduct are 
considered, yet the scope of such discussions is inevitably limited by the constraints of space. In 
some instances, I have sought to elaborate on those points elsewhere.
38
  
 
The structure of this dissertation extends from contextual discussion and analysis, to analysis of 
empirical research, and finally to conclusions: 
 
Chapter 2 establishes the historical and public-policy situation of Australian universities, from 
founding of the first such bodies in the 1850s through to the present ‗neoliberal‘ university. 
Subsequently, I consider certain, important structural features that have arisen in the sector, 
namely the role of administration and ‗managerialism‘ in the university, as well as key changes 
in the nature and characteristics of university students (or, as I term it, student subjectivity
39
).  
 
Chapter 3 outlines the nature of the student-university relationship at law, noting that this 
relationship is now founded on a range of legal bases, including contract, tort, administrative 
law, and, in some residual respects, the ancient common law of charities. Statutory regulation of 
the relationship has also grown significantly in recent years, especially in regards to ‗consumer 
protection‘ treatment of students. In total, the legal ‗terrain‘ of the relationship is complex and 
not clearly settled. Arguably, it is still in the midst of a process of evolutionary change. 
 
Proceeding from the general to the particular, Chapter 4 seeks to expand the contextual 
investigation of the student-university relationship in a close analysis of the model of discipline 
as it applies to university students. Particular scrutiny is applied to academic misconduct, given 
that this issue has been identified as one of particular prevalence and concern in the 
contemporary university. I make reference especially to the issue of plagiarism. Not only is this 
issue important, if not notorious in the sector, but I argue it is actually quite problematic at a 
conceptual level, and legal research proves useful in resolving ambiguities surrounding this 
concept. Finally, I make reference to an additional problem in university discipline imported 
from law, variable evidentiary standards, which applies to select groups of students.  
 
In Chapter 5, I review the literature on empirical research into student disciplinary decision-
making, and additionally consider more recent literature on student complaints and disputes, in 
order to provide statistical information of relevance to disciplinary action. Previous empirical 
research into disciplinary decision-making has focused investigation on the operation of 
                                                                                                                           
37
 Review of Australian Higher Education Expert Panel Review of Australian Higher Education: Final 
Report (2008), xiv (‗Bradley Review‘). 
38
 Eg Bruce Lindsay ‗Breaking University Rules: Discipline and Indiscipline Past and Present‘ (2008) 50 
Australian Universities’ Review 1 37. 
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disciplinary rules. This chapter expands the scope of statistical information by analysing 
original data on rates and nature of disciplinary action by universities against students.  
 
In Chapter 6, I begin to move from contextual problems to qualitative findings on decision-
making and fairness. Specifically, this chapter provides analysis and findings on a survey of 
student disciplinary rules at selected Australian universities, as measured against the legal 
standard of procedural fairness. In the course of the chapter comprehensive discussion and 
analysis of the rules of procedural fairness (and their content), as they are applicable to 
university disciplinary action, is undertaken.  
 
Chapter 7 extends investigation and analysis of legal standards into decision-making practices in 
disciplinary cases. This insight is achieved by way of scrutiny of records on file at participating 
universities. Some statistical information is acquired, although the primary focus is qualitative 
review of legal standards, as far as is practicable, from the contents of administrative files. 
Issues and concerns in relation to the conduct of decision-making bodies involve not only 
questions of fair procedure but also other problems of legality, notably (but not exclusively) in 
respect of procedural conduct.  
 
Empirical analysis culminates in the reporting in Chapter 8 on a series of interviews conducted 
with student advocates, who are typically involved in advising and/or representing students in 
disciplinary and other matters. Those discussions charted various procedural issues in respect of 
disciplinary proceedings, and especially key tenets of procedural fairness. Further, however, 
wider issues as to the impact of system-wide reforms (commercialization of the university 
sector) on the conduct of university discipline formed an important dimension of the interview 
data.  
 
The final two chapters (Chapter 9 and 10) seek to provide broad, informed conclusions to the 
study. Chapter 9 summarizes the prevailing trends of the empirical research: trends in the 
quality of decision-making as measured against standards of fair procedure and legality 
generally. This assessment is placed within the wider context of ‗administrative justice‘ and the 
applicability of the methods of individualized (‗judicial‘) justice in the university system. 
Finally, Chapter 10 ventures a range of reforms to disciplinary rules and methods within the 
university, as well as engaging in an emerging debate over the value of, and preferred approach 
to, an ‗external‘ disputes-handling or review jurisdiction in the higher education sector. The 
reform proposals are intended to contribute to the appropriate balance of good administration in 
public institutions and the relatively atypical nature of the university as an ‗administrative‘ and 
public body.  
                                                                                                                           
39
 Compare also Bruce Lindsay ‗Student Subjectivity and the Law‘ (2005) 10 Deakin Law Review 2 628. 
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Chapter 2 
The Australian University: History, Policy, Patterns 
 
2.1 The ‘Australian University’40 
 
The Australian university‘s origins lie in small colonial institutions, developed under the 
auspices of the colonial governments, educating the sons (and later daughters) of the local, 
provincial elites, a situation expanded but largely unaltered until the Second World War. As 
with the comparable, ‗developed‘ nations, rapid expansion of the university system after this 
War led to substantial changes in organisation, structure, size and functions of the university, 
and to change in the relationship of the university and society.  
 
In Australia, government has played a leading role in the formation and development of the 
university sector. The universities have emerged as quasi-autonomous creatures of government, 
subject to growing state intervention and planning. In the post-Second World War environment, 
government has become responsible for policy direction and organisation. It might be said that 
this transition represented a passage from a colonial/post-colonial institution to an industrialised 
one, as well from an elite institution to one with a mass base.  
 
The Australian university can be characterised as a product of local circumstances and world-
historical trends in the organisation of higher education. Three periods emerge in an 
‗institutional history.‘ The first period includes the founding of the colonial universities until 
approximately the Second World War. The second period encompasses the Second World War 
and the long boom that followed it, including the period of subsequent economic and social 
crisis in the 1970s and 1980s. This was a period of rapid expansion and growth, and transition 
of the university to a more central place in economy and society. The final and contemporary 
period begins in the late 1980s and continues into the present, and may be classified as the 
period of the neoliberal university.  
 
2.1.1 The Colonial/Postcolonial University 
 
The Universities of Sydney and Melbourne were founded within three years of each other, in 
1850 and 1853 respectively, as the first universities in the then Australian colonies. These 
                                           
40
 ‗The Report (of the Royal Commission into establishing a university in Western Australia) 
recommends what is called the Australian system of university. We in Australia realise that perhaps it is 
not possible for us to establish a university on the lines of Oxford and Cambridge; we are rather leaning 
towards establishing a university which will assist us in commercial life and in establishing industries in 
this great State.‘ Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 2 February 1911, 3637 
(R D McKenzie, Honorary Minister). 
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institutions were the forerunners of the other colonial (or immediately post-Federation) 
universities. South Australia established its university in 1874, Tasmania in 1890, Queensland 
in 1910, and Western Australia in 1913. In most cases, the founding of the university was 
preceded by a public inquiry. The first university, Sydney, was a product of compromises 
between the colonial establishment and a rising democratic and radical sentiment.
41
 A ‗colonial 
Oxbridge‘ was viewed as a measure of conservative defence,42 although the outcome of political 
expediency was a model based on the less ancient University of London, a democratic and 
federal university founded in the early years of the nineteenth century. Like Oxford and 
Cambridge Universities, the University of London provided for autonomous teaching colleges. 
Examinations and conferral of degrees were the province of the University per se.
43
 Such a 
decentralised institution allowed for sectarian colleges within a secular institutional form. The 
University itself however would have no religious tests.
44
   
 
The fate of college-based university was short-lived. Eclipse of independent colleges as the sites 
of teaching was affected by the first professors appointed to the University. Under the auspices 
of arguing for a ‗central standard of teaching‘ and misconstrued intention of the founders, the 
three inaugural academic staff successfully argued that they were Professors of the University, 
not the Colleges.
45
 
 
Whatever the internal configuration of these bodies, no dispute or confusion existed that they 
were being established by the state as self-governing institutions, and therefore somewhere 
between strictly governmental and civil structures. The emphasis on the status as a ‗body 
politic‘ is established in the first article of Sydney University‘s 1850 Act. University statutes 
acted as a form of constitution, within which the model of institutional government operated: 
management and administration under the Council, the advisory role of a Senate (or Professorial 
Board), and a ‗quasi-judicial‘ authority invested in the Visitor (normally the Governor). The 
examples of the first two universities lay down the quasi-autonomous public character of the 
Australian university. 
 
In the period from the middle of the 19
th
 century to the pre-First World War years, three broad 
world-historical influences generally were brought to bear on the university.
46
 These were, first, 
                                           
41
 W J Gardner Colonial Cap and Gown: Studies in the Mid-Victorian Universities of Australasia 
(University of Canterbury, 1979), 12-13. 
42
 Gardner Colonial Cap and Gown, 12-13. 
43
 H E Barff A Short Historical Account of the University of Sydney; In Connection with the Jubilee 
Celebrations 1852-1902 (Angus & Robertson, 1902), 15: ‗It was the evident intention of the Senate that 
all examinations should be conducted by the University, and that all instruction should be by the College, 
the first Professors being distinctly appointed ―Professors of the Sydney University College.‖‘  
44
 University of Sydney Act 1850 (UK), s 20. 
45
 Barff A Short Historical Account of the University of Sydney. 
46
 See Margaret Thornton ‗The Idea of the University and the Contemporary Legal Academy‘ (2004)  26 
Sydney Law Review 481. 
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the British model. The second influence was the German university, which had been reformed 
under Humboldt. Finally, there was the emergence of the so-called ‗Land Grant‘ universities in 
the United States from the Lincoln Administration onward, which became the large state 
university system and its stimulus to scientific, applied and technological knowledge.  
 
A guiding sentiment of the early universities was provision of a ‗liberal course of education‘ for 
the ‗better advancement of religion and morality and the promotion of useful knowledge.‘47 The 
original curriculum would be in Arts, Law and Medicine. Other disciplines were added that 
reflected the scientific and commercial requirements of colonial societies. The cultural function 
of a ‗liberal course of education‘ may have been important, but the reality on the ground in the 
colonies required the need for professional and scientific training. The curriculum of the new 
universities in each of the colonies (and then States) expanded to include law, engineering, 
science, and agriculture. With respect to Sydney University, Philp
48
 notes that ‗… the university 
was firmly associated with the middle class, city community of Sydney… By occupation they 
were essentially either professional men or men of business and industry.‘ Into the British 
institution would be set a more instrumentalist and pragmatic approach to higher learning.
49
 The 
university in Australia evolved over a sixty-year period with a view to the British ‗motherland‘ 
and local expediencies, heavily subsidised by government, and considered essential to 
advanced, progressive, and ‗civilised‘ society. 
 
2.1.2 A National University System 
 
Emergence of a university system is synonymous with Federal Government expansion into the 
sector. Involvement of the Commonwealth in the university sector begins during the Second 
World War, first by regulation under the National Security Act 1939 (Cth)
50
 and then under the 
                                           
47
 University of Sydney Act 1850 (NSW), s 1. 
48
 Hugh Philp The University and its Community (Ian Novak, 1964), 5. Compare the remarks of the West 
Australian Premier in the course of debate on the establishment of the University of Western Australia, in  
Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 24 January 1911, 3264 (Hon. Frank 
Wilson, Premier): 
The old idea that a university was a place where the sons of the well-to-do citizens could spend a few years 
acquiring a knowledge of the classics and perhaps a great knowledge of sports, seems to have altogether 
disappeared… and it is recognised that the highest education is essential to the national welfare and to the 
State‘s commercial prosperity. 
49
 The ‗struggle‘ within the university between a cultural (generally Newmanian) ‗conception‘ and an 
instrumentalist one ‗was decided very early in the piece… in favour of the instrumental view‘: Sol Encel 
‗The Social Role of Higher Education‘ in E L Wheelwright (ed) Higher Education in Australia  
(Federation of Australian University Staff Associations, 1965), 5. 
50
 National Security (Universities Commission) Regulations 1943 (Cth). These Regulations established 
the first Universities Commission, or central planning body, whose authority was the subject of dispute in 
R v The University of Sydney; Ex parte Drummond (1943) 67 CLR 95, where a prospective student at 
Sydney University, John McPherson Drummond, sought a ruling (which was upheld) to have 
Commonwealth quotas on enrolments declared unconstitutional. The High Court described the function 
of the Regulations in these terms:  
The objects of these Regulations are to provide, during the present war, for financial assistance to students 
at Universities and the supervision and control of their enrolment and studies, for the purpose of 
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Commonwealth Reconstruction Training Scheme (‗CRTS‘) established under the Re-
establishment and Employment Act 1945. With a view to the US experience, the CRTS was 
considered a ‗Bill of Rights‘ for demobilised troops.51 The CRTS came to end at the end of the 
1940s,
52
 but the pattern of Commonwealth support for the universities had become a permanent 
policy fixture. It was already 10% of recurrent funding by this time.
53
  
 
Prior to 1939, funding had been divided more or less equally between the State governments, 
student fees and endowments.
54
 By the early 1950s elements of a national university system 
were in place, supported by Commonwealth funding programs. Commonwealth funding under 
States Grants (Universities) Acts provided three-yearly funding cycles to scheduled institutions. 
This approach became accepted practice but it was not as yet accompanied by a machinery of 
planning, coordination and administration. Two initiatives that would lay the foundation of 
longer-term policy, planning and direction were the reports of the Murray Committee
55
 (1957) 
and the Martin Committee
56
 (1965).  
 
The Murray Committee conducted an inquiry into Australia‘s universities in 1957, concluding 
that the situation was ‗critical.‘57 The Commonwealth was called on to provide the way out of 
an immediate crisis.
58
 The Commonwealth acceded to the Committee‘s recommendations, 
                                                                                                                           
conserving, organizing and directing man-power and woman-power in the best possible way to meet the 
requirements of the Defence Force and the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the 
community, and these Regulations shall be administered and construed accordingly.  
This initial period of Commonwealth involvement was authorised under the defence power 
granted to the Commonwealth Parliament under the Constitution. 
51
 Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates House of Representatives, 15 May 1945, 1693 
(Mr. Halen, Member for Parkes). 
52
 ‗… the number of students, augmented by the Commonwealth Reconstruction Scheme for returned 
service men and women, rose from 15 586 in 1945 to 32 453 in 1948… The 1948 level of enrolments was 
not to be achieved again until 1956…‘: Simon Marginson Educating Australia: Government, Economy 
and the Citizen Since 1960 (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 20. 
53
 Bruce Williams Systems of Higher Education: Australia (International Council for Educational 
Development, 1978), 13. 
54
 Williams Systems of Higher Education: Australia,  13. 
55
 Committee on Australian Universities Report (1957) (‗Murray Committee Report‘). 
56
 Committee on the Future of Tertiary Education in Australia  Tertiary Education in Australia : Report of 
the Committee on the Future of Tertiary Education in Australia to the Australian Universities 
Commission (1965) (‗Martin Committee Report‘). 
57
 Committee on Australian Universities Report (1957), 29. Five years earlier the Vice-Chancellor‘s 
Committee put out a statement entitled A Crisis in the Finances and Development of Australian 
Universities. It was an important impetus for the establishment of the (eventual) Murray inquiry. See 
Susan Davies The Martin Committee and the Binary Policy of Higher Education in Australia (Ashwood 
House, 1989), 13: ‗Its investigations revealed Australian universities to be short-staffed, poorly housed 
and equipped, with high student failure rates, and weak honours and post-graduate schools. It believed the 
principal single cause of these defects to be financial stringency.‘  
58
 A financial malaise was directly related to an academic malaise in the institutions, bordering on 
dysfunction. In its conclusions the Committee would write (Committee on Australian Universities Report 
(1957), 35-41): 
The most disturbing aspect of university education in its actual working is the high failure rate… of the 
students enrolled at six universities for the first time in 1951 showed that of every hundred students only 
sixty-one passed the first year examinations; only thirty-five graduated in the minimum period of time; and 
only fifty-eight have graduated or are expected to graduate at all. Such a high failure rate is a national 
extravagance and can be ill afforded. 
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including support for the establishment of a new university in Victoria (Monash University). 
The principal administrative outcome was establishment of the Australian Universities 
Commission. The underlying rationale of the Martin Committee Report was accommodation of 
the university system to the emerging policy paradigm of human capital formation. The solution 
was the so-called binary system: establishment of a second-tier of degree-granting institutions 
(Colleges of Advanced Education) under the universities. It brought various types of institutions 
(technological institutes, teachers colleges, agricultural colleges, etc) under a common model. 
Planning and policy-making for this new sector was therefore rationalised. In short, the Martin 
committee provided a plan for the higher education sector, as the Murray committee had 
provided the institutional/governmental means in the form of a standing commission with strong 
influence over resource allocation.
59
 Universities retained authority in the sphere of ‗academic 
affairs.‘60 
 
In the forty year period from the Second World War until the 1980s, the higher education sector 
was subject to strong expansionary trends. Expansion had quantitative and qualitative 
dimensions. On the quantitative side, the number of institutions grew, as well as the numbers of 
students or other ‗outputs.‘ Student numbers in higher education increased from around 30,000 
in 1947 to over 270,000 in 1975 (including the CAEs).
61
 The apotheosis of the post-war phase 
of higher education (university and CAE) might be said to have occurred under the Whitlam 
Government of 1972-75. In this period the Federal Government assumed full financial control 
of the sector and abolished university fees. The role of the States became largely residual.
62
  
 
                                           
59
 It is perhaps more accurate to state that the Martin Committee provided a longer term plan for the 
system – centred on the binary policy – where the Murray Committee had been required in part, and 
delivered, a short-term plan for a critical situation in the university sector.  
60
 Of the universities response to planning, Williams writes Williams Systems of Higher Education: 
Australia, 53:  
the bulk of funds come as recurrent grants, and there is very little of this that universities are not free to 
allocate as they see fit. Nevertheless the involvement of universities in the planning process and the control 
of building expenditure and major new developments by the commission ensured that the university system 
developed according to the commission‘s general plan.  
The Universities‘ Commission (and its successors) would report generally on academic matters, such as 
student failure rates, but the administration of courses and content, the government of student (and a 
considerable portion of staff) matters, and the conduct of programs, continued to lie in the hands of the 
institutions.  
61
 Marginson Educating Australia, 22, Table 2.2. Generally, this occurred in two waves. From 1946 to the 
end of the 1960s a second wave of universities was founded, including the Australian National University 
(1946), the University of New South Wales (1949) (as the NSW University of Technology), Monash 
(1958), La Trobe (1967), Newcastle (1965), and Flinders (1966). In the 1970s a further wave of 
institutions emerged, including Deakin (1974), James Cook (1974), Wollongong (1975). The qualitative 
changes in the post-war expansion are also evident in the nature of those newer institutions, with a focus 
on scientific and technological education and knowledge, on decentralisation and regional location 
(including into the metropolitan suburbs), and in the case of ANU a postgraduate and research 
specialisation. 
62
 Most universities remain statutory creatures of the States. State funding of the sector had fallen to just 
over one-third, from nearly one-half between 1939 and 1971: Marginson Educating Australia, 29, Table 
2.8. 
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2.1.3 The ‘Era of Reform’63 
 
The contemporary phase of the Australian university might be said to commence in the mid- to 
late-1980s. Writing on the impact of economic policy reforms on education, Marginson refers to 
this period as dominated by ‗economic government.‘64 Swept up in these changes, relationships 
within the university have substantially changed: from an intellectual ‗workshop‘ to an 
industrialised, business model. The binary policy was abandoned, and under the so-called 
Unified National System (‗UNS‘), 17 universities and more than 50 Colleges of Advanced 
Education were merged into 36 public universities in late 1980s and early 1990s. The outcome 
was a ‗comprehensive‘ university.65 The universities were increasingly viewed as a policy 
instrument in the context of restructuring of the labour force and the perceived need for a 
‗knowledge-based economy.‘66  
 
The shift in university policy that occurred in the second half of the 1980s amounted to the 
absorption of this sector into the general project of ‗economic government.‘67 Intellectual 
autonomy of the university was overtaken by a form of economic autonomy: ‗Market liberal 
reform did not reduce university autonomy per se. Rather, it enhanced the freedom and 
autonomy of universities in the entrepreneurial sense, and diminished them in a collegial 
sense.‘68 
 
Commonwealth governments achieved these ends by way of university financing arrangements 
and through the conditions attached to those funding regimes. The Higher Education Funding 
Act 1988 (Cth) replaced the States Grants Act system and introduced market  elements into the 
system in the form of student fees, partial contestation for funding, triennial quasi-contractual 
negotiation over student load, and a substantial decline in government funding (fiscal 
austerity).
69
 At the same time, a new cycle of expansion was embarked on. The rate of increase 
                                           
63
 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Thematic Review of the First Years of 
Tertiary Education Australia (1997). 
64
 Marginson Educating Australia, Ch 4; Simon Marginson Markets in Education (Allen and Unwin, 
1997), Ch 3. In various texts, Marginson has extensively considered the history and rationale of neoliberal 
reform of the university/higher education sector.  
65
 Simon Marginson ‗Mission Impossible or New Opportunities? Potentials Created by the Nelson 
Reforms‘ (2005) (Paper presented to Vice-Chancellor‘s Strategic Directions Forum, University of New 
England, Armidale, 8 June 2005), 12 
http://www.education.monash.edu.au/centres/mcrie/docs/otherrecentpapers/une-080605.doc (accsessed 
15 May 2009) . 
66
 Hon. John Dawkins Higher Education: A Policy Statement (1988). See also eg R G Gregory ‗Higher 
Education Expansion and Economic Change‘ (1995) 21 Australian Bulletin of Labour 4 295; Leo Maglen 
‗The Role of Education and Training in the Economy‘ 28 Australian Economic Review 2 128.  
67
 See generally Marginson Educating Australia, Ch 9. 
68
 Marginson Markets in Education, 231. 
69
 See generally Marginson Markets in Education, Ch 8. 
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in student enrolments increased sharply.
70
 The expansion programs of the 1960s and 1970s were 
primarily based upon increased public funding, and increase in the proportion of government 
funding. This cycle was based on a new precondition: the raising of funds from private sources, 
by and large from students in the form of fees (including ‗deferred‘ fees from the Higher 
Education Contribution Scheme (‗HECS‘)).  
 
Post-1988 universities found themselves with an urgent need to pursue ‗entrepreneurial‘ 
activity, contain costs and ‗find efficiencies,‘ deal with multiple and uncertain sources of 
revenue, a changing pedagogical and curricular landscape including technological changes, and 
assuming a leading role in reproducing a changing labour force.  
 
Further measures aimed at ‗marketisation‘ were introduced after election of a Coalition 
(Liberal-National Party) Government in 1996. Changes included increases in HECS and 
lowering repayment thresholds, cutting operating grants, providing for domestic undergraduate 
up-front fees and a subsidised loan scheme for full fee postgraduate courses. After various false 
starts,
71
 the new phase of market reform would lead to passage of the Higher Education Support 
Act 2003 (‗HESA‘), which considerably advanced the ‗market order‘72 in the sector. The HESA 
established a purchaser-provider model for the delivery of higher education services, further 
deregulation in fee setting and levying from students, and growth of regulatory control and 
‗steering‘ of the universities. Government regulation became more proscriptive and pervasive.73 
HESA has accentuated existing tendencies to stratification of institutions, with the prospect of a 
new cleavage emerging: between research-intensive, academically-prestigious institutions, and 
high-volume commercialised institutions.
74
 This trend proceeds from a post-1988 median of 
‗high volume medium quality‘ universities.75  
 
                                           
70
 For instance, enrolments increased from 393 734 in 1987 to 604 177 in 1995, or an increase of 53.4% 
over 8 years (or 6.68% increase per annum). Between 1979 and 1987 by comparison student enrolments 
increased from 320 286 to 393 734, an increase of 22.9% (2.87% per annum): Marginson Educating 
Australia, 187, Table 8.3. 
71
 For example, see then Federal Education Minister Kemp‘s leaked 1999 Cabinet paper Proposals to 
Reform Higher Education, reproduced in Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Eduction 
Committee Universities in Crisis: Report on Higher Education (2001), Appendix 4. The proposals, 
subsequently abandoned, included plans to deregulate further the higher education, including a student 
‗voucher‘ system. See also Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs Review of 
Higher Education Financing and Policy (1998) (‗West Review‘), which recommended greater 
deregulation but was largely not implemented.  
72
 Simon Marginson ‗They Make a Desolation and They Call It F A Hayek: Australian Universities on the 
Brink of the Nelson Reforms‘ (2004) 260 Australian Book Review 28 30-32. 
73
 See section 2.3 below.  
74
 See eg Simon Marginson and Mark Considine The Enterprise University: Power, Governance and 
Reinvention in Australia (Cambridge University Press, 2000),188-220. 
75
 Marginson ‗Mission Impossible or New Opportunities?‘, 12; see also Marginson and Considine The 
Enterprise University, Ch 7. 
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2.2 Contemporary University Policy 
 
2.2.1 The ‘Enterprise University’76 
 
University education is now viewed as an industry engaged in ‗service provision,‘ specifically 
the provision of educational services at an academic or high order level, as well as related 
activities such as research and consultancy. In this guise, Australian universities are lauded as 
one of the largest export sectors in the national economy, by virtue of sale of full-fee paying 
places to foreign students.
77
   
 
Industrialisation of universities was acknowledged as far back as the late 1950s, as a major 
component of the ‗knowledge industries,‘78 and as intellectual and ‗immaterial‘ labour became 
increasingly central to the advanced industrial economies.
79
 The university as service-provider 
is suggestive of that institution‘s role in a larger economic ‗supply chain.‘  
 
Educational services
80
 are the range of educational activities associated with the university (or 
other educational institutions, such as schools) now subsumed to market exchange, where the 
market represents the dominant organising principle.
81
 Education services assume an abstracted 
and measurable quality that facilitates economic transaction and, in particular, is subject to the 
                                           
76
 Marginson and Considine The Enterprise University. 
77
 See eg the Federal Minister‘s Second Reading speech on introduction of new legislation to regulate the 
provision of international education: Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Representatives, 30 August 2000, 19609 (Dr David Kemp, Minister for Education, Training and Youth 
Affairs):  
We are introducing these bills to provide a more effective regulatory framework for the education and 
training export industry, which we know to be of great value to Australia. The new ESOS Act will protect 
and enhance the industry's integrity and quality, and will assist in reducing abuse of the student visa 
program. The industry strengthens our relations with the region and with countries from which students 
come. It yields valuable revenue. It provides a cross-fertilisation of ideas and cultures, and the 
internationalization of education enhances the quality of education for all students. It is enjoying a record 
year, with over 180,000 international students enrolled with Australian institutions: fifteen per cent up on 
1999. It now earns Australia $3.7 billion a year in export dollars, comparable to wool or wheat. The 
continuing value of the industry depends on the service it provides to overseas students and on public 
confidence in its integrity and quality. 
Compare Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 26 May 2009, 
4282 (Ms Gillard, Minister for Education, Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations and 
Minister for Social Inclusion):  
International education has made a significant contribution to Australia. It has grown to now be 
our third largest source of overseas earnings, generating $15.5 billion in 2008 and supporting more than 
125,000 jobs. In 2008, nearly half a million students came to Australia. It is the lead sector in terms of 
export earnings in Victoria and the second largest in New South Wales. 
78
 Eg Clark Kerr The Uses of the University (Harvard University Press, 1963). 
79
 See eg C. Wright Mills White Collar: the American Middle Classes (Oxford University Press, 
1956[1951]) with respect to ‗intellectual‘ labour, especially Chs 6-7. On the concept of immaterial labour, 
see Maurizio Lazzarato ‗Immaterial labor‘ in Paulo Virno and Michael Hardt (eds) Radical Thought in 
Italy: A Potential Politics (University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 133-146. 
80
 Regarding ‗education services,‘ including reference to UNESCO‘s International Standard Classification 
of Education, see World Trade Organisation Education Services: Background Note (1998) www.wto.org 
(accessed 20 April 2008). 
81
 Marginson Markets in Education. 
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nexus of money and finance. In Australia, the formation of educational services in this manner 
has been led by internationalisation of access to university education and development of an 
international market. This has occurred via different formats, including international mobility of 
students (‗overseas students‘) and investment by universities and education ‗providers‘ in 
overseas campuses and delivery of academic programs elsewhere.
82
 Such a paradigm in 
education has been boosted by the initiatives of international economic organisations, such as 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (‗OECD‘) and the World Trade 
Organisation (‗WTO‘). The WTO (and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (‗GATT‘)) has included education services on its agenda for more than a decade an 
agreement on trade in services including educational services. It appears nonetheless that 
‗liberalisation‘ of trade in education remains one of the more difficult achievements of the 
international economic system.
83
 In 2004, the ‗export‘ of educational services (ie the sale of 
these services to non-Australian nationals and entities) was the sixth largest export sector in the 
economy as a whole, and revenues from ‗international education‘ were estimated at $7.5 
billion.
84
 The vast bulk of this revenue was from overseas students studying in Australia, and by 
far the largest sector involved was higher education. 
 
The precondition of the neoliberal model of the university is an economics of education, 
especially in relation to the university‘s principal object, knowledge. The philosophical origins 
of this tendency lay in neoclassical economics, and its equation of human rationality with 
economic rationality (‗homo economicus‘), an approach to education inspired by the works of 
writers such as Hayek,
85
 Friedman
86
 and Becker.
87
 The ‗economisation‘ of education is 
consistent with the notion of education generally (and higher education in particular) as 
cognisable in terms of  ‗production functions,‘ where education is conceived in terms of discrete 
inputs and outputs and to which can be applied the appropriate productive systems and 
processes of the university. Government funding represents a key input, and the accumulated 
mass of skills (and skilled workers) circulating in the economy represents a key output.
88
  
                                           
82
 Referred to as ‗modes of supply‘: see for instance Pierre Sauve ‗Trade, Education and the GATS: 
What‘s In, What‘s Out, What‘s All the Fuss About?‘ (Paper delivered to OECD/US Forum on Trade in 
Educational Services, Washington, 23-24 May  2002):  
http://www.oecd.org/document/14/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1833550_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed 20 
April 2008). 
83
 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development ‗Current Commitments under the GATS in 
Educational Services: Background Document‘ (Prepared for OECD/US Forum on Trade in Educational 
Services, Washington, 23-24 May  2002): 
http://www.oecd.org/document/14/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1833550_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed 20 
April 2008). 
84
 Department of Education, Science and Training Higher Education Report 2004-05 (2005), 100. 
85
 See F A Hayek The Constitution of Liberty (Legal Classics Library, 1999 [1960]). 
86
 See, especially, Milton Friedman Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press, 1962), Ch 6. 
87
 Gary Becker Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, With Special Reference to 
Education University of Chicago Press, 1993 [1964]). 
88
 Marginson Markets in Education, Ch 4 and especially 118-130. With respect to the social-theoretical 
dimension of the ‗economics of education,‘ and government educational policies and programs consistent 
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In human capital theory, the individual represents a vehicle for the acquisition, production and 
reproduction, of qualities and capacities valued in the market, specifically in this case, the 
labour market. These capacities may be attributed economic value, be the object of investment, 
and achieve a rate of return (for the individual and for wider social actors and forces):  
 
As developed by the Chicago School [of neoclassical economics], human capital theory has two 
core hypotheses. First, education and training increase individual cognitive capacity and 
therefore augment productivity. Second, increased productivity leads to increased individual 
earnings, and these increased earnings are a measure of the value of human capital.
89
  
 
This ‗cognitive capacity‘ will be conceived generally as skill (or competence). Skill is 
fundamental to the discourse and operation of human capital policies. It is a representation of 
the economic character of knowledge. Embodied in the worker/individual, skill assumes the 
character of knowledge that is ‗performative‘90 or ‗operative‘91 and can contribute to the 
accumulation of value (‗economic growth‘). Skill has become closely aligned with the concept 
of human resources: the individual subject is the sum of his/her skills and abilities, or his/her 
‗portfolio‘ of skills. The analogy is to human resources as a ‗raw material‘ of the contemporary 
economy, and by extension the university as the supplier of human resources onto the market.  
 
Marginson
92
 has also argued that the product of higher education is a ‗positional good,‘ which is 
consistent with the economic paradigm. According to Marginson, the ‗positional good‘ is aimed 
at socioeconomic advantage: ‗Positional goods in education are places which provide students 
with relative advantage in the competition for jobs, income, social standing and prestige. They 
are status places.‘93 In seeking ‗positional advantage,‘ the individual becomes a site of ‗self-
investment.‘ Every individual is conceived of as a type of ‗micro-enterprise;‘ the self an 
atomistic site of expenditure, benefit and valorisation, looking toward the labour market.  
Credentials are a key mechanism in this situation of competitive standing. Hence, credentials 
are not simply a representation of skills, competencies and capabilities, but have a socio-
political dimension as well.  
 
                                                                                                                           
with this paradigm, Marginson has elaborated, and constructed, a critical theory drawing heavily on the 
work of Michel Foucault and notions of the (discursive) production of economic subjects. Educational 
economics and educational markets represent a particular use of ‗power/knowledge‘: see Simon 
Marginson ‗Subjects and Subjugation: The Economics of Education as Power-Knowledge‘ (1997) 18 
Discourse 2 215 This discursive production is in turn realised in the model form of the commodity 
(‗positional good‘) in education and the formation of a political-economy of higher education. 
89
 Simon Marginson Education and Public Policy in Australia (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 38. 
90
 Jean-Francois Lyotard The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (University of Minnesota 
Press, 1984), 41ff. 
91
 Franco Piperno ‗Technological Innovation and Sentimental Education‘ in Paulo Virno and Michael 
Hardt (eds) Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics (University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 123-
132. 
92
 Marginson Markets in Education. 
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The enterprise university
94
 represents the university model based on primacy of the market and 
the logic of the firm (the corporate business model). Authority within this new system rests on 
executive power,
95
 centralised under the office of the Vice-Chancellor. In a body that may 
remain de jure a ‗body politic,‘ and possess a model of self-government, the concept of 
executive power properly reflects the political configuration of the university. Notably, the 
arrogation of power by the internal executive marginalises in practice the university‘s collegial 
function, including the autonomy and authority held by academic staff, on bodies such as 
Academic Boards or Senates.
 96
 Under pressure from Commonwealth Government policy, the 
universities have sought to maximise revenues and focus on the ‗bottom line.‘ In addition, and 
as a result of the complex and ‗unpriced nature of many of its outputs,‘97 universities have faced 
a range of other performance-based measures and implicit controls, such as graduate 
employment and salaries and employer satisfaction with graduates.  
 
2.2.2 Austerity: The Development of Underdevelopment 
 
Implementation of the market model in the university sector has been achieved by strategies of 
fiscal austerity. Primary evidence of austerity is the dramatic decline in government 
spending/public investment between the early 1980s and the present. In this time, government 
spending has fallen from around 90% of university revenues in the early 1980s to approximately 
40% in 2004,
98
 within an intra-sectoral range of just under 50% (at the University of the 
Sunshine Coast) to 29% (at University of Western Australia).
99
 On a per capita basis (per 
Equivalent Full-Time Student Unit (‗EFTSU‘)), spending fell from a high of $12,580 in 1976-
77 to $5518 by 1997-98.
100
 Relatively speaking this was a precipitous fall in government 
                                                                                                                           
93
 Marginson Markets in Education, 38. 
94
 Marginson and Considine The Enterprise University. 
95
 Marginson and Considine The Enterprise University, 62: ‗… in every case it is ―executive centred 
governance‖ rather than a council or a professoriate that defines the character of the institution to the new 
world of markets and corporate mandates. Its priorities are expressed in budgets, planning doctrines and 
targets for income earning, rather than scholarship or the public interest. Executive dominance, explicitly 
corporate in form and substance, has become part and parcel of every university. The new systems of 
executive governance are focused also exclusively upon the office of vice-chancellor.‘ 
96
 See Bill Readings The University in Ruins (Harvard University Press, 1996), 40: ‗The central figure of 
the university is no longer the professor who is both scholar and teacher but the provost to whom both 
(the) apparatchiks and professors are answerable‘ (p. 8); ‗… the University is no longer primarily an 
ideological arms of the nation-state but an autonomous bureaucratic corporation.‘.  
97
 R. Carrington, T Coelli and D S Prasada Rao ‗The Performance of Australian Universities: Conceptual 
Issues and Preliminary Results‘ (2005) 24 Economic Papers 2, 158. The authors note the conceptual 
difficulty in considering productivity in the university sector, given the ‗dearth of appropriate productivity 
measures….‘ (146) The authors also note the universities are ‗relatively efficient and… productivity 
growth was superior to that of most other sectors of the economy for the period 1996-2000.‘ 
98
 Department of Education, Science and Training Finance 2006: Financial Reports of Higher Education 
Providers (2007), 3. 
99
 Phillips Curran Independent Study of the Higher Education Review: Stage 1 Report (2002), 37: 
http://www.mceetya.edu.au/verve/_resources/exec_sum_vol_2_file.pdf (accessed 15 May 2009). 
100
 Simon Marginson ‗Toward A Politics Of The Enterprise University‘ in Simon Cooper, John Hinkson 
and Geoff Sharp (eds) Scholars and Entrepreneurs: Universities in Crisis (Arena Publications, 2002), 115 
(in 1989-90 dollars). 
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funding by more than half in twenty years. Government revenue decline has been 
accommodated through ‗private‘ financing, principally in the form of student fees. Despite this 
trend, government funding has continued to play a key strategic role in the operation of the 
sector, notably as a mechanism of policy-setting and direction-setting. In the voluminous report 
of the Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee, Universities in 
Crisis, the Committee (Opposition and minor party) majority stated of the austerity question 
that ‗… it heard evidence from across the sector… that current funding levels fell far short of 
the requirements for providing quality teaching and research and that, as a result, Australia‘s 
universities were in a state of crisis.‘101 In the Committee‘s mind, the policy of austerity was 
calibrated with a policy of financially-induced crisis, especially after 1996 and the then 
Coalition government‘s first budget.  
 
The deterioration in the public funding position is linked to the practical change and 
transformation in conditions ‗on the ground‘ in institutions. These changes may be identified 
with the achievement of ‗efficiencies‘ and ‗productivity gains‘ in the economy of higher 
education, or the extraction of greater output (eg graduates and research) for proportionately less 
input (expenditure). Perhaps the most cited figure in the deterioration of conditions is the 
growing student to staff ratio. Expansion of university ‗participation‘ (ie student enrolments) in 
the system was a hallmark of the ALP Government reforms post-1988 and generally adopted by 
the Coalition Government after 1996. Staff numbers – in particular academic staff numbers –
increased only marginally in the same time, and include a fall in academic staff of 6.4% 
between 1996 and 1999.
102
 Between 1990 and 2005 student to staff ratios for academic teaching 
staff rose from 14.3 to 20.9, or approximately 46%.
103
 With the growth of international students, 
this situation is made qualitatively more difficult with growth of poor English-language 
competence (the primary language of instruction) among the student population.
104
 A concurrent 
deterioration in the proportion of students to non-academic ‗support‘ staff also occurred.105 
 
The fate of student-staff ratios is a signal development in a deterioration of campus conditions. 
Qualitatively, such indicators represent the overcrowding of classes (lectures, tutorials, labs), a 
                                           
101
 Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Eduction Committee Universities in Crisis,  [3.17]. 
102
 Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Eduction Committee Universities in Crisis, 170, Table 
5.2. 
103
 Bradley Review, 72. There has been a slight decline in student-staff ratios in the 2003-06 period (to 
20.5 in 2006). Universities Australia 2005 Student to Teacher Ratio for Academic Staff with Teaching 
Function, 
 http://www.universitiesaustralia.edu.au/documents/publications/stats/Student-teacher-ratio-1990-
2007.pdf (accessed 15 August 2008). 
104
 See Tracey Bretag ‗The Emperor‘s New Clothes: Yes, There is a Link Between English-Language 
Competence and Academic Standards (2007) 15 People and Place 1. 
105
 For figures relating to academic support staff and ‗student services‘ staff over the 1990s, see National 
Union of Students ‗Submission to the Crossroads Ministerial Discussion Paper‘ (2002),  
http://www.backingaustraliasfuture.gov.au/submissions/crossroads/pdf/342.pdf (accessed 13 July 2009), 
[1.14]-[1.17]. 
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decline in contact between academics and students, and between staff and students more 
broadly. The Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Eduction Committee‘s Universities 
in Crisis report remarked on the erosion of the ‗learning experience,‘ including resources and 
infrastructure directly concerned with teaching and learning.
106
 For example, real expenditure on 
libraries (per full-time student) declined from $601 in 1991 to $565 in 1999; library student-
staff ratios grew from 121 in 1991 to 159.4 in 1999; face-to-face teaching time has been 
reduced; student support services have declined by 13.8% between 1991-99.
107
 The Senate 
Committee itself reported ‗a large number of short submissions from students describing 
unsatisfactory aspects of their everyday student routines. These difficulties related mainly to 
overcrowded classrooms and lack of accommodation, and poor resources generally, especially 
library facilities.‘108  Concurrent with these circumstances on campus, academic standards have 
been identified as under strain, if not also in crisis,
109
 as a general condition and, in specific 
cases, as a cause celebre, especially where corruption has occurred or has been alleged to have 
occurred.
110
  
 
Austerity also has an impact on the workforce. First, the academic workforce has confronted a 
long-term decline in real wages and a ‗substantial‘ increase in workloads and working time,111 
accompanied by growing job dissatisfaction and ‗psychological stress‘ that is ‗disturbingly 
high.‘112 Second, the workforce as a whole has been reorganised and polarised, toward a core-
periphery arrangement.
113
 At the ‗core‘ end, permanent staff generally experience expansion of 
working time and intensification of work; the ‗peripheral‘ workforce coincides with the growth 
of casualization and ‗cost-saving‘ modes of employment, in particular for teaching functions 
(and hence the emergence of a mass, precarious teaching-only workforce).
114
 In the course of 
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 Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee Universities in Crisis, [5.55]-
[5.68]. 
107
 National Union of Students (2001) ‗Submission No. 274 to the Senate Employment, Workplace 
Relations and Eduction Committee Inquiry into the Capacity of Public Universities to Meet Australia's 
Higher Education Needs‘ (Canberra, 21 March, 2001)  . 
108
 Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Eduction Committee Universities in Crisis, [5.64]. 
109
 In addition to the Senate Committee Report, see for example Peter Abelson ‗Surveying University 
Student Standards in Economics‘ (2005) 24 Economic Papers 2 116. 
110
 See eg New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption Report on Investigation into 
the University of Newcastle’s Handling of Plagiarism Allegations June 2005. 
111
 Craig McInnis The Work Role of Academics in Australian Universities (Department of Education, 
Training and Youth Affairs, 1999). 
112
 Tony Winfield The Higher Education Workplace Stress Survey (University of South Australia, 2001) 
113
 See eg Megan Kimber ‗The Tenured ―Core‖ and the Tenuous ―Periphery‖: The Casualisation of 
Academic Work in Australian Universities‘ (2003) 25 Journal of Higher Education Policy and 
Management 1 41. 
114 See Australian Learning and Teaching Council The Contribution of Sessional Teachers to Higher 
Education (2008), 
 http://www.altc.edu.au/carrick/go/home/grants/pid/558 (accessed 6 August 2008), 2:  
The Project found that: All universities depend heavily on sessional teachers; Universities are unable to 
report comprehensive and accurate data on the number of sessional teachers and their conditions of 
employment; The DEEWR (formerly DEST) FTE figures do not represent the magnitude of the 
contribution of sessional teachers to higher education; The FTE disguises the supervisory load on 
permanent staff; Sessional teachers are responsible for much of the teaching load, estimates suggest this 
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this polarisation, the crisis in academic relationships is evidenced in declining personal contact 
between staff and university students.  
 
The symptoms of austerity have also been inflationary. For instance, revenue growth has been 
based on cost-shifting from government to students through fee-charging, and price deregulation 
has led to the expansion fee-charging capacity and inflation within that system. ‗Informal‘ cost-
shifting to students has occurred through the levying of fees and charges for ‗ancillary‘ goods 
and services or de facto charges for course materials, books, and so forth. Official ancillary 
fees
115
 constituted nearly 5% of total university revenues in 1998, and paid on average $791 per 
year in such fees, a $278, or 54%, increase over the previous three years. Approximately 300 
different fees were charged at 23 universities in 1998.
116
 
 
Marginson has specified the austerity measures in higher education as the ‗declining resource 
commitment to teaching and learning.‘117 Yet he notes that the general trend in resource 
allocation is not entirely one-way, and is not singly composed of austerity measures: rather the 
economic strategy in the universities is a selective austerity. Investment and reinvestment in the 
sector have occurred, but as part of a substantial redistribution of resources toward ‗corporate‘ 
functions, toward executive operations, toward market sensitive courses, and toward prestige or 
high-profile projects, such as overseas campuses or technology precincts. Imposition of long-
term austerity therefore does not equate to a generalised malaise or deterioration in the higher 
education system, but of a strategic dynamic: underdevelopment and erosion of some elements 
of higher education on the one hand, and (re)development of and (re)investment in other factors. 
This may be read in a number of ways. Marginson suggests at least two: first, the shift of 
                                                                                                                           
could be as high as half the teaching load; and Sessional teachers perform the full range of teaching related 
duties, from casual marker to subject designer and coordinator. 
115
 The charging of ancillary fees is provided for under Higher Education Support Act 2003 (Cth) in the 
Commonwealth Grant Scheme Guidelines (Cth), Ch 12, where these fees are termed ‗incidental fees‘: 
12.5.1 A higher education provider may charge a student for a good or service related to the provision of 
their course if one of the following criteria apply: 
(a) The charge is for a good or service that is not essential to a course of study. 
(b) The charge is for an alternative form or alternative forms of, access to a good or service 
that is an essential component of a course but is otherwise made readily available at no 
additional charge by the higher education provider. 
(c) The charge is for an essential good or service that the student has the choice of acquiring 
from a supplier other than the higher education provider and is for: 
(i) equipment or items which become the physical property of the student and are not 
consumed during the course of study; or 
(ii) food, transport and accommodation costs associated with the provision of field trips… 
12.5.5 A higher education provider may charge a student a fine or a penalty if the fine or penalty is 
imposed principally as a disincentive and not in order to raise revenue or cover administrative 
costs.   
116
 Results of a ‗National Ancillary Fee Survey‘ conducted by the National Union of Students, and cited 
in National Union of Students ‗Submission No. 274 to the Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and 
Education Committee Inquiry into the Capacity of Public Universities to Meet Australia's Higher 
Education Needs‘ (Canberra, 21 March, 2001) . 
117
 Simon Simon Marginson ‗Submission No. 81, Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and 
Education Committee Inquiry into the Capacity of Public Universities to Meet Australia's Higher 
Education Needs‘ (Canberra, 21 March, 2001), [22]-[26]. 
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resources and control to the bureaucratic functions of the university; second, the realignment of 
disciplines toward high revenue, cheap, perceived high wage courses especially in Business 
Studies and Computer Sciences, which also tend to move away from ‗intensive‘ academic 
formation.
118
 In respect of the latter trend, international students in particular have acted 
effectively as a ‗commercial vanguard,‘ having a major effect on the reorganisation of 
university curriculum over the past 15 years. Key changes in curriculum over the nineties were 
the decline of education as a field of study (by 3%) and the growth of Business (up 43%) and 
Law (up 86%).
119
 Universities‘ accommodation and development of the international student 
market have also arguably been at the expense of the domestic student population.
120
 
 
2.3 The Administrative Condition 
 
2.3.1 Administration in Theory 
 
The question of administration is central to the present study, albeit in the quite specific 
circumstances of higher education. Further, the neoliberal, market reforms to which the sector 
has been subjected are founded, to a considerable degree, on fundamental changes to public 
sector administration, and indeed intensification of administrative and regulatory forms.
121
 It is 
less the case that the administrative state of the twentieth century has declined that it has been 
reorganised or reconstituted. In relation to the university, as elsewhere in the ‗administered 
society,‘ governmental rationality has been reorientated to the market, and there has arisen a 
new nomenclature of ‗state-forms.‘122 The model of the firm (enterprise), combined with 
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 Marginson ‗Submission No. 81‘; Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee 
Universities in Crisis, [3.128]-[3.129], [3.146]-[3.158]. 
119
 V Lynn Meek and Fiona Wood Managing Higher Education Diversity in a Climate of Public Sector 
Reform (Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs, 1998). 
120
 Scott Bayley, Rob Fearnside, John Arnol, John Misiano and Rocco Rottura (2002) ‗International 
Students in Victorian Universities‘ 10 People and Place 2 45, 54:  
Direct displacement of domestic HECS students by fee-paying domestic or international students is both 
protected against and regulated by the Commonwealth‘s higher education policies. However, over the last 
15 years, changes to Commonwealth educational policy and funding arrangements have altered the 
financial incentives faced by universities. Universities have responded by reducing the relative proportion 
of over-enrolled (marginally-funded) domestic HECS students and increasing the proportion of fee-paying 
domestic and international students… A larger proportion of international undergraduate students enrol in 
the fields of Business and Information Technology. 
121
 Hence the important, if theoretical, critiques of new forms of government by writers such as Foucault 
and Deleuze:  see Michel Foucault ‗Governmentality‘ in Graham Burchill, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller 
(eds) The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 87-104; also Colin 
Gordon ‗Governmental rationality: an introduction‘ in Graham Burchill, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller 
(eds) The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 1-51; Gilles 
Deleuze ‗Postscript on the Societies of Control‘ (1992) 59 October 3. As Delueze remarks: ‗The 
operation of markets is now the instrument of social control and forms the impudent breed of our 
masters.‘ 
122
 For example, the ‗crisis-state‘: Antonio Negri ‗Crisis Of The Crisis-State‘ in Antonio Negri Revolution 
Retrieved: Selected Writings on Marx, Keynes, Capitalist Crisis and New Social Subjects 1967-1983, 
trans. Ed Emery and John Merrington (Red Notes, 1988), 177-189; the ‗regulatory state‘: Roger King The 
Regulatory State In The Age Of Governance: Soft Words And Big Sticks (Palgrave MacMillan, 2007); the 
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internal corporate-political relations (managerialism) and the primacy of commodity forms 
(‗outputs,‘ ‗deliverables‘) constitute the central models and structures of public administration. 
For the university, these elements of administration have been thoroughly analysed in the forms 
of the ‗enterprise university,‘ ‗executive‘ (managerialist) ascendency, and human (‗cognitive‘) 
capital or ‗positional goods.‘  
 
In their evolving synthesis, market and administration constitute the ‗market order‘ of the 
university. Much of the focus in this term has been on market and quasi-market relations, 
especially in Simon Marginson‘s studies. Bill Readings‘ The University in Ruins123 shifts the 
focus onto the other side of this equation, the market order of the university. The university, as 
he puts it, is now ‗subsumed under administration.‘124 In his ‗posthistorical‘ university, 
administrative order is a precondition to economic transformation. The ontological ‗emptiness‘ 
of the (corporate) ‗university of excellence‘ is founded on collapse of the (national) cultural 
logic of the university (ie the ‗idea‘ of the university), and subsequently the university‘s 
purposes and operations tend to find their reason in economic calculus:  
 
… the appeal to excellence marks the fact that there is no longer any idea of the University, or 
rather that the idea has now lost all content… All that the system requires is for activity to take 
place, and the empty notion of excellence refers to nothing other than the optimal input/output 
ratio in matters of information.
125
  
 
As these terms of the university‘s contemporary development apply to the practical ‗activity‘ of 
basic university tasks, he writes: ‗… I shall focus on how a general administrative logic of 
evaluation replaces the interplay of teaching and research as central to the functioning of the 
University.‘126  
 
Readings argues that administration has come to prevail within the university, supplanting an 
historic pre-eminence of academic authority, and subordinating teaching and research functions 
                                                                                                                           
‗contract state‘: Jonathon Boston ‗Public Sector Management, Electoral Reform and the Future of the 
Contract State in New Zealand‘ (1998) 57 Australian Journal of Public Administration 4 32. 
123
 Readings The University In Ruins. 
124
 Readings The University In Ruins, 125. 
125
 Readings The University In Ruins, 39. He continues (40): ‗Like the stock exchange, the University is a 
point of capital‘s self-knowledge, of capital‘s ability not just to manage risk or diversity but to extract a 
surplus value from that management. In the case of the University this extraction occurs as a result of 
speculation on differentials in information.‘ 
126
 Readings The University In Ruins, 126. There is not space or scope to consider Readings‘ theory of the 
university‘s crisis in any detail here. Suffice it to say, one of the enormous contributions of his assessment 
of the contemporary university is his conceptualization of the existential crisis, if not paralysis, of that 
institution (which he equates in particular with the disjuncture of the university‘s cultural praxis and the 
nation-state, summed up in the notion of its ‗de-referentialization‘). The university crisis is, in effect, its 
crisis as a cultural subject. Administration, in this context, becomes the primary force enlivening the 
content of university operations, in the vacuum left by the retreat of the ‗referent‘ of cultural (especially 
national) identity. This tendency may perhaps be expressed in the notion of the rise of the professional 
manager (eg Vice-Chancellor) as the pre-eminent figure of the institution, as distinct from the historic 
model figure of the professor.  
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to administrative rationality and behaviour. Presuming Readings‘ analysis to be correct, these 
are reasons why closer study of university administration is, indeed, warranted, as the present 
study endeavours to do.  
 
2.3.2 Administration in Practice 
 
Readings‘ contentions are relatively abstract. Are his assertions supported empirically? Is there 
an actual and quantifiable growth in the machinery of the ‗administrative state‘ governing the 
university and its internal relations? A first point to make is that these issues are not entirely 
new. The problem of university administration surfaced in the decades following the Second 
World War,
127
 and the ‗scientific management‘ paradigm of the administrative state emerged, 
albeit slowly and unevenly, in university organisation.
128
 As a 1963 US study noted: ‗While 
having certain bureaucratic characteristics, large universities are probably less systematically 
bureaucratic than many business or governmental organisations of comparable size.‘129 
Notwithstanding limits on the dominance of administrative conduct in this period, it is worth 
recalling the susceptibility of the (US) academy to an administrative rationality. As C Wright 
Mills wrote, early in the post-war years: ‗The specialisation that is required for successful 
operation as a college professor is often deadening to the mind that would grasp for higher 
culture in the modern world. There now is… a celibacy of the intellect.‘130  
 
In the contemporary, ‗reform‘ period, hegemony of administration over the operations of the 
university is indicated in several key developments. As an initial port of call, there has been a 
quantitative expansion of Commonwealth statutory controls over the university system. The 
quantum of direct
131
 Commonwealth legislative controls over higher education prior to 1988 
was not vast, although wide in scope.
132
 In addition, further Commonwealth administrative 
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 See eg Murray Committee Report; Marshall Dimock ‗The Current Administrative Challenge in Higher 
Education‘ (1954) 25 Journal of Higher Education 6 307 
128
 See eg Francis Rourke and Glenn Brooks ‗The ―Managerial Revolution‖ in Higher Education‘ (1964) 
.9 Administrative Science Quarterly 2 154. Compare the analysis of university administration in Edmund 
Day ‗The Role of Administration in Higher Education‘ (1946) 17 Journal of Higher Education 7 339. 
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 Eugene Haas and Linda Collen ‗Administrative Practices in University Departments‘ (1963) 8 
Administrative Science Quarterly 1 44, 46. 
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 Mills White Collar, 130. Mills continues in a manner entirely apposite to a sentiment of the professor 
giving effect to an administrative machine (136, emphasis added): ‗As a group, American professors have 
seldom if ever been politically engaged: the trend towards a technician’s role has, by strengthening their 
apolitical professional ideology, reduced whatever political involvement they may have had and often, by 
sheer atrophy, their ability even to grasp political problems.‘  
131
 Universities are also affected by the growth of statutory regulation from other sources, both State and 
Federal, such as industrial relations, financial management, corporations law and even road safety Acts! 
For present purposes I will confine remarks to the key legislation bearing on ‗core‘ university operations, 
ie teaching and research.  
132
 The primary legislation having a direct bearing on university operations were the States Grants Acts 
pertaining to university funding and Universities Commission (and its successor organisations) 
legislation. The States Grants (Universities) Act 1976 (Cth), for instance, contained 25 sections, 
notwithstanding that the Commonwealth had taken full operational responsibility for universities in 1974. 
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controls operated under the University Commission (and its successors). With the advent of the 
Higher Education Funding Act 1988 (‗HEFA‘), and its successor Higher Education Support Act 
2003 (‗HESA‘), legislative controls grew markedly. Indeed, the 120 discrete provisions of the 
1988 legislation grew to 293 sections in the 2003 statute. A range of subordinate legislation was 
promulgated under the authority of these primary Acts.
133
 The sphere of ‗international 
education‘ is separately and additionally regulated by the Education Services for Overseas 
Student Act 2000 (‗ESOS Act‘).134 A central objective of the total legislative program has been, 
of course, formation and regulation of market subjectivities and conditions, including fee-
charging, funding conditions and programs, regulation of ‗providers‘ and of the contractual 
space between ‗providers‘ and students, including a form of ‗consumer protection.‘  
 
Further quantitative indicators of the rise of administration are, however, rather elusive.
135
 There 
is anecdotal evidence of the growth of internal rules, policies, procedures and regulations 
(distinct from delegated legislation), although seemingly no systematic study of this 
proliferation. Considerable effort appears to have been put into codification and prescription of 
areas of institutional activity that would once have been the subject of academic or 
administrative custom, convention and discretionary expertise (eg pedagogy, examination and 
assessment). Such formal (or semi-formal) codification of rules and powers is perhaps 
consistent with tendencies to ‗juridification‘ of institutional norms and practices.136  
                                                                                                                           
The Tertiary Education Commission Act 1977 (Cth) (replacing and updating legislation establishing 
Commonwealth advisory and administrative authority over the universities, Colleges of Advanced 
Education and Colleges of Technical and Further Education) contained 47 sections. In addition, 
legislation allowing charges of fees to international students under the Overseas Student Charges Act 
1979 (Cth) extended to a mere 8 sections. Even the Student Assistance Act 1973 (Cth), which did not 
relate directly to the administration of institutions (but rather to student grants and scholarships) contained 
only 36 sections.  
133
 Compare Arjen van Witteloostuijn and Gjalt de Jong ‗The Evolution of Higher Education Rules: 
Evidence for an Ecology of Law‘ (2007) 73 International Review of Administrative Sciences 235. In 
reference to rule-making in the Netherlands in respect of higher education they find (emphasis added):  
On the basis of our count, we therefore conclude that the rule stock has increased by 8 to 14 percent 
annually. This means that the number of formal laws on higher education has doubled in less than ten 
years. We should also point out that the growth rate base is rising sharply: the period required to double the 
quantity of such legislation has decreased considerably over time. 
134
 Replacing the Education Services for Overseas Students (Registration of Providers and Financial 
Regulation) Act 1991 (Cth). The ESOS Act 2000 adds a further 177 discrete provisions in the primary 
legislation, as well as the extensive regulatory regime applying to institutions (‗providers‘) dealing with 
students under the National Code of Practice for Registration Authorities and Providers of Education and 
Training to Overseas Students 2007 and the Education Services for Overseas Students Regulations 2001 
(Cth) (‗National Code‘). 
135
 Although, see however Ase Gornitzka, Svein Kyvik and Ingvild Marheim Larsen ‗The 
Bureaucratization of Universities‘ (1998) 36 Minerva 21, in the Norwegian context. 
136
 A cursory survey of policy instruments at various Australian universities indicates that accumulation 
of formal written rules or provisions is substantial. These statistics refer to all non-legislative instruments 
available at relevant sections of institutions‘ websites (as at 25 May 2009). Typically they cover both 
academic and managerial (eg human resources, physical assets, information technology) areas of activity: 
 
Institution Number of policies  
University of Sydney 64 
University of Technology, Sydney 104 (including Rules) 
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Statistical information on the overall labour effort dedicated to ‗non-academic‘ (including 
administrative) work is mixed. Employment data on the balance of academic and non-academic 
staff in the university indicates the ratio has not changed significantly over decades. The 
majority of university employees (other than casual staff) have always tended to work in non-
academic roles.
137
 It is reasonable to assume that this bloc of staff work across a range of 
institutional functions, including administration, professional-managerial roles, technicians, 
marketing, and student assistance. Yet, there is evidence to suggest that the functions and roles 
of academic and ‗non-academic‘ staff are becoming less distinct (especially at the margins), 
with the work of ‗professional‘ (non-academic) staff increasingly likely to ‗overlap‘ with 
academic functions.
138
 Additionally, there is evidence of the growing administrative burden on 
academic staff, reinforcing a notion that teaching/research work is becoming more 
administrative in character.
139
 The latter factors are consistent with a shift in the general 
composition of university work toward work with an administrative content, and arguably a 
shift in the balance of ‗operational‘ power away from academic authority.140  
 
In any case, quantitative indicators suggest major qualitative changes in higher education 
practices. Ideological dispositions in the universities – not only toward economic subjectivity 
and ‗managerialism‘ as general conditions and more specifically as expressed in cultures of 
                                                                                                                           
University of Western Sydney 169 
University of Newcastle 319 
Deakin University  578 (including Faculty Rules) 
Monash University 207 
RMIT 433  
University of Wollongong 148 
University of Queensland 266 (including certain EBA provisions) 
 
137
 As at 2007, 56.3% of Full-Time Equivalent Staff, excluding casuals, were in ‗non-academic 
classifications‘: Department of Education, Science and Training Selected Higher Education Statistics – 
Staff 2007 (2008), Table 1.2. Indeed, there is evidence that the proportion of staff in non-academic 
classifications have, in relations to those in academic classifications, declined since the 1960s. The 
Australian Universities Commission reported in 1972 that on average, the ratio of non-academic to 
academic staff was around two-to-one: Australian Universities Commission Fifth Report (1972), 84; see 
also Department of Employment, Education and Training National Report on Australia’s Higher 
Education Sector (1993), 137.  
138
 Richard Pickersgill, Kristin van Barneveld, Sue Bearfield General and Academic Work: Are They 
Different?: A Discussion Paper on Current Practices and Options for Changing Work Organisation and 
Enterprise Bargaining Report No. 5, Evaluations and Investigations Program (Department of 
Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs, 1998). 
139
 See Don Anderson, Richard Johnson and Lawrence Saha Changes in Academic Work: Implications for 
the Universities of the Changing Age, Distribution and Work Roles of Academic Staff (Department of 
Education, Science and Training, 2002),  
http://www.dest.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/57E92071-C591-4E15-879C-
468A9CDE80A1/910/academic_work.pdf (accessed 4 May 2009). This study of nearly 2000 respondents 
found that (at 75) ‗Over 80 per cent of our respondents thought that time given to (administration and 
committee work) had increased… Our respondents largely took a negative view regarding the increased 
time doing administration.‘  
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‗performance‘ and ‗quality assurance‘ – produce new forms and models of administrative 
conduct in the universities, and these forms and models are widely adopted in institutional 
practice. ‗Quality assurance‘ is one of the more prominent mutations of the administrative 
condition,
141
 being a key vehicle for introduction of highly prescriptive management technique 
and bureaucratic scrutiny, notably under rubrics of ‗performance‘ and ‗audit.‘142  
 
Consistent with these trends, and facilitative of them, is formal codification of academic, as well 
as non-academic, practice. Academic pedagogy is subject to widespread trends toward 
codification of student behaviour qua performance based on (positive) categories of ‗skill,‘ 
‗attribute,‘ ‗standards,‘ ‗criteria,‘ ‗competence,‘ and so on.143 Reconstituted in these modes 
(‗empty‘ codes, to appropriate Readings‘ term, and economistic signifiers), academic practices 
are susceptible to instrumental rationality: they are made the objects of educational 
administration. Instrumentality applies to organisation of internal order (eg grading and 
accumulation of ‗credit,‘ research accounting144), as well to the ‗knowledge economy‘ more 
broadly (eg by way of credentiallism).
145
 The treatment of knowledge as an instrumental factor, 
subject to the administrative rationality and commodity production, is characteristic also of the 
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 See eg Judy Szekeres ‗General Staff Experiences in the Corporate University‘ (2006) 28 Journal of 
Higher Education Policy and Management 2 133, 143-4. 
141
 See Grant Harman‘s early remarks on the Quality Assurance ‗movement‘: Grant Harman ‗Australian 
Higher Education Administration And The Quality Assurance Movement‘ (1994) 16 Journal of Tertiary 
Education Administration 1 25, 26: ‗… at least some of the recent and proposed changes could led to 
increased bureaucratization and regulation of teaching activities, which in turn could adversely affect 
spontaneity and creativity in teaching, and autonomy of academic work.‘  
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 Andreas Hoecht ‗Quality Assurance in UK Higher Education: Issues of Trust, Control, Professional 
Autonomy and Accountability‘ (2006) 51 Higher Education 4 541: He concludes (at 556): ‗Quality 
assurance was mostly perceived as a form of control and an encroachment on (academic‘) professional 
autonomy. Many but not all felt that they were less trusted and more controlled than they had been in the 
past, although they did not perceive this control as being voluntarily exercised by their immediate 
academic managers… but as the outcome of ‗the system‘ and the central administrative core of their 
universities.‘ Compare Lesley Vidovich ‗Quality Assurance in Australian Higher Education: 
Globalization and ‗Steering at a Distance‘‘ (2002) 43 Higher Education 391; Lesley Vidocivh and Paige 
Porter ‗Quality Policy in Australian Higher Education in the 1990s: University Perspectives‘ (1999) 14 
Journal of Education Policy 6 576. See also, Australian Universities Quality Agency Audit Manual, 
Version 5.0 (2008).  
143
 See eg Clair Hughes and Clare Cappa ‗Developing Generic Criteria and Standards for Assessment in 
Law: Processes and (By)Products‘ (2007) 32 Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education 4 417; 
Elisabeth Dunne, Neville Bennett and Clive Carré ‗Higher Education: Core Skills In A Learning Society‘ 
(1997) 12 Journal of Education Policy 6 511; Simon Barrie ‗Understanding What We Mean by the 
Generic Attributes of Graduates‘ (2006) 51 Higher Education 215; Philip C. Candy, Gay Crebert and 
Jane O'Leary Developing Lifelong Learners Through Undergraduate Education Report No 28 (National 
Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1994). 
144
 See Simon Marginson ‗Research as a Managed Economy: The Costs‘ in Tony Coady (ed) Why 
Universities Matter: A Conversation about Values, Means and Directions (Allen and Unwin, 2000). 
145
 The production of objects and categories that may be administered, from the substance of academic 
experience and interaction, is, as Massimo De Angelis and David Harvey have argued, central to the 
economic project of measurement of that experience and interaction (and the behaviors correlated with 
this activity): Massimo De Angelis and David Harvey ‗Cognitive Capitalism and the Rat Race: How 
Capital Measures Ideas and Affects in UK Higher Education‘ (Paper presented at the Conference on 
Immaterial Labour, Multitudes and New Social Subjects: Class Composition in Cognitive Capitalism, 
Cambridge, 29 April 2006), http://www.geocities.com/immateriallabour/angelisharviepaper2006.html 
(accessed 18 April 2007). 
 34 
longer-term, historic decline of higher education as the ‗cultivation‘ of the internal, or ‗interior,‘ 
self (Bildung). As Lyotard has expressed it:
146
  
 
We may thus expect a thorough exteriorization of knowledge with respect to the ‗knower,‘ at 
whatever point he or she may occupy in the knowledge process. The old principle that the 
acquisition of knowledge is indissociable from the training (Bildung) of minds, or even of 
individuals, is becoming obsolete and will become ever more so. The relationship of the 
suppliers and users of knowledge to the knowledge they supply and use is now tending, and will 
increasingly tend, to assume the form already taken by the relationship of commodity producers 
and consumers to the commodities they produce and consume—that is, the form of value. 
 
If these are the general conditions by which administration of the university is unfolding, what 
are the general circumstances of the students, the other major subject in this study? 
 
2.4 Trends in Student Composition and Behaviour 
 
The present research is concerned with decisions affecting university students. Some initial 
exploration of the circumstances and conditions of the students in the university is therefore 
warranted. In the past thirty years, these circumstances have changed significantly, as the 
general policy conditions impacting on the university have changed and as social and cultural 
factors affecting and influencing young people have altered. There is a general perception that 
the pressures facing students are greater than they have been in the past, such as greater 
competitiveness in the labour market and a growing accumulation of responsibilities. There is 
also evidence to suggest that the distinction between ‗student life‘ and the wider ‗world of 
work‘ is eroding, if not collapsing.  
 
The students are the single largest grouping in, and represent the ‗mass base‘ of, the university.  
There has been a transition from a so-called ‗elite‘ to ‗mass‘ higher education system since the 
late 1980s. The student body may be put in the following, abbreviated terms.  
 
 As at 2007, more than one million students (1,029,846) were enrolled by Australian higher 
education providers and hence in degree-level or comparable programs,
147
 and of this 
number more than 976,000 (976,786), or 94.8%, were enrolled at public universities. This 
represents nearly 12% of the population aged 15-34.
148
 DETYA reported in 2001 that ‗over 
40% of today‘s 18 year olds can expect to attend university at some stage in their lives.‘149  
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 Lyotard The Postmodern Condition, 4. 
147
 Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations Students 2007: Selected Higher 
Education Statistics (2008). These figures include all higher education students, in public and private 
providers. 
148
 Australian Bureau of Statistics 6227 – Education and Work, Australia, June (2008); Australian Bureau 
of Statistics 3201.0 – Population by Age and Sex, Australia, States and Territories, May (2008). 
149
 Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs Triennium Report 1999-2001 (2001), 7. 
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 International students, paying full-fees at a commercial rate, comprise one-quarter of 
enrolments in the public universities (254,414, or 25.24%).
150
 This proportion has grown 
from 4.3% in 1988 and 13.7% of all students in 2000.
151
 As Marginson has noted,
152
 
international students have, as a market, had a strategic, even disproportionate, impact on 
higher education. They have had the affect of altering both the ‗funding structure and 
funding trends‘ and the ‗pattern of expenditure‘ in the universities – funding shifts into new 
functions related to revenue-raising itself and corporate operations, and away from ‗core 
activities‘ (teaching and learning). In addition, they have contributed to a pedagogical 
recomposition of the university.
153
 
 By 2000, more than 40% of higher education students studied part-time or as external 
students,
154
 By 2001, 54% of students were entering the system other than on the basis of 
secondary school qualifications.
155
 By 2007, more than one-third (37.93%) of all higher 
education students were aged 25 or older, and almost one-quarter were aged over 30 years 
of age.
156
  
 The numbers of students not completing courses they have enrolled in (attrition rate) was at 
just under 20% for both domestic (18.5%) and international students (17.7%) in 2002. This 
had been relatively stable for the preceding decade, although the rate for international 
students had declined. Students‘ age appears to be a significant factor in attrition rates, with 
older students more susceptible to non-completion than younger students.
157
  
 In a 1998 analysis of enrolments, Meek and Wood158 argued that ‗Australian higher 
education has assumed a more postgraduate character,‘ notably as students are undertaking 
study for ‗professional and continuing education‘ purposes, or in other words as 
specialisation and retraining within professional labour markets. The 1990s saw a decline in 
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 Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations Students 2007: Selected Higher 
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 Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations Students 2007: Selected Higher 
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 Tatjana Lukic, Anne Broadbent, Maureen Maclachlan Higher Education Attrition Rates 1994-2002: A 
Brief Overview, Research Note 1 (Department of Education, Science and Training, 2004). 
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 Meek and Wood Managing Higher Education Diversity. 
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students studying education (-3%) and significant growth in Business (43%) and in 
Law/Legal studies (86%).
159
 Participation by most equity groups has been declining.  
 Student participation has been increasingly on the basis of fee-paying, either up-front or 
deferred via debt mechanisms. Just a decade after introduction of ‗user-pays‘ mechanisms, 
two-thirds of all domestic students had a HECS debt, and a considerable proportion of funds 
otherwise sourced to pay for university education came from families (34% in 1998).
160
  
 
The commercialisation of the university has had substantial impact upon the nature and 
character of this student subject (or subjects). A growing amount of commentary has been 
focused on the emergence of the student as consumer, or as user, of educational services.
161
 In 
this manifestation, the student is a market subject. This is seen as changing the relationship of 
the student to the university and it is contributing to a change in student practices and 
approaches to university education.  
 
The commercialisation and consumer emphasis of the student-university relationship has not 
gone unnoticed in judicial opinion as well. In Fennell v Australian National University,
162
 a case 
of student litigation for misrepresentation under the Commonwealth Trade Practices Act 1974, 
Sackville J remarked: ‗This case might be said to be a by-product of a relatively new 
phenomenon in Australian tertiary education, namely competition among Universities for full 
fee-paying graduate students.‘  
 
This shift in subjectivity has prompted scrutiny of the ‗student experience.‘ Correlating with the 
propensity for students to approach the university as consumers is the phenomenon referred to 
as ‗disengagement‘ 163 of students from the university and from ‗campus life.‘ The student is 
                                           
159
 Meek and Wood Managing Higher Education Diversity. 
160
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Education Section (Sydney), 26 July, 2006. See also Hazel Blunden ‗Managerialism and Economic 
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 [1999] FCA 989, [1]; also compare Kwan v University of Sydney Foundation Program [2002] 
NSWCTTT 83. 
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 Craig McInnis ‗Signs of Disengagement? The Changing Undergraduate Experience in Australian 
Universities‘ (Inaugural Professorial Lecture, Centre for the Study of Higher Education University of 
Melbourne, Melbourne, 13 August 2001); see also Craig McInnis ‗New Realities of the Student 
Experience: How Should Universities Respond?‘ (Paper presented to 25th Annual Conference, European 
Association for Institutional Research, Limerick, 24-27 August 2003). 
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increasingly detached, or withdrawing, from the university, especially for economic reasons. 
Attention has been given to the role of other needs and responsibilities on students in the present 
era, in particular the effect of paid work. The combination of study with paid work is now 
almost the norm. Financial pressures also play an important role in this development. The 
AVCC-commissioned study Paying Their Way
164
 found that around 70% of students were in 
paid employment during the semester, that full-time students work an average of 14.5 hours a 
week and part-time students at least 30 hours a week. The incidence of paid work for full-time 
students increased 50% between 1984 and 2000, and students noted themselves the toll taken by 
work on their studies (over one-half stating that they are affected ‗somewhat or a great deal‘ by 
work, and 28% missing classes ‗sometimes‘ or ‗frequently‘ because of work). The report states 
that the work-study nexus is impacting adversely upon student experience and retention in 
higher education.
165
 This picture is reinforced by the 2002 DEST-commissioned study 
Managing Study and Work,
166
 and the follow-up, Universities Australia-commissioned student 
finances study Australian Student Finances 2006.
167
 
 
Langridge‘s168 assessment of the cultural content of student and youth experience is that  
 
the communication culture has changed – as have the rules governing it. It is hardly surprising, 
then, that the manner in which many students interact (communicate) with a tertiary institution 
has changed. Today students are just individual shells negotiating their life highway, obeying the 
traffic rules society has set before them, rather than fully engaged, integrated participants in the 
institution.
169
  
 
Langridge interrogates the notion of disengagement, especially in relation to pervasive 
technological mediation of student (youth) experience. She argues that the cultural practices of 
students represent an ‗instant‘ fix‘ approach to education, or what she terms the ‗backyard blitz 
syndrome,‘ an approach that appears to accord with the input-output logic of consumption 
patterns and consumer behaviour:  
 
It seems safe to argue that it was inevitable that this ‗instant fix‘ attitude would, for some 
students at least, find its way into the academic arena: a concentrated effort for a limited time 
span will see the task achieved – no matter how well or how badly the task is cobbled together, it 
is done.
170
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McInnis‘ finds that not only do students face ‗an increasing number of activities and priorities 
that compete with the demands of university,‘ but there is a general decline in ‗student effort‘, 
and ‗Students appear to be getting higher grades for doing less, and a culture of entitlement is 
widely reported.‘171 He concludes that the ‗university experience‘ is being relegated or 
rationalized in the context of life as a whole, especially for young people. He talks of a 
‗negotiated engagement,‘ which is part of a practice to maximize options, a skepticism with 
respect to commitment, and the dissolving of the hegemony (or at least exclusivity) of study 
over particular moments of life.  
 
2.5 Conclusions 
 
The university as an institution first emerged in the Australian colonies little more than half a 
century after British occupation of the continent, based invariably on UK models. In many 
ways, the development was typical of the transplantation of British culture generally to the 
Antipodes. In the intervening period, higher education and the university in Australia have 
proceeded through various phases of development, most recently culminating in the period of 
‗deregulation,‘ market reform and ‗commercialisation.‘ By the time of the Martin Committee 
Review of 1965, clear trends were emerging of greater direct integration of the universities into 
the (capitalist) economic project. This trend became the dominant condition by the 1980s, 
especially from 1988 onwards.  
 
Certain important trends have underpinned this contemporary reality in the universities. Not 
only have market (or ‗quasi-market‘) and commercial models come to dominate policy and 
practice, these mechanisms are indissoluble from patterns of internal austerity, or ‗uneven 
development,‘ with relative austerity being focused generally on ‗core‘ activities, such as 
teaching and learning. Further, as the university has been reorganised primarily as an instrument 
and as a space of economic behaviour, the rationality of institutional practice has changed to 
accommodate administrative behaviours. Administration, rather than the (Enlightenment) ‗idea‘ 
of the university, now prevails as the central organising force. This development coincides with 
greater legislative and administrative prescription of, and control over, higher education. 
Finally, these contemporary conditions unfold in the context of new forms of student 
subjectivity, notably the existence of a ‗mass‘ but diverse student base, and a student far less 
distinguishable from other social and economic actors. In particular, the student is far less likely 
to identify solely, or even predominantly, with the campus, and far more likely to accommodate 
study, work and other responsibilities, than in earlier periods. No doubt, these factors are among 
the critical reasons why the relationship between then student and the university is more 
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complex and diverse than ever before, and why the legal form of the relationship has come to 
play an increasingly important role in its organisation and government.  
 40 
Chapter 3 
Complexity and Ambiguity in University Law: Navigating the Legal 
Terrain of the University-Student Relationship 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Until the 1960s, universities in the English-speaking, common law, countries benefited from a 
high degree of judicial deference to university affairs and a broad discretion in decision-making. 
In essence, an ‗arm‘s length‘ policy prevailed. The rise of administrative law saw a willingness 
of courts to intervene directly into university affairs to guarantee administrative law rights, 
notably natural justice. Subsequently, the legal relationship has grown. This has occurred as a 
matter of ‗judicial control of universities,‘172 that is through the common law, as well as by way 
of statutory changes. More recently, we have seen reference to the ‗legalisation‘ of the student-
university relationship.
173
 
 
3.2 Contours of the Relationship in Public and Private Law 
 
3.2.1 Public Law 
 
The student-university relationship is legally complex and has been referred to as a ‗hybrid‘ of 
private and public law elements.
174
 A first basis of the student-university relationship lies in the 
role of public law to establish and regulate the university sector, and to control universities as 
public institutions. Australian universities are statutory bodies, for the most part legally 
constructed through two types of instrument: the founding or establishing enactment, and 
legislation regulating of the provision of higher education, including restrictions on the use of 
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the term ‗university.‘175 Common national protocols agreed to by State/Territory and 
Commonwealth governments now standardise the approvals process for higher education 
providers.
176
 University operations are also extensively regulated through federal funding 
legislation,
177
 and legislation governing international students in Australia.
178
  
 
Typically, public universities in Australia are incorporated under their founding statute, and this 
may include the variation that the university is a ‗body corporate and politic.‘179 In the public 
university the student is a ‗corporator,‘ often alongside other classes of corporator established 
by statute (eg governing body, staff, alumni). The student is a corporator at common law
180
 in 
circumstances where their status is not otherwise provided for by statute.
181
 The student‘s 
corporate relationship with the university is founded on the ancient concept of the eleemosynary 
corporation:
182
 a corporation founded for charitable purposes (or in this case for higher learning) 
and governed by a founding instrument (in this case, the University Act). Most Australian 
universities retain the character of an eleemosynary corporation.
183
 The student as corporator is 
the same as the concept of the student as a member of the university. Such a status gives rise to 
the domestic relationship between the student and university.
184
 In respect of the public 
university, therefore, the domestic relationship is a product of statute.  
 
Not all universities in Australia are incorporated by statute. Where an institution is incorporated 
under the Commonwealth Corporations Act or other relevant legislation, they may have 
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statutory support in the form of enabling legislation.
185
 In these instances, the relationship 
between the student and university does not find substantive effect in administrative law but 
rather in the private law of contract.
186
 The student is a corporator and, additionally, a party to 
the contract.
187
 This has been termed a ‗contract of membership.‘188  
 
The character of ‗membership‘ of the university as a corporation (or as it is often expressed in 
cases concerning Visitorial jurisdiction, the ‗foundation‘) received recent consideration in the 
University of Western Australia v Gray litigation in the Federal Court.
189
 Although this case 
concerned intellectual property rights and the contract of employment of academic staff, the 
Court‘s consideration of the ‗distinctiveness‘190 of the university and of the employment 
relationship in the university were material to the outcome of the case, and in substance the 
Court‘s statements on the character of the university are not inconsistent with the more ancient 
principles of the eleemosynary corporation as applied to universities. Gray affirms the notion 
that the academic staff member is not only an employee but a ‗member‘ of the university,191 a 
status implied into the contract of employment
192
 and flowing from the nature of the university 
as a ‗special purpose statutory corporation‘193 with a ‗traditional public function as an institution 
of higher education.‘194 The notion of ‗tradition‘ here is not subject to any great scrutiny. 
Although the content of the terms of membership will differ,
195
 there is no logical or practical 
reason to distinguish the fact of membership of the corporation enjoyed by the academic staff 
from that enjoyed by students.
196
 It would be fair to say, as a matter of legal interpretation, that 
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continuity of purposes of ‗higher learning‘ or ‗advancement or learning (cf R v University of 
Sydney; ex parte Drummond) represent a thread between the eleemosynary corporation and the 
‗special purpose statutory corporation‘ of Gray‘s case. 
 
Finally, one of the more significant differences in the statutory source of corporate membership, 
as against contractual membership, will lie in the form of relief available to students in the 
context of a dispute or a breach of the student‘s rights arising from his/her membership. While 
breach of contract may provide relief in damages, prejudice to their corporate status (eg 
arbitrary expulsion) may enliven administrative law remedies, such as the common law 
remedies of certiorari, mandamus or prohibition, or their modified or statutory equivalents. 
 
Australian administrative law finds two sources related to the control of governmental action: 
application of the common law prerogative writs, and the various statutory schemes in force in 
Australian jurisdictions. The result is that the application of judicial review to universities is 
complex and varies by jurisdiction. It has been said that judicial control of universities by way 
of judicial review at common law ‗reveals ambivalence‘ and ‗[i]t is not always clear just what is 
the foundation of judicial intervention.‘197 
 
At common law, the susceptibility in principle of public universities to judicial review is well-
established.
198
 The question as to the precise application of this sphere of administrative law to 
the student-university relationship must contend, as Francine Rochford has put it,
199
 with the 
substantial ‗confusion that surrounds the applicability of public law remedies to universities.‘ 
Through the twentieth century, the test for application of the prerogative writs has evolved to 
the point where the jurisdictional issue is the use and identification of public power. Thus, as 
exemplified in R v Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin Plc,
200
 this form of 
judicial review now effectively concerns institutional actions of a ‗public nature.‘ Likewise for 
the university, the issue becomes one of identifying those actions or decisions that are of a 
public character or function.
201
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Statutory schemes for judicial review have been in force since the 1970s, including the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‗ADJR Act‘). The jurisdictional test 
of the ADJR Act differs from the common law test, especially to the extent that the former 
applies to ‗a decision… of an administrative character made under an enactment‘.202 While 
these schemes were originally proposed to expand access to review of government action, it has 
been argued that the current trend is otherwise.
203
 
 
It has been held that the university, with regard to the ADJR Act, satisfies the test of being an 
‗administrative‘ body.204 The more troublesome issue concerns the extent to which university 
actions vis-a-vis students may or may not be a ‗decision… made under an enactment‘ for the 
purposes of the ADJR Act. The key phrase ‗under an enactment‘ was tested in the High Court in 
Griffith University v Tang,
205
 a case arising from a decision to exclude a student from a 
university for academic misconduct, and the subject of considerable commentary from 
education and administrative law academics.
206
 The facts in Tang have been restated a number 
of times in this literature. I only refer to the more pertinent elements here. 
 
The decision in the Tang case concerned interpretation of the Queensland Judicial Review Act 
1998 (Q). Ms Tang had sought judicial review of Griffith University‘s decision to expel her for 
a breach of the University‘s Policy on Academic Misconduct. A majority of the Court held that 
the student could not apply for judicial review because the University decision had not been 
‗made under an enactment.‘ In this case, the ‗enactment‘ at issue was the Griffith University Act 
1998 (Q). The majority reasoned inter alia that a ‗decision‘ was only a ‗decision‘ made for the 
purposes of the Judicial Review Act where legal rights and obligations were affected, and that 
this was not the case under the Griffith University Act 1998. The student had, in this instance, 
been expelled under a non-statutory instrument, an internal University ‗policy,‘ or what Baldwin 
has referred to as ‗tertiary rules.‘207 It is not unusual for student disciplinary rules, or related 
measures, to be contained in non-statutory instruments.
208
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The relevant provision to be tested (whether the decision was one to which the Judicial Review 
Act applied and specifically a ‗decision… made under an enactment‘) effectively reproduces the 
jurisdictional formula available under the ADJR Act. The same formula is reproduced in the 
statutory review schemes in the ACT
209
 and Tasmania.
210
 Victoria‘s statutory review scheme 
under the Administrative Law Act 1978 (Vic) is distinguishable and the question of jurisdiction 
under that Act parallels the common law scope for review.
211
  
 
Kamvounias and Varnham
212
 have argued that universities‘ ‗immunity‘ from review as 
established in Tang would be limited. The ADJR Act formula regarding application of the 
review scheme does not operate outside of the Commonwealth, Queensland, the ACT and 
Tasmania. Even within those jurisdictions it is often the case that statutory review would apply 
where decisions are made under subordinate legislation and would be amenable to review under 
the relevant statutory review schemes.  
 
The point here is that, notwithstanding the High Court‘s narrow interpretation of certain judicial 
review mechanisms, the application of administrative law to Australian universities remains 
broad. By extension, where the student has a corporate status within the university, public law 
still generally applies to university decisions affecting them, especially where such decisions 
would have a serious, adverse impact on that status (eg exclusion). Courts may see fit to 
intervene in university decision-making where they find abuse of power or error of law.
213
 The 
main source of qualification to this principle is the Courts‘ reluctance to intervene in matters of 
academic judgement.
214
 
 
3.2.2 Private Law 
 
The student-university relationship also exists in private law (contract), and student litigation 
may arise as common law action in contract or under various statutory schemes constructed to 
protect the student as a consumer. These schemes include elements of the Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth), and the respective State and Territory Fair Trading Acts, and, with respect to 
international students, the Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 (Cth).  
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In commercialised settings such as the provision of full fee-paying courses, contract theory 
seems compelling. Contract is of increasing significance, and leading UK commentators 
submitted some time ago it is the prevailing basis of the relationship.
215
 In the US, contract is an 
entrenched basis of a student‘s relationship with the university, particularly in view of the 
significance of private institutions.
216
 The more pertinent authorities are – for the sake of current 
argument and given the Australia universities‘ origins – British. The question of contract, and its 
nature and structure, has been considered in depth in British,
217
 US,
218
 and Australian
219
 legal-
academic literature.  
 
In brief, application of the law of contract to university students was rejected in the 19
th
 
century.
220
 But by 1964, in Sammy v Birkbeck College,
221
 the English High Court held contract 
to apply and considered its implied terms. Upon payment of his fees, the student could expect 
the institution to provide facilities and expertise necessary for tuition appropriate to the 
examinations at the University of London in exchange for the student‘s adherence to the 
university rules. Terms were held to be similar in the 1971 case of D’Mello v Loughborough 
College of Technology
222
. Nevertheless, the contract was held to provide considerable latitude 
and discretion to the institution, a dimension to the contract common to the US experience.
223
 
The student litigants in both English cases were defeated. 
 
Two more recent English cases are worthy of note. In Clark v University of Lincolnshire and 
Humberside,
224
 the UK Court of Appeal confirmed the contractual relationship while at the 
same time adding the conventional qualification of judicial deference to the university in 
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academic matters.
225
 The Court of Appeal decision in Clark affirms that a contractual (private 
law) and public law relationship co-exist. Second, in Moran v University College Salford,
226
 the 
Court was effectively called to adjudicate on the structure of the contractual relations operating 
between the student and university and concluded that two contracts operate: one for admission, 
and one for matriculation or enrolment. The contract of enrolment is similar to a ‗contract of 
membership‘ with a private organisation, where the student agrees to abide by the rules in 
exchange for the benefits of membership.
227
 
 
With respect to the Australian context, Rochford has remarked that the courts ‗have not adopted 
an exclusively contractual analysis with any enthusiasm.‘228 Instances where contract has been 
held to apply are scant and not particularly revealing of the nature and content of the contract. In 
Bayley-Jones v University of Newcastle,
229
 the New South Wales Supreme Court held contract 
to apply, in the relatively conventional manner of incorporating as terms the rules of the 
university, including the jurisdiction of the Visitor where a domestic matter was concerned: 
‗One can have contractual rights which are a reflection of the rules of the university.‘ Contract 
was affirmed in principle in Harding v University of New South Wales.
230
  
 
The subsequent question of relief or remedy afforded to a student who may successfully 
challenge their institution for breach of contract has been considered by Davis,
231
 Kamvounias 
and Varnham,
232
 and Rochford.
233
 The issue of common law challenge in contract poses two 
important hurdles for any student seeking remedial action against a university. First, it is 
unlikely a successful challenge would provide relief other than in the form of damages. For 
instance, the courts would be unlikely to compel specific performance of the contract as a 
remedy to a proven breach,
234
 or for that matter a mandatory injunction that may give a similar 
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effect.
235
 The subsequent issue becomes the quantification of damages. There is an 
accumulating body of legal and academic opinion on this issue, indicating that award of 
damages is indeed possible where a direct loss (eg in the form of fees or income directly 
foregone) has been found,
236
 or even where a student suffers mental distress in the failed 
performance of the contract (‗disappointment damages‘).237  
 
The ‗contract of membership‘ that operates at common law may be said to be affected 
increasingly by the treatment of the student as a consumer of ‗education services.‘ The contract 
is increasingly being viewed as a form of ‗consumer‘ contract and therefore susceptible to 
consumer protection legislation.
238
 Consumer protection provisions of the Commonwealth 
Trade Practices Act 1974, in particular Sections 52 and 53 which concern deceptive or 
misleading conduct and misrepresentation, have been used (or sought to be used) by students on 
occasion to litigate against universities. The Trade Practices Act applies to public universities 
by virtue of those institutions being considered as trading and/or financial corporations for the 
purposes of s 4 of the Act. The question as to whether universities are trading or financial 
corporations was considered in Quickenden v O’Connor.239 In that case, the Federal Court tested 
the phrase as it appeared in the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (to determine whether an 
industrial agreement made under the latter Act applied to the University of Western Australia). 
In both legislative contexts, the term is derived from, and applies, s 51(xx) (the ‗corporations 
power‘) of the Constitution. It has been accepted in trade practices cases that universities are 
susceptible to challenge as corporations under the Trade Practices Act.
240
 The Full Court in 
Quickenden held: 
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The University was not established for the purpose of trading and at another time, closer to the 
time of its creation, it may not have been possible to describe it as a trading corporation. But at 
the time relevant to this case and at present, it does fall within that class.
241
 
 
The more difficult, but pertinent, question is the scope of activities within the university to 
which consumer protection measures under the Trade Practices Act, or comparable State or 
Territory legislation, apply. Sections 52 and 53 of the Trade Practices Act will not apply to all 
conduct undertaken by the university in relation to a student as a consumer, but only that 
occurring, as relevant, ‗in trade or commerce.‘242 In Quickenden, the Full Court identified a 
range of commercial, trading and investment activity in which UWA was involved. While the 
Court held that it was ‗doubtful‘243 that fees charged for educational provision established and 
regulated by statute (in that case, HECS payments under the Higher Education Funding Act 
1988
244
) could be considered as trading, it left open the notion that fee-charging outside of the 
scope of statutory control (eg in relation to international students) was a trading activity. 
Additionally, it has been argued that university marketing or promotional activities, now 
commonplace, will likely attract Section 52, as would communications aimed at inducing or 
offering services to students already enrolled.
245
 Alternatively, it has been argued that basic 
educational activities of the university, such as lectures, do not occur ‗in trade or commerce‘ 
and therefore are not susceptible to trade practices legislation.
246
 But this ought to be considered 
in the context of a State fair trading case, Kwan v University of Sydney Foundation Program.
247
 
 
Key relevant elements of the Commonwealth consumer protection scheme, such as protection 
against deceptive or misleading conduct and false representation, are generally reproduced in 
the State and Territory Fair Trading Acts.
248
 Some procedural variations aside,
249
 the statutory 
schemes contain a range of remedies, including damages, injunctions and in some instances 
criminal sanction. In Kwan, a tertiary student was held to be a consumer for the purposes of the 
NSW consumer protection law
250
 and in that case the educational relationship was seen to be 
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reduceable to the ‗supply of education services.‘251 Challenge for misleading and deceptive 
conduct was available, although unsuccessful. The Tribunal in this case accepted for the 
purpose of relevant sections of the NSW Fair Trading Act that it had jurisdiction to hear the 
matter, that there was a contract between the student and the educational provider, and, by 
inference, that the totality of the relationship (ie including ‗core‘ activities such as classes and 
lectures) operated ‗in trade or commerce.‘252 Kwan may be distinguished by the fact that the 
student-university relationship was entirely fee-for-service (there was no statutory control over 
fees or pricing) and supplied by a private entity. It may also be distinguished by the fact that 
‗core‘ educational provision possessed a substantial enough ‗relationship with trade or 
commerce‘253 to attract the Fair Trading Act. This may not be said of all educational or 
intellectual activity in the university sector.
254
  
 
Additionally, Victoria and NSW have enacted prohibitions on unjust and unfair terms in 
consumer contracts, a form of statutory unconscionability.
255
 As Whittaker has remarked, these 
forms of statutory control on the content of consumer contracts (and conduct of making 
contracts) represent the extension of judicial review to private law and ‗a conscious borrowing 
of the terminology of public law.‘256 The Victorian scheme borrows directly from UK and 
European Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts legislation,
257
 and establishes grounds of 
substantive unfairness in contract terms as well as grounds of (procedural) unfairness in the 
making of contracts. The student-university contract has been subjected to academic analysis in 
light of the ‗unfair terms‘ legislation.258 This analysis would apply directly to the Victorian 
situation.
259
 As yet, application of the ‗unfair terms‘ elements of the Victorian legislation has 
not been tested in the university-student context.  
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Finally, a form of consumer protection legislation is specifically enacted for international 
students under the ESOS Act. This includes express prohibition on ‗registered providers‘ 
engaging in misleading and deceptive conduct in recruiting overseas students and providing 
courses to them.
260
 It also regulates extensively the terms and conditions by which education 
may be provided to international students, under the National Code. Under the ‗consumer 
protection‘ elements of ESOS Act and the National Code, however, universities are not 
susceptible to student challenge for alleged breaches. Action may only be taken by the Minister 
for such non-compliance, including placing conditions on a provider‘s registration, or 
suspension or cancellation of registration.
261
 Students do have ‗complaints and appeals‘ 
mechanisms available, by which decisions can be reviewed. I will consider those procedures 
below.  
 
3.3 The University’s ‘Domestic’ Jurisdiction 
 
3.3.1 The Domestic Jurisdiction and the Visitor 
 
The concept of the university‘s domestic jurisdiction derives from its corporate character. It was 
an element of the British chartered universities until recently that their institutional architecture 
included the office of Visitor at common law.
262
 Domestic jurisdiction in this regard concerns 
adjudication of disputes and grievances arising under the internal laws of the university, and 
operation of that jurisdiction lies, where it is extant, in the Visitor:  
 
The jurisdiction derives from the visitor‘s position as judge of the internal laws of the 
foundation, and he has jurisdiction over questions of status because it is upon those laws that 
status depends.
263
 
 
The office and the law have historically been imported into the Australian public universities, 
with the office of Visitor normally residing with the relevant State Governor. The jurisdiction 
has been exercised on numerous occasions in Australia.
264
 
 
The jurisdiction of the Visitor is exclusive of the courts. This is famously elaborated in the 
dictum of Kindersley VC in Thompson v University of London:
265
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…whatever relates to the internal arrangements and dealings with regard to the government and 
management of the house, of the domus, of the institution, is properly within the jurisdiction of 
the Visitor, and this Court will not interfere in those matters; but when it comes to a question of 
rights of property, or rights as between the University and a third person dehors the University, 
or with regard, it may be, to any breach of trust committed by the corporation… or any contracts 
by the corporation, not being matters relating to the mere management and arrangement and 
details of the domus, then, indeed, this Court will interfere.
266
 
 
Thompson represented a high watermark in judicial treatment of the Visitor. The House of 
Lords affirmed the role of the University Visitor in Thomas v University of Bradford.
267
 
Decisions of the Visitor may be reviewed for jurisdictional error and for breaches of natural 
justice.
268
 It has been held that appeals on academic decisions do not form part of the Visitor‘s 
jurisdiction,
269
 although it may be that where a Visitor declines to intervene against a decision 
that is ‗plainly irrational or fraught with bias or some other obvious irregularity‘ the (non)action 
may be reviewed for error of law.
270
 Other principles have arisen in the exercise of the Visitor‘s 
discretion, such as the award of damages,
271
 declining relief where it is in the ‗best interest‘ of 
the university to do so,
272
 declining to act against a discretion exercised in good faith,
273
 and 
adjudicating on disputes over membership.
274
 However, the office is an extension of the 
founding instrument (eg Act of Parliament) and its exercise is discretionary and not bound by 
the common law.
275
 While the jurisdiction may be statutory, it can also be invoked in 
contract.
276
  
 
3.3.2 The Fate of the Visitor 
 
Reform of universities‘ legislation has led to the abolition of the visitorial jurisdiction, where it 
had previously existed, in all Australian jurisdictions other than Western Australia.
277
 Where the 
                                           
266
 Thompson v University of London (1864) LJCh 625, 634. 
267
 (1987) 1 AC 795. 
268
 R v Aston University Senate, ex parte Roffey (1969) 2 QB 538; Glynn v Keele University (1971) 1 
WLR 487; University of Ceylon v Fernando (1960) 1 All ER 631. 
269
 R v Judicial Committee of the Privy Council Acting for the Visitor of the University of London; ex 
parte Vijayatunga (1988) 1 QB 322. 
270
 R v Judicial Committee of the Privy Council Acting for the Visitor of the University of London; ex 
parte Vijayatunga (1988) 1 QB 322, 334. 
271
 Bayley-Jones v University of Newcastle (1990) 22 NSWLR 424. 
272
 Bayley-Jones v University of Newcastle (1990) 22 NSWLR 424; Re Macquarie University, ex parte 
Ong [1989] 17 NSWLR 113. 
273
 Re University of Melbourne, ex parte De Simone (1981) VR 378, 387. 
274
 Patel v University of Bradford Senate (1978) 1 WLR 1488. 
275
 Page v Hull University Visitor (1993) 1 All ER 97, 106d: ‗This inability of the court to intervene is 
founded on the fact that the applicable law is not the common law of England but a peculiar or domestic 
law of which the visitor is the sole judge.‘ See Sadler ‗The University Visitor‘, 8. 
276
 Bayley-Jones v University of Newcastle (1990) 22 NSWLR 424, 436B; Casson v University of Aston 
in Birmingham (1983) 1 All ER 88. 
277
 Eg University Acts (Amendment) Act 2003 (Vic); University Legislation (Amendment) Act 1994 
(NSW). 
 53 
office remains it is entirely ceremonial. Abolition has proceeded on the grounds that the 
jurisdiction is rarely used and other internal appeal mechanisms are adequate.
278
 
 
The office is indeed archaic, especially when scrutinised as a relic of the medieval organisation 
of charity and alms. It has tended to sit uncomfortably alongside the statutory university 
established in Commonwealth countries, such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada, based on 
the British model. This has led in certain instances to judicial reluctance to sanction an exclusive 
jurisdiction.
279
 In the 1940s, the idea that a student should turn to the Visitor to deal with a 
dispute with a public university was derided from the NSW Supreme Court Bench: ‗I think also 
that probably nobody, until Ex parte King; Re University of Sydney
280
 ever though that there 
was any possibility of intervention by the Visitor.‘281 In the UK, the Blair Government enacted 
the Higher Education Act 2004 (UK), which also took the step of abolishing the University 
Visitor‘s jurisdiction as it applied to institutions of higher education in England and Wales.282  
 
The office of Visitor was held in Thomas as having the ‗advantage of cheapness, lack of 
formality and flexibility,‘283 or in other words it represents a form (or potential form) of 
domestic tribunal, with scope for affecting a system of dispute resolution alternative to the 
courts.
284
 It has been advocated that the jurisdiction may be suitably reformed for contemporary 
circumstances: ‗If properly constituted and qualified the visitoriall forum offers all the 
advantages inherent in suitably constituted specialist tribunals.‘285 The trend in public policy has 
not been, however, to reform the Visitor but to dispense with it. In the UK, human rights law 
provided the legal and constitutional framework upon which this decision was made. As Kaye 
has put it, in relation to European human rights standards, ‗the determination of disputes by a 
university Visitor simply does not pass muster.‘286 Comparatively unfettered, the Visitor‘s 
discretion is also a ‗relic‘ of redundant models of administration. It is unstructured, and despite 
attempts to discern them,
287
 possesses no established rules of procedure. Although by 
convention in Australia visitorial judgements have been reported, proceedings before a Visitor 
are not public. In contrast to the assertions of expediency in Thomas, it has been argued in UK 
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and Australian legal commentary that the Visitor is ‗neither necessarily cheap, speedy nor 
final.‘288 
 
Removal of the Visitor‘s jurisdiction appears to leave a gap in the legal architecture governing 
the domestic student-university relationship: the body corporate has lost its (penultimate) 
judicial arm. Admittedly, universities possess an apparatus of internal appeals and quasi-judicial 
decision-making (eg for discipline proceedings, unsatisfactory performance, and complaints). 
The arguable significance of the office of the Visitor is its standing in law, independent of and 
‗superior‘ to the organs of internal government and management, whether by common law or 
statute. This status derives from the office‘s function as a ‗delegate‘ of the founder. 
Notwithstanding legal and procedural shortcomings, the jurisdiction gives quasi-judicial effect 
to the student‘s corporate status in the eventuality of a major dispute. Abolition of the 
jurisdiction removes a statutory mechanism of challenge to internal university decisions (albeit 
rarely used), but more significantly it poses the question: on what basis can supervision of 
domestic relations and adjudication of domestic disputes occur? Bearing in mind that internal 
disputes may have major consequences for students (including financial loss or even expulsion), 
two responses may be adverted to: establishment in the UK of the Office of the Independent 
Adjudicator for Higher Education (‗OIA‘), and Australian regulation for dispute-settling and 
grievance procedures.  
 
3.3.3 UK Renovation of the Domestic Jurisdiction 
 
Under Part 2 of the UK Higher Education Act, the UK Government established a statutory basis 
for the review of student complaints in higher education institutions in England and Wales. The 
OIA, a company limited by guarantee, receives statutory support under the Act as the designated 
operator of the student complaints scheme. It is an independent body charged with investigating 
and ruling on student complaints. The OIA issues Rules governing the handling of 
complaints.
289
 
 
The Higher Education Act has been described as having the effect of ‗translating‘ the 
jurisdiction of the Visitor ‗into the authority of the Office of the Independent Adjudicator for 
higher education‘290 This has been an important step in ‗modernizing‘ the student-university 
relationship in that country. A participating institution is obliged to comply with the OIA‘s 
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rules,
291
 which include an ‗expectation‘ that its decisions will be complied with and 
implemented.
292
 The effect of the OIA‘s decisions on institutions may therefore have weight but 
are not legally binding on institutions.
293
 The OIA may issue relief to student complainants, 
including in 2005 over £250,000 in compensation.
294
 Redress may include remitting a decision 
to a higher education institution to be made afresh, identifying a different course of action, or 
payment of compensation. The OIA may recommend changes to internal rules and complaint-
handling. Recommendations are not limited to identified forms of redress, and hence the scope 
of review and action by the OIA is wide-ranging.
295
 Matters of academic judgement and student 
admissions can not be dealt with under the Scheme.
296
 A student who takes a matter to the 
courts cannot subsequently seek to have it heard by the OIA,
297
 and a student must exhaust 
internal complaints procedures before seeking to refer a matter to the OIA.
298
 
 
The OIA‘s procedure is typically to adjudicate matters on the papers. Under the Rules, oral 
hearings, although anticipated, are not the norm.
299
 Parallels have been drawn between the OIA 
and statutory ombudsmen.
300
 There is merit in this argument, although the comparison needs to 
be weighed against the powers invested in the ombudsman in any particular scheme. The 
distinction ought to be made in the meaning of the adjudicative function of the OIA in relation 
to its powers. OIA ‗recommendations,‘ if not binding, may be compelling because of the 
‗expectation‘ they are implemented, by the fact that all higher education institutions in England 
Wales must make payments to it, and by the ‗perceived risk of external exposure‘301 attendant in 
the OIA‘s actions. The reforms introduced with the Higher Education Act are a significant 
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improvement in cheap, expedient access to justice for students and ‗quality assurance‘ for 
higher education institutions.
302
 There remains, nonetheless, an ambiguity in the OIA‘s powers, 
which is reflected in remarks by the OIA itself: 
 
… higher education is not a commodity for purchase and money is no substitute for what may 
have gone wrong… the OIA is still finding its rightful place in the spectrum of legal and 
informal methods of settling disputes in English public law…303 
 
The universities are not easily reduceable to other forms of public services, in which the public 
are consumers. The OIA would appear to be self-consciously distinguishing itself from the 
traditional models of ombudsman and judiciary in an attempt to navigate this complex legal and 
policy terrain.  
 
3.3.4 Regulation of the Domestic Jurisdiction in Australia 
 
Australian governments have established for universities no comparable scheme to the OIA. 
Importation of the OIA model has been advocated.
304
 Western Australian universities maintain 
the Visitor‘s jurisdiction,305 which remains exclusive in relation to internal disputes.306 Bond 
University has the capacity to appoint a Visitor.
307
 Elsewhere, as has been noted, there is no 
visitorial jurisdiction in Australia. The Australian response to these developments has generally 
been to resist a judicial or adjudicative model of student-university dispute-handling. It is 
submitted that this has occurred with a view to treating students primarily as consumers of 
‗education services.‘ For instance, relevant provisions of the National Code made pursuant to 
the ESOS Act are constructed as ‗consumer protection‘ measures for international students.308 
Consequently, the prevailing policy and legislative approach has been to require institutions to 
establish grievance and dispute-settling procedures. External review of student complaints, in 
the manner comparable to adjudication by the OIA, is not available, whether by an OIA-like 
body or by the established generalist or specialist merits review schemes operating in Australian 
jurisdictions. At the same time, student complaints being handled by statutory Ombudsman 
have been reported as increasing.
309
 The Victorian Ombudsman found in 2005 that universities 
in that jurisdiction ‗do not have effective complaint systems and procedures and lack 
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comprehensive centralised record keeping. I expect to see similar reports from other 
Ombudsmen in the coming months.‘310 The NSW Ombudsman issued complaint-handling 
guidelines for universities in 2006, following an investigation into the issue at NSW 
universities.
311
 Those guidelines included the recommendation that universities establish an 
independent ‗complaints centre‘ as part of their internal institutional architecture.312 This 
recommendation is not reiterated in the statutory requirements referred to below.  
 
Two principal legislative schemes apply to student disputes in Australian universities,
313
 with 
the effect of regulating internal challenge to university decisions. The Higher Education 
Support Act provides that all ‗higher education providers‘ shall have grievance and review 
procedures to deal with academic and non-academic complaints by students.
314
 In turn, the 
nature of those procedures is prescribed by legislative instrument.
315
 It is a requirement of the 
ESOS National Code that ‗registered providers‘ of educational services to international students 
(including universities) have ‗complaints and appeals processes.‘316 These requirements are 
intended to ‗protect the interests of overseas students,‘317 although they are obligations on 
‗providers‘ and hence available in effect to all students.  
 
Complaints and review procedures as required under HESA and the ESOS Act are similar. Both 
the National Code and Higher Education Provider Guidelines have been amended
318
 since 
inception of the primary legislation with the effect of strengthening review schemes available to 
students. The amended schemes move review procedures closer in effect to those operating in 
the UK context, although without the institutional architecture of the OIA and the same 
legislative coherence of the (UK) Higher Education Act.  
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Prior to amendment, both HESA and the ESOS Act schemes required providers to have 
procedures for dispute or grievance resolution. This did not amount to a requirement for an 
adjudicative procedure or judicial approach. Leaving aside the question of visitorial jurisdiction, 
domestic challenge to a university decision need not be resolved at that point by adjudication or 
arbitration. This was confirmed by the Federal Court in Ogawa v Secretary, Department of 
Education, Science and Training.
319
 In that case, the Court considered the effect of the 
requirement on the University of Melbourne under (the then) Paragraph 45 the National Code to 
have ‗independent‘ grievance and dispute resolution procedures available to Ogawa as an 
international student. In his judgement, Dowsett J stated: 
 
It is difficult to attribute precise meaning to the requirements of par 45 in so far as they concern 
grievance handling and dispute resolution. Paragraph 45 does not require that the university have 
in place a system of arbitration or other extra-judicial decision-making. However, in argument, it 
seemed that the applicant believed she was entitled to demand a cheap, non-judicial procedure 
for enforcing legal rights. That is not grievance handling or dispute resolution. Those terms 
imply resolution rather than arbitration. Thus it must be accepted that any such arrangements 
might, in a particular case, not resolve the dispute.
320
 
 
Subsequent amendments have given greater ‗precision‘ to the procedures and what would 
appear to be greater adjudicative effect to the procedural arrangements. Under the revised 
National Code, a ‗provider‘ must have arrangements in place for review by a ‗person or body 
independent of and external to‘321 the provider. This provision is similar to that considered by 
Dowsett J in Ogawa. However, the revised scheme additionally provides that:  
 
If the internal or any external complaint handling or appeal process results in a decision that 
supports the student, the registered provider must immediately implement any decision and/or 
corrective and preventative action required and advise the student of the outcome.
322
 
 
The key procedural development is that a provider is compelled to give effect to any form of 
redress advantageous to the (international) student as a condition of registration. The language is 
similar in the HEP Guidelines, the provisions of which are generally applicable to higher 
education providers and their students. Means of external review of decisions arising from 
student grievances are mandatory,
323
 and in addition the provider must ‗have a mechanism in 
place to implement the grievance procedures, including implementation of recommendations 
arising from any external review.‘324 The requirement under the HEP Guidelines is less 
prescriptive and it may be that having a mechanism to implement ‗recommendations‘ does not 
mean ‗recommendations‘ must be implemented. In this respect, the character of the provision 
has similar ambiguities to the Rules governing the OIA scheme. Arguably, the requirements 
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under the ESOS National Code are less ambiguous and remove the loophole identified by 
Dowsett J: in effect, a form of arbitration is possible under the revised National Code scheme, 
as a provider is now required to implement a decision advantageous to a student.
325
  
 
Improvements to both HESA and the ESOS Act schemes effectively give students greater rights 
in regards to review of domestic decisions. As distinct from the OIA framework, decisions 
relating to academic judgement may also be reviewed.
326
 Neither establishes (nor prescribes) a 
body for dispute-handling or review. The HESA framework does not establish procedural 
requirements for the handling of grievances or review, for example, in relation to how a matter 
must be heard. Procedure for external review may or may not be judicial in style on the basis of 
these rules, although the general obligation on providers to treat students fairly
327
 would tend to 
incorporate the general law of procedural fairness into the conduct of both complaints-handling 
and review schemes.
328
 The requirements on providers under the National Code are more 
prescriptive. Internal and external schemes applying to international students require an 
opportunity for a student ‗to formally present his or her case,‘ allows a student to be 
‗accompanied and assisted‘ by a ‗support person,‘ and requires reasons to be given for a 
decision.
329
 Finally, in those jurisdictions that have introduced human rights legislation, such as 
the ACT and Victoria, the nature and standards of hearing may have an impact on how schemes 
for review of decisions affecting students unfold.
330
 This has been the subject of some debate in 
the UK following introduction of the Human Rights Act and its application to UK 
universities.
331
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3.4 Conclusion 
 
The legal relationship between the student and university is complex. The student cannot be 
easily reduced to a consumer of public (or private) services, and there is a strong basis on which 
the student‘s relationship to the university remains a question of status and the student therefore 
a member, or ‗corporator,‘ of the university. Disputes that spill over internal systems of 
grievance and review find their way to the courts in applications for judicial review, actions in 
contract, and actions for consumer protection. Given the ‗hybrid‘ character of the student-
university relationship, it is not surprising that the relationship is founded on public and private 
law. This situation produces a level of peculiarity in the systems of legal review and redress 
available to students. Adjudication of contractual or consumer protection disputes is likely to 
face the sequential difficulties of identifying the contractual terms at issue and their effect, and 
quantifying appropriate damages (and determining what loss has been suffered). In 
administrative law, universities are distinguishable from ‗mainstream‘ public sector decision-
making in that their decision-making overwhelmingly lies outside of the merits review 
system.
332
 It may be expressly stated in university enabling legislation that the institution is not 
an ‗instrumentality of the Crown.‘333  
 
Historically, the legal basis of the student-university relationship has grown. Where once the 
Visitor held pre-eminence in adjudication on domestic affairs, this office is in decline. Student 
challenge to university decisions is, however, unlikely to decline.
334
 There is evidence that UK 
reforms establishing the OIA have been successful in dealing with disputes before they get to 
the courts
335
 and therefore providing an intermediary institution between ‗internal‘ review and 
resolution and adjudication before the courts. These arrangements, however, have their 
limitations, including potential ambiguity over the authority of OIA decisions, adequacy of 
adjudicative procedure, and removal of academic decisions from the scope of review.  
 
In respect of external recourse, the Australian approach has been more ad hoc and piecemeal. 
Abolition of the Visitor‘s jurisdiction in most universities may have been warranted because of 
the arcane and uncertain rules of visitorial action. But the policy rationale that internal appeals 
mechanisms
336
 or resort to the law and courts
337
 would suffice appeared to be accompanied by 
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little or no evidence. The Commonwealth has filled the policy vacuum through requirements on 
universities for student complaints and review mechanisms. The Australian regulatory approach 
has required important revisions to the original statutory rules, most notably in compelling 
stronger systems of external review.  
 
It is only relatively recently that a regulatory or legislative attempt has been made to craft 
special mechanisms for the resolution of student-university disputes. UK and Australian 
(Commonwealth) reforms of dispute handling are noteworthy for their efforts to carve out a 
‗place in the spectrum of legal and informal methods of settling disputes‘ in public law. On 
balance the British approach is more coherent, organised and accountable. It possesses an 
institutional architecture, funding base, statutory support in primary legislation, and 
demonstrated (if short-run) effectiveness. All four elements are absent from the Australian 
schemes required under Federal legislation. On the other hand, the Australian statutory 
conditions do encompass disputes relating to academic judgement, thereby widening the 
capacity for review beyond what is possible in the UK. Yet, if Australia is to move down the 
route of a single national disputes-handling body for the university sector (or for the wider 
tertiary education sector, for that matter), as has been mooted,
338
 lessons may be learnt from the 
UK experience – for instance, that the scheme should be adjudicative, although under a more 
precise model of adjudication, and that the model should be inspired by the public law 
tradition.
339
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Chapter 4 
Discipline 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Disciplinary regimes codify conduct, and, by extension, proscribe transgressive behaviours or 
misconduct. It is aimed at the order of a collectivity, and the effectiveness and legitimacy of that 
body within the general community. In respect of law, the ‗community‘ at issue may be entirely 
private or ‗domestic,‘ and regulated by contract or trust. It may be a private association with 
some form of statutory regulation or ‗underpinning,‘340 as with clubs. It may be a body primarily 
operating with respect to statutory regulation and licensing, as in the context of professional 
associations, or the ‗community‘ may be an institution of the state itself, as in the case of police 
and military forces or the prison system.  
 
4.2 The Professions  
 
In consideration of university discipline, the question of professional discipline is an instructive 
point of comparison. The model of the professions, as with the model of the university, is a 
community dedicated to a given sphere of practice and provided with an ‗machinery‘ of self-
government to that end. The university is arguably distinguishable by its larger ‗cultural‘ 
project,
341
 and the scope and diversity of its intellectual (and physical) ‗territory.‘342 Moreover, 
in respect of discipline, the university is distinguishable by the specific nature of the scholarly 
relationship at its heart, the fact that the majority of that body‘s membership possesses a unique 
status: what is termed historically, in statu pupillari.  
 
Yet, as with older professions, such as law, theology or medicine, the university has an ancient 
corporate existence and this implies the capacity (indeed necessity) of such bodies to control 
their members, including admission to membership and circumstances of removal from 
membership. It has been remarked of the professions:  
 
It is far from a novelty that members of a profession should be formed into a corporation, that 
corporate membership should form a condition of practice in that profession, and that the 
corporation should have the power to discipline its members, even to the point of expulsion. 
Such corporations and their enforcement of discipline have been familiar for centuries.
343
 
 
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, the professions – the ‗spontaneous coming together 
of practitioners in associations, [under the] regulative intervention of the State… organised on a 
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craft basis‘344 – have faced two developments bearing on the question of discipline. First, they 
have come under statutory control. Second, the range of bodies identifying as professions (and 
regulated as such) has grown significantly. Statutory controls in the UK originate in the Medical 
Act 1858 (UK). In Australia, legislation to regulate professions, or aspects of professional 
practice, also emerged in the nineteenth century. Until recently, the general formulation of 
misconduct to which sanction could apply followed, or was comparable to, that expressed in the 
original UK Medical Act 1858, namely that disciplinary sanction might apply to a person guilty 
of ‗infamous conduct in a professional respect.‘ The construction of jurisdiction in these terms 
conferred upon the appropriate authorities disciplinary power over ‗infamous‘ or ‗disgraceful‘ 
conduct by a professional person but only ‗bearing in mind his [sic] special position and 
responsibilities.‘345 In addition, the scope of conduct liable to disciplinary action was not limited 
to that carried out in the direct course of professional practice but may include conduct 
considered as impugning the standing of the profession, inappropriate to the profession, or as 
morally reprehensible.
346
  
 
In the past two decades in Australian jurisdictions, the formulation of misconduct in the 
professions has been overhauled and updated, although a general distinction between 
professional competence on the one hand and wider misconduct on the other hand still tends to 
operate.
347
 Evolution of the grounds of professional discipline has occurred as part of wider 
reforms to professional regulation, bearing in mind a greater ‗consumerist‘ approach to markets 
for ‗professional services‘ and in the eclipse of a ‗peer-review‘ model of professional 
regulation.
348
 That is to say, the disciplinary model in the professions has changed in the context 
of a changing relationship between the professions and their clients. 
 
It is important to note that, in the context of the ‗special skill‘349 possessed by the professional, 
discipline functions as a system of protective controls.
350
 Disciplinary controls, although they 
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may have quasi-criminal overtones, are not criminal penalties. As Forbes remarks, ‗… 
disciplinary ―sanctions‖ are not penal. They are not intended to punish, but to protect the 
community or members of the organisation concerned.‘351 This rationale applies even where 
sanction ‗may involve a great deprivation to the person disciplined…‘352 
 
4.3 University Discipline 
 
In the university, the precise function and role of discipline in respect of students, has not been 
as stable or as apparent as it is in the case of the professions. I suggest this is because of the 
enormous transformation in the higher education system, especially in the post-war period. The 
changing functions of university discipline in respect of those in statu pupillari has led to 
change in the jurisdiction of disciplinary authorities and in the scope and emphasis of 
disciplinary powers.  
 
4.3.1 In Loco Parentis and Beyond 
 
Prior to the sixties‘ upheavals, university discipline as it applied to students primarily concerned 
itself with moral as well as educational tutelage of students. The standing of the institution in 
loco parentis was widely adopted in US jurisdictions. ‗The university has two bases for 
exercising disciplinary powers,‘ wrote one author in the late 1960s, ‗―one in connection with 
safeguarding the University‘s ideals of scholarship, and the other in connection with 
safeguarding the University‘s moral atmosphere.‖‘353 The same tenor and principle arose in 
English cases, such as Glynn v Keele University,
354
 where a ‗magisterial‘ authority applied ‗in 
certain circumstances‘:  
 
The context of educational societies involves a special factor which is not present in other 
contexts, namely the relation of tutor and pupil; that is to say the society is charged with the 
upbringing and supervision of the pupil under tuition, be the society a university or college, or a 
school.
355
 
 
Until the latter part of the nineteenth century, magisterial powers were literally vested in 
university authorities at the ancient universities, such as Oxford and Cambridge. Authority 
dating back to the late medieval period vested in the University regulatory powers over the town 
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as well as the University‘s own members.356 This included a ‗special criminal jurisdiction,‘357 
where (at Cambridge at least) the Vice-Chancellor was ex officio a local magistrate. These 
powers came to some notoriety in Daisy Hopkins’ Case,358 in which a woman was convicted by 
the University for what amounted to prostitution,
359
 a conviction later overturned. Cambridge 
University‘s ‗special‘ jurisdiction was shortly afterwards abolished.360  
 
Disciplinary jurisdiction consonant with moral supervision of students came under sustained 
attack in the sixties‘ revolution. In the US, the in loco parentis doctrine went into sharp decline 
with the extension of Constitutional rights to students in publicly-funded educational 
institutions.
361
 As a Yale University Professor remarked:  
 
In recent years, higher education has been experiencing an identity crisis… Time was when 
higher education was a self-governing community, a law unto itself. Recently, all of this has 
changed. It develops, almost suddenly, that conceptions of fair treatment on this campus are not 
altogether consistent with those off the campus. Consequently, the courts are second-guessing 
the campus in order to make it more accountable to traditional conceptions of justice.
362
  
 
Among other things, the student movements of the period rejected paternalism. Struggles 
against disciplinary regimes were part of the wider campus upheavals.
363
 Farrington notes: 
‗Universities‘ disciplinary procedures had been drawn up as a cross between the rules which 
might apply in loco parentis and the rules of a gentleman‘s club. Neither was suited to the 
revolution of the late 1960s.‘364 Student repudiation of the internal order combined with judicial 
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intervention into university affairs prompted a rethinking of the ‗scope of university 
discipline.‘365  
 
Inevitably, this process involved a retraction of the domain of disciplinary action, ‗limited to 
student misconduct which distinctly and adversely affects the university community‘s pursuit of 
its proper educational purposes.‘366 The function of discipline was reformulated as a broadly 
pedagogical one,
367
 with the university giving regard also to its public circumstances.
368
 
Discursively, the student would less be considered the supervised and instructed ‗pupil‘ than a 
citizen subject to certain domestic conditions:
369
 ‗Students are not only dependents in a 
paternalistic society. They are also citizens of a republic...‘370  
 
Absent the moral and quasi-familial imperative, the form of the disciplinary model also 
changed:  
 
It is… no longer possible to think of university discipline as an aspect of family law and 
relations; it has become necessary to find a new intellectual underpinning and corresponding 
new institutions to deal with problems formerly handled in a family manner. The new conception 
which seems to have filled the void left by the decline of in loco parentis is one that views 
university discipline as quasi-criminal.
371
  
 
As far as the student was concerned, the language of (quasi) criminality, coextensive with the 
language of legal right and obligation,
372
 tended to dissolve discursive and legal boundaries 
between the university and the general public domain. It also imported a sentiment of 
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institutional anxiety, in particular the need for discipline to affect a ‗protective‘ ethic for the 
university itself: ‗Undoubtedly an academic community is a delicate organism, largely 
dependent for its existence and well-being on the self-restraint of all its members.‘373 
Consequently, the ‗protective‘ function of discipline in this context differed from the use of 
sanction in the professions, at least to the extent that the object of protection in the university 
was the ‗internal community‘ (primarily from students); in the latter situation it was, and 
remains, the ‗external‘ public at large.374  
 
4.3.2 Contemporary Construction of Disciplinary Schema 
 
In the wake of ‗the sixties,‘ disciplinary schema ordinarily distinguish between academic and 
‗non-academic‘ misconduct.375 This approach is consistent with decline of a strict in statu 
pupillari model of the student, and renovation of the ‗domestic‘ model of university relations, 
analogous to a self-regulating association, in which the student possesses a type of membership 
contract,
376
 with a ‗public law dimension.‘377 The ‗academic-nonacademic‘ disciplinary 
structure is articulated in a 1991 Canadian case, Healey v Memorial University of 
Newfoundland:
378
  
 
First, there is no question that the University has the legal authority to protect persons and 
property… Second, there is no question that the University has the authority to take into account 
professional, as well as academic factors, in deciding whether to permit a student to continue 
studies… Third, the courts should respect the intention of the Legislature that internal problems 
be resolved by the University itself.  
 
In the US, this structure of arrangements has also tended to derive from distinctions made by the 
courts between university decisions with an academic content and those without. At one pole, 
‗disciplinary‘ decisions strictly speaking (ie ‗non-academic‘ discipline) attract relatively 
stronger procedural safeguards and greater ‗quasi-criminal‘ treatment. At another pole, 
‗academic dismissal‘ decisions, or academic disputes, receive far fewer protections, on the basis 
of judicial deference to university expertise in academic matters.
379
 ‗Academic discipline,‘ or 
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sanction for academic misconduct, falls in between the two.
380
 In the US cases, judicial 
approach to the construction of ‗academic discipline‘ has been to view it as an extension of 
proper academic performance.
381
 While the approach to procedural safeguards has been contrary 
in other jurisdictions,
382
 the US situation nevertheless highlights a general juridical spectrum, if 
not clear distinction, of academic and disciplinary decision-making. Disciplinary decision-
making may be characterised with regard to academic content in the decision being made, 
which will fall more or less to the expertise or discretion of the disciplinary body. Where 
‗academic‘ content comes into play the (functional) focus of discipline is less the protection of 
persons or property interests and more the protection of an institution‘s academic standards. 
With the eclipse of large-scale campus rebellion on Western university campuses through the 
1980s and 1990s, disciplinary preoccupations by university administrators were less the issue of 
campus ‗disorder‘ and public disruption of the university‘s activities. The disciplinary 
preoccupation and anxiety appear not per se to have been resolved, but rather recast ‗closer to 
home,‘ as a problem of academic standards and specifically as a problem of academic 
misconduct.  
 
4.4 The Rise of Academic Misconduct  
 
Codes of academic conduct include prohibitions on plagiarism, cheating on examinations, 
falsification of data, and ‗collusion‘ (or unauthorised collaboration among students). Actions 
such as falsification of academic records, grades or ‗special consideration‘ documents may fall 
on the margins of this category. These forms of misconduct are viewed in some quarters as 
forms of moral and/or intellectual failure on the part of students.
383
 They may be viewed as the 
product of a malaise within the universities, facilitated by new communications technologies.
384
 
These measures are closely related to concerns over academic standards.
385
 In one study,
386
 the 
authors draw the rather severe analogy between action on plagiarism and prosecuting war:  
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These statistics [showing high rates of cheating] show that cybercheating is endemic in 
Universities around the world, and that academic and administrators have to wage a war to both 
stop and prevent such cheating… In such a climate [including student litigation and corruption 
investigations], the issue of plagiarism can rightly be described as a battleground, where a war is 
being waged between students and institutions, and played out using all of the means afforded by 
contemporary digital technologies. 
 
There is a growing body of empirical evidence on rates, or prevalence, of student misconduct in 
tertiary education, accompanied by research on motivations for such behaviours. Through 
surveys of students on a range of academic behaviours (or misbehaviours), significant rates of 
academic misconduct have been reported, despite the fact that these appear to dramatically 
contrast with rates of identification or ‗prosecution‘ of students for misconduct by way of 
disciplinary action.  
 
A 2005 Australian study
387
 has put ‗baseline‘ rates of ‗dishonest academic behaviours‘ at 41% 
for exam cheating, 81% for plagiarism, and 25% for falsification of records or dishonest 
excuses. A contemporaneous UK survey in a post-1992, statutory university found that ‗it is 
likely that up to 80% of students plagiarise to some extent.‘388 An earlier UK study389 found the 
occurrence of a range of ‗cheating behaviours‘ among students at between 54 and 72% of 
respondents. In a New Zealand study,
390
 88% of students responded to having engaged in 
serious or minor incidents of cheating (65% reported as having engaged in ‗serious cheating‘).  
 
These figures do need to be treated with caution. In particular, the UK study notes an inverse 
correlation between the seriousness of misconduct and its frequency (ie the more serious 
misconduct is the less frequent it is), and declining incidents of misconduct as students get 
older. These studies affirm a trend by students not necessarily to engage serially in cheating or 
misconduct but rather engaging in transgressive conduct at some time in their studies. It is also 
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necessary to consider that ‗dishonest‘ academic conduct lies on a spectrum of tactical 
behaviours, legitimate and prohibited, employed by students to ‗cope… with the demands of 
assessment.‘391 It is arguable that a tactical approach to education is itself, whether or not it falls 
into the domain of proscribed action, counter-productive, if not corrosive, of higher learning.
392
  
 
The New Zealand study above collected data on the rate of formal disciplinary action against 
students (0.2% of enrolled students), and the rate of students actually caught cheating (5.8% of 
enrolled students). The NZ data suggests not only that most ‗detected‘ misconduct is dealt with 
informally but that the formal disciplinary system is ineffective from the point of view of 
‗prosecution‘ or deterrence.  
 
Literature on academic dishonesty has found important motivating forces to include: pressures 
of assessment;
393
 time pressures and desire to improve grades;
394
 student inexperience and/or an 
instrumental approach to education;
395
 and assessment of the likelihood of detection.
396
 Staff 
reluctance to engage with the issue, especially its formal procedural dimensions, is reported to 
be based on lack of institutional support and/or the workload involved.
397
 In the US context, 
McCabe and Trevino
398
 found that a key variable in academic honesty/dishonesty was peer 
attitudes, approval and disapproval. They also found, counter-intuitively, that rates of cheating 
were higher where they perceived the penalties more severe. Marsden et al‘s399 Australian study 
correlated propensity to academic dishonesty with attitudes to learning, gender (male students 
more likely to engage in dishonesty than female students), year level (later years students more 
likely to engage in dishonesty than first-year students), and information about rules and 
penalties regarding dishonesty (information did not have a major impact on propensity to act 
honestly).  
 
A third body of analysis considers structural and institutional factors linked to academic 
misconduct. The Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Eduction Committee‘s 
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Universities in Crisis report linked decline in government funding and commercialisation of the 
sector to deterioration in academic standards and the ability of universities to perform their 
principal functions.
400
 Indirectly, objective conditions of resources and funding may be linked to 
academic behaviours, for instance with regard to workload pressures on students and staff. 
Sutherland-Smith
401
 makes the point that management and policing of student academic 
dishonesty impacts on academic staff, often adversely, and they are constructing unofficial 
strategies to deal with it: ‗… a growing form of underground disciplinary proceedings is 
emerging in which teachers allege and condemn students for plagiarism by summary trial.‘ To 
the extent that this empirical observation can be verified or generalised, the capacity for students 
to receive fair treatment at the hands of local decision-makers is surely compromised. 
Williams
402
 also looks to the function of objective conditions on students‘ propensity to engage 
in academic misconduct. Criticising increased surveillance and deterrence as ‗essentially a 
reactionary approach that is unlikely to yield lasting benefits,‘ he argues that the ‗source of the 
problem is systemic.‘ In particular, he raises concerns with the pedagogical conditions faced by 
university students: ‗The prevention of plagiarism through innovative pedagogy is more likely 
to produce lasting results for the simple reason that such an approach provides students with an 
incentive to learn.‘ Pendleton403 raises the growing dissonance between academic cultures of the 
Australian (western) university and the learning methods and traditions of international students, 
notably those from east and south Asia. This issue is made pressing by the fact of the dramatic 
growth in international students (and reliance in international student fee income). For 
Pendleton, emergence of the ‗―problem‖ of plagiarism‘ not only highlights a moral or 
behavioural crisis among students but a conceptual problem in the model of misconduct, 
associated with concepts of originality and ownership of knowledge. Brian Martin
404
 also 
undertakes a thorough critique of the concept of plagiarism.  
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4.5 Plagiarism 
 
At certain times, a veritable hysteria has emerged over the issue of plagiarism (and other 
academic misconduct) by students in Australia universities.
405
 As a form of scholarly rule-
breaking, plagiarism by students comes in for special attention and scrutiny. One reason for this 
is that acts of plagiarism tend to constitute a significant proportion of reported rates of academic 
misconduct.
406
 A further reason is that plagiarism may represent a particularly heinous form of 
misconduct in the academic community: ‗Clearly, the charge of plagiarism is a charge of 
cheating and as such the most serious academic breach of discipline possible. It is also criminal 
in its nature.‘407 It is consistent with (and extends) the ethical violation exhibited in scientific or 
intellectual misconduct, ‗when the intention is to deceive or demonstrate a serious disregard for 
the truth. As such, misconduct involves… in some instances, a serious erosion of the rights of 
scholars and other to have the intellectual debt that others owe them acknowledged.‘408 Finally, 
plagiarism rather awkwardly straddles the issue of disciplinary action and academic judgement. 
To that end, academic plagiarism in respect of students is not necessarily a straightforward, 
transparent concept. It is, at its margins, ambiguous and unsettled. 
 
Several recent cases in the courts have highlighted academic plagiarism (and related concepts, 
such as ‗collusion‘) as a legal and conceptual problem. Most of these cases have involved 
disputes over ‗good character‘ for admitted lawyers, or individuals seeking admissions.409  
 
4.5.1 Origins of Plagiarism 
 
Academic analysis of the ‗plagiarism problem‘ will, on occasion, provide useful, even 
extensive, philological discussion of the origins of the concept, which owes its etymological 
roots to the Latin term plagium, referring to the enslavement of a freeman or theft of a slave. 
The parallel to misappropriation lies in the reference to a form of ‗piracy,‘ the analogy 
eventually acquiring the character of a dead metaphor and employed to refer to the 
appropriation of ideas or language without acknowledgment or deference to the author. Its 
modern origins lie in literature and concepts of literary novelty, including where these issues 
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intersect with copyright. The relationship of plagiarism and copyright has been the subject of 
ongoing academic concern,
410
 however academic opinion cautions against conflating the two:  
 
In short, plagiarism and copyright infringement do share important characteristics, but for the 
most part remain distinct from one another. All cases of plagiarism are not cases of copyright 
infringement, and vice versa. And while all cases of copyright infringement may be legally 
actionable if monetary damages are proven, many cases of academic plagiarism offer no cause of 
action or private remedy whatsoever.
411
  
 
Although there is academic and judicial opinion assimilating plagiarism to criminality,
412
 it is 
more arguable that, where it is legally actionable (as arising, for instance, from economic 
interests), plagiarism is a form of wrong,
413
 whose content may be intentional or negligent 
transgression of rules of originality or authority.
414
 It is a consequence of intellectual authority, 
in its broadest sense. In the academic context, plagiarism essentially represents an ethical 
prohibition against misattribution or misappropriation of the intellectual endeavours of other 
authors, notwithstanding that it may find expression in quasi-criminal or quasi-tortious 
language. Papy-Carder makes the important point that academic plagiarism is also (and 
principally) distinguishable from literary or other forms of plagiarism on policy grounds: 
‗Plagiarism… goes beyond [economic] interests and protects a third set of interests – those 
associated with scholarly institutions.‘415 The prohibition against plagiarism, in the educational 
context, is aimed at protecting the standing and standards of the institution.  
 
4.5.2 Scope of the Concept 
 
In the academic setting, it is my submission, a central point of contention in respect of 
plagiarism arises in its delineation as a disciplinary concept, that is as a disciplinary subject as 
distinct from, for example, a question of academic assessment or procedure.  
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The distinction is important because once a decision goes beyond the limits of academic 
judgement into the field of disciplinary action the consequences, subject-matter and nature of 
the decision-making become more serious. How decisions are handled also differ. There may be 
considerable academic content to disciplinary decision-making, and, as US judicial opinion 
exemplifies, this fact may have considerable impact on how the decision-making proceeds and 
the protections afforded a student.  Napolitano v Trustees of Princeton University
416
 
demonstrates that US courts are reluctant to intervene in any decision in which academic 
judgement plays a role, other than where capricious or arbitrary decision-making can be proven. 
The issue of deference to academic discretion also applies, if more narrowly, in the UK or 
Australian jurisdictions. For instance, academic judgements may be reviewable at law for 
unfairness or bad faith, where ‗extraneous‘ factors enter into decision-making.417 There also 
now appears ‗circumstances where courts will intervene and make judgements of an academic 
nature,‘418 notably where decisions of academic judgement affect admission to professional 
practice.
419
 Reluctance to intervene in strictly academic decisions remains the norm in judicial 
review of university decisions.
420
  
 
Fact-finding in respect of academic plagiarism will inherently require academic assessment and 
knowledge. Student disciplinary bodies may apply their own academic expertise and knowledge 
to the proceedings. This may include expertise in a particular academic field.
421
 Additionally, 
this fact-finding is an issue of understanding the pedagogical process, or possessing knowledge 
of academic convention and procedure, as this applies to university students in the course of 
their development in the institution. This knowledge is significant in consideration of the scope 
and limits of plagiarism as a disciplinary offence. 
 
4.5.2.1. Intention and ‘Wrong’ 
 
There are two circumstances in which academic plagiarism equates to misconduct (and is 
therefore subject to disciplinary action). The first, most renowned, category is where 
misappropriation of ideas, text or other intellectual content occurs as a matter of dishonesty, or 
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in other words where the conduct includes an element of intention. In this case, it is an intention 
by a student to misrepresent his/her ideas, work, or expression as his/her own in order to gain 
some benefit or advantage, such as higher grades or passing a course of study. As Bills has 
noted: ‗The role of ―intent‖ may be the central issue to a student charged with plagiarism.‘422 He 
found that in a survey of US law schools approximately 64% included ‗intent‘ in the 
formulation of their plagiarism policy. By contrast, LeClerq
423
 found (only eight years later) 
only 28% (42 out of 152) law schools surveyed required intent to be found in cases of 
plagiarism.  
 
In Australian universities, express requirement in disciplinary rules, or relevant policy or 
guidelines, for intent to be proved in plagiarism cases is the exception rather than the rule. Table 
4.1 refers to elements of plagiarism rules in selected Australian universities.
424
 It can see that all 
the investigated universities do provide a specific definition of plagiarism, either in statutory 
rules or (more commonly) in accompanying guidelines or policy. The large majority of 
institutions do not require intent as the test or threshold in the definition of plagiarism. To that 
end, the concept of plagiarism has wider effect. In both instances where intent is required 
(Griffith University and Curtin University), the formulation of plagiarism is in terms of a 
student ‗knowingly‘ engaging in the practice.  
Table 4.1: Construction of the concept of plagiarism in university rules, selected 
Australian universities 
Institution Specific defn Statutory 
rule (s) or 
other 
guideline (g) 
Intention 
required? 
Plagiarism threshold other than 
intention (if expressly stated) 
Sydney Y G N ‗negligent‘ 
UTS Y S N - 
UWS Y G N ‗inadvertent‘ 
Newcastle Y G N - 
Monash Y G N ‗unintentional‘ 
Deakin Y S N ‗has the effect of‘ being 
misleading 
RMIT Y S N - 
Swin Y G N - 
Wollongong Y G N ‗unintentional‘ 
Queensland Y G N ‗carelessness‘ 
Tas Y G N - 
Griffith Y G Y NA 
Curtin Y G Y NA 
Sunshine Coast Y G N ‗unintentional‘ 
JCU Y G N - 
Total (N) = 15 15 G=12, S=3 Y=2 (13.3%) Other threshold = 7 
 
The question of intent imports a student‘s state of mind into the decision-making process, and 
effectively narrows the scope of the concept and hence the scope of misconduct falling under 
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Education 236. 
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this head. Intention proved a critical factor in a review of findings of academic misconduct in Re 
Humzy-Hancock.
425
 In that case, Griffith University Law School‘s Assessment Policy and 
Procedures defined plagiarism as including ‗knowing presentation‘ of others‘ work as a 
student‘s own. Intent became the ‗critical question.‘426 At trial, McMurdo J found, in review of 
the University‘s disciplinary action against Humzy-Hancock, an absence of intent in the  
(former) student‘s conduct, and distinguished his ‗poor work‘ from plagiarism.427 The review of 
Humzy-Hancock‘s actions in this case arose in the course of resolution of matters of fact in his 
application for admission to legal practice in Queensland.  
 
If plagiarism is not limited to circumstances where intent can be proven, then what are the 
proper limits of that form of action? How far-reaching is the model of behaviour? How wide 
ought the reach of disciplinary action to be in these cases? 
 
Patten AJ remarked in Nguyen v Nguyen & Vu Publishers Pty Ltd and Van Thang Nguyen and 
Thien Huu Nguyen,
428
 a defamation case:  
 
It was [the respondent‘s] extensive use of the means of expression employed by others without 
their acknowledgment or permission which constituted plagiarism, not the circumstances that he, 
quite legitimately, wrote about the same subject matter. His intentions, which may or may not 
have been reprehensible, are I think irrelevant. 
 
In this opinion, plagiarism was found, regardless of intent. Academic opinion has sought to 
make similar points.
429
 Yet, beyond the question of intent, plagiarism qua misconduct has its 
limits. In particular, those limits are expressed in the notion of plagiarism as a wrong. For 
instance, it was remarked in Carleton v ABC,
 430
 also a defamation case: ‗It follows that not 
every copying or imitation of the work of another without attribution will be plagiarism. It must 
also be wrongful.‘ It has been argued that plagiarism is in fact an ‗ancient tort‘ at law.431 But it 
is more accurate to state that, in distinguishing scholarly plagiarism from an economic wrong 
(copyright), academic plagiarism applies a model of wrong. It is strictly speaking an ethical 
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‗wrong.‘ The analogy of tort is perhaps extended in the idea that, as a matter of policy, damage 
arising from academic plagiarism is to the integrity of educational institutions.  
 
The nature of plagiarism as a wrong is discussed in Re La Trobe University; ex parte Wild,
432
 a 
visatorial case concerning findings of plagiarism against a professor at La Trobe University. In 
Ex parte Wild, ‗plagiarism committed entirely as a result of carelessness or negligence might be 
held to amount to gross misconduct in a professor‘433 and that ‗It is sufficient to say that it does 
not necessarily contain an element of moral culpability or an intention to deceive.‘434 The 
threshold and content of the wrong are extended, beyond intention, to encompass ‗carelessness 
or negligence.‘ By implication, such a framework incorporates into the threshold of misconduct 
what a person in the academy ought reasonably to know, and be able to apply, in the preparation 
and production of scholarly/academic work. As Higgins J stated in Carleton v ABC, plagiarism 
does not apply to any form of copying or reproduction. The practice, conduct or action must be 
put in a context: ‗The notion of ―copying‖ is always a matter of degree… The issue of 
―copying,‖ for example, house plans often revolves around breach of copyright. That breach is 
what imparts wrongfulness or impropriety.‘ Citing Flanagan v University College Dublin in 
respect of the scholarly context, his Honour remarks ‗―the charge of plagiarism is a charge of 
cheating.‖… Again, however, there is a distinction between the appropriation of ideas through 
research and the copying of the expression of those ideas by others without attribution.‘435  
 
4.5.2.2 Beyond Dishonesty and Carelessness: The Limits of Misconduct and Consideration of 
Educational Problems in Plagiarism Cases 
 
There is a further distinction to be made in the debate over plagiarism. Misappropriation of text 
or ideas may occur (for example, through copying of material without satisfactory attribution) as 
a result of ordinary ignorance or inexperience of the student, or for other relevant reasons 
outside of the scope of intention, ‗carelessness or negligence.‘ This may be the sort of conduct 
referred to by McMurdo J in Re Humzy-Hancock as ‗poor referencing‘ or ‗poor work.‘436  It is 
submitted that misappropriation arising from ignorance, inexperience or socio-cultural 
dislocation – which may technically be termed plagiarism – is distinguishable from conduct 
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Turner ‗Plagiarism: Academic Dishonesty or ―Blind Spot‖ Of Multicultural Education? (2008) 50 
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 78 
exhibiting ‗wrongfulness or impropriety.‘ The latter may fall within the scope of misconduct, 
while the former appears to me correctly to constitute an academic or educational problem, a 
problem of inadequate or incomplete competence rather than a ‗violation of the rules of 
conduct.‘437 On balance, it falls within the sphere of academic, rather than disciplinary, 
decision-making. Such a construction of academic misconduct needs to have regard to the 
(presumed) knowledge base acquired by the person facing the allegation. Regarding the 
circumstances in Ex parte Wild for instance, are the standards for misconduct ‗in a professor‘ 
comparable to the standards applying to a student? The implication of the phrase ‗in a professor‘ 
in that case would tend to suggest an appropriately variable standard. Such variability might 
also extend to students at different levels of ‗development‘ or progression in their course.  
 
The variable standard implied in Ex parte Wild means regard needs to be had to the pedagogical 
procedure and the academic model of the university; that is, the threshold of plagiarism ought 
reasonably to consider the developmental assumptions applied. The (quasi-criminal) model of 
dishonesty and the (quasi-tortious) model of wrong on which academic plagiarism unfolds in 
the reported cases establishes a space outside of the scope of misconduct where ‗copying,‘ 
‗misattribution‘ or ‗misappropriation‘ do not breach rules of conduct but advert to pedagogical 
issues foreseeable in the ‗formation‘  of the student. Plagiarism needs to give regard formally to 
the nature of student experience.  
 
4.5.2.3 The Nature of Student Experience 
 
The model of undergraduate education extends the process of ‗formation,‘438 in which a student 
acquires academic ‗literacy,‘439 ‗lifelong learning attributes,‘440 intellectual and human 
‗capabilities,‘441 or intellectual and personal autonomy. According to these principles, the 
educational process includes acquisition of competence and technique. This includes the 
‗cultivation‘ of academic methods, as well as knowledge of principles, assumptions and reasons 
underpinning them. It assumes maturation of the student as much as the cognitive accumulation 
of skills.
442
 It might be anticipated from this model that in the course of the educational 
                                                                                                                           
seemed to be not so much an issue of improper behaviour, as, rather, a safe and viable course of action in 
what often seemed to be a time of confusion and uncertainty.‘  
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 79 
experience, ‗plagiarism‘ might reasonably arise from inexperience, or insufficient inculcation in 
academic methods and techniques, or limits to the student‘s confidence or other psychological 
factors.  
 
Empirical study of the student experience, especially the ‗first year experience,‘ including those 
regarding plagiarism, reinforces this proposition. In his substantial 1970 study of university 
students, Little concludes: ‗The major finding of this study is that there are severe limits to 
students‘ intellectual autonomy.‘443 This early insight into student experience is reiterated in 
more recent research. In a 2000 report, surveying over 2600 first-year students, McInnis, James 
and Hartley
444
 found that a substantial minority of students experienced a ‗very uncertain start at 
university.‘445 Twenty-three per cent of students would have preferred a generalist, introductory 
first-year program, and more than one-third (34%) stated they were not prepared to choose a 
course when they left school. The problem of the ‗transition‘ to university (notably for school-
leavers), and adaptation to academic rules and styles, has been prominent in this ‗first year 
experience‘ literature.446 ‗Uncertainties‘ are consistent with the model of ‗formation,‘ in which 
students not only acquire knowledge of content in an intellectual discipline but also the methods 
and (cultural) rules underpinning the discipline. The latter methods and rules may be 
considerably more subtle, contradictory and complex than university authorities (and teachers) 
perceive. In ethnographic research on students‘ experience with the ‗social, cultural and literary 
                                                                                                                           
educational sense) with the Wilhelm von Humboldt and the founding of the University of Berlin, advert 
to the Idealist ‗cultivation‘ of the self, especially in the image of (and striving for) an ideal national and/or 
rationalist figure: the model of the ‗educated Man‘ (see eg Sven Erik Nordenbro ‗Bildung and the 
Thinking of Bildung’ (2002) 36 Journal of Philosophy of Education 3 341). This pedagogical foundation 
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‗Introduction: Bildung and the Idea of a Liberal Education‘ (2002) 36 Journal of Philosophy of Education 
3 317. Lyotard‘s reference to the eclipse of Bildung, noted above (Chapter 2), coextensive with an 
‗exteriorisation‘ and ‗performativity‘ of knowledge, presumes the crisis of a pedagogical condition 
autonomous of commodity-forms (ie models of economic value and supply chains). Lyotard‘s reference 
is presumably to a ‗classical‘ Bildung identified in particular with Humboldt‘s ‗neo-humanism‘ and an 
individualistic ‗self-transformation.‘ The content of this Bildung – with its teleological figure of egoistic 
(and ‗interior‘) freedom – has no doubt been displaced by a new content, characterised by the 
accumulator of pragmatic (ie operative and ‗exterior‘) knowledge, including ‗generic‘ knowledge, and 
where the (trans)formative experience of education is not teleological, or revelatory, but mutable and 
always provisional. I would argue it is possible to retain the skeletal concept of Bildung/formation while 
recognising that it has been ‗hollowed out‘ (‗ruined,‘ to use Readings‘ metaphor), and its humanist 
narrative of maturation/freedom replaced by the technocratic one of competence.  
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practices of introductory level economics,‘ Richardson447 finds anxiety and tension over the 
plagiarism question among students derives from contradictory early experiences with 
pedagogical practice in the academy. In particular, students are confronted with both the 
‗canonical‘ authority of the ‗introductory textbook‘ and ‗exhortations‘ to write and think 
critically and originally.  For Richardson, plagiarism by new students may be viewed in the 
context of this tension: ‗When it came to writing answers to assignment questions, students felt 
themselves wedged between a rock and a hard place. How could they express in their own 
words that which was more effectively expressed in the textbook?‘448 Further, tensions over 
plagiarism also arise from disjuncture between academic assumptions and expectations, and 
realities of developing or unformed academic literacy:  
 
While academics gave careful consideration to the setting of assignment and examination 
questions, they nonetheless anticipated that students would already know how to write before 
coming into the course. The processes of learning new discourses, learning new content 
knowledge and being able to express these ―in their own words,‖ as if they are indeed their own, 
was not seen as problematic, complex or particular difficult.
449
  
 
Generally, assumptions regarding ‗literary‘ and intellectual development ought not to be 
overstated, especially in early year students. In this context, construction of plagiarism as a 
disciplinary problem, rather than as a pedagogical issue, may be inappropriate, and the scope of 
the concept ought to be refined accordingly. Ellery emphasises the need for a pedagogical 
approach to plagiarism at the early stages of university education:
450
  
 
With regard to addressing plagiarism in its overall context at a tertiary level, it seems logical to 
assume that there comes a point where institutional disciplinary procedures must be brought into 
play. The findings in this study indicate that the first year may be too early for such drastic 
measures. However, the lack of real engagement in plagiarism and referencing issues by some 
students in this study also point towards a combined carrot (using pedagogical processes with 
ongoing feedback and support) and stick (threat of discipline) approach being necessary from the 
outset if we are to address plagiarism in any meaningful way. 
 
Song-Turner‘s study of international students identifies important issues specific to that ‗cohort‘ 
of students, notably cultural dislocation and unfamiliarity with relevant academic traditions, 
which have a comparable effect to inexperience or academic ‗illiteracy.‘451 Revision of the 
concept of plagiarism within university rules, according to schema that account for problems in 
academic practice (and implicitly accommodate a model of ‗formation‘ in university students), 
has not gone entirely unheeded. Of the institutions noted above, the University of Queensland 
has produced guidelines expressly recognising the issue of ‗poor academic practice,‘ 
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considering it in the context of plagiarism but additionally distinguishing it from misconduct 
strictly speaking: 
 
2.1 Plagiarism defined 
 
Plagiarism is the act of misrepresenting as one's own original work the ideas, interpretations, 
words or creative works of another.  These include published and unpublished documents, 
designs, music, sounds, images, photographs, computer codes and ideas gained through working 
in a group.  These ideas, interpretations, words or works may be found in print and/or electronic 
media. 
 
Academic staff have a responsibility to students to explain clearly academic expectations and 
what constitutes plagiarism and to cultivate, with their students, a climate of mutual respect for 
original work. 
 
Plagiarism can be divided into careless plagiarism and intentional plagiarism.  The former is 
discussed in more detail in section 2.3 of this policy.  Intentional plagiarism is likely to be 
treated as misconduct as explained in section 4. 
 
2.2 Examples of plagiarism 
 
The following are examples of plagiarism where appropriate acknowledgement or referencing of 
the author or source does not occur: 
 Direct copying of paragraphs, sentences, a single sentence or significant parts of a 
sentence;  
 Direct copying of paragraphs, sentences, a single sentence or significant parts of a 
sentence with an end reference but without quotation marks around the copied text;  
 Copying ideas, concepts, research results, computer codes, statistical tables, designs, 
images, sounds or text or any combination of these;  
 Paraphrasing, summarising or simply rearranging another person's words, ideas, etc 
without changing the basic structure and/or meaning of the text;  
 Offering an idea or interpretation that is not one's own without identifying whose idea 
or interpretation it is;  
 A ‗cut and paste' of statements from multiple sources;  
 Presenting as independent, work done in collaboration with others;  
 Copying or adapting another student's original work into a submitted assessment item.  
  
2.3 Poor academic practice 
 
There will be instances when a student unintentionally fails to cite sources or to do so 
adequately.  For example, a student 
 may clearly recognise the need for referencing but references carelessly or inadequately 
for the context of the relevant discipline;  
 has undertaken extensive research but, in the process, loses track of the source of some 
material;  
 is ignorant of western academic conventions.  
Careless or inadequate referencing or failure to reference will be considered poor academic 
practice and a demonstration of carelessness in research and presentation of evidence.  The 
student may be required to correct the error or may lose marks. 
  
Academic staff have a responsibility to educate students about appropriate citation practices in 
the context of their discipline and provide clear examples of what is acceptable.
452
 
 
4.6 Standards of Persuasion in Plagiarism and Academic Misconduct Cases 
 
                                                                                                                           
451
 Song-Turner ‗Plagiarism: Academic Dishonesty or ―Blind Spot‖ of Multicultural Education?‘. 
452
 University of Queensland Policy 3.40.12 – Academic Integrity and Plagiarism. 
 82 
It is worth also considering a final issue affecting decision-making in disciplinary cases, and 
academic misconduct cases in particular: what standard or standards of proof, in the legal sense, 
are required to be applied in the fact-finding process? The significance of this question in 
university discipline is that for different groups of students the nature and/or consequences of 
the disciplinary decision may differ. In turn, the obligations resting on disciplinary decision-
makers regarding how they come to their decision may also vary. Within the university the 
standards applying to proof of misconduct by students will, in certain circumstances, differ. The 
task will not always be the same. This premise is an extension of the law of evidence and 
application of that law to non-court tribunals.
453
 
 
As a form of administrative tribunal, student disciplinary proceedings apply the civil standard of 
proof to the fact-finding and decision-making process. The persuasive burden in respect of an 
allegation of fact against a student is that a decision-making body must be ‗reasonably satisfied‘ 
of its occurrence on the ‗balance of probabilities,‘ or the ‗preponderance of probability.‘ It is 
established law that in forming a view on the civil standard a decision-maker is required to take 
into account the gravity of the situation and consequences.
454
 The standard of proof is a variable 
standard. The so-called ‗Briginshaw test‘ affects how such decisions are to be reasoned:  
 
‗Reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the 
nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of the allegation made, 
the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of the given description, or gravity of the 
consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer 
to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In 
such matters, ―reasonable satisfaction‖ should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite 
testimony, or indirect inferences…‘455 
 
Gravity of consequences and seriousness of allegations are key considerations that may affect 
decision-making in university discipline. Circumstances in which those considerations apply 
would in particular be where findings of misconduct affect professional registration or where 
they affect residency status. As prime examples, law students fall into the former category, and 
international students (where they are susceptible to suspension or exclusion from the 
university, or restrictions on their enrolment) fall into the latter category.  
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4.6.1 Law Students 
 
The breadth of sanctions that may follow from a finding of misconduct by university authorities 
may have serious ramifications for other persons, including graduates or alumni.
456
 For 
example, university powers to revoke degrees
457
 may imperil a person‘s continuing practice in 
their profession or trade once they have graduated and been admitted to practice. Revocation of 
degrees is an exceptional event, however. For law students, the significance of disciplinary 
action lies in the potential for findings of misconduct to preclude them from gaining admission 
to practice in the legal profession, or alternatively having the right to practice withdrawn. The 
issue for prospective lawyers is not so much status of their (future) degree. Rather, the issue is 
that a finding of misconduct is relevant to the ‗character review of intending lawyers,‘458 or in 
other words, the test as to whether they are a ‗fit and proper‘ (or ‗suitable‘) person to practice in 
the profession. The grounds for that test were authoritatively stated by Kitto J in Ziems v 
Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW:
459
 
 
The issue is whether the appellant is shown not to be a fit and proper person to be a member of 
the Bar of New South Wales. It is not capable of more precise statement. The answer must 
depend upon one's conception of the minimum standards demanded by a due recognition of the 
peculiar position and functions of a barrister in a system which treats the Bar as in fact, whether 
or not it is also in law, a separate and distinct branch of the legal profession. It has been said 
before, and in this case the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court has said again, that the Bar is no 
ordinary profession or occupation. These are not empty words, nor is it their purpose to express 
or encourage professional pretensions. They should be understood as a reminder that a barrister 
is more than his client's confidant, adviser and advocate, and must therefore possess more than 
honesty, learning and forensic ability. He is, by virtue of a long tradition, in a relationship of 
intimate collaboration with the judges, as well as with his fellow-members of the Bar, in the high 
task of endeavouring to make successful the service of the law to the community. That is a 
delicate relationship, and it carries exceptional privileges and exceptional obligations. If a 
barrister is found to be, for any reason, an unsuitable person to share in the enjoyment of those 
privileges and in the effective discharge of those responsibilities, he is not a fit and proper person 
to remain at the Bar.  
 
In more recent times, findings of academic misconduct at university have led to admitted 
lawyers consequently being ‗disbarred,‘460 or graduates seeking admission facing the prospect 
of denial to be admitted.
461
 The consequences, therefore, of disciplinary action at university can 
be a ruined career as well as the lost costs of the course undertaken. Application of Briginshaw 
principles to disbarment proceedings recently occurred before the Victoria Supreme Court, 
                                           
456
 Graduates and alumni commonly retain a status as ‗members‘ of the university under university 
legislation in Australia. 
457
 Such a power may be expressly incorporated into sanctions available to disciplinary bodies, although 
in any case, universities possess an inherent power to do so: R v the Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of 
the University of Cambridge; ex parte Bentley [1723] 93 ER 698; Re La Trobe University; ex Parte 
Hazan [1993] 1 VR 7. 
458
 John Basten and Paul Redmond ‗Character Review of Intending Lawyers‘ (1980) 3 University of New 
South Wales Law Journal 117. 
459
 (1957) 97 CLR 279, 298. 
460
 Eg Re Legal Profession Act 2004; Re OG, A Lawyer [2007] VSC 520; compare Re: Humzy-Hancock 
[2007] QSC 34. 
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where findings of fact in respect of academic misconduct (plagiarism and collusion) at 
university were the central issues before the Court. In Re OG, the Court held:  
 
In coming to those conclusions [that the practitioner had committed academic misconduct as a 
student] we bear in mind that these are in effect professional disciplinary proceedings and that, 
while the standard of proof is the civil standard, the degree of satisfaction for which that standard 
calls in this context is proportionate to the gravity of the facts to be proved. We have also given 
weight to the presumption of innocence and the exactness of proof expected in matters of this 
kind.
462
  
 
While this rule of law applies to a practising lawyer (hence reference to professional 
disciplinary proceedings), the same rule arguably applies to a graduate applying for 
admission.
463
 The requisite gravity of consequences for law students in academic misconduct 
cases is reinforced by moves in various jurisdictions to include in Supreme Court admission 
rules requirement for express disclosure of academic misconduct.
464
  That misconduct will not 
per se lead to disbarment or denial or admission, and in that respect university proceedings are 
not directly ‗in effect professional disciplinary proceedings.‘ Supervising courts will review 
cases for findings of fact as part of their inherent supervisory jurisdiction, and, like criminal 
convictions, there are circumstance where incidents of academic misconduct do not impugn the 
prospective lawyer‘s character sufficiently or irredeemably to prohibit them from being 
admitted.
465
 Decisions of a university tribunal may in effect be overturned.
466
 However, these 
factors do not diminish the ‗seriousness‘ of the allegation,467 or the gravity of the consequence 
that, at best, findings of misconduct may be scrutinised by a superior court. Those courts are 
unlikely to look on questions of academic misconduct lightly.
468
 
 
4.6.2 International Students 
 
For different reasons, the gravity of consequences for international students of findings of 
misconduct is relevant to the fact-finding process and the standard of persuasion brought to that 
process. That situation tends to go beyond questions of academic conduct, to any circumstances 
where disciplinary action (or indeed action for unsatisfactory academic performance) may place 
a student in breach of obligations imposed by visa conditions. As a result of disciplinary action, 
academic penalties, restrictions on enrolment, suspension, exclusion or expulsion from an 
                                                                                                                           
461
 Law Society of Tasmania v Richardson [2003] TASSC 9; Re Liveri [2006] QCA 152. 
462
 Re Legal Profession Act 2004; Re OG, A Lawyer [2007] VSC 520, [99]. 
463
 See Re Liveri [2006] QCA 152, [13], [19], [21]. 
464
 Eg Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2008 (Vic), r 5.02(c)(v); Rules of Legal Practitioners 
Education and Admission Council 2004 (SA), r 7.6(b). 
465
 See Re AJG [2004] QCA 88; compare Re Liveri [2006] QCA 152. 
466
 As in, eg, Re Humzy-Hancock  [2007] QSC 34. 
467
 Compare Flanagan v University College Dublin (1988) IR 724. 
468
 See the remarks from the Chief Justice of Queensland in Re AJG [2004] QCA 88: ‗Over the last 
couple of years, the Court has, in strong terms, emphasised the unacceptability of this conduct on the part 
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institution may imperil a student‘s right to stay in Australia, require them to leave the country, 
or lead to their removal from Australia. Such an occurrence may impose considerable costs on a 
student, effectively mean they are unable to complete their studies, or affect future applications 
to enter or stay in Australia. Subject to Standard 13 of the National Code of Practice for 
Registration Authorities and Providers of Education and training to Overseas Students 2007, a 
provider (including a registered university) may ‗defer or temporarily suspend‘ a student‘s 
enrolment, including for ‗misbehaviour.‘469 Subject to Standard 10, a provider must monitor a 
student‘s course progress, and a student is required to make ‗satisfactory course progress‘ as a 
condition of holding a student visa.
470
 Where a provider terminates a student‘s ‗studies,‘471 or 
where a student breaches their visa conditions,
472
 the provider is obliged to inform the Secretary 
of the Department of Immigration. Students found not to be complying with visa conditions 
may have their visa cancelled,
473
 leading them to be treated as an unlawful non-citizen
474
 and 
‗removed‘ from Australia.475  
 
An international student‘s right to stay and study in Australia would be affected by disciplinary 
action in a number of circumstances. If a student is excluded or expelled for disciplinary 
reasons, they will no longer be meeting the conditions of their visa, which include requirements 
to be enrolled with an education provider and attend courses. A student may have their 
enrolment ‗temporarily suspended‘ as a result of disciplinary action, under Standard 13, but that 
action would also place a student in breach of the requirement that they be enrolled in a full-
time course of study. In this case, a student would also be liable to have their visa cancelled.
476
 
In addition, suspension of a student from all or part of their course would likely place them in 
breach of visa conditions relating to course progress and/or attendance (Condition 8202). Even 
where sanctions for misconduct are solely in the form of academic penalties, such as awarding 
                                                                                                                           
of an applicant for admission to the legal profession. At the last Admissions Sitting, the Court indicated a 
strengthening of its response to situations like this on the basis adequate warning had been given.‘ 
469
 National Code, Standard 13.2(b). 
470
 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth),Schedule 8, subs 2.05(1) and (2), Condition 8202 (3).  
471
 ESOS Act, subs 19(1)(d). 
472
 ESOS Act, subs 19(2). A breach may also occur where a student‘s course attendance is unsatisfactory, 
a situation that may be imposed on him/her by, for example, a restriction of his/her enrolment resulting 
from disciplinary action. 
473
 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 137J. It is a requirement under s 20 of the ESOS Act that a provider send a 
notice to the student regarding an alleged breach, allowing them to respond to the allegation. The student 
has 28 days to respond to the notice. The Minister is required to cancel a visa, including a student visa, if 
the Minister is satisfied the student has not complied with visa conditions: see Migration Regulations 
1994, subs 2.43(2)(b), made pursuant to Migration Act 1958, s 116. 
474
 Migration Act 1958, s 15. 
475
 Migration Act 1958, s 198. 
476
 It is unlikely that the ‗exceptional circumstances‘ provisions relevant to the cancellation powers of the 
Minister (Migration Regulations 1994, subs 2.43(2)(b)) would have effect in these circumstances. 
Temporary suspension of the student‘s enrolment for ‗misbehaviour‘ is a distinct category of discretion 
available to education providers under the National Code, and in any case, the ‗exceptional circumstance‘ 
provisions apply expressly to circumstances ‗beyond the [student‘s] control‘: Migration Regulations 
1994, subs 2.43(2)(b)(ii)(B). Misbehaviour is mutatis mutandis inherently not beyond the student‘s 
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reduced or failed grades, such action may represent, or contribute to, a breach of the student‘s 
obligations under the Migration Regulations regarding satisfactory course progress.  
 
Disciplinary action against an international student might, therefore, cause, by varying routes, 
the student‘s right to stay and study in Australia to be cancelled. The student may be removed 
from Australia, and a substantial investment in a full fee-paying course is effectively lost. The 
question as to whether a student visa-holder is compliant or not with their obligations under 
relevant legislation is one that will be determined ultimately by the Minister (or his/her 
delegate), subject to any process of tribunal or judicial review. In that context, it has been held 
that the Briginshaw standard of persuasion applies to fact-finding, in migration cases 
generally
477
 and in student cases in particular.
478
 The scope for discretion in respect of either 
reporting (on the part of providers) or decision-making (on the part of the Minister or review 
tribunal) in student misconduct cases, once disciplinary action has been given effect and a 
student‘s enrolment, progress or attendance status is affected, is limited, arguably more limited 
than in law students‘ ‗character‘ cases. Where disciplinary action would likely, or inevitably, 
lead to visa cancellation, high standards of persuasion and fact-finding would be, it is submitted, 
equally applicable to disciplinary decision-makers. The chain of consequences is, arguably, 
more straightforward in ‗in-house‘ misconduct cases concerning international students, than in 
comparable cases dealing with potential lawyers.  
 
4.7 Conclusions 
 
University discipline of students has evolved in the context of the unique circumstances of the 
academic institution. The operation of the university in this respect reflects the nature of the 
functions it is required to discharge, notably education, research and intellectual ‗formation.‘ 
Students represent a particular class of member of the university, with a role and with 
characteristics distinguishable from those of other major constituencies, such as the staff and the 
administration. This distinction was historically captured in the status of the student (in statu 
pupillari), although the situation is affected by incremental changes at law toward a rather more 
complex mixture of public and private law.  
 
                                                                                                                           
control: see, for example, discussion of the term in student visa cases in Wang v Minister for Immigration 
[2005] FMCA 918, [24]-[36]. 
477
 Jasreeber Singh v Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 127 ALR 383, [16]. 
478
 071 497 780 [2007] MRTA 637, [38]-[43]. At [42], Member Ellis remarks (emphasis added):  
The Tribunal is aware of the distinction which was drawn between the cancellation powers set out in s 116 
of the Act and those more rigorous provisions in Part 2, Division 3 Subdivision C of the Act which were 
drawn by Smith FM in SZEEM v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] 
FMCA 27, however the Tribunal considers that the same principle applies; the serious consequences of a 
visa cancellation require that the Tribunal should be satisfied to a high degree that the information upon 
which the visa was cancelled was correct. 
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The university must also contend with an exceptionally long institutional history, in which the 
role, subjectivity and standing of students have not been static. The question of discipline has 
changed, as its objects have changed. I have noted that, in academic literature and commentary, 
university discipline has come to be preoccupied with issues of academic misbehaviour or 
transgression. This is consistent with historical shifts in the primary purposes of university 
discipline, beginning with concerns for the ‗moral upbringing‘ of students and then 
subsequently quelling challenges to the internal order of the university associated with social 
and political struggles on campus. The rise of academic misconduct in higher education – or 
what might be termed a creeping academic ‗disorder‘ – arguably goes quite directly to the heart 
of university life, that is, to issues of academic authority and indeed to the validity of the 
academic project. It is hardly surprising in this context that issues such as plagiarism have 
achieved prominence. As an important manifestation of contemporary ‗indiscipline,‘ I have 
sought to subject this form of rule-breaking to particularly rigorous scrutiny. It is not an 
uncontroversial concept. Given the consequences of disciplinary action can be severe for 
students – as I have considered at length, for law students and international students in particular 
– interrogation of key disciplinary concepts is an important exercise, with potential 
ramifications on questions of jurisdiction for decision-makers acting against student 
misconduct.  
 
Given clarification of the history, concepts and meaning of discipline in the university context, 
it is worth considering what investigations may have been undertaken into disciplinary schema 
and into the use of disciplinary action. The subsequent chapter reviews empirical and 
quantitative literature. Additionally, it includes data and analysis on the incidents of disciplinary 
action at Australian universities. Combined with the foregoing qualitative or conceptual analysis 
of university discipline, the next chapter seeks to provide a quantitative context to the issue of 
disciplinary decision-making.  
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Chapter 5 
Quantitative Analysis of University Discipline: Rules, 
Complaints, Proceedings 
 
5.1 Empirical Research on University Discipline 
 
Analysis of university discipline has largely been restricted to developments in the case law, 
especially in the US,
 479
 but also Canada
480
 and the UK.
481
 There are few Australian studies. 
Forbes produced a study in the heady days of student militancy and under the early influence of 
judicial controls.
482
 His conclusion was to caution against ‗legalism‘ and ‗judicialisation‘ of 
university procedures:  
 
… some existing university discipline rules may already extend, procedurally, about as far as is 
wise to go without further prompting from the courts or general law… Technical sophistication 
is not necessarily so good in domestic as in criminal law… Here legalism helps only up to a 
point. That point is more quickly reached in domestic than in higher public tribunals.
483
 
 
In a 1996 study, Dutile
484
 examined internal disciplinary procedures at several Australian 
universities, as well as student litigation in Australia. He found a ‗paucity of litigation‘ by 
Australian students, at least in comparison to their US counterparts. Significant in explaining 
this situation, he concludes, is an ‗atmosphere of accommodation‘485 to students, relatively 
‗lenient treatment,‘486 and the tendency of Australian universities to ‗take jurisdiction over 
relatively few disciplinary incidents.‘487 On the operation of university discipline, he found that 
disciplinary processes ‗(seem) invulnerable to charges of unfairness.‘488 Two and half decades 
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 See eg Ira M Heyman ‗Some Thoughts on University Disciplinary Proceedings‘ (1966) 54 California 
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Students‘ (1994) 3 Dalhousie Law Journal 105.  
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 See eg Farrington The Law of Higher Education, 365-369; Ferdinand Dutile ‗Law and Governance 
Affecting the Resolution of Academic and Disciplinary Disputes at Scottish Universities: An American 
Perspective‘ (1998) 8 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 1. 
482
 Forbes ‗University Discipline: A New Province for Natural Justice?‘. 
483
 Forbes ‗University Discipline: A New Province for Natural Justice?‘, 107-108. 
484
 Ferdinand Dutile ‗Law, Governance and Academic and Disciplinary Decision in Australian 
Universities: An American Perspective‘ (1996) 13 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative 
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after Forbes flagged wholesale entry of legal machinery into the university, his fears appear to 
have gone unfounded.  
 
In this chapter I consider the available statistical evidence on university discipline. Until very 
recently, this body of research was exclusively confined to analysis of disciplinary rules, and, in 
particular, confined to the question of their consistency with requirements of fairness. I adopt 
this method of analysis in Chapter 6 below. A cross-institutional study into student complaints 
and discipline at Australian universities since 2008 has expanded this research base, at least to 
the extent of providing data on university disciplinary as a source of litigation and internal 
grievance. Finally, there is an absence of evidence or evaluation of rates of disciplinary action, 
or proceedings, against students by university authorities. A survey instrument seeking 
quantitative data on university disciplinary actions was developed as part of the present research 
project. This chapter reports on, and analyses, data on rates of disciplinary action at Australian 
universities, supplied by institutions who participated in that survey.  
 
5.2 Disciplinary Procedures 
 
Empirical investigation of student disciplinary rules and procedures is rare. Nonetheless, there 
are studies of US higher education institutions, ranging from the period of 1960s campus unrest 
to relatively recently.
489
 The common method to this research is investigation of university rules 
and assessment of those rules against relevant standards provided by Constitutional safeguards 
of fair procedure (‗due process‘ requirements).  
 
Duke Law Journal undertook a substantial 1970 study of over 500 institutions, based on a 
detailed survey of rules and practices, during the period of ‗campus-wide civil disorder.‘490 The 
survey was remarkably comprehensive, going to all aspects of procedural safeguards viewed as 
protected by Constitutional standards.
491
 The Journal‘s assessment was that ‗Though many 
schools have kept pace with legal developments in the student disorder area or even advanced 
ahead of such developments, results of the questionnaire reveal that many existing procedures 
fail to satisfy even the minimal requirements of due process.‘492 A smaller contemporaneous 
(1971) study into six New Mexico universities found that ‗for the most part, these universities 
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 Duke Law Journal Project ‗Procedural Due Process and Campus Disorder: A Comparison of Law and 
Practice‘ (1970) Duke Law Journal 763; Branch ‗Student Discipline Cases at State Universities in New 
Mexico – Procedural Due Process‘; Edward Golden ‗Procedural Due Process for Students at Public 
Colleges and Universities‘ (1982) 11 Journal of Law and Education 337; Curtis Berger and Vivian 
Berger ‗Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair Process for the University Student‘ (1999) 99 Columbia 
Law Review 289. 
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 Duke Law Journal Project ‗Procedural Due Process and Campus Disorder‘, 763. 
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 The survey questions run to 8 pages and 51 questions dealing with inter alia pre-hearing procedure, 
hearing procedures, post-hearing outcomes and actions, and the composition of disciplinary tribunals. 
492
 Duke Law Journal Project ‗Procedural Due Process and Campus Disorder‘, 793. 
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do follow the minimum requirements (of procedural due process).‘493 While this study may 
repudiate the claim to excessive ‗legalism‘ or ‗over-judicialisation,‘ noting however various 
‗recurrent problems,‘494 the Duke Law Journal investigation tended, rather, to assert that the 
situation across the US – a large, diverse and complex higher education sector – was highly 
uneven at that point in time. In a rapidly changing social, administrative and legal milieu, such a 
result was hardly surprising.  
 
Once the sixties‘ upheavals had passed, how had the student disciplinary situation settled? In a 
1980 study, Golden
495
 undertook an analysis of published material supplied to students facing 
disciplinary action at 83 US public institutions, although he did not make an overall assessment 
of practices against Constitutional (‗due process‘) standards. That material concerned both 
disciplinary actions and ‗academic dismissal‘ actions (generally, dismissal for unsatisfactory 
academic performance). Glaring differences were found in the procedural standards applied to 
disciplinary action as against academic dismissals, with, for instance, a much higher rate of 
published procedures for the former as against the latter (93% versus 31%) and a higher rate in 
the provision of written notice including particulars (82% versus 25% for academic dismissal). 
Further: ‗few institutions (10.7%) take a sophisticated or legalistic approach to evidence or level 
of proof in disciplinary dismissal proceedings.‘496 Most (86%) provided an appeal mechanism 
for disciplinary action. Nearly all disciplinary rules provided for a formal hearing, almost 40% 
provided for legal representation, half provided for an ‗open hearing,‘ and over 20% allowed a 
student to have no inference of guilt drawn from their silence in a hearing.  
 
The findings in Berger and Berger‘s497 assessment appear to be more favourable to an historic 
improvement in procedural standards in US student disciplinary practices. This (1999) study 
represents a further temporal leap in comparable data. In surveying the rules of 159 US higher 
education institutions, they found that ‗the level of protection enjoyed by students at many, 
albeit not all, schools is surprisingly high‘498 and that procedural rights enjoyed by students are 
often greater than those required by law.  
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 Branch ‗Student Discipline Cases at State Universities In New Mexico – Procedural Due Process‘, 
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 Specifically, with ‗catchall‘ rules, inadequate appeals mechanisms, and failure to meet ‗one or more‘ 
due process duties: Branch ‗Student Discipline Cases at State Universities in New Mexico – Procedural 
Due Process‘, 257. 
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 Golden ‗Procedural Due Process for Students at Public Colleges and Universities‘. This study 
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 Golden ‗Procedural Due Process for Students at Public Colleges and Universities‘, 359. 
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 Berger and Berger ‗Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair Process for the University Student‘. 
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 Berger and Berger ‗Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair Process for the University Student‘, 300. 
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What may be more revealing is how the results across these studies, and the space of thirty 
years, compare.
499
  
 
As can be seen from Table 5.1, in so far as the data is comparable, standards found between 
1970 and 1999 have tended generally to be stable, although exhibiting notable, even dramatic, 
variation in respect of some categories. This assessment is perhaps more cautious than that 
presented by Berger and Berger.
500
  
 
Where trends to higher procedural standards appear, they occur in relation to: greater provision 
of an impartial tribunal, extension of rights to cross-examination, and greater provision of 
written decisions. A converse trend has appeared in the right to legal representation, with a 
tendency to a decline in this entitlement. 
 
Certain other procedural standards have tended to remain stable, including the right to present 
witnesses in one‘s defence, provision of an ‗open‘ hearing, and provision of a record of 
proceedings.  
 
Fluctuating results are evident in relation to the issue of representation, the right to remain silent 
without an inference being made against the student, express standards as to the burden of 
proof, and provision of written findings of fact. While the right to legal representation appears 
to be in decline (or in relation to non-legal representation, stable), Golden‘s findings in respect 
of this point appear anomalous, as do his results in relation the issue of inferences to be drawn 
from silence.  
                                           
499
 There is some variation in the questions asked and consequently in the data collected. The figures 
noted here may be considered comparable as far as the content of questions is concerned. 
500
 Berger and Berger ‗Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair Process for the University Student‘, 299. 
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Table 5.1: Rates of application of selected procedural standards in student disciplinary 
proceedings, various studies of US higher education institutions, 1970-1999 (% of 
institutions according with standard) 
 
Procedural standard
501
 Duke Law Journal 
(1970) 
Golden (1982) Berger and 
Berger 
(1999)
502
 
Impartial tribunal ‗majority‘ 35 >90 
Right to legal representation 74 40 58 
Adviser representation 91 40 90 
Right to cross-examination 44 64 NA 
Right to present witnesses 81 83 >80 
Right to silence without inference 71 22 c. 90 
Burden of proof ‗substantial majority‘ 14 NA 
Open hearing 49 50 NA 
Adequate record 53 66 57 
Written finding of facts 58 24 NA 
Written decisions 36 62 78 
 
Comparisons between US ‗due process‘ standards and Australian standards of fair procedures 
ought to be treated cautiously, consistent with the different legal and constitutional regimes and 
historical developments. Notwithstanding this qualification, the US literature is instructive, if 
not for the reason that it adverts to a gap in Australian research. Limited direct comparison may 
be made about procedural standards prevailing across the Pacific, other than perhaps the 
interesting, concurrent conclusions draw by Forbes and Berger and Berger (thirty years apart): 
that the standards applied are, in most cases, satisfactory, and even in excess of what the law 
requires. The law in Australia has developed significantly beyond what Forbes was dealing with 
in 1970, and the Berger and Berger study (as with all the US studies) also points to areas of 
notable shortcoming, or in other words, unevenness, in disciplinary practice.  
 
5.3 Student Litigation and Complaints  
 
A yet smaller body of evidence exists on the proportion of student complaints and/or legal 
litigation that concerns disciplinary action by universities. Data regarding student complaints 
and/or litigation is minimal. Astor has investigated reported cases of litigation involving 
universities, in courts or tribunals, between 1985 and 2006. This data was not restricted to 
student cases. She found a considerable growth in hearings in which universities were involved 
                                           
501
 Categories as per Golden ‗Procedural Due Process for Students at Public Colleges and Universities‘, 
345. These are a selection of categories only, where comparable data tended to exist. Thus these figures 
may be considered as indicative only of comparisons of procedural standards generally.  
502
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cited papers. They remark ‗Because each of these surveys asked questions rather different from ours, we 
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similar to ours in some key respects‘: Berger and Berger ‗Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair Process 
for the University Student‘, 299. It would have to be said that this 1999 study survey is not all that 
different from the approach (as to content) of the earlier studies. The reporting of data in the Berger and 
Berger study, however, is neither as systematic nor as lucid as the earlier studies.  
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ranging from ‗three to five hearings a year to a peak of 92 hearings [in 2005]… over 20 
years.‘503 As far as student cases are concerned, Astor‘s study provides no breakdown of the 
nature of those cases, although student cases generally have grown as disputes generally have 
grown, to between 2 and 15 a year in the period 1995-2006.
504
  
 
In the UK context, the Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education (‗OIA‘) 
supplies data on enquiries to, and disputes heard by, that body. These data include information 
on disciplinary matters, providing a useful and comparable source of data on rates of actions 
concerning discipline. In this context, enquiries and complaints are external to institutions 
participating in the scheme and do not necessarily give an indication of rates of disciplinary 
action within universities. Disciplinary matters here refer solely to the source of complaint.  
 
Rates of disciplinary action as a source of enquiry and complaint under the OIA scheme are set 
out in Table 5.2 for the 2004-2007 period. Complaints concerning disciplinary decisions by 
universities represent between 7.53% and 11.33% of all complaints handled by the OIA. This 
figure is approximately 26-114% greater than the rate of student enquiries to the OIA 
concerning disciplinary matters. For present purposes, it appears that complaints related to 
discipline at UK universities are relatively constant, constituting around one in ten complaints 
that are actually heard. A former Independent Adjudicator has stated recently, in respect of 
plagiarism particularly, that most cases concern penalties and inconsistency within or between 
institutions.
505
  
 
By comparison to the OIA data, recent research on ‗student grievances and discipline‘ at 
Australian universities has also found that university authorities had approached around one in 
ten students with a complaint or problem, such as discipline,
506
 although this figure may under-
report the propensity of universities to raise issues, including disciplinary issues, with 
students.
507
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Table 5.2: Disciplinary Enquiries and Complaints, UK Office of Independent Adjudicator, 
2004-07 
Year Student enquiries by type Complaints received by category 
 Discipline 
and 
plagiarism
508
 
Total 
enquiries 
Discipline, 
plagiarism/ 
total 
Discipline 
and 
plagiarism 
Total 
complaints 
Discipline, 
plagiarism/ 
total 
2004
509
 
15 308 4.87% 9 86 10.46% 
2005 58 942 6.16% 32 322 9.94% 
2006 55 897 6.13% 35 465 7.53% 
2007 89 1374 6.48% 68 600 11.33% 
 
Sources: OIA Annual Report (2004), 46-47; OIA Annual Report (2005), 46-47; OIA Annual Report 
(2006), 45-46; OIA Annual Report (2007), 45-46 
 
5.4 Rates of Disciplinary Action in Australian Universities 
 
As part of the present research project, a brief survey instrument was developed and sent to 27 
Australian public universities.
510
 The survey sought statistical information on incidents and rates 
of disciplinary action against students. The information sought included data on academic and 
‗general‘ (non-academic) misconduct, whether proceedings were conducted at a ‗local‘ (ie 
Faculty of School) level or ‗centrally‘ (by a body or person acting under a University-wide 
jurisdiction) and numbers of appeals, as well as incidents of summary action. In respect of 
academic misconduct cases, information was also sought on whether cases concerned 
plagiarism, misconduct in examinations, or ‗other‘ misconduct.  
 
Of the universities to which the survey was sent, seven institutions ultimately responded, from 
four States or Territories.
511
 Although a limited response rate, the data supplied is sufficient to 
provide a useful sample of misconduct data. A range of institutions was represented in the 
sample, including metropolitan and regional, and larger, established (eg ‗sandstone‘) 
universities and newer ones (eg post-war or post-UNS). The data collected concerned discipline 
proceedings in the 2006 academic year.  
 
                                           
508
 Data for ‗discipline‘ and ‗plagiarism and IP‘ are separately reported in OIA statistics. Data from both 
categories are included here. Elsewhere in OIA Annual Reports cases concerning plagiarism are included 
in discussions of disciplinary matters: eg OIA Annual Report (2005), 25-26. 
509
 Data from 29 March -31 December 2004 only. 
510
 See Appendix 1. 
511
 It should be noted that one institution supplied results relatively late, and as a consequence these were 
not reported in earlier references to this survey data in Bruce Lindsay ‗University Hearings: Student 
Discipline Rules and Fair Procedures‘ (2008) 15 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 3 146, 148. 
The results in the present sample therefore vary from the results reported in the Australian Journal of 
Administrative Law article.  
 95 
Results from the survey are summarised in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. Each respondent university is 
identified by letter, from University A to G. Broad types of misconduct – academic or general – 
are distinguished, and rates of disciplinary proceedings at individual institutions as well as 
across all respondents institutions are provided. Rates of proceedings are determined as a 
proportion of student enrolments (ie as a proportion of individual students), and also as a 
proportion of Effective Full-Time Student Units (EFTSU), the standard sectoral measure for 
‗student load,‘ or student enrolment giving regard to fractional (or part-time) enrolments. 
EFTSU is intended to provide a more accurate measure of student demand in the system. A 
greater disparity between enrolments and EFTSU measures indicates a higher rate of part-time 
enrolments. 
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Table 5.3: Numbers and rates of discipline proceedings, selected Australian universities, 2006 
University  Academic 
misconduct 
(local) 
Academic 
misconduct 
(central) 
Total 
academic 
misconduct 
General 
misconduct 
(local) 
General 
misconduct 
(central) 
Total 
general 
misconduct 
Total 
misconduct 
Academic 
misconduct
/onshore 
enrolments 
(%) 
Academic 
misconduct/ 
EFTSU (%) 
Total 
misconduct/ 
onshore 
enrolments 
(%)  
Total 
misconduct/ 
EFTSU (%) 
A 188 17 205 NA 9 9 214 1.17 2.23 1.22 2.63 
B 139 5 144 1 1 2 146 0.38 0.50 0.39 0.5 
C 425 16 441 27 3 30 471 2.52 3.32 2.70 3.55 
D512 157 24 181 NA 5 5 186 1.30 1.85 1.34 1.90 
E 174 0 174 1 7 8 182 0.44 0.64 0.46 0.67 
F 112 49 161 4 0 4 165 0.42 0.58 0.43 0.6 
G 190 28 218 0 20 20 238 0.67 0.94 0.73 1.03 
All 1385 139 1524 33 45 78 1602 0.77 1.09 0.97 1.38 
 
Table 5.4: Grounds for disciplinary action and rates of appeal, selected Australian universities, 2006 
University  Plagiarism  Plagiarism/all 
misconduct (%) 
Exam 
misconduct 
Other Total 
academic 
misconduct 
Appeals 
(academic 
misconduct) 
Summary 
action 
Total general 
misconduct
513 
Appeals 
(general 
misconduct) 
Total 
appeals 
Appeals/original 
proceedings (%) 
A 193 90.19 12 0 205 NA NA 9 NA NA NA 
B 114 78.08 4 26 144 1 4 2 2 3 2 
C 393 83.44 38 10 441 9 NA 30 3 12 2.55 
D 118 63.44 8 55 181 NA NA 5 NA NA NA 
E 123 67.58 46 5 174 0 0 8 0 0 0 
F 93 56.36 61 7 161 12 0 4 0 12 7.27 
G 123 51.68 28 67 218 7 0 20 0 7 2.94 
All 1157 72.22 197 170 1524 29 4 78 5 34 2.12 
 
                                           
512
 Data provided from University D includes patent double counting. Figures supplied for academic misconduct appear to have been reproduced in reporting for 
general misconduct. In addition, data supplied on ‗appeals‘ patently included data relating to any form of dispute locally termed ‗appeal‘, such as appeals against 
grades. For these reasons, data on general misconduct, summary action and appeals from University has been discounted for the sake of reliability.  
513
  May include available data for summary action. 
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In 2006, therefore, over 1600 (1602) students in the seven respondent institutions were the 
subject of disciplinary action, equating to slightly under 1% of all student enrolments at those 
institutions. This figure refers to students dealt with by hearing at first instance, or (a much 
smaller number) dealt with by summary action.
514
 By comparison with de Lambert et al‘s New 
Zealand study
515
 – which quantified rates of formal disciplinary action at New Zealand tertiary 
institutions at just 0.2% of enrolled students – the situation inferred from the present data-set is 
that the rate of incidents of formal disciplinary action in Australian universities is several times 
higher than across the Tasman. If the proportion of students subject to initial disciplinary action 
were extrapolated to all student enrolments in publicly-funded higher education institutions
516
 in 
2006, it may be estimated that nearly 10,000 (9546) students Australia-wide were the subject of 
disciplinary action in that academic year.  
 
Clearly, this is not an insignificant number of students being investigated and/or sanctioned for 
misconduct. Additionally it represents a substantial administrative effort on the part of higher 
education authorities. In particular, it is a substantial administrative effort on the part of 
University Faculties and Schools. As can be gleaned from the data, the far greater proportion of 
disciplinary action occurred in respect of (alleged) academic misconduct, and the overwhelming 
effort in handling misconduct issues occurred at a ‗local‘ – Faculty or School – level. If we 
leave aside accounting for summary action,
517
 nearly nine out of ten allegations of misconduct 
are handled at the Faculty/School level (88.5%) This amount of proceedings does not account 
for appeal proceedings that, while relatively small in proportion to all proceedings, are generally 
conducted at a ‗central,‘ university-wide level rather than at a Faculty/School level. If 
disciplinary action conducted at the ‗central‘ level and appeals are taken together, 218 hearings 
out of a total of 1636 hearings (ie central and local hearings, whether at first instance or on 
appeal, excluding summary action) were carried out at that level. That is, 13.32% of all hearings 
were carried out ‗centrally,‘ and conversely more than four-fifths of all hearings (86.68%) were 
carried out by Faculties/Schools.  
 
While this data-set indicates overall numbers and proportions of disciplinary action, as well as 
the preponderant site of the administration of university discipline, it also provides a general 
indication of the nature of misconduct being handled by institutions.  As Table 5.3 identifies, 
                                           
514
 It is conceded that there may be some overlap or double-counting between students subject to 
summary action and those heard before disciplinary authorities, given that summary action may represent 
a ‗holding position‘ in ‗emergency cases‘ prior to a student proceeding to a hearing of some description. 
It is not known what proportion of summary cases proceeded to hearing and what proportion were 
resolved by other means (eg student withdrawal, suspension of disciplinary action).  
515
 de Lambert, et al ‗Chalkface Challenges: A Study of Academic Dishonesty amongst Students in New 
Zealand Tertiary Institutions‘. 
516
 As based on ‗higher education providers‘ reported in Department of Education, Science and Training 
Students 2006 – Full Year (2007).  
517
 Only one institution supplied reliable data for summary action – Universities B. The location (‗local‘ 
or ‗central‘) of the summary authority was not requested in the survey.  
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academic misconduct is far more likely to be at issue in disciplinary proceedings, a figure 
consistent with the literature on student misconduct. Again discounting for summary action and 
appeals, greater than nine out of ten (95.13%) discipline proceedings concern academic 
misconduct. Table 5.4 seeks to break the incidence of academic discipline down still further. In 
distinguishing cases of plagiarism and examination misconduct from ‗other‘ possible forms of 
misconduct (eg ‗collusion‘, fraudulent application for ‗special consideration‘), it can be seen 
that plagiarism is the largest single source of disciplinary action. Nearly three-quarters (72.22%) 
of all cases at first instance involve allegations and/or findings of plagiarism. An overwhelming 
majority (75.92%) of cases of academic misconduct involve questions of plagiarism. The rate of 
plagiarism as a proportion of disciplinary action, however, varies considerably across 
institutions, from around 50% of cases to over 90% of cases. Reasons for this disparity may be 
complex and/or cyclical. For instance, regard may be had to the construction of the meaning of 
plagiarism under the disciplinary rules, such as whether it incorporates the question of intent 
(tending to diminish the propensity of plagiarism cases by narrowing the scope of concept) or 
whether issues of poor academic practice and citation are dealt without outside of the 
disciplinary framework.
518
 Additionally, the impact of public or institutional concern over the 
issue of plagiarism at a particular point in time may increase the likelihood and/or propensity for 
plagiarism to be the subject of internal investigation or ‗policing.‘519 These factors may be 
present at some institutions and not at others (or to a lesser degree). No dis-aggregated data was 
requested on general misconduct cases, therefore it is not possible to determine precise reasons 
for the particular composition of disciplinary issues at that university.  
 
Appeal statistics are reported in Table 5.4, and these figures are in addition to first instance 
proceedings. Few students (2.12%) appeal from a finding of misconduct. Just under 2% (1.9%) 
of students found to have breached academic conduct rules takes the matter on appeal internally. 
The volume of appeals from general misconduct cases is negligible. The availability of internal 
appeals or review is commonplace in Australian universities, and it is not unusual for review 
procedures to require a re-hearing of the original case on the merits.
520
  
 
The seeming low rate of appeal may be considered in relation to several factors. In the first 
place, rates of use of internal review mechanisms in other administrative contexts suggest that 
these forms of appeal are not heavily used. In the context of housing decisions in the UK, 
Cowan and Halliday have remarked that ‗the level of reviewing activity seems much less than it 
might be.‘521 Their study investigated internal review applications received by housing 
authorities, and found that 71% of those authorities have received less than 5 requests in the 
                                           
518
 See Chapter 4, section 4.5, above. 
519
 Compare Chapter 8, sub-section 8.8.7, below. 
520
 See Ch 6, subsection 6.6.7, below. 
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preceding six months (11% had received no requests), and only 16% had received more than 16 
requests. Given the high volume of unsuccessful applications to housing authorities, they 
hypothesised, ‗the general take-up rate of rights to internal review seems very low.‘522 They 
propose various reasons why review rates are low, including poor communication of appeal 
rights, doubts about the integrity of the review process on the part of applicants, and the length 
and complexity of the bureaucratic process.
523
  
 
It may be, however, that the rate of appeals against university disciplinary decisions is not, in 
fact, all that low. When compared to rates of administrative appeals to external bodies, either by 
merits review or on judicial review, the university appeal rate is relatively high. For instance, 
Wikely and Young have noted that tribunal appeals in UK social security cases are ‗fewer than 
1 percent of decisions by adjudication officers.‘524 Cowan and Halliday found a further 
significant drop-off in applications for recourse, by way of judicial review, in housing cases: 
75% of housing authorities surveyed had no experience of disputes reaching the courts.
525
 
Appeals from student misconduct decisions at Australian universities who provided data in this 
study range from around 2% to over 7%.  
 
A further factor in the university context may be the construction of appeal rights. In some 
institutions, recourse is limited to prescribed grounds of appeal. These may be relatively narrow. 
Finally, it may be that, where there is a basis for a disputed finding and/or sanction, disciplinary 
decision-makers at first instance are capable of, and experienced in, making the reasons for the 
adverse decision explicable to the student. That is to say, following Galligan, that the original 
decision-maker demonstrates to the student that the decision is reasonable, even worthy and/or 
educational, and that his/her ‗case has been dealt with properly according to authoritative 
standards.‘526 
 
                                                                                                                           
521
 David Cowan and Simon Halliday The Appeal of Internal Review: Law, Administrative Justice and 
The (Non-) Emergence of Disputes (Hart Publishing, 2003), 31. 
522
 Cowan and Halliday The Appeal of Internal Review. 
523
 Cowan and Halliday The Appeal of Internal Review, generally see chapter 8. 
524
 N Wikely and R Young ‗The Administration of Benefits in Britain‘ in Denis Galligan (ed) A Reader 
on Administratve Law (Oxford University Press, 1996), 409. 
525
 Notwithstanding the fact that housing and immigration disputes represent the two largest sources of 
applications for judicial review in the UK: see M Sunkin, L Bridges, and G Mazeros ‗Changing Patterns 
in the Use of Judicial Review‘ in Galligan (ed) A Reader on Administrative Law (Oxford University 
Press, 1996), 477-495. 
526
 Galligan Due Process and Fair Procedures, 433.  
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5.5 Conclusions 
 
An overview of the available empirical (statistical) research relating to university discipline 
exposes a paucity of information. Published, or at least publicly available data and analysis, falls 
into two main categories: studies on the quality of disciplinary rules and procedures as measured 
against appropriate legal standards, and information on student complaints and litigation, 
generating some indirect data on rates of disciplinary action. In respect of the former category of 
(primarily US) research, university adherence to basic legal standards is arguably ‗adequate,‘ 
but variable over time. The latter category of research is in part suggestive of the quality of 
disciplinary action at least to the extent of identifying rates of complaint arising from it 
(although not necessarily rates of those complaints being upheld in disciplinary complaint 
cases). Complaints arising from disciplinary action appear to generate around one in ten of all 
student complaints about university action.  
 
The original survey data produced in the course of the present study contributes to the overall 
picture of university discipline, in supplying direct information on rates of disciplinary action 
against students. The picture portrayed by that data is sobering. Significant numbers of students 
are subject to disciplinary action: around 1% of all enrolled students at the investigated 
institutions, and an estimated 10,000 across the country based on this 2006 data. 
Overwhelmingly, their impugned conduct concerns academic misconduct generally and 
plagiarism in particular. While only around 10% of students subsequently have (or need) 
recourse to an internal appeal or review, that rate appears greater than review and appeals in 
other administrative jurisdictions.  
 
In short, there is evidence that disciplinary action is not uncommon, is part of a growing volume 
of disputation, and may be the subject of inadequate procedure and practice. This is ground for 
greater scrutiny of this sphere of university affairs, which is the task of the next three chapters. 
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Chapter 6 
Student Discipline Rules and Fair Procedures 
 
6.1 University Discipline 
 
Design of university discipline rules, in modern times,
527
 has evolved from two organising 
principles: the functional imperative for order in the university and standards in academic 
qualifications, and the administrative-legal requirement to apply fair procedures in disciplinary 
decision-making. Those rules typically are embodied in one or more (statutory or non-statutory) 
instruments, proscribing certain behaviours or conduct, and normally organised into classes of 
academic and non-academic (‗general‘) misconduct.  
 
Increasingly, indiscipline is viewed as an ethical, or alternatively, as an educational problem. It 
is focused on academic misconduct. In this guise, it concerns various forms of transgression of 
academic rules, whether intentional or not: plagiarism, cheating in exams, unauthorised 
collusion on assessments or falsifying data. These are typically reproduced in university rules. 
 
This chapter considers student disciplinary rules at a selection of Australian public universities, 
considering their content and procedures in relation to standards of procedural fairness operating 
at common law. This method of investigation reproduces generally the methodology of similar 
studies undertaken in US universities.
528
 
 
6.2 The Legal Requirement to Proceed Fairly 
 
For those students who have the seeming misfortune to be caught up in disciplinary action, they 
will generally face a well-established domestic machinery for adjudication of allegations of 
misconduct. Students in public universities will be subject to actions and proceedings that fall 
within the ambit of administrative law.
529
 In private institutions, even those in receipt of public 
funding, where the relationship of the student and university lies in contract, provision of higher 
education is regulated by law and requires statutory approval.
 530
 Students in those institutions 
                                           
527
 It may be noted that more ancient cases concerning fair treatment of university members by domestic 
authorities also exist, eg R v the Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Cambridge; ex 
parte Bentley [1723] 93 ER 698.  
528
 See Chapter 5, section 5.2, above. 
529
 University of Ceylon v Fernando (1960) 1 All ER 631; R v University of Saskatchewan, ex parte King 
(1968) 1 DLR (3
rd
) 721; Ex parte King; Re The University of Sydney (1943) 44 SR(NSW) 19; Rochford 
‗Claims against a University‘.  The issue of susceptibility to statutory administrative law remedies is more 
complicated since, in some jurisdictions, since Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99: see, for 
example, Kamvounias and Varnham ‗Doctoral Dreams Destroyed‘. 
530
 See generally Chapter 3, sub-section 3.2.1. The nature of statutory backing for higher education 
providers may include enabling statutes (eg Bond University Act 1987 (Q), Australian Catholic University 
Act 1990 (NSW)) as well as registration and accreditation under relevant higher education legislation. 
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may also expect fair treatment in decision-making affecting their interests.
531
 For the purposes 
of this thesis, the investigation solely concerns public universities.  
 
It is a general tenet of law that a decision-maker must proceed fairly, and specifically that no-
one should be condemned without being heard and that they should be heard by an impartial 
decision-maker.
532
 The present chapter primarily concerns application of the hearing rule, rather 
than the rule against bias.  
 
The doctrine of natural justice has an ancient genealogy,
533
 and commentary on it need not be 
rehearsed here.
534
  In English (and imperial) law until the middle part of the twentieth century, 
the notion that no person could be deprived of liberty or property by judicial or quasi-judicial 
action other than by a fair hearing was well-entrenched in civil law as well as criminal law.
535
 In 
the course of the twentieth century, the doctrine of natural justice evolved into a general 
obligation on administrative decision-makers to proceed fairly.
536
 It has been well-settled since 
the House of Lords decision in Ridge v Baldwin
537
 that a decision-maker, upon whom there is a 
statutory duty to undertake a course of action, additionally is under a duty to proceed fairly. 
That is, a decision-maker in an administrative setting is obliged to consider how a decision is to 
be made, not solely what it is that needs to be decided or acted upon. It has elsewhere been 
stated that the duty is attracted where the decision has ‗civil consequences‘ to the individual,538 
and there is a ‗presumption‘ that the duty applies.539 The ‗threshold‘ at which the duty to accord 
procedural fairness arises in the ‗making of administrative decisions‘ has been held to be where 
rights, interests and legitimate expectations are affected ‗subject only to the clear manifestation 
                                           
531
 Herring v Templeman [1973] 3 All E R 569; Clark v University of Lincolnshire and Humberside 
[2000] 1 WLR 1988; Hall v University of New South Wales (2003) NSWSC 669, [114]-[115]; R v 
Wadley; ex parte Burton [1976] Qd R 286.  
532
 See, generally, Geoffrey Flick Natural Justice: Principles and Practical Application (2
nd
 ed, 
Butterworths, 1984), 26: ‗It is a firmly established principle of both English and Commonwealth law that 
no man [sic] should be condemned unheard… [and] the opportunity to be heard involves not only an 
opportunity to be heard and present evidence and submissions in favour of one‘s own cause, but also an 
opportunity to be heard by an impartial adjudicator.‘ Primarily, I will be concerned with the law as it has 
developed and applies in British, Australian and Commonwealth law, as distinguished from the 
constitutional ‗due process‘ doctrine deriving from US law. 
533
 See, eg, S De Smith, Lord Woolf and Jeffrey Jowell Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5
th
 ed 
1995), [7-007]-[7-008]. 
534
 Generally, on natural justice/procedural fairness, see Flick Natural Justice: Principles and Practical 
Application; Galligan Due Process and Fair Procedures; Forbes Justice in Tribunals. 
535
 The principle also extended to voluntary associations and professional bodies: Wood v Woad (1874) 
LR 9 Ex 190, 196.  
536
 The ‗twin pillars‘ of natural justice – the hearing rule and the rule against bias – are said to be 
supplemented by a third rule of fairness, the rationality principle: see Forbes Justice in Tribunals, [7.4]. 
But compare Geoffrey Airo-Farulla ‗Rationality and Judicial Review of Administrative Action‘ (2000) 24 
Melbourne University Law Review 3 543. 
537
 (1964) AC 40. 
538
 Wood v Woad (1874) LR 9 Ex 190. 
539
 Forbes Justice in Tribunals, [7.13]-[7.15]. Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 143 ER 414, 
420 that ‗the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature.‘ Also Twist v 
Randwick Municipal Council (1976) 136 CLR 106, 109-111 (Barwick CJ). 
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of a contrary statutory intent.‘540 As Galligan has noted: ‗An obvious strength of this approach is 
that all areas of administration are now, in principle, subject to the requirements of procedural 
fairness.‘ 541 
 
It is also fundamental to the principle of procedural fairness that the content of the rule is not 
rigidly determined: ‗no general rule can be laid down.‘542 As a matter of principle, the courts are 
at pains to emphasise the need for flexibility in application of the rules. What is required as a 
matter of fairness may vary and will depend on the circumstances of a particular case.
543
 It has 
been argued however that there remains a tension between the flexibility principle and a need to 
‗maximise certainty and predictability‘ in administrative decision-making.544 The courts have 
seen fit therefore to provide further guiding principles in the application of procedural 
fairness.
545
 For instance, a distinction may be made between decisions of an ‗operational‘ 
nature, to which the doctrine will generally apply, and those of a ‗policy‘ or political type, to 
which it generally will not. Alternatively, not all ‗interests‘ in administrative action are 
comparable. Some, such as property and liberty, will attract stronger protection than others.
546
 
 
6.3 Universities and Procedural Fairness 
 
The student holds an interest in their status as a member of the university, with the benefits that 
this implies, including the ability to proceed through a program of studies and, upon successful 
completion, award of a qualification. This interest has been held to be analogous to a proprietary 
interest in a club or society.
547
  
 
Even prior to Ridge v Baldwin, a student‘s entitlement to be afforded natural justice in the 
course of disciplinary action was held to arise from the quasi-judicial nature of the action in 
                                           
540
 Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 585 (Mason J); Galligan Due Process and Fair Procedure, 318-319 
541
 Galligan Due Process and Fair Procedures, 329. 
542
 Durayappah v Fernando (1967) 2 AC 337, 349. ‗There is no rule which can provide in every case an 
answer by its mechanical application‘: Twist v Randwick Municipal Council (1976) 136 CLR 106, 111. 
543
 Russell v Duke of Norfolk (1949) 1 All ER 109, 118 (Tucker LJ): ‗There are, in my view, no words 
which are of universal application to every kind of inquiry and every kind of domestic tribunal. The 
requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, 
the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with, and so forth.‘ Kioa 
v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 585 (Mason J): ‗The critical question in most cases is not whether the 
principles of natural justice apply. It is: what does the duty to act fairly require in the circumstances of the 
particular case?‘. 
544
 Bruce Dyer ‗Determining the Content of Procedural Fairness‘ (1993) 19 Monash University Law 
Review 1 165, 169. 
545
 Durayappah v Fernando (1967) 2 AC 337, 349. Compare Minister for Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs v Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57, 98-102 (McHugh J). 
546
 Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 618-619; FAI Insurances v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342; See 
Chris Enright Federal Administrative Law (Federation Press, 2001), [33.28]: ‗The distinction between the 
old and new property arises in the application of natural justice in a fundamental way. Basically, the 
stronger the interest the stronger the claim to natural justice. Old property based on rights generally 
confers a stronger interest than new property based on discretion.‘ 
547
 R v Aston University Senate; ex parte Roffey (1969) 2 WLR 1418, 1430. 
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University of Ceylon v Fernando.
548
 In that case, the Privy Council held the actions of a Vice-
Chancellor to expel a student on disciplinary grounds to be constrained by the duty to observe 
natural justice. This was also held to be the case in Glynn v Keele University,
549
 a general 
misconduct rather than academic misconduct case.
550
  
 
By the late 1960s, student political upheavals, and the requirement on university authorities to 
contend with ‗collective indiscipline,‘ coincided with the emerging, general duty on statutory 
and domestic bodies to act fairly. The duty to act fairly also extended to other types of decisions 
affecting students. This was confirmed in the controversial decision in R v Aston University 
Senate; ex parte Roffey,
551
 and subsequently Herring v Templeman.
552
 These judgements 
established that the duty applies not only to disciplinary action but also to a decision to expel a 
student or compel his/her withdrawal from the university on grounds of unsatisfactory academic 
performance. In an earlier university case, it was held that the duty applies to a decision to 
revoke degrees.
553
 More recently, the requirement to proceed fairly has been applied to 
decisions of academic judgement.
554
 A general statement on the application of natural justice 
was made in Re Macquarie University; Ex Parte Ong:
555
  
 
It should first be said that it was conceded for the University that both the committee and the 
Council were required to afford Dr Ong natural justice or procedural fairness, though it was not 
conceded that this general obligation required the doing of things contended for by Dr Ong. I 
have no doubt the general concession is correct.  
 
6.4 Methodology 
 
Analysis was undertaken of student disciplinary rules at sixteen Australian public universities. 
All institutions possess written rules and procedures in publicly available documents.  
 
                                           
548
 (1960) 1 All ER 631. 
549
 (1971) 1 WLR 487: the so-called ‗naked sunbather‘ case. 
550
 Here the distinction was between quasi-judicial and ‗magisterial‘ action. 
551
 (1969) 2 WLR 1418. The controversy concerned the source of power (whether public or contractual) 
and thereby whether the prerogative writs were available: See Wade ‗Judicial Control Of Universities‘; 
Farrington The Law Of Higher Education.  
552
 (1973) 3 All ER 569, 585b (Russell LJ). 
553
 R v the Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Cambridge; ex parte Bentley [1723] 93 
ER 698.  
554
 R v University of Portsmouth; ex parte Lakereber (1998) EWCA Civ 1553; R v Higher Education 
Funding Council, ex parte Institute of Dental Surgery (1994) 1 WLR 242; see also Davies ‗Challenges to 
―Academic Immunity‖ – The Beginning of a New Era?‘; Kamvounias and Varnham ‗In-House or in 
Court? Legal Challenges to University Decisions‘; see further, Chapter 9, subsection 9.2.1, below. 
555
 (1989) 17 NSWLR 113, 129. A staff, not a student, disciplinary case: Ong was removed from the post 
of Head of School as a result of an investigation carried out under the auspices of the University Council. 
This decision was held to be void for breach of natural justice on the grounds inter alia that Ong had not 
been given the opportunity to address adverse material and on grounds of actual bias. The decision was 
visitorial, not curial. 
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The analysis requires some standardisation and generalisation of data. Typically, each 
institution possesses several instruments – either statutory or non-statutory (‗policy‘) 
instruments – giving effect to the disciplinary powers of the university.  
 
In the discussion below, these findings are assessed in relation to the case law on procedural 
fairness, with a view to investigating particular procedural elements: the standards of hearing, 
notice, cross-examination, representation, reasons, and appeal.  
 
In so far as discipline rules provide evidence of hearing procedures, they will nonetheless lack 
insight into the state of mind or conduct of decision-makers implementing those procedures.  
 
6.5 The Student Discipline Scheme  
 
Summary data on provisions in university discipline procedures at the sixteen public 
universities are contained in Table 6.3. Evidence accumulated from student discipline rules 
reveals common themes, principles and structures in the organisation of student discipline 
schemes. Consequently, a generalised model of the discipline scheme operating for students in 
Australian public universities may be articulated with the following elements. 
 
6.5.1 Proscribed Behaviours 
 
The rules establish a disciplinary code, based on proscribed behaviours or actions – that is, 
conduct to which disciplinary powers and/or sanction may be applied. On average the surveyed 
institutions possess 15 discrete categories of proscribed behaviour, although this ranged from 5 
(University of Wollongong) to 28 (University of Technology Sydney). The language adopted to 
articulate misconduct tends to quasi-penal (‗offences‘) or administrative (‗breaches‘) forms of 
expression.  
 
The rules distinguish between academic misconduct and non-academic (general) misconduct. A 
majority of surveyed institutions (12 out of 18) articulate academic and non-academic 
misconduct rules in separate disciplinary instruments. 
 
Academic misconduct is particularly associated with plagiarism and cheating on exams or other 
forms of assessment.
556
 Added to this may be ‗offences‘ such as ‗collusion.‘557  
                                           
556
 Eg ‗Academic misconduct‘ includes, but is not limited to, cheating, plagiarism and any other conduct 
by which a student seeks to gain advantage for himself or herself, or for any other person, any academic 
advantage or advancement to which he or she or that other person is not entitled…‘ University of 
Melbourne Statute 13.1 – Student Discipline, subs. 13.1.1(1). 
557
 See, eg, Flinders University of South Australia Policy on Academic Integrity subs 2.2.2: ‗Collusion 
occurs when a student submits work as if it has been done individually when it has been done jointly with 
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General misconduct typically pertains to behaviour affecting persons or property. This category 
may include moral or ‗political‘ actions, such as offensive behaviour on the one hand and 
student demonstrations on the other hand.
558
 Student disciplinary actions in relation to political 
unrest have not disappeared entirely and have, more recently, found their way to the courts.
559
  
‗Offences‘ against property and persons may overlap with criminal actions, including damage to 
property, assault or harassment.  
 
6.5.2 A Primary Decision-Maker 
 
Primary decision-makers may be authorised officers of the university or internal tribunals. The 
identity of a primary decision-maker tends to correlate to the severity of the penalty that may be 
imposed and hence the seriousness of the proceedings. At one end of the spectrum, a decision-
maker may wield authority of negligible adverse effect,
560
 ‗hearings‘ may be highly informal, 
and matters dealt with by an authorised officer. Alternatively, in serious misconduct cases, a 
prospective outcome may be exclusion or expulsion. In the latter case, the primary decision-
maker will likely be a disciplinary tribunal. In respect of general misconduct a senior official 
responsible for student affairs or other functional area of the university may be responsible at 
first instance.
561
 Universities may establish a dedicated class of university officer with 
responsibility for the primary decision-making process, or part of it.
562
 There is a commonly a 
wide ambit for a matter or allegation to be referred to a disciplinary authority.
563
 
 
6.5.3 Student Disciplinary Tribunals 
 
Student disciplinary tribunals exist at all the surveyed institutions. Discretion may lie with a 
prescribed university officer to refer a matter to a student disciplinary tribunal, giving regard to 
the seriousness of the charge and severity of the consequences.  
                                                                                                                           
one or more other persons unless the topic coordinator has indicated that this is acceptable for the specific 
piece of work in question.‘ 
558
 The University of Western Australia includes a category of ‗professional misconduct‘ applying to 
students, which seeks to reproduce standards of professional-ethical behaviours and attitudes among 
students: University of Western Australia Regulation for Student conduct and Discipline, s. 1(1)(d). 
559
 Bray v University of Melbourne (2001) VSC 391: judicial review under the Administrative Law Act 
1978 (Vic) of a disciplinary decision arising out of a student occupation of the main administration 
building at the University of Melbourne.  
560
 Or indeed, decision-making not intended to penalise at all, but rather provide an educative approach to 
disciplinary problems, especially in academic misconduct situations. 
561
 For example, Director of Student Affairs, University Registrar, Director of ITS, Deputy Vice-
Chancellor, or Dean. 
562
 See University of Newcastle Policy on Student Academic Integrity, which establishes a Student 
Academic Conduct Officer (‗SACO‘). The SACO is an appointee of the relevant Head of School. 
University of Wollongong Rules for Student Conduct and Discipline 2006, ss 2, 6, which establishes a 
Primary Investigation Officer (‗PIO‘). 
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The concept of disciplinary tribunal requires some clarification. Forbes associates a disciplinary 
tribunal with an authority exercising ‗quasi-penal functions outside the regular court system.‘564 
This model is expansive and would encompass almost all decision-makers established under 
university discipline rules. An alternative, although equally broad definition, may be a decision-
making body required to apply the rules of natural justice.
565
 For the sake of clarity, I will 
associate the term with those disciplinary bodies expressly constituted by the university rules as 
tribunals.
566
 It is necessary to accept that there are circumstances where senior officers (eg 
Heads of School or Deans) are required, by virtue of their office, to act judicially and perform 
the functions of tribunals. 
 
The composition of student disciplinary tribunals tends to follow a common architecture: 
distinct bodies for general as against academic misconduct, and establishment of ‗local‘ (ie 
School or Faculty) as against ‗central‘ (ie University) level bodies.  
 
Local tribunals deal in particular with allegations of academic misconduct. Central, university-
wide bodies commonly hear matters of general misconduct. These authorities may be described 
as a ‗hybrid tribunal,‘567 with the character of a specialist adjudicative body: 
 
… it is neither inappropriate nor unusual for committees such as this to possess some knowledge 
of the discipline from the accusations of academic misconduct arise. In our view, it is 
appropriate for the Board to consider the material of the parties that is presented to it in the light 
of that knowledge and expertise… provided that it is done in a way that is fair to all parties. 568  
 
Composition of tribunals may include academic staff, senior officers, non-academic staff and/or 
student members, depending on the nature of proceedings. Student membership is not a 
universal phenomenon in student disciplinary tribunals.
569
 Student appointments to disciplinary 
bodies occur by various means, such as appointment of or by the Student Union President,
570
 
                                                                                                                           
563
 For example, ‗any person who considers that a student may have engaged in misconduct‘ may report 
an allegation (Australian National University Discipline Statute 2005, subs 4.1). 
564
 Forbes Justice in Tribunals, [1.1]. 
565
 See eg Administrative Law Act 1978 (Vic), s 2, which defines a tribunal as ‗a person or body of 
persons… required…to act in a judicial manner to the extent of observing one or more of the rules of 
natural justice.‘ 
566
 By whatever precise name: eg board, tribunal, panel, or committee. 
567
 Forbes Justice in Tribunals, [2.16]. 
568
 Simjanoski v La Trobe University [2004] VSC 180, [27]. In that case, Balmford J rejected counsel‘s 
submission (at [25]]) that ‗it was inappropriate that a member of a disciplinary tribunal should have 
expertise related to the subject matter before the tribunal.‘ Her Honour applied reasoning on the nature 
and composition of domestic tribunals in Australian Football League v Carlton Football Club Ltd (1998) 
2 VR 546, including that expert membership of the tribunal was consistent with its inquisitorial function. 
569
 See eg Faculty Investigation Committee at the University of Wollongong: Rules for Student Conduct 
and Discipline subs 7.1.2. 
570
 Swinburne University of Technology Assessment and Appeals – Higher Education Policy and 
Procedures, subs 9.4(c), University of Newcastle Student Discipline Rules – Rule 341, subs 4(4). 
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appointment by the Vice-Chancellor,
571
 Board of Studies,
572
 or Academic Senate or Academic 
Board.
573
 In one instance, Student Association staff are appointed to the tribunal.
574
 Tribunal 
members may be selected from a larger body, such as a Discipline Panel, itself established by 
appointment.
575
 
 
6.5.4 Inquisitorial or Adversarial Proceedings? 
 
There is no strictly fixed line between adversarial and inquisitorial methods in tribunals.
576
 In 
serious misconduct cases, adversarial methods would appear a reasonable assumption given the 
criminal analogy
577
 and the ‗quasi-penal‘578 form of action. The procedure is often expressly 
inquisitorial, albeit it overlaid with ‗variations of the adversary method of presentation.‘579 As 
much is implied in the nature of disciplinary proceedings: that a dispute may lie at the heart of 
the proceedings,
580
 that allegations or ‗charges‘ are issued, and there is the possibility of 
penalties. Added to this is the distinction that a disciplinary decision-maker does not normally 
instigate his or her own inquiry,
581
 although ‗preliminary inquiries‘ may precede the ‗laying of 
charges.‘582 
 
                                           
571
 Eg Griffith University Student Misconduct Resolution, subs 9.1.3. This may be an appointment made 
in consultation with the relevant student organisation: Australian National University Discipline Statute 
2005, s 7.6. 
572
 University of Western Sydney Student Academic Misconduct Policy [55e]. 
573
 University of Tasmania Ordinance No. 9 – Student Discipline subs 1.6; University of Queensland 
Statute No. 4 (Student Discipline and Misconduct) 1999, subs 13(1); University of Sydney By-law 1999, 
Chapter 8 – Student Discipline, subs 64. 
574
 James Cook University Student Academic Misconduct Requirements subss 7.3.4, 8.3.2. The 
‗committee‘ includes a ‗case worker‘ from the James Cook University Student Association.  
575
 Eg RMIT Regulation 6.1.1 – Student Discipline s 11. The Council of Flinders University has a 
‗Nominating Committee‘ whose tasks include selecting members of a panel from which the Vice-
Chancellor appoints members to a Board of Inquiry: ‗Policy and procedures for handling a matter under 
Statute 6.4 – Student Conduct‘, s 10. 
576
 See, generally, Margaret Allars ‗Neutrality, the Judicial Paradigm and Tribunal Procedure‘ (1991) 13 
Sydney Law Review 377, 381-385. 
577
 See Flanagan v University College Dublin (1988) IR 724; Khan v University of Ottowa [1997] CanLII 
941 (ON C A), [91] (Finlayson JA, dissenting);  Mark Aronson, Bruce Dyer, and Matthew Groves 
Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4
th
 ed, Lawbook Co, 2009), [8.190]: ‗…where an individual is 
threatened with serious deprivation if some fault or misconduct on the part of that individual is 
established… the analogy of criminal proceedings, although no more than an analogy, will tend to suggest 
that the notice be adequate to allow the individual to prepare and mount an adversarial defence.‘  
578
 Forbes Justice in Tribunals, [1.1]. 
579
 Flick Natural Justice: Principles and Practical Application, 12-14. 
580
 Australian Postal Commission v Hayes (1989) 23 FCR 320, 328. Regarding the nature of proceedings 
of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the role of cross-examination in particular in this forum and the 
interests of parties before the Tribunal to adduce evidence and test contrary evidence, His Honour stated: 
‗In that sense, proceedings before the Tribunal are adversarial, the parties being in active dispute on an 
issue and being concerned to have findings of fact conducive to their interests.‘ [emphasis added] 
581
 See Aronson, Dyer, and Groves Judicial Review of Administrative Action, [8.295]: ‗Similarly, the fact 
that a ―first instance‖ tribunal is unable to act of its own motion may well suggest that an adversarial 
approach is intended.‘  
582
 This is commonly the case in student discipline action. It may be distinguished from, for instance, the 
circumstances in Hall v New South Wales Trotting Club (1977) 1 NSWLR 378 where charges were laid 
after the inquiry hearing.  
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The question of the mode of procedure arose in a student (academic) discipline case in 
Simjanovski v La Trobe University.
583
 Broad latitude for an inquisitorial function was held to be 
available to the disciplinary body, although there were elements of adversarial presentation (a 
Chief Examiner presented adverse evidence and appeared to act in the role of complainant).  
 
It may be that the types of student disciplinary matters coming before university tribunals and 
decision-makers require variations in approach. For instance, allegations of plagiarism based 
solely on documentary evidence may be more conducive to an inquisitorial procedure than a 
case of general misconduct involving an accuser and witnesses. Additionally, it is reasonable to 
assume that appeals will proceed within a more adversarial framework.
584
 The evidence from 
the student disciplinary rules supports such a proposition. In particular, as I note below, there is 
slightly greater scope for a right to cross-examination, or lay and legal representation, in internal 
appeals, suggesting an adversarial approach is more acceptable at this level of decision-making.  
 
6.5.5 The Hearing 
 
The student has a right to a hearing in misconduct cases. The hearing procedure encompasses 
not only the conduct of the hearing itself but also measures and requirements preceding, and 
subsequent to, the hearing.  
 
In all cases, the rules provide for written notice of a hearing in serious misconduct cases within 
a fixed minimum time frame, ranging from one to two weeks. In all but two cases there are 
express provisions for ‗particulars‘ to be given. In a majority of institutions (11 out of 16) 
institutions there is express provision in the rules for evidence or relevant information to be 
made available to the student as part of pre-hearing procedure. 
 
As a rule a student is unrepresented and the subject of inquisitorial proceedings. The right to 
cross-examine other parties or witnesses is not provided for, other than in a small minority of 
cases (3 out of 16 institutions). On appeal there is a greater allowance of the right of cross-
examination (nearly half of cited institutions). Representation, especially legal representation, 
appears an equally vexed issue. While there is a greater willingness to allow for non-legal 
representation at first instance, it is generally prohibited for lawyers to enter the hearing room in 
primary hearings. Again, there is relaxation of these restrictions for matters on appeal (10 
                                           
583
 [2004] VSC 180. 
584
 Aronson, Dyer, and Groves Judicial Review of Administrative Action, [8.295]: ‗An inquisitorial 
approach is arguably less likely to be appropriate for a ―review‖ tribunal, which does not engage in 
primary decision-making. The fact that the jurisdiction of a tribunal is enlivened only where review is 
sought by a person who is dissatisfied with a decision suggests that the primary purpose of a tribunal is to 
address justified dissatisfactions. Even if the appeal is a full appeal on the merits by way of a de novo 
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institutions allow non-legal representation on appeal, 7 allow legal representation). In this 
context, representation is taken to mean the right of an appointed ‗agent‘ to participate in 
proceedings on behalf of the student, as distinct from a ‗support‘ person or where the role of the 
agent is restricted or qualified.  
 
The decision-making body is authorised to adjudicate (other than in two circumstances where its 
role is advisory). Just under half of the decision-makers are obliged to provide reasons for their 
decision under the rules. Much smaller minorities are under obligation, or have discretion, to 
publish decisions or employ precedent (2 out of 16 in each case).  
 
Urgent or summary action, including suspension or exclusion, may be required in the context of 
imminent threats to persons or property, or where the educational process is compromised, 
disrupted or threatened, whether in a classroom or in relation to another activity.
585
 The scope of 
summary powers typically follows the seniority of the officer authorised to impose penalties. 
These range from an individual teacher‘s discretion to exclude a student from a class to a senior 
officer‘s (eg Dean, Deputy Vice-Chancellor or Vice-Chancellor) power to exclude/suspend a 
student from the university for a period up to a month, or suspend other rights and privileges. 
 
6.5.6 Penalties 
 
The range of penalties a disciplinary decision-maker may impose is prolific. There are those that 
may be imposed for serious misconduct. These forms of penalty deprive the student of a 
fundamental benefit acquired as an enrolled student, including expulsion from the university, 
exclusion for a substantial period of time (eg one to five years), or the revocation of degrees.  
 
Universities may take other action that, while still substantial, does not affect their interests 
quite so fundamentally. For instance, the university may suspend a student‘s entitlement to 
attend the university for a period of time (eg up to a semester) or suspend entitlements to use 
university facilities or services. The university may issue fines, or impose ‗service orders.‘  
 
There are penalties affecting a student‘s enrolment, such as the imposition of conditions on an 
enrolment, and academic penalties. The latter may include variation to grades, cancellation of 
grades, imposition of fail grades, requirement for re-submission of work or to repeat a unit, or 
conditions on grades that may be awarded. In regards to minor academic infractions, notably 
those found to be unintentional (eg minor forms of plagiarism), university actions may not be 
                                                                                                                           
hearing, an adversarial approach will inevitably give a higher profile to the dissatisfaction of the appellant 
and the matters ―in dispute‖; and that, we suggest, is usually desirable.‘ 
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penal but educative in their purpose. Alternatively, minor transgressions may be accompanied 
by a warning or reprimand.  
 
In general misconduct matters concerning damage to persons or property the university often 
has powers to order compensation or restitution.  
 
At hearing a student may be able to speak in mitigation of penalty. Guidelines may establish 
criteria a decision-maker may, or must, consider in the application of penalties.  
 
6.5.7 Appeals 
 
An internal review or appeal mechanism is universal in the schemes investigated. Appeal may 
only be available on limited grounds, which nevertheless may be broad, such as a failure to hear 
a case on its merits. Alternatively, they may be narrower, such as where substantial new 
evidence can be introduced, in matters of disproportionate penalty, or for procedural unfairness 
or misapplication of the rules/policy.  
 
As noted above, hearing procedure on appeal may be more adversarial than at first instance. In 
some instances, the rules establish that a ‗respondent‘ to an appeal is appointed to act on behalf 
of ‗the university.‘ There is a tendency for appeal proceedings to be chaired by persons with 
legal training, or appellate bodies include member/s with legal training.
586
 
 
6.5.8 Student Misconduct Register 
 
A register of students found to have engaged in misconduct may be established.
587
 Discipline 
procedure may require reference to the register and in cases where a student on the register 
subsequently is found to have committed misconduct again a more severe, or mandatory, 
penalty applies.  
                                                                                                                           
585
 Such as a practicuum, fieldtrip or placement: eg University of Technology Sydney Student and 
Related Rules, subss. 16.13, 16.17. At University of Wollongong, a student may be discipline summarily 
for bringing the University into ‗public disrepute‘: Rules for Student Conduct and Discipline, s 10. 
586
 The exemplary case here being the requirement that the University of Sydney‘s Student Disciplinary 
Appeals Committee be chaired by a judge or magistrate and at least one other member be an admitted 
lawyer: University of Sydney By-Law 1999, s 78. 
587
 Eg, University of Newcastle Student Academic Integrity Policy, subs 4.8.  
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Table 6.1: Procedures and rules in serious student misconduct cases, selected Australian universities 
University Syd UTS UWS N’castle Monash Deakin RMIT Swin Woll’ng Q’land Tas ANU Griffith
588 
Curtin Sun Coast JCU 
Separate academic and general 
misconduct rules 
Y N Y Y N N N Y N N N N Y N N Y 
Powers of summary action Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Right to be heard in relation to 
summary action 
N N N N Y Y N N N Y Y N Y N N N 
Right to a hearing Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Written notice of charge Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Length of notice (days) 14 7 15 - 7 10 10 10 10 5 10 7 - 10 5 14 
Particulars Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y 
Access to all evidence589 Y N N N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y 
Tribunal  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Is the decision determinative?                 
at first instance Y N N Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
590 
on appeal Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Internal appeal Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Right to representation                 
at first instance Y N N N N N Y Y N Y N N Y N Y Y 
on appeal Y N N N Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y N 
Right to legal representation                 
at first instance Y N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N 
on appeal Y N N N Y N Y N N Y N Y Y Y N N 
Right to cross-examination                 
at first instance Y N N N Y N N N N N N N N N Y N 
on appeal Y N N N Y N N N N Y N Y Y Y Y N 
Duty to provide reasons N Y N N N N N Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Publication of decisions N N N N N N N N N Y Y N N N N N 
Availability of precedent in 
decision-making 
N Y N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N 
                                           
588
 Refers to rules for general misconduct only, as academic misconduct procedures substantially incommensurate with these procedures.  
589
 Denoted where right to have access to all documentation or evidence is express duty on decision-maker. 
590
 In relation to hearings where students have previously been found to have committed academic misconduct, the decision-maker (Head of School) may only make 
recommendations on the issue of penalty to a relevant Committee. 
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6.6 Are Student Discipline Rules Fair? 
 
6.6.1 What Sort of Hearing is Required? 
 
The right to be heard is universal in student discipline rules, leaving aside for the moment the 
issue of summary or urgent action. To that end a particular threshold of procedural fairness is 
satisfied. The real question perhaps is what is the precise nature of the hearing to be afforded. 
 
In Board of Education v Rice,
591
 Lord Loreburn LC famously said that the duty to ‗fairly listen 
to both sides‘ is qualified by the principle that the decision-maker is not ‗bound to treat such a 
question as though it were a trial.‘ This has been reiterated in university cases, such as Kane v 
Board of Governors of the University of British Columbia.
592
 In that case, the Canadian 
Supreme Court heard an appeal from a university professor, and held the decision-maker ‗need 
not assume the trappings of a court.‘593 The court in that case did go on to hold that the 
proceedings ought to be heard in a ‗judicial spirit,‘ and a hearing must provide a ‗real and 
effective opportunity‘ to meet the charges.594 In R v Aston University Senate; ex parte Roffey,595 
the right to be heard may be ‗orally or in writing, in person or by [the student‘s] representatives 
as might be appropriate.‘ The Queensland Supreme Court has taken this dictum to mean an oral 
hearing is not afforded to a student as of right.
596
 However, the latter case concerns a disputes 
over grades, rather than the more serious circumstances of discipline and/or expulsion.  
 
By contrast the Irish High court in Flanagan v University College Dublin
597
 drew a strict 
analogy to court and to criminal procedure. The approach of the Irish Court was in effect to 
codify procedural fairness in student (academic) disciplinary actions, requiring a high standard 
in the observance of procedural rights such as representation and cross-examination. Flanagan 
was a case brought by a student found to have committed plagiarism and excluded for a period 
of time from the university. That Court held
598
: 
 
The present case is one in which the effect of an adverse decision would have far-reaching 
consequences for the applicant. Clearly, the charge of plagiarism is a charge of cheating and as 
such the most serious academic breach of discipline possible. It is also criminal in its nature. In 
my view, the procedures must approach those of a court hearing. The applicant should have 
received in writing details of the precise charge being made and the basic facts alleged to 
constitute the alleged offence. She should equally have been allowed to be represented by 
someone of her choice, and should have been informed, in sufficient time to enable her to 
prepare her defence, of such right and of any other rights given to her by the rules governing the 
                                           
591
 (1911) AC 179, 182. 
592
 (1980) 110 DLR (3d) 311. 
593
 Kane v Board of Governors of the University of British Columbia (1980) 110 DLR (3
rd
) 311, 321. 
594
 Kane v Board of Governors of the University of British Columbia  (1980) 110 DLR (3d) 311, 324. 
595
 (1969) 2 QB 538, 554. 
596
 Ivins v Griffith University (2001) QSC 86, [42]. 
597
 (1988) IR 724. 
598
 Flanagan v University College Dublin (1988) IR 724, [20]. 
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procedure or the disciplinary tribunal. At the hearing itself, she should have been able to hear the 
evidence against her, to challenge that evidence on cross-examination, and to present her own 
evidence.  
 
While Flanagan sets a high benchmark, it is not in conflict with the general principle that the 
procedural standards in disciplinary cases are distinguishable, for instance, from matters 
involving academic judgement. The latter principle is expressed in R v University of Cambridge, 
ex parte Persaud
599
 and was supported by Kirby J in Griffith University v Tang.
600
 It is also been 
held by the Federal Court that a higher level of procedural protection may be required in 
disciplinary cases conducted by administrative bodies.
601
 This approach is consistent with the 
dictum of the High Court in R v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitation Commission; ex 
parte Angliss Group
602
 that the nature of the jurisdiction being exercised is part of the 
circumstances in which fairness is assessed. 
 
In practice at the institutional level a spectrum of approaches operates for serious misconduct. In 
primary decision-making the general approach may be described as a form of institutional 
inquiry, held in closed session. Primary decision-making does possess some trial-like qualities 
(such as charges), prescribed in rules and/or guidelines,
603
 and in a minority of instances this 
extends to representation and cross-examination. The trial analogy may not be entirely absent 
from first instance proceedings. For instance, there may be capacity for a ‗complainant‘ to put 
their case against the student and be afforded comparable standing before the decision-maker, 
thus acting as ‗prosecutor.‘604 There are circumstances where a complainant, as well as a 
student, may be represented.
605
 
 
In general, university discipline hearings need not operate like trials, and in general they do not. 
There is a minority tendency in the sector to take a more formal approach. One approach to the 
construction of appeal procedures, for instance, is to establish some elements of more formal, 
‗trial-like‘ proceedings (eg the right to cross-examination, the right to representation). 
Proceedings may appear more as a dispute inter partes where for instance the university itself 
becomes a ‗party‘ to the proceeding.606 Added to this is a greater propensity for decision-makers 
on appellate bodies (in particular presiding officers) to be legally-qualified and, presumably, 
                                           
599
 [2000] EWHC Admin 374, [40]-421]. 
600
 (2005) HCA 7, [166]; 221 CLR 99.  
601
 McCabe v Fitzgerald (1992) 28 ALD 175. 
602
 (1969) 122 CLR 546, 553. 
603
 A succinct and arguably model construction of hearing procedure may be found in the University of 
Queensland Statute No 4 (Student Discipline and Misconduct), s 7. 
604
 Eg, University of Western Sydney Non-academic Misconduct Policy, s 4, para 76(f): ‗The complainant 
and the student will have the opportunity to put their cases to the body that is hearing the matter, and… 
have equal access to information pertaining to the matter.‘ 
605
 Swinburne University of Technology General Misconduct Policy, s 3.5. 
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deal with questions of law. The exemplary body in this respect is the Student Discipline 
Appeals Committee at the University of Sydney.
607
 
 
6.6.2 Summary Action 
 
Summary action is ‗magisterial‘608 or ‗peremptory‘609 action: ‗It is in the nature of a police 
action not judicial process.‘610 Summary powers are universal in the surveyed rules, and in 
nearly one-third of cases a form of recourse and/or explanation from summary action exists. 
This is a valuable protection to the student, and a standard arguably in excess of the legal duty. 
Fairness in respect of summary action may recede to ‗nothingness‘611 and dispense with the 
right to be heard. In allowing the business of education to proceed, summary power is 
nevertheless no general invitation to arbitrary action against students. The purpose of such 
summary action is to maintain the status quo, ‗carefully expressed as a measure to preserve 
existing interests, without punitive intent and without prejudice to the issues to be determined 
later on.‘612  It necessarily implies a person will be afforded a hearing in due course and as soon 
as practicable. A typical, maximum timeframe of 1-2 weeks accords with the generally 
prescribed notice requirements. Such a timeframe may or may not prejudice the preservation of 
‗existing interests,‘ depending on circumstances. However, a summary suspension period of up 
to 6 weeks would likely be unfair or unreasonable.
613
 Alternatively, provision for restitution for 
the effects of summary exclusion, especially with regard to academic progress, would provide 
an important protection against unfairness in this procedure.
614
  
 
6.6.3 Notice and Disclosure 
 
The adequacy of pre-hearing procedure will substantially turn on the questions of notice, 
particulars and pre-hearing disclosure of evidence. This is an extension of the principle that a 
student must be give a ‗fair opportunity‘ to test or contradict ‗any relevant statement prejudicial 
                                                                                                                           
606
 Eg, University of Queensland Statute No 4 (Student Discipline and Misconduct), s 16(e): ‗the 
chancellor may appoint counsel or solicitor or a member of staff to represent the university at the 
hearing…‘ 
607
 Which includes both a judicial officer (or retired judicial officer) and an admitted legal practitioner. 
608
 Glynn v Keele University (1971) 1 WLR 487, 494; although now perhaps shed of overtones of action 
in loco parentis.  
609
 See Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 615. 
610
 Forbes ‗University Discipline: A New Province For Natural Justice?‘, 95. 
611
 Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 615 (Brennan J): in order to ‗avoid frustrating the purpose for 
which the power was conferred.‘ 
612
 Forbes Justice in Tribunals, [9.7]. 
613
 University of the Sunshine Coast Student Conduct and Discipline Policy s 7.1. In the context of the 
semester teaching cycle, 6 weeks would typically comprise half of the semester.  
614
 See University of Sydney By-Law 1999 Ch 8, subs 61(2). In certain circumstances where a student is 
subsequently found not guilty of an offence ‗reasonable allowance must be made by the University for 
any academic disadvantage incurred by the student as a result of the suspension.‘  
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to their view.‘615 A party should ‗not be left in the dark as to the risk of an adverse finding.‘616 
As Lord Denning put it in Kanda v Government of Malaya:
617
 ‗If the right to be heard is to be a 
real right which is worth anything, it must carry with it a right in the accused man to know the 
case which is made against him.‘ In general, ‗The more serious the charge the more important 
due process becomes.‘618 
 
Universities would appear to be highly conscious of the requirement to give notice in 
disciplinary proceedings. It is a principle universally applied at least at a general level. In almost 
all cases, there is a proscribed timeframe for the notice period. Particular forms in which notice 
is prescribed vary across the sector. Two mechanisms are common. First, there may be a 
provision in the rules prescribing the notice content.
619
 Alternatively, there may be a model 
notice, such as a ‗charge letter,‘620 ‗primary investigation notice,‘621 or ‗allegation notice,‘622 
which typically include notice of the time, place and nature of the proceedings, details of 
allegations, and the rules. There are some interesting, and arguably valuable, additions to this 
general form. For instance, at UTS, it is within the ambit of notice that a student is provided 
with information on ‗precedent cases.‘623 At the University of Western Sydney it is a 
requirement of notice that a student is informed they may continue to attend classes while 
proceedings are under way.
624
 
 
In proceedings with an adversarial dimension, such as disciplinary action, provision of 
particulars as part of a ‗sufficiently informative notice‘625 would generally be required: 
 
The inadequacy in ordinary civil and criminal litigation of merely providing access to documents 
is equally applicable to proceedings of a disciplinary character. There is an initial obligation on 
the prosecuting authority to acquaint the person concerned with adequate particulars of the 
nature of the case to be made against him.
626
  
 
                                           
615
 Board of Education v Rice (1911) AC 179, 182. 
616
 Mahon v Air New Zealand  (1984) 1 AC 808, 821. 
617
 (1962) AC 322, 337. See also University of Ceylon v Fernando (1960) 1 All ER 631, 639G-H; 
Annamunthodo v Oilfield Workers’ Trade Union (1961) AC 945. 
618
 Forbes Justice in Tribunals, [10.9]. 
619
 A good example is RMIT‘s discipline regulation, s 21, which provides for notice inter alia of 
particulars including the name of the complainant, the hearing date, what assistance is available to the 
student, the student‘s rights, and a copy of the Regulation.  
620
 Monash University Discipline (Student) – Guidelines, s 2.2 . 
621
 University of Wollongong Rules for Student Conduct and Discipline, Appendix E. 
622
 Griffith University Student Misconduct Resolution, s 4.1. 
623
 ‗… to enable the student to make representations as to the relevance and appropriateness of any such 
precedent, and refer to any others.‘ University of Technology, Sydney Student and Related Rules, subs 
16.12.4(6). 
624
 University of Western Sydney Student Academic Misconduct Policy, s 61. 
625
 Forbes Justice in Tribunals, [10.2]. 
626
 Public Service Board of NSW v Etherton (1985) 1 NSWLR 430, 432F. 
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Once allegations or ‗charges‘ arise, even in an inquisitorial proceeding, particularisation of the 
charges is necessary.
627
 What form this duty takes may vary but at a minimum what is required 
is that the ‗accused‘ have the ‗substance of what is alleged against him.‘628 Aside from 
insufficiency solely in the provision of access to documents, it also not sufficient that the person 
is provided only with knowledge of the rule or rules alleged to have been broken. Allegations of 
fact, action or omission also need to be notified.
629
 
 
The general trend in the universities is, as for instance at James Cook University, that the 
student must receive ‗the allegation and details of the allegation.‘630 However, other rules do 
specifically refer to the language of particulars.
631
 Or may contain other forms of construction, 
for example: ‗the substance of the information provided to support the allegation.‘632 What may 
be gleaned from the rules is that in principle adherence to the requirement to provide particulars 
is met. What cannot be discerned readily is whether, or to what extent, particularisation of 
charges is sufficient with respect to content, for instance allegations of fact, action or omission.  
 
Where issues of notice appear more problematic on the face of the rules is in regards to 
disclosure of relevant materials. As can be seen from Table 6.3, there are a number of instances 
where disclosure (which may be expressed as access to evidence or materials) is neither an 
entitlement under the rules nor do the rules provide guidance in this area.  
 
The courts have been cautious to limit pre-hearing disclosure of evidence or materials to those 
to be relied upon by a decision-maker. There is the concern that comprehensive rules of 
disclosure would detrimentally affect the efficiency and flexibility of tribunals in administrative 
proceedings. Forbes discounts the right of pre-hearing access to evidence in disciplinary cases 
                                           
627
 Bond v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (No 2) (1988) 84 ALR 646, 662; ‗In investigative 
proceedings, the incidents of adversarial proceedings, such as particulars and control over one‘s case, are 
in principle inappropriate. If specific allegations are made, fairness and efficiency would support 
particularisation of those allegations.‘ 
628
 Re La Trobe University; ex parte Wild (1987) VR 447, 458: a University Visitor case hearing a 
petition from a staff member charged with gross misconduct as a consequence of plagiarism. Compare 
Flick Natural Justice: Principles and Practical Application, 61: ‗It follows that although a notice need 
not in all cases quote chapter and verse, it must be formulated with sufficient precision to inform the 
ordinary reasonable man as to what is being complained of and what he is required to do.‘ 
629
 R v Solicitor’s Disciplinary Tribunal; ex parte L (A Solicitor) (1988) VR 757, 770; Robbins v Harness 
Racing Board (1984) VR 641, 645. 
630
 James Cook University Student Academic Misconduct Requirements subs 8.3.1(a); compare University 
of Queensland Statute no 4 (Student Discipline and Misconduct) 1999 subs 7(1); compare University of 
Wollongong Rules for Student Conduct and Discipline subs 6.2.7. 
631
 Eg RMIT Regulation 6.1.1 – Student Discipline subs 21(a)(i).  
632
 University of Tasmania Ordinance no.9 – Student Discipline subs 2.2.6; compare Australian National 
University Discipline Statute 2005 subs 7.2; University of Sydney Student Plagiarism: Coursework – 
Policy and Procedure subs 9: a student must ‗be informed of the allegations against them in sufficient 
detail to enable them to understand the precise nature of the allegations and to properly consider and 
respond.‘ 
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and plays down the analogy to criminal trials,
633
 as does Flick.
634
 The test as established in Kioa 
v West
635
 relates to ‗adverse information that is credible, relevant and significant to the decision 
to be made.‘ Where the disclosure is so conditioned, it will form part of procedural fairness.636  
 
In some cases, the language of the rules is comparable to the common law test. For example a 
committee must ‗make available to the student documents relied upon by the University.‘637 
Other forms of wording are slightly more expansive, such as ‗copies of substantive material 
upon which the allegations are based,‘638 or ‗a copy of any document provided to [the 
committee].‘639 In other cases, disclosure is of ‗relevant‘ materials. In circumstances where 
closed hearings are commonplace and lay decision-makers the norm, direction and/or guidance 
on the disclosure standard should, it is submitted, be universal. This protection is lacking is 
some cases. Where it does operate, it appears satisfactory to standards of fairness. 
 
6.6.4 Cross-Examination 
 
The right to cross-examination by parties connotes a level of formality within an adversarial 
process, a situation seemingly at odds with the desired informality of administrative decision-
making.
640
 It would tend to shift control over and the focus of proceedings from the decision-
maker to the parties. Where cross-examination is allowed it cannot be ‗arbitrarily‘ restricted by 
the decision-maker but must allow it to run its course.
641
 Authority on the question of cross-
examination as a component of fairness in administrative tribunals is unsettled. In review of 
authorities, Forbes concludes:
642
 ‗The present weight of authority is against a right of cross-
examination in tribunals, private or public. But judicial opinion to the contrary is significant 
(although often unexplained) and there is an unsatisfactory air of uncertainty.‘  
 
There are certain circumstances in student discipline hearings where it would seem cross-
examination ought to be permitted if a student (or their representative as appropriate) seeks to 
utilise the technique. Two examples come to mind: where adverse oral evidence is given against 
                                           
633
 Forbes Justice in Tribunals, [10.13]. 
634
 Flick Natural Justice: Principles and Practical Application, 60. 
635
 (1985) 159 CLR 550, 629 (Brennan J). 
636
 See LBC, Laws of Australia, vol 2 (at 1 December 2006) ‗Judicial Review of Administrative Action: 
Procedural Fairness‘, [2.5.530]: ‗Like the duty to give notice, the duty of disclosure is one of the more 
certain aspects of procedural fairness.‘ 
637
 Deakin University Regulation 4.1(1) – Student Discipline, s 8. Compare University of Tasmania 
Ordinance 9 – Student Discipline, subs 1.7.2: ‗A decision maker considering evidence… must make sure 
that each party who has presented evidence – (a) is informed of the substance of all evidence that the 
person or body intends to rely on in making the decision.‘ 
638
 Australian National University Discipline Statute 2005, s 7.2. 
639
 Monash University Discipline (Student) – Guidelines, subs 2.4.2. 
640
 However, see for example Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 102. 
641
 R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13. 
642
 Forbes Justice in Tribunals, [12.95]. 
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a student in a general misconduct case; or alternatively, in the circumstances that an exam 
invigilator gives oral evidence against a student which the student seeks to contest. In such 
circumstances, credibility may especially be at issue.
643
 
 
By comparison, in University of Ceylon v Fernando,
644
 it was held that had a student accused of 
academic misconduct sought to cross-examination a witness it may have been unfair to prohibit 
him from doing so. In another disciplinary context, it was held in Murray v Greyhound Racing 
Control Board
645
 that fairness would ‗ordinarily‘ require cross-examination to be allowed in an 
oral hearing and permitting it to only one side would constitute a breach of the rules of natural 
justice. Yet the decision of the High Court in O’Rourke v Miller646 is contrary.647 Finally, 
variations to the system of cross-examination, diluting the adversarial framework, are possible 
and this may make the process of cross-examination less confronting and more palatable to a 
tribunal.
648
  
 
In student disciplinary proceedings, the right to cross-examination generally does not apply as a 
matter of right in the disciplinary rules. There is slightly greater propensity for access to cross-
examination on appeal, where there is likely to be greater scope for adversarial procedure. 
Despite the equivocal correlation of procedural fairness and the opportunity for cross-
examination in tribunal actions, the reluctance of university discipline instruments to 
contemplate the question of cross-examination – that is to say, their silence on the question – 
presents a difficulty, if not impediment, to fairness for students. Although in practice discretion 
may lie with a tribunal (or tribunal chair) to permit cross-examination, the rules themselves 
provide no guidance for decision-makers in this respect. This includes variations to the model of 
cross-examination as may be effective and appropriate in the circumstances. It is foreseeable 
that entitlement to cross-examination may lie in certain circumstances.
649
 By and large the 
disciplinary rules fail to account for and accommodate the contingency.  
 
                                           
643
 See Healey v Memorial University of Newfoundland [1992] CanLII 2756 (NL SCTD); Mohl v Senate 
Committee on Appeals on Academic Standing [2000] BCSC 1849. 
644
 (1960) 1 All ER 631, 641-2. 
645
 (1979) Qd R 111, 116-117, citing as authority Barrier Reef Broadcasting Ltd v Minister for Post and 
Telecommunications (1979) 19 ALR 425 for the latter principle (the first being established by the court 
itself) and distinguishing the High Court dictum in R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; ex 
parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228.  
646
 (1985) 156 CLR 342. 
647
 In that case, a probationary police constable had his position terminated on disciplinary grounds. He 
claimed a denial of fairness on the ground that he was not permitted to cross-examine two witnesses to an 
incident leading to the disciplinary action. The Court held there was no denial of fairness. Certain factors 
may distinguish this decision from application to disciplinary tribunals more generally, such as the 
probationary nature of the constable‘s appointment and the fact that the witnesses were members of the 
general public. 
648
 See Flick Natural Justice: Principles and Practical Application, 85-87. 
649
 See McCabe v Fitzgerald (1992) 28 ALD 175. 
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6.6.5 Representation 
 
Rules regulating representation of a student before a disciplinary hearing are widespread and 
preponderantly are aimed at restricting representation. With a desire not to ‗legalise‘ 
proceedings and to limit adversarial methods, there is an understandable reluctance by 
universities to allow legal representation as of right. This is loosened slightly for matters on 
appeal. There is also widespread restriction on non-legal representation. In these cases, the rules 
do allow for a support person.
650
 But in some cases, there is additional restriction placed upon 
the support person being a non-lawyer. Most clauses exclusive of representation are non-
discretionary, notably the prohibition on representation by lawyers, although in a few cases 
some discretion does lie with the decision-maker: for instance, ‗at the express invitation of the 
Chair.‘651 
 
Historically, the role of student associations in providing non-legal representation to students, 
analogous to union representation of workers in industrial matters, has filled the gap between 
unassisted self-representation and legal representation.
652
 This would tend to explain a 
propensity for non-legal representation in student discipline rules. In some instances, direct 
reference is made to representation by student union advocates.
653
 Are these fetters and 
qualifications on representation fair? 
 
Procedural fairness provides no absolute right to legal representation before a domestic 
tribunal.
654
 On grounds of fairness, the situation is similar before statutory bodies,
655
 although 
on the basis of the law of agency the right to representation is more likely.
656
 There is no 
absolute rule the other way, prohibiting representation without regard to all the circumstances, 
and this may be of concern in relation to several student disciplinary schemes. As Lord Denning 
remarked in Enderby Town Football Club v Football Association Ltd:
657
 ‗The Tribunal must not 
fetter its discretion by rigid bonds. A domestic tribunal is not at liberty to lay down an absolute 
rule: ‗We will never allow anyone to have a lawyer appear for him.‖‘ 
 
                                           
650
 Compare McKenzie v McKenzie (1970) 3 All ER 1034; Krstic v Australian Telecommunications 
Commission (1988) 16 ALD 751, 754. 
651
 University of Newcastle Student Discipline Rules subs 4(9)(d). See also University of Western Sydney 
Student Academic Misconduct Policy, s64, ANU Discipline Statute 2005, s 8.8. 
652
 See Chapter 8, section 8.3, below. 
653
 Eg James Cook University Student Academic Misconduct Requirements, s 3. 
654
 Cains v Jenkins (1979) 28 ALR 219; Enderby Town Football Club Ltd v Football Association Ltd 
[1971] 1 Ch 591. 
655
 Brett v Willmot (1988) 17 ALD 462, 468. 
656
 R v Board of Appeal; ex parte Kay (1916) 22 CLR 183. 
657
 (1971) 1 Ch 591, 605. See also Freedman v Petty (1981) VR 1001, 1015: ‗Mandatory disallowance of 
legal representation in all cases conflicts with the notion that natural justice may dictate that in a 
particular case it should be permitted. So understood, a rule which denies legal representation in all cases 
irrespective of the merits is capable of being regarded as contrary to the principles of natural justice.‘ 
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In hybrid tribunals, such as student discipline tribunals, the capacity for legal representation to 
be absolutely proscribed depends on more than the ‗statutory backing‘ of enabling legislation. 
Rather, what is required is ‗express or implied statutory power for such a rule.‘658 It is arguable 
that such exclusion clauses in subordinate instruments, including relevant university by-laws 
and rules, may be beyond power.
659
 
 
Statutory exclusions aside, what does fairness require where discretion exists? What might 
university hearings require? In short, ‗There must be flexibility.‘660 More usefully, fairness does 
require ‗an application for… representation [to be] properly considered.‘ Legal representation 
was rejected in Cains v Jenkins
661
 because the official charged was knowledgeable in the rules 
and business of the union concerned. In Pett v Greyhound Racing Association Ltd (No 2),
662
 
fairness was not held as a ground supplying a right to legal representation until a ‗society… has 
reached some degree of sophistication in its affairs.‘ More instructively, in Krstic v Australian 
Telecommunications Commission,
663
 Woodward J stated: ‗… it depends upon the ability of the 
person concerned to conduct his or her own case.‘ Having regard to non-legal representation or 
assistance as well as legal representation, His Honour went on to say:
664
   
 
A person with tertiary qualification and a normal amount of self-confidence should require no 
representation or assistance. But even that person may have to ask to have a friend present, for 
reassurance and, perhaps, consultation at times. A tribunal such as that in the present case [for 
review of probationary officers] would, in my view, be well advised to grant such a request, 
unless there is good reason for rejecting it. At the other end of the scale, a person having a low 
standard of education, and perhaps some difficulty with the English language, who is lacking in 
self-confidence, may be quite incapable of adequate self-representation, and only able to put the 
case through a friend or union representative – or if these are not available, a lawyer. Such an 
application should clearly be granted.  
 
University decision-makers typically face rigid controls on the question of student 
representation. The rules rarely adopt a discretionary approach, providing instead a codified 
form of entitlement. Such an approach is more problematic given the in camera nature of these 
proceedings.  
 
As measured against Krstic v Australian Telecommunications Commission, restrictions on 
representation in student discipline rules are undesirable and inflexible. For instance, fairness in 
the context of hearing for an international student with poor English and a cultural disposition 
                                           
658
 Freedman v Petty (1981) VR 1001, 1015. 
659
 See also Forbes Justice in Tribunals, [11.1]. 
660
 Freedman v Petty (1981) VR 1001, 1015. 
661
 (1979) 26 ALR 652. 
662
 (1970) 1 QB 46, 66. Just what the appropriate degree of sophistication means in the proceedings of a 
domestic tribunal is not clear: Forbes Justice in Tribunals, [11.16]. 
663
 (1988) 16 ALD 751, 753. 
664
Krstic v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1988) 16 ALD 751, 753-754. 
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not to dispute authority would be qualitatively different to an admitted lawyer studying for 
postgraduate qualifications or even an articulate, English-speaking undergraduate student.  
 
6.6.6 Reasons 
 
The value of giving reasons includes their contribution to the transparency of decision-making 
and to the correctness and lawfulness of decisions: ‗It has long been recognised that the giving 
of reasons by a tribunal for its decisions is a desirable course of action.‘ 665  
 
There are further imperatives in university hearings: they are generally held in closed session 
and, as a rule, there is no recourse to external merits review where the giving of reasons would 
be standard.  
 
Providing reasons has been a legislated requirement of a wide range of Australian statutory 
decision-making since the 1970s.
666
 At common law, it has been pointed out that the judicial 
stance on the duty to give reasons contains a significant tension, notably in the difference 
between the general and particular approaches to the duty:  
 
Now while the courts continue to restate the absence of a general duty to give reasons, they are 
sounding more and more like Mark Antony at Caeser‘s funeral: saying one thing and meaning 
another.
667
  
 
There is no general rule at common law that fairness requires the giving of reasons. This was 
emphatically stated by the High Court in Public Service Board of NSW v Osmond.
668
 
‗Exceptions‘ to the general rule would appear to be sufficiently prolific, as circumstances and 
fairness dictate, that  
 
the general proposition is meaningful only in indicating that the mere fact that a decision-making 
process is held to be subject to the requirement of fairness does not automatically or naturally 
lead to the further conclusion that reasons must be given. However it is certainly now the case 
that a decision-maker subject to the requirements of fairness should consider carefully whether, 
in the particular circumstances of the case, reasons should be given.
669
 
 
While this may be the position in relation to decision-making by statutory bodies,
670
 for 
domestic tribunals the dictum in Public Service Board of NSW v Osmond more readily 
                                           
665
 Geoffrey Flick ‗Administrative Adjudications and the Duty to Give Reasons – A Search for Criteria‘ 
(1978) 1 Public Law 2 16, 17-18; R v Higher Education Funding Council; ex parte Institute of Dental 
Surgery [1994] 1 WLR 242, 256-7. 
666
 Eg Administrative Decision (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s 13; Administrative Law Act 1978 
(Vic), s 8. 
667
 Galligan Due Process and Fair Procedures, 435. 
668
 (1986) 159 CLR 656. 
669
 De Smith, Woolf And Jowell Judicial Review Of Administrative Action , [9-041]. 
670
 R v Civil Service Appeal Board; ex parte Cunningham (1991) 4 All ER 310, 318: ‗I do not accept that, 
just because Parliament has ruled that some tribunals should be required to give reasons for their 
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applies.
671
 Absence of a general duty to give reasons for university decisions is supported by the 
judgement in Wing Kew Leung v Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine.
672
  
 
In respect of circumstances where the duty may apply, Sedley J, in R v Higher Education 
Funding Council; ex parte Institute of Dental Surgery,
673
 posed a threshold as to the duty to give 
reasons. While no general duty lies, at least two classes of case exist where a duty would exist: 
where fundamental interests are affected (he gives the example of personal freedom), and where 
the decision prima facie ‗appears aberrant.‘674 In student discipline cases the latter test is more 
likely to be triggered.
675
 A similar approach may be found in Jackson v Director-General of 
Corrective Services.
676
 
 
A statutory obligation lies on universities in several Australian jurisdictions to provide reasons 
for decisions when requested by an affected person. Even so, there may be no requirement in the 
relevant discipline rules for a university decision-maker to provide reasons. In Victoria, for 
instance, in spite of the Administrative Law Act 1978 (Vic), s 8, three out of four surveyed 
institutions do not require decision-makers to supply reasons. On the other hand, the 
Queensland universities
677
 and ANU, subject to similar statutory requirements
678
 but where 
justiciability may be in question,
 679
 do require reasons to be given. 
 
Just over half of the surveyed institutions (10 of 16) do not require decision-makers to provide 
reasons for their decisions. This division perhaps reflects tension in the law regarding this duty 
as an administrative standard, and apprehension in application of this standard in a disciplinary 
context. At common law reasons are not required for fairness. The stance of many universities is 
                                                                                                                           
decisions, it follows that the common law is unable to impose a similar requirement upon other tribunals.‘ 
The Board in this case was, additionally, acting in a judicial capacity. 
671
 Dixon v Australian Society of Accountants (1989) 18 ALD 102; compare the well-known dissenting 
opinion of Lord Denning MR in Breen v Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971) 2 QB 175, 190-191: 
‗Then comes the problem: ought such a body, statutory or domestic, to give reasons or to give the person 
concerned a chance of being heard? Not always, but sometimes. It all depends on what is fair in the 
circumstances… The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration.‘  
672
 [2002] EWHC Admin 1358, [37]. This position was common ground between the parties. The issue 
lay in the adequacy and consistency of reasons, especially supplementary reasons, which the College had 
provided in any case.  
673
 [1994] 1 WLR 242. 
674
 R v Higher Education Funding Council; ex parte Institute of Dental Surgery [1994] 1 WLR 242, 263 
675
 Eg, where there is an arguable case of irrationality or disproportion in the decision. 
676
 (1990) 21 ALD 261, 264: ‗If an authority is not bound to state reasons for a decision but chooses to do 
so a court may act on them if they demonstrate an erroneous approach to an exercise of power… equally 
so when the reasons appear directly or by clear inference from other proved facts and circumstances.‘ 
(emphasis added) 
677
 Other than the University of Queensland, which appears to be in the unusual position of not requiring 
reasons as part of the decision – although an appeal committee is required to keep a record of the 
proceedings including how it conducted the inquiry (s 16(2)) – but must ‗record and publish details of 
findings of misconduct according to a scheme approved by the senate.‘(s 24). 
678
 Judicial Review Act 1991 (Q), s 32; Administrative Decisions( Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s 13. 
679
 Despite the fact that, where the rules are not in a statutory instrument, the review legislation would not 
apply: Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99. 
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consistent with this prevailing standard. A number of institutions appear in excess of the 
standard. However, that may be for the value that the practice of formulating reasons brings to 
the decision-making process.  
 
6.6.7 Appeal Rights 
 
As noted, internal recourse from primary decisions is universal in the universities investigated.  
Two questions arise from this fact. First, are existing appeal mechanisms capable of ‗curing‘ 
failures to accord procedural fairness at first instance? Second, how accessible are appeal rights?  
 
Denial of procedural fairness is a ground for appeal from an original decision in all the 
investigated cases, although the precise wording may vary.
680
 At James Cook University, 
indeed, it is the sole ground of appeal. From the construction of the rules, it is expressly stated 
or reasonable to discern that a form of re-hearing de novo is available to students in 8 of the 17 
institutions. Where a rehearing de novo is available, it is possible that the appeal may ‗cure‘ a 
procedural defect of the primary decision.
681
 In situations where less than a full de novo hearing 
operates it will be the case that an appellant is entitled to a fair hearing at both levels of 
decision-making.
682
 Therefore, slightly fewer than half of the universities investigated in this 
study have established adjudicative machinery capable of ‗curing‘ procedural unfairness by 
original decision-makers. It is arguable that failure to provide this adjudicative procedure, and 
indeed appeal procedures ‗fuller or enlarged‘ from those employed at first instance, reflects an 
ambivalence on the part of university rule-makers to mechanisms that would allow to challenge 
to internal decisions affecting students.  
 
Having said this, there are a number of examples where appeal procedures are ‗fuller or 
enlarged‘ over those of the original hearing. This includes rights to cross-examination and 
representation. Decision-makers on appeal are apt to be senior officers of the university and/or 
required to have legal qualifications. Greater ‗judicialisation‘ of procedure on appeal provides 
an element of protection from error in primary decision-making. 
 
                                           
680
 Eg Deakin University‘s Discipline Regulation provides appeal is available for ‗misapplication of 
procedures,‘ which presumably implies denial of procedural fairness (Discipline Committees are 
expressly required to observe the rules of natural justice). Swinburne University uses the term ‗procedural 
irregularity‘ as a ground of appeal. Monash University uses the term ‗significant procedural irregularity.‘  
681
 Calvin v Carr (1979) 1 NSWLR 1; Forbes Justice in Tribunals, [14.7]-[14.12]: ‗A re-hearing de novo 
is more in the nature of a re-trial than a conventional appeal.‘ He cites Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 
172, 180 in support of the distinction between a re-hearing de novo and an appeal properly speaking 
(dealing with an error of law).  
682
 Calvin v Carr (1979) 1 NSWLR 1. 
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The requirement to observe procedural fairness in domestic tribunals does not compel an 
internal right of appeal, although in practice internal appellate bodies are common.
683
 Whether 
or not such a body exists, and whatever its precise powers and functions, both the appellate and 
first-instance decision-makers will be required to proceed fairly,
684
 and if there is no internal 
recourse on this question an affected person may turn to the courts for judicial review. In the 
case of statutory tribunals, systems of administrative appeal are available. Historically, of 
course, in the case of university tribunals, recourse may be had to the Visitor. But that avenue 
was been largely removed. In Australia, as distinct from the UK, no alternative body of external 
or statutory appeal or merits review has been established.
685
 
 
Whether or not the rules provide for a re-hearing on appeal, there is an initial question of access 
to the appeal procedure. Most disciplinary rules provide for appeal rights on specified grounds 
without any further limitation or discretion upon an appellate body or other decision-maker to 
hear an appeal. The appellate body would, presumably, adjudicate on any dispute over whether 
a student meets the ground or grounds of appeal. This task is expressly provided for in the 
University of Tasmania rules, where the Discipline Appeals Committee must determine the 
preliminary question as to whether an application ‗discloses a reasonable basis‘ of appeal.686 
Appeal procedures at Curtin University are the exception to this rule. At that institution, appeal 
from a decision imposed by various University officers
687
 may only be made by leave of the 
University Registrar to a Board of Discipline (acting as the appellate body). A decision on an 
application for appeal made by the Registrar is final, and, in relation to appeal procedures 
operable at other universities, the exercise of an extraordinary and unregulated discretion over 
the availability to students of appeal rights. 
 
In general, access to appeal rights is straightforward. Although not strictly required for fair 
procedure to be observed, the availability of appeal mechanisms is a common feature of student 
discipline rules. It is a valuable protection against injustices that may be perpetrated in the 
course of the administration of discipline. Arguably, this is an important feature of a jurisdiction 
from which review on the merits is absent or, at best, uncertain. Additionally, in circumstances 
of judicial review the grant of discretionary remedies may well be refused where a form of 
internal recourse and remedy is available.
688
 The shortcoming of the present investigation, 
                                           
683
 See Forbes Justice in Tribunals, [14.1]-[14.6]. 
684
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686
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 See eg Re Harelkin and University of Regina (1979) 96 DLR (3
d
) 14. 
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however, is that, while appeal by way of re-hearing is expressly established in various rules, 
what occurs in practice in half of the surveyed institutions is uncertain.  
 
6.7 Conclusions 
 
Since the 1960s universities have found themselves increasingly obliged to accord their students 
elementary administrative justice. In a situation where the student may be deprived of their 
status as a student, or face some other substantial deprivation, the university will be required to 
accord the student procedural fairness. Procedures for subjecting a student to university 
discipline may result in the suspension or expulsion of the student, revocation of a degree, or 
imposition of other significant penalty. Design of these rules has been crafted from the 
functional need to maintain internal order and academic standards, as well as the application of 
standards of fairness in decision-making required by law.  
 
In their study of student discipline procedures in US universities, Berger and Berger have 
remarked:
 689
 ‗Bedrock safeguards such as written notice of charges, the right to an impartial 
hearing body, respect for the privilege against self-incrimination, and availability of appeal are 
almost universally accepted.‘ It may be said of Australian universities that, taking into account 
differing constitutional arrangements, ‗bedrock safeguards‘ are equally universal. This is true 
for basic tenets of procedural fairness: the right to a hearing, the right to adequate notice, and 
the right to an appeal. Procedural standards can vary widely across institutions, and it should not 
be discounted that in some instances high standards of procedural fairness apply, sometimes in 
excess of what would be required at common law. 
 
In general, shortcomings are more pronounced when we consider those elements of fair 
procedure that give effect to (student) participation in the hearing process. It is unsurprising, in 
an effort to limit adversarial procedure, that the right to cross-examine other parties or witnesses 
is not expressly provided for in most disciplinary codes. But equally it does not require a leap of 
the imagination to anticipate circumstances where such a right may, in the circumstances, 
facilitate the attainment of fairness. Such flexibility ought to be appreciated in the rules and 
generally it is not. Rules regarding representation are more explicit and restrictive. Universities 
are justifiably concerned not to legalise proceedings and they are certainly under no obligation 
to do so. However, the prevailing approach expressly prohibits or constrains even non-legal 
representation. This is an inflexible position. It drifts toward clear unfairness where the question 
of representation cannot even be countenanced by the decision-maker.  
 
                                           
689
 Berger and Berger ‗Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair Process for the University Student‘, 300. 
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Provision of reasons is a further area where there is unevenness in approach. At common law, 
fairness does not require a decision-maker to give reasons, although there are circumstances 
where statutory review schemes would compel the giving of reasons in disciplinary cases if they 
were requested. Those institutions that do not impose a duty to give reasons cannot be faulted 
technically on grounds of fairness, at least against the common law standard. If they are to be 
faulted, it may be on grounds of good practice: that decisions, especially those affecting a 
student in a substantial manner, should be reasoned, transparent (to the student) and 
respectful.
690
  
 
Application of fair standards in appeal rights is also equivocal. While appeal procedures 
themselves commonly have stronger procedural safeguards than hearings at first instance, 
appeal rights may prove a site of unfairness where grounds of review are restricted and a form 
of merits review is inaccessible. Limitation of internal appeal rights is made more problematic 
in the university sector by the general absence of statutory merits review for university 
decisions.  
 
Warnings against the ‗legalisation‘691 of the student-university relationship, or of the ‗over-
judicialisation‘692 of administrative proceedings, are important to bear in mind in domestic 
proceedings concerning students. At the same time, standards of procedure ought to be assessed 
in a context of the growing financial liabilities borne by students, a growing propensity to (and 
avenues for) litigation, and at best uncertain avenues for merits review of university decisions. 
Published university discipline schemes may generally be described as fair, although this should 
not detract from the need to address procedural shortcomings at some institutions and in relation 
to certain standards across the sector.
693
  
                                           
690
 See Galligan Due Process and Fair Procedures, 429-434. 
691
 Rochford ‗The Relationship Between the Student and University‘. 
692
 Eg Lord Diplock‘s statement in Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment (1989) AC 75, 97. 
693
 This assessment compares rather more critically to Dutile‘s (limited) assessment of disciplinary 
procedures, noted above at Chapter 5, section 5.1: Dutile ‗Law, Governance and Academic and 
Disciplinary Decision in Australian Universities: An American Perspective‘. 
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Table 6.2: Appeals procedures in student discipline rules, selected universities 
University Re-hearing de novo 
expressly required 
or reasonably 
inferred from the 
rules? 
Grounds Relevant provisions in 
scheme 
U Syd No  Determination unreasonable; denial of 
natural justice; evidence should not 
have been admitted; new evidence; 
misapplication of rules; general 
miscarriage of justice; excessive or 
inappropriate penalty 
University of Sydney By-Law 
1999, subs. 79(c) 
JCU  No Denial of procedural fairness Student Academic Misconduct 
Requirements, subs 7.4.2 
Curtin Yes Both student and university may appeal 
any decision; matter may be heard de 
novo, on penalty, or on point of law 
Statute No. 10 – Student 
Disciplinary Statute, subss 
19(1), 19(2), 20(2)(a)-(c)  
Deakin No  New evidence; excessive penalty; 
misapplication of rules 
Regulation 4.1(1), subs 17, 25 
Swinburne Yes  Matter not heard on merits; new 
evidence; ―procedural irregularity‖ 
Regulation 16 – Student 
Discipline, subs 6.1(a)-(c) 
Newcastle Yes  (Discretion with appeal body) Student Discipline Rules, s 3 
Griffith Yes  (Discretion lies with appeal body) Council Resolution 6/2005 
Student Misconduct, subs 
12.1, 13.1.11 
Monash Yes  Excessive penalty; bias; ―significant 
procedural irregularity‖; new evidence 
Statute 4.1 – Discipline, s 
11.1 
UWS No  Denial of procedural fairness; new 
evidence 
Student Academic Misconduct 
Policy, sub 14.2  
ANU No  (Broad discretion lies with appeal body; 
committee may substitute its own 
decision for primary decision) 
Discipline Statute 2005, subs 
19.1, 21, 23.1(c) 
UTS No  ―misunderstanding‖ of rules; error of 
fact; denial of procedural fairness; new 
evidence; penalty ―manifestly excessive 
or inappropriate‖ 
Student and Related Rules, 
subs 16.18 
Tasmania No  Bias; denial of procedural fairness; new 
evidence; penalty ―manifestly excessive 
or inappropriate‖ 
Ordinance No. 9 – Student 
Discipline, sub 4.2 
Queensland Yes  (Discretion with appeals body) Statute No. 4 (Student 
Discipline and Misconduct), 
ss 15, 16 
RMIT No  Bias; denial of natural justice; excessive 
or inappropriate penalty 
Regulation 6.1.1 – Student 
Discipline, s 24 
Wollongong Yes  Denial of procedural fairness; new 
evidence 
Rules for Student Conduct 
and Discipline, subs 7.3.1 
Sunshine 
Coast 
Yes (Discretion with appeal body) Student Conduct and 
Discipline Policy. subs 9.1.1, 
9.3.1 
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Chapter 7 
Delivering In-House Justice? Practice and Procedure in University 
Discipline 
 
The slim body of empirical literature that exists on student disciplinary action in universities 
focuses analysis on published rules and the case law applying to higher education.
694
 
Investigation of formal discipline rules and procedures does shed light on this form of university 
decision-making up to a point. The limitation effectively lies in how the rules are translated into 
practice – if we may paraphrase T S Eliot,695 in the ‗shadow‘ between the formal rules and the 
reality of their practical implementation. 
 
Other fields of scholarship, such as psychology, have shed light on phenomena of student 
(mis)behaviour.
696
 However, as valuable as this research is, it has done little to advance 
knowledge about university conduct with respect to student ‗indiscipline‘ and transgression, 
especially in academic endeavours.  
 
This chapter seeks to fill this gap in knowledge of decision-making by university discipline 
tribunals. It seeks to extend investigation of basic legal norms operating in disciplinary 
proceedings through consideration of available information on ‗in-house‘ cases at Australian 
public universities.  
 
7.1 Research Methods and Preliminary Findings 
 
The empirical research was based on an investigation of 38 individual student disciplinary cases 
at two Australian public universities. By agreement with the institutions, access was granted to 
case files, which contained all written materials relevant to and produced in the course of the 
proceeding. All material in the files was de-identified prior to access. Field notes obtained from 
these materials are the qualitative data on which the discussion in this chapter is based. I refer to 
the institutions as University A and University B. From University A, 21 cases were 
investigated. From University B, 17 files were examined: see Table 7.1.  
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 See Chapter 5 above. 
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 ‗The Hollow Men‘ in T S Eliot The Complete Poems and Plays (Faber and Faber, 1969), 83-86. 
696
 See Chapter 4 above.  
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Table 7.1: Student Misconduct Cases, Universities A and B 
Cases University A University B All 
Total cases 21 17 38 
Academic misconduct  16 12 28 
General misconduct 5 5 10 
Appeals 5 6 11 
Finding of misconduct, or appeal dismissed 19 13 32 
Misconduct not found, or appeal upheld 2 4 6 
Penalties 
     Academic penalty 
 
13 
 
8 
 
21 
     Exclusion 15 1 16 
     Fine 2 1 3 
 
 
At University A, of the 21 cases available, 14 involved allegations of academic misconduct 
perpetrated in examinations. Only one case concerned plagiarism, and one other matter involved 
another allegation of academic misconduct. Five cases related to allegations of general 
misconduct. Five matters involved an action taken on appeal. At University B, of the academic 
misconduct cases 7 concerned exam misconduct, 4 plagiarism and one case involved 
falsification of a medical certificate.  
 
It may appear surprising, on the basis of the academic literature on student misconduct (which 
tends to focus on plagiarism), that the largest proportion of files concern exam cheating. This 
may be explained by the operation of internal jurisdiction. There is a tendency, as a matter of 
policy, in both institutions for decision-making regarding plagiarism to be delegated to a ‗local‘ 
(School or Faculty) level. It is only where plagiarism actions are taken on appeal that they tend 
to appear at the ‗central‘ university tribunal. All cases investigated were heard before ‗central‘ 
tribunals. 
 
In all but 6 cases the student was found to have breached the discipline rules and a penalty (or 
penalties) was applied, or their appeal against a primary decision was dismissed. At University 
A, no appeals were upheld. At University B, 2 cases concluded with no finding of misconduct at 
the original hearing, and in 2 appeals the tribunal found in favour of the student and overturned 
the original decision. In one other case, a finding of misconduct was made but no penalty was 
imposed. In one case, an appeal against a finding of misconduct was notified and subsequently 
withdrawn.  
 
Penalties ranged from a reprimand to exclusion from the University for not less than five years. 
In general, the penalties at University A were more severe than those applied at University B. 
For example, in only one case at University B was a student excluded from the University – in 
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this case expelled. Most penalties at University B were academic, such as imposing fail grades, 
or reprimand. At University A, in 12 cases students were excluded from the University (in some 
cases, those exclusions were suspended on conditions). In two appeal cases at University A, 
penalties were varied (and mitigated) on appeal. In several of the appeal cases, review was 
sought for mitigation of penalty, which is submitted as unreasonably harsh or disproportionate 
to the offence. In mitigation, it is common for students to cite financial and professional 
consequences of penalties, notably those that include action to exclude the student from the 
University for a period of time. Some appeal cases also make submission for mitigation of 
penalty giving regard to personal circumstances.  
 
7.1.1 Exam Cases 
 
Academic misconduct in examinations typically occurs (although not always) in final 
examinations, which are organised en masse, and overseen by invigilators. Academic staff, as 
examiners, are usually present during some or all of the examination time. The most common 
form of exam cheating concerns students taking ‗unauthorised‘ materials into the examination 
room, such as notes. Where such material is prohibited, the exam is known as a ‗closed book‘ 
exam. Established formal procedures operate in ‗mass‘ examinations, including the issuing of 
written and oral instructions to students and notification of ‗allowable‘ material in any particular 
examination. At University A, reports are issued by an invigilator, the ‗invigilator-in-charge,‘ 
the examiner, and the Chair of the Examination Board. Material may be confiscated and used in 
evidence. The examiner normally makes a statement as to the advantage alleged through the 
access to the confiscated material. In effect, the adverse documentary material confronting a 
student in an exam cheating case includes these statements, any confiscated materials, and pro 
forma rules and instructions issued. There are fewer cases of student misconduct arising from 
exams other than in ‗mass‘ settings. These are examinations at a School or Faculty level. In one 
instance, students were accused of collusion in an exam by transmitting answers by text 
message. In another, intriguing instance, a student had another person take a test for him (ie 
impersonate him).  
 
7.1.2 Other Academic Misconduct Cases 
 
Two other types of academic misconduct are ‗tried‘ in this sample. The more common is 
plagiarism. Only one case of plagiarism arises from the University A cases, and 4 from 
University B. It is not uncommon for plagiarism cases to be disputed, not least because of the 
contentious nature of the concept of plagiarism. The other types of misconduct reported in these 
cases concern a form of academic misconduct analogous to ‗professional‘ misconduct at 
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University A (in the context of a nursing ‗practicum‘), and a student found to have falsified a 
medical certificate for the purposes of receiving special dispensation at University B.  
 
7.1.3 General Misconduct Cases 
 
The subject-matter of general misconduct cases is eclectic. This fact may explained by the wide 
scope of ‗offences‘ captured within that concept. In the present sample, the cases falling under 
this heading include: 
 
University A 
 
 Disruptive behaviour in a lecture (Case 5); 
 Attempted theft from the University Bookshop (Case 16); 
 Disruptive and unruly behaviour on a field trip (Case 17); 
 Misrepresentation of residency status and of prior academic qualifications (Case 20); 
 Misrepresentation of qualifications to another university (Case 21). 
 
University B 
 
 Misuse of the university email system (sending abusive emails) (Case 10); 
 Student assault (Case 11); 
 Misuse of email system (sending threatening emails) (Case 12); 
 Assault and threats to assault (Case 13); 
 Misuse of internet system (accessing pornography) (Case 14).  
 
Most cases involve what may be termed ‗traditional‘ disciplinary breaches relating to improper 
conduct in an educational setting and ‗offences‘ against persons or property. Scope for new 
forms of misconduct, such as misuse of the electronic communications systems, are also 
evident. The latter two cases at University A are analogous to instances of fraud. In both, the 
matters were also referred to the police. 
 
7.2 Discipline Rules  
 
Within universities‘ establishing legislation there is typically provision, consistent with the wide 
discretion granted to the governing body (or bodies), for the institution to enact subordinate 
legislation for the purposes of guaranteeing the ‗good order and discipline of the University.‘ 
Institutions may enact the substance of student discipline rules under this power, as is the case at 
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both Universities A and B. Alternatively, they may give effect to disciplinary powers, wholly or 
in part, through ‗policy‘ or non-statutory instruments.  
 
The Discipline Rules contain a number of components, which I refer to in a generalised form. 
 
A first part establishes in effect a disciplinary code for students, including a range of proscribed 
conduct and behaviours. Both sets of rules contain a broad ‗general article‘ provision.  
 
A second element establishes delegated disciplinary powers distributed among various officers 
of the University as well as to a disciplinary tribunal. The rules establish a disciplinary tribunal 
and its jurisdiction. All cases considered in the present sample refer to matters dealt with by one 
or more internal disciplinary tribunals. Powers include powers and duties to impose penalties, 
which may range from reprimand and academic penalties to expulsion. Formally, tribunals are 
‗lay‘ bodies comprising membership from various ‗constituencies‘ of the university, including 
senior staff, academic staff and students. They are ‗lay‘ bodies in the sense they are not legally- 
or judicially-trained. At both investigated institutions, tribunals are ad hoc panels chosen (by 
undisclosed means) from among the membership of a wider body (in effect, from a ‗pool‘ of 
appointed members).  
 
A third element of the Rules is the establishment of procedure for the conduct of proceedings, 
which will include procedures for handling a disciplinary matter other than before a tribunal (eg 
emergency action), procedure for bringing a matter before a tribunal (eg referral), hearing 
procedures (including requirements for procedural fairness and excluding the rules of evidence), 
and appeal procedures. The precise content of hearing procedure varies in the present situations: 
at University A, a tribunal proceeds on the face of the rules in an adversary fashion, to the extent 
that the ‗complainant‘ (or appellant as the case may be) and the student put their respective 
cases before the tribunal. While it is expected that proceedings will occur, as a form of domestic 
action, in private, the rules at University A (but not University B) provide for an open hearing as 
a general rule.  
 
7.3 Scope of Potential Legal Problems 
 
In the majority of cases investigated in this study there is no compelling evidence of breaches of 
legal standards (with the exception of provision of notice at University A: see sub-section 7.4.1 
below). Nevertheless, evidence of prima facie legal problems emerged in 16, or 42%, of cases. 
Other shortcomings were revealed in decision-making practices. The scope of these problems in 
particular cases is outlined in Table 7.2.  
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Insight into the decision-making process and ‗state of mind‘ of the tribunal is influenced by the 
nature of the record contained in the case files. There are no requirements for provision of 
reasons or publication of decisions.  There is no evidence of a student asking for written 
reasons. At University B, detailed minutes are available and proved a valuable source of 
information into the conduct and approach of tribunals. No such record was available at 
University A. In significant part, this particular practice (providing a record of proceedings) 
explains the different volume of cases exhibiting prima facie legal issues. It is reasonable to 
assume, therefore, potential for under-reporting of problems in the present sample of cases.  
 
Table 7.2: Prima facie legal problems in student discipline cases, Universities A and B 
 
Case Nature of misconduct Nature of principal issue(s) and/or arguable defect(s) 
A6 Academic misconduct; analogous 
to ‗professional misconduct‘ on 
practical placement 
Disciplinary action beyond power; tribunal lacks 
jurisdiction 
A10 Exam cheating No evidence; evaluation of evidence; bias 
A16 General misconduct (attempted 
theft from university bookshop) 
Failure to take into account relevant consideration; 
retrospective application of penalties 
A20 Academic fraud (misrepresented 
residency status and 
undergraduate qualifications) 
Failure to disclose material relied upon; failure to 
discharge a duty to inquire. 
B2 Exam cheating Denial of procedural fairness (failure to provide an 
opportunity to meet charge) 
B3 Plagiarism No evidence (of probative value); reversal of burden of 
proof; failure of disclosure (taking evidence from other 
‗party‘ in absence of student).  
B4 Plagiarism Misconception of rules (plagiarism); excess of 
jurisdiction 
B6 Plagiarism Misconception of rules (plagiarism); excess of 
jurisdiction 
B7 Exam cheating Failure to discharge a duty to inquire. 
B9 Plagiarism Failure to discharge a duty to inquire; reversal of onus of 
proof.  
B10 General misconduct (misuse of 
email to send threatening 
communications) 
Denial of procedural fairness (hearing proceeded in 
absence of accused student) 
B11 General misconduct (assault 
against another student) 
Breach of rules (failure to provide timely hearing 
subsequent to summary suspension); failure to supply 
adequate notice. 
B14 Plagiarism Misconception of rules (plagiarism); excess of 
jurisdiction 
B15 General misconduct (misuse of 
internet, accessing pornography) 
Denial of procedural fairness (failure to provide for 
cross-examination of relevant witness) 
B16 Exam cheating Misapplication of rules (finding of misconduct 
overturned on appeal) 
B17 Exam cheating Bias; failure to discharged duty to inquire (findings of 
misconduct overturned on appeal) 
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7.4 Fairness
697
  
 
7.4.1 Particulars 
 
Satisfactory particulars are a component of the provision of adequate notice to a person whose 
rights, interests or legitimate expectations are affected by a decision. An accused student is 
entitled to know at least the ‗substance‘ of the charge against him/her and the case s/he is to 
meet.
698
 A simple recitation of a rule allegedly breached would not likely be sufficient,
699
 as the 
basic procedural requirement is that a student is given a ‗real and effective opportunity to 
correct or meet any adverse statement made.‘700 The requirement to supply particulars is 
expressly stated in the rules of both institutions.  
 
There is a systemic failure formally and sufficiently to particularise ‗charges‘ at University A. I 
refer here to particulars of allegations of fact, act or omission on the part of a student, in 
addition to the notice of the rules alleged to have been breached. The University‘s standard 
practice is to issue a compendious ‗charge sheet‘ against the student, comprising in effect a 
schedule of alleged ‗disciplinary offences‘ derived from both the Discipline Regulation and (in 
many instances of academic misconduct), by cross-reference, from alternative internal rules 
governing academic assessment. In general, this schedule of rules is unaccompanied by express 
reference to facts, actions or omissions on the part of the student. The student is presented with 
a considerable (and probably intimidating) list of rules alleged to have been broken. It may be 
that the relevant facts can be reasonably inferred from other documents, such as, in the case of 
exam misconduct, invigilator reports. But, as Forbes701 has remarked:  
 
A person accused of misconduct is entitled to know in advance not only the rule allegedly 
broken but also the particulars of how it was broken. A charge is not the same thing as 
particulars. A charge identifies the legal prohibition; particulars inform the person charged of the 
facts that are said to constitute the breach.  
 
Even where the facts constituting the breach may be reasonably inferred from other materials, 
the student would likely face the further task of responding to charges implicit in all the rules 
notified, or alternatively second-guessing which are the appropriate rules to respond to. For 
example, in a relatively simple exam misconduct case, the student is confronted with allegations 
of a breach of the ‗general article‘ and 20 other rules or sub-rules under two different statutory 
instruments. While the absence of factual allegations may create a real risk of leaving a student 
‗in the dark‘ as to what is alleged against him, the proliferation of rules cited against him/her are 
                                           
697
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698
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699
 Forbes Justice in Tribunals, [10.2]; Gardiner v Land Agents’ Board (1976) 12 SASR 458, 470-471. 
700
 Kane v Board of Governors of the University of British Columbia  (1980) 110 DLR (3d) 311, 324. 
701
 Forbes Justice in Tribunals, [10.2]. 
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in practice ‗so complex or so numerous as to confuse a party or otherwise deprive him of a fair 
hearing.‘702 The ‗guesswork‘ required to decipher and respond to the notice means that, in 
nearly all cases at this institution, adequate notice is not supplied.
703
 
 
The provision of particulars is generally more satisfactory at University B. Out of 17 cases, 
questions regarding satisfactory particulars of allegations might reasonably be raised in 4 cases. 
In 3 of those cases, better particulars may have been requested, including more accurate details 
of alleged actions of events. In another case (at the School level), notice arguably failed to give 
an accurate representation of proceedings, referring to its purpose simply ‗to investigate the 
matter,‘ and with no regard to the disciplinary nature of the action. 
 
7.4.2 Other Deficient Notices 
 
In the case just referred to, a student was summoned, without notice, to an ‗informal meeting‘ 
regarding exam misconduct, which staff members appear to have used as an investigation.  This 
‗meeting‘ appears to have been conducted in much the same manner as a formal hearing.  There 
is no provision for this inquiry procedure in the relevant rule or delegations. Material from the 
meeting led to formal allegations being made at the School level and formal notice of a hearing 
issued. The student indicated verbally she was unable to attend the hearing. As a result of 
administrative breakdown, this was not communicated to the relevant School tribunal, which 
proceeded in her absence and found misconduct. On appeal, by majority, the School‘s decision 
was upheld. The appeal committee did not consider the question of whether, in the face of 
administrative failure, an opportunity to be heard was not given, whether an adjournment the 
student sought was not given, or whether the matter should be re-heard. Additionally, it did not 
consider whether the informal investigation was appropriate or ultra vires the University‘s 
disciplinary procedures. Serious questions of correct procedure and conduct on the part of the 
University appear to have been disregarded, to the student‘s detriment, notwithstanding for the 
moment more detailed questions as to when, in the course of an inquiry, notice should be given.  
 
In another case at University B, a student was summarily suspended from the University 
following an allegation of physical violence against another student. The rules required 
subsequent notice of a hearing and the hearing to be convened within 10 days. The ‗emergency‘ 
action can last no longer than 14 days. The student countered that she was not provided notice 
of the rules under which the suspension occurred and was suspended for 30 days, in which case 
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 Forbes Justice in Tribunals, [10.14]. 
703
 See Forest v La Caisse Populaire de Saint-Boniface Credit Union (1962) 37 DLR (2d) 440, 445, 
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she had ‗effectively failed the semester.‘ The tribunal issued a reprimand and arranged 
(presumably with consent) the student‘s withdrawal without financial or academic penalty. The 
University sought, it would appear, to apply some principles of restitution to its own breach of 
the rules and its unsatisfactory notice.  
 
7.4.3 Disclosure 
 
The requirement to disclose material or information that may be relied upon by a decision-
maker is a cornerstone of administrative justice,
704
 and a logical extension of proper notice and 
the entitlement of an affected party to know the case they need to meet.
705
 Universities are 
generally quite conscious of the need to provide relevant documentation and in ‗routine‘ 
discipline matters, such as plagiarism or exam cheating, this occurs as a matter of course.  
 
There are two circumstances in which unfairness in this respect occurs: one exceptional, the 
other recurrent. In one case a Chinese student was excluded for at least 5 years for ‗academic 
fraud.‘ The student had misrepresented himself as a permanent resident when he held only a 
temporary resident visa. It was also alleged that he had misrepresented his academic 
qualifications by submitting a false certificate of an undergraduate degree in China.
706
 The 
documents suggest complex, unfortunate and matrimonial causes to his situation. In particular, 
it could be inferred from information on the file that his ex-wife wrote to the University 
bringing these issues to its attention. An official receiving the information referred the matter to 
the discipline tribunal, with the advice that the source and existence of the correspondence not 
be disclosed to the accused student. The conduct of the proceedings would suggest that the letter 
and its author were not disclosed to the student, and he had no opportunity to contend with its 
contents (nor with the author or her motives). It seems likely that this material had considerable 
impact on the case and on the student‘s fortunes. For instance, it may have exposed malice 
and/or misinformation on the part of the estranged wife. It may have given greater scope for the 
student to bring to light the role of his estranged wife in the process of his application and 
enrolment at the University. In short, the student may have tested, or may have wished to test, 
the credibility of this evidence.
707
 Additionally, it would appear the Panel made no effort to hear 
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from the wife or seek to have her appear as a witness.
708
 Such an appearance may have allowed 
cross-examination by the student or his representative. There are various other potential 
breaches of law in this case.
709
 
 
In the second set of circumstances there is a practice by tribunals to take evidence or receive 
oral submissions in the absence of the student. This occurs in five cases at University B. This 
kind of conduct tends to contravene directly the admonition of Lord Denning in Kanda v 
Government of Malaya
710
 that a decision-maker must not ‗hear evidence or receive 
representations from one side behind the back of another.‘ Alternatively, it may be argued that, 
even where information of substance is not revealed or at issue in the student‘s absence, 
proceeding in the presence of one ‗party‘ (or even where they are solely considered an 
informant) may lead to claims of bias. In at least three cases, the tribunal‘s exchange with 
School officials contains matters the student may wish to know, correct or contend with. In two 
cases, the student and their representative were expressly required to leave the proceedings 
while the tribunal took further evidence from representatives of the relevant School. No record 
of any additional matters of substance appears to have been provided to the student. In another 
situation, two students were investigated over exam cheating allegations, in which one was 
alleged to have sent a text message to the other containing answers to exam questions. The 
matters were heard at separate hearings, and evidence and submissions were taken from both 
students in their own hearings. The tribunal appeared to act on knowledge elicited from the first 
hearing in the second. No record made available to the second affected student. Neither student, 
however, sought to call the other to give evidence before the tribunal.  
 
7.5 The Legal Burden 
 
In a number of cases, argument is made on behalf of a student that the tribunal has either 
incorrectly imposed the legal burden (burden of proof) on the student, or alternatively, failed to 
impose the onus on the School or other ‗party‘ bringing the allegations of misconduct to prove 
their case. In what is available in the files, misapplication of the onus of proof is a problem in 
some cases, especially plagiarism and/or ‗collusion‘ cases.  
                                                                                                                           
concerned, what allegations have been made against him sufficient to enable him to know the case he has to 
meet. That is not to say that in some cases the names of witnesses should not be revealed to an appellant. 
This must depend on the circumstances of the particular case. 
708
 While hearsay evidence is permitted in hearings of this type, the student may have diminished or 
discredited it in this case, or sought to diminish or discredit it. It was an opportunity ever afforded him.  
709
 For example, the student states in a Statutory Declaration that he neither completed nor signed his 
enrolment documents, which raises questions of fraud in regards to the enrolment. Further, the student 
appears to have enrolled in rush and claims not to have understood the documents he was dealing with (or 
indeed the process generally) and was asked no questions by the University administration upon 
enrolment. These claims also raise the question of consideration, if not unconscionability, on the part of 
the University in regards to the contract it was entering into with the student.  
710
 (1962) AC 322, 337. 
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In administrative proceedings it is frequently the situation that, in order for a tribunal to be 
satisfied as to a finding, no burden lies on one ‗party‘ over another to persuade the tribunal of its 
position and therefore to discharge an onus of proof.
711
 This is especially the case where there 
are no ‗parties‘ per se, in the sense of a lis inter partes.712 However, obligations vary with the 
nature of the proceedings and the duty to discharge the legal burden operates in disciplinary 
proceedings, especially as a result of the accusatorial character of the proceedings:
713
  
 
It would be strange if, even allowing for the administrative nature of the proceedings, the general 
onus, based on common sense and considerations of justice and summed up in the phrase ―he 
who asserts must prove,‖ did not apply.714  
 
In student discipline proceedings, the onus of proof of a breach of university discipline lies on 
the ‗prosecuting‘ School or other body bringing the accusation, or alternatively, on the tribunal 
itself if, in substance, it is the accuser.
715
  
 
This question arises in Case 10 at University A and Cases 3, 7, 9, 12 and 17, University B. In 
Case 10 at University A, the student conceded misconduct in respect of one minor charge of the 
19 alleged. The student disputed the ‗general article‘ and serious charges, such as cheating, 
committing academic misconduct or breaching the ‗good order‘ of the University. Neither the 
complainant nor the tribunal possessed evidence, on the face of it, regarding the contents of the 
‗unauthorised materials,‘ that the student had used the materials or gained any advantage from 
them, or that her story (having gone to the toilet with menstrual cramping and unwittingly taken 
‗unauthorised‘ materials with her) was implausible or lacked credibility. On appeal several of 
these factors were cited as grounds that the penalties imposed were disproportionate.
716
 Perhaps 
more to the point, regarding onus of proof, the penalties were imposed under the main 
Discipline Regulation (rather than a lesser Statute, under which the student had pleaded 
‗guilty‘), and therefore the finding of misconduct was made in relation to the disputed 
allegations, not where misconduct was conceded. It is difficult to say, on the documentary 
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 McDonald v Director-General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354. 
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 See McDonald v Director-General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354, 369 (Jenkinson J). The 
question as to whether university disciplinary proceedings are properly a dispute between parties is 
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 Minister for Health v Thomson (1985) 60 ALR 701, 712 (Beaumont J); Secretary, Department of 
Social Security v Willee (1990) 96 ALR 211, 220 (Foster J). 
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 Secretary, Department of Social Security v Willee (1990) 96 ALR 211, 220 (Foster J). 
715
 See Enid Campbell ‗Principles of Evidence and Administrative Tribunals‘ in Enid Campbell and Louis 
Waller (eds) Well and Truly Tried (Law Book Company, 1982), 53: ‗This would be so notwithstanding 
that the accuser was also, of necessity, the person or body having authority to adjudicate.‘   
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 Conceding the student was in possession of the materials, submission was made at first instance that 
the appropriate penalty would be a reprimand. In the event, the student was reprimanded, lost credit for 
the examination and excluded for 12 months (with 6 months suspended). The appeal solely went to 
penalty and the assertion it was disproportionate.  
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evidence at least, that, where the burden is on the complainant in these circumstances, that it 
could have been discharged in regards to many, or most, of the ‗charges.‘  
 
The situation at University B is more mixed. In two plagiarism cases (Cases 3 and 9), the 
misconduct was alleged to have involved more than one student, and the findings appear to be 
primarily based upon similarities between, or copies of, other students‘ work. Prima facie 
evidence of misconduct exists but the complainant adduces no evidence to attribute misconduct 
to the accused student. In Case 3, although the student‘s representative expressly raises the point 
of a reversal of the burden of proof, the matter is decided against him. The file includes 
correspondence with the University Solicitor‘s Office concerned that the matter (and a related 
one) has not been correctly decided. There is no record that the matter was re-heard. In Case 9 
the presumption seems to lie against the student and at times the line of questioning from the 
tribunal seems to be hostile to him. The student is unable to answer why his work (construction 
of a web site) is the same as that of another student (who had already completed the course). 
The tribunal decides against him on the basis of the strong similarities and the inference that the 
accused student has committed the plagiarism. Significantly, there is no evidence adduced by 
the ‗complainant‘ School, nor the tribunal, as to how the student had, or could have, gained 
access to the original work.  
 
There is an occasional sense in these internal tribunals, in respect in particular of allegations of 
plagiarism or ‗collusion‘ among students (rather than from other sources), of decision-makers‘ 
frustration with requirements of proof. This sentiment is exemplified in material from a School 
hearing at University B (Case 17). The allegation facing the student (which she disputed) was 
that she had taken a 14-page marked up exam booklet into an examination. The student‘s 
representative asserted that the handwriting on the unauthorised material and the student‘s exam 
differed. The School found against the student on the basis inter alia that ‗…someone brought 
the sample paper into the exam room.‘ In this case, the misconduct finding was overturned on 
appeal, on the ground that the original decision was affected by bias.  
 
A burden of proof lies against a person or body bringing misconduct charges against a student 
and there is evidence that the burden has been ignored, if not reversed, by some university 
tribunals. Where this problem does arise, it does so notably where the case against the student is 
circumstantial, where there are no direct proofs of the student‘s misconduct. It may be that 
decision-makers in those situations do not sufficiently grasp the nuance and balance of their 
role, which is to arrive at a state of reasonable satisfaction that the accused student has engaged 
in misconduct (or, more accurately, engaged in the misconduct alleged in the complaint notified 
against him/her). They may expect to be persuaded definitively, or sufficiently, one way or the 
other but find themselves (as Jenkinson J put it in McDonald v Director-General of Social 
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Security) ‗unpersuaded either that a circumstance exists or that it does not exist.‘717 Allocation 
of the burden of proof to the accuser, in that case, becomes a precursor to the tribunal‘s state of 
mind: that, if unpersuaded, it must find for the student. The persuasive value of materials in a 
number of the cases leaves much to be desired.  
 
7.6 Legal Error: Misconceptions and Excess of Jurisdiction 
 
7.6.1 Plagiarism  
 
Universities exercise broad powers in fulfilling statutory duties to conduct higher education and 
research. Disciplinary codes refine that jurisdiction. There are two circumstances in the present 
cases where limits of jurisdiction are tested by tribunal decisions. Arguably, the decision-
makers exceed their powers on both sets of circumstances.  
 
One of those (which is likely to be the more common) is an expanded and misconceived 
understanding of plagiarism.  The issue is likely to have substantial and wide-ranging 
implications for university practice and rules.  
 
The first point to make is that confusion, ignorance or misapplication of the concept of 
plagiarism exists under the discipline rules.
718
 Misconduct is found for a student‘s failure to 
adhere to the correct conventions of academic citation, especially as a result of poor 
understanding of those conventions. The problem arises in distinguishing action that may be 
considered plagiarism from that which may be considered as poor academic work: disciplinary 
action ought to be distinguished from questions of poor referencing. A finding of misconduct 
turns on the question of intention or negligence on the part of the student, in excess of any 
question of mere competence. Plagiarism properly falls into the scope of misconduct, where it is 
found the student‘s actions are, by definition, more than a matter of academic judgement 
(although academic judgement may play a central role). The equation of plagiarism with 
intention or quasi-legal wrong is consistent with judicial and quasi-judicial treatment of the 
issue. ‗Boundary‘ issues concerning plagiarism as a disciplinary matter were considered at 
length in Chapter 4.  
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 For instance, in Case B14, a matter of appeal from a School hearing, the original decision-maker is 
reported to have been ‗unclear about which policy should be used and told myself [student] and the 
Student Rights Officer… to ―take it up with the University.‖‘ The student is minuted as saying in the 
appeal hearing, with some justification: ‗I don‘t feel it is my responsibility to ―take it up with the 
university.‖ The university has all the power, they make the rules, and if they don‘t know which one 
applies, I‘m not sure what I can do about it.‘  
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Findings of misconduct in circumstances where the facts do not support an intention to 
reproduce work without attribution or acknowledgment, nor ‗carelessness or negligence‘ 
(bearing in mind the circumstances of the student), but are symptomatic of poor academic work, 
are, on the face of it, in error. Mutatis mutandis, not only does a tribunal in those circumstances 
misconceive plagiarism, but it is acting beyond the power granted it by the relevant authority 
(University Council). It is acting where there is no question of misconduct to be resolved.  
 
The distinction of misconduct and academic judgement here may seem fine, or even tenuous. 
However, it is important not least because the consequences for misconduct may be far more 
severe than for poor academic work, including the prospect of exclusion from the university, the 
end of career prospects (eg law students), and/or an impact on migration status.
719
  
 
At University A, the prohibition on plagiarism has been formulated in such a broad manner as to 
encompass any act of un-attributed reproduction, notwithstanding the question of intention or 
other factors. In my mind this is bad policy, but effectively removes the problem of decision-
makers acting beyond their powers in poor referencing cases. At University B, the concept of 
plagiarism is stated generally and the jurisdictional problem could arise – and indeed it does. In 
two cases, misconduct is found against students for what is in effect poor referencing. The 
confusion over the concept of plagiarism is captured in the minutes of proceedings. In one of 
those cases there is a debate within the tribunal itself over precisely the question of whether 
poor referencing equates to plagiarism or not.  
 
7.6.2 Jurisdictional Fact: Who is a Student? 
 
A second circumstance in which potential for jurisdictional error arises relates to the concept of 
the student per se, and the subsequent authority of the university to discipline an individual qua 
student. A nursing student, in a midwifery program, was on practical placement at a hospital. 
She was held to have breached the discipline rules when she visited a patient outside of the 
organised activities and requirements of her academic course, whom she was observing as part 
of that program.  The student had been ‗observing‘ the patient (an expectant mother) during the 
course of the semester, and she was witness to an ‗adverse‘ event during the birth of the 
mother‘s child. At the invitation of the mother, the student visited her some weeks after the 
birth, ‗for coffee,‘ in a public place. The main charges against the student were that she had had 
contact with a patient, known to her through her program, against the ‗direction‘ of relevant 
staff and that would have constituted a ‗risk‘ to the student, the patient, and the reputation of the 
University. The student contended the visit was purely ‗social‘ and she acted in her capacity as a 
‗private citizen.‘ There was no dispute that the visit took place, nor that the student was a 
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 See Chapter 4, sub-section 4.6.2, above. 
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student in good standing at the University. The University, it was argued on her behalf, had no 
jurisdiction to discipline her for misconduct, thereby falling into legal error for wont of 
jurisdiction. The tribunal found against her. The student was represented at the hearing and 
substantial written submissions were made on her behalf. 
 
In these circumstances, the student‘s status appears as a question of jurisdictional fact, a 
‗condition precedent‘ to the exercise of power by the disciplinary tribunal. As the High Court 
stated in Corporation of the City of Einfeld v Development Assessment Commission:
720
  
 
The term ‗jurisdictional fact‘ (which may be a complex of elements) is often used to identify that 
criterion, satisfaction of which enlivens the power of the decision-maker to exercise a discretion. 
Used here, it identifies a criterion, satisfaction of which mandates a particular outcome.
721
 
 
Spiegleman CJ stated in Timbarra Protection Coalition Inc v Ross Mining NL
722
 that the issue 
of jurisdictional fact arose out of the process of statutory interpretation: ‗Whether or not a 
particular finding of fact is jurisdictional in the requisite sense, depends upon the proper 
construction of the factual reference in the particular statutory formulation in which it appears.‘ 
As it may go to the issue of whether an authority has acted correctly or not according to law, 
that process of interpretation and fact-finding is susceptible to review by the courts, ‗which 
decides whether it thinks the fact existed at the relevant time.‘723  
 
At its widest, the University‘s disciplinary jurisdiction applies to student conduct that may 
disturb the ‗good order and discipline of the University.‘ Under the University‘s Act, student is 
defined as an ‗enrolled student.‘ Disciplinary action must be protective of the University rather 
than punitive toward the student. This will include the need to maintain academic standards and 
safeguard its reputation and/or relationships with other bodies necessary to the performance of 
its functions (as, in this case, the hospital where the placement occurred). In this latter respect, 
the disciplinary criterion is similar to disreputable conduct clauses operating in the rules of 
sporting codes or other voluntary associations.
724
 Yet, in regard to the student‘s ‗private‘ visit to 
the mother, was she relevantly a ‗student‘? By way of comparison, if a student should threaten a 
staff member, with whom they are otherwise unconnected, with violence on a public street near 
the University, are he/she subject to the University‘s disciplinary jurisdiction? In effect, the 
fundamental question arising in this case is the limit of the university‘s capacity to regulate the 
conduct of individuals who happen to be students. Alternatively, in what respects are the 
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behaviours of private citizens who are also students specific or peculiar to their status as 
students, or in other words, in what ways are the behaviours (or even disposition and manner of 
conduct) of students more than would be expected, appropriate or possible of ordinary citizens?  
 
It is no doubt true that the ‗social‘ visit would not have occurred other than by the a priori fact 
of the student‘s participation in the course and the particular unit. There is no suggestion on the 
file that the student and patient were acquainted prior to the events concerned. It is also the case 
that the precise scope of ‗domestic‘ jurisdiction, as it concerns the management or ‗good 
government‘ of the university, may, at the margins, be unsettled. 725 Finally, it appears as 
common ground on the file records that the student
726
 disregarded a relevant direction from an 
academic staff member not to participate in the ‗visit‘ (an action that may enliven the 
disciplinary jurisdiction, in certain circumstances, where applicable to a student). Yet none of 
these facts or concessions resolves the key issue as to where the boundary between student and 
private citizen lies.  
 
The proximity of personal and professional conduct has been considered in cases concerning 
nurse discipline. In Yelds v Nurses Tribunal,
727
 for instance, it was held that misconduct need 
not occur ‗in the course of nursing‘728 but may display conduct inappropriate to the profession. 
729
 Relevantly, of course, the student was not a registered nurse or midwife and therefore did not 
owe professional duties applicable at law by a registered nurse or midwife. There is no evidence 
on the file that the University issued instructions, promulgated policy or provided advice to 
students generally regarding forms and/or standards of conduct applicable to students‘ 
involvement in, or proximity to, clinical or therapeutic settings, prior to engagement in those 
settings.
730
 The production of such a policy, advice or instruction may have been invaluable to 
the characterisation of (students‘) conduct and approaches to the clinical and/or therapeutic 
situation, and dispositive of the present problem. It is unlikely that, in practice, a document 
might be produced to codify or prescribe the entire range of possible situations, conflicts or 
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ambiguities in which a (midwifery) student may find himself or herself, in the clinical setting. 
Nevertheless, a relevant code might identify (and sanction) the limits of behaviour applicable to 
the clinical/therapeutic setting, giving regard to the particular (educational and clinical) 
circumstances of the student. While the student on practicum cannot be treated as a registered, 
clinical practitioner, subject to the entire gamut of professional conduct rules, the circumstances 
in which they relate to the clinical setting may treated as analogous to those facing the 
registered professional. It is noteworthy therefore that the rules of conduct of registered nurses 
do include ‗guidelines‘ in respect of ‗professional boundaries,‘ including boundaries between 
nurses and patients.
731
 Such rules would be apposite to the facts of the present case, and 
arguably influential in determining the question of jurisdiction in the absence of anything more. 
In the case examined that point is, of course, moot.  
 
Nevertheless, considering, for example, the ‗professional boundaries‘ guidelines issued by the 
Nurses Board of Victoria, it is possible, though arguably unlikely, that the student conduct 
would meet the tests of (mis)conduct provided for in those rules. In an underpinning definition, 
the Guidelines state:
732
 
 
3. Professional Boundaries 
 
Professional boundaries are defined as ‗limits that protect the space between the professional‘s 
power and the patient‘s vulnerability‘… Maintaining appropriate boundaries manages this power 
differential and allows for a safe interaction between the professional and the patient based on 
the patient‘s needs and recognising the patient‘s vulnerabilities. The maintenance of boundaries 
need not be seen as an impediment to the professional relationship, but rather as facilitating it. 
Maintaining professional boundaries protects the safe space in the relationship and thereby 
enhances the building of the trust which is essential to enable patients to reveal their needs and 
have them met therapeutically. 
 
Concepts of ‗power differential‘ and patient ‗vulnerability‘ are central to considerations of 
inappropriate conduct and/or misconduct. The Guidelines consider ‗confusion between the 
needs of the registered nurse and those of the patient‘ as symptomatic of the ‗breaching of 
boundaries.‘ Concurrently, they provide scope for ‗dual relationships,‘ including social 
relationships.
733
 It may be arguable, if at the margins, that the student has ‗crossed‘ the 
boundaries as indicated by these professional guidelines, having regard, for instance, to the fact 
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that the ‗dual relationship‘ problem would not have been inevitable,734 and that the student was 
‗giving inappropriate… status‘ to the patient. Yet a number of factors militate against a finding 
of misconduct, even using these Guidelines, and on balance it is more likely that, mutatis 
mutandis, the student‘s action could not be subsumed within the University‘s jurisdiction. First, 
such Guidelines would have been of themselves of limited interpretative value and would have 
to be read in the context of the anomalous situation of the student ‗nurse,‘ thereby taking into 
account the limited knowledge and clinical authority of the student, the various supervisory 
relationships (academic and clinical), and so on. Second, the student did in fact notify the 
relevant supervisor of the intended ‗visit‘ and was initially granted ‗permission‘ to attend it. 
That action was consistent with the approach in the Victorian Guidelines to ‗dual relationship‘ 
situations.
735
 The conduct and procedure of the supervising academic authorities were 
problematic at best. Finally, the standard of disciplinary procedure (especially given its 
professional context and potential impact on future livelihood) would arguably require the 
tribunal‘s decision on the facts to be made having regard to a relatively high standard of proof, 
and specifically weight be given to the student‘s ‗presumption of innocence.‘736 In this case, it 
would be a considerable task for the ‗prosecuting‘ School or the tribunal itself to discharge a 
persuasive burden against the student on the information provided.
737
  
 
In all the circumstances, there appears a likely error of law in the decision made in this case, 
although it must be acknowledged that the case comprised difficult, complex issues, warranting 
more than strictly legal and administrative responses.  
 
7.7 Failure of a Duty to Inquire?  
 
There is a body of judicial opinion that a tribunal with wide discretion to regulate its own 
procedure has a limited duty to make inquiries and undertaken investigations.
738
 In limiting that 
duty, the courts are influenced by the prevalence of the adversary method in adjudication. A 
duty to inquire is viewed as a correlate of the requirement to take into account relevant 
considerations,
739
 and the duty to act fairly.
740
 While the duty may be enlivened by facts that are 
                                                                                                                           
student‘s conduct fell with the first of these categories, although unlikely to fall within the ambit of the 
latter two (the ‗social invitation‘ was offered by the patient in this case).  
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constructively known to the decision-maker, and there may even be circumstances in which 
‗own motion‘ inquiries are warranted,741 the general rule is that a tribunal is not required to 
make a party‘s case for it.742  
 
There is also opinion that a statutory investigative body is under a statutory duty to inquire and 
those inquiries cannot be arbitrarily limited or curtailed.
743
 It may be that the duty to inquire is 
an implied duty on student disciplinary tribunals.
744
 
 
A problem arising in the present student discipline cases is that fact or inference may advert to 
further relevant information, often in support of a student‘s case, but not put before the tribunal 
by the student nor dealt with in argument, examination or deliberations. The problem, in my 
submission, is as much one of legality in decision-making (in this case a extension of fairness 
and rational decision-making) as of practice and procedure crafted to achieve what, on the face 
of it, student disciplinary tribunals seek to achieve: an adjudicative inquiry. In this respect, the 
situation in these tribunals is not dissimilar to flaws found in the approach of a public service 
appeals committee in Finch v Goldstein,
745
 including that the inquisitorial body might ‗[absolve] 
itself from the need to inquire further into the truth or otherwise of… allegations‘746 or that a 
variable standard of inquiry might apply depending on all the circumstances.
747
 
 
In five cases, the issue as to whether the tribunal has conducted a sufficient inquiry arises. The 
outcome of all five cases goes against the students involved.  
 
Case 20 at University A has been referred to already. In that case, a student was found to have 
committed misconduct through misrepresenting himself as a domestic student and, as a basis for 
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admission, as a graduate of a Chinese university. Among the various developments of this case, 
express reference is made in the case to the involvement of the student‘s (estranged) wife in 
these actions, and indirect inference is made to her involvement in these misrepresentations 
coming to the attention of the University administration. Additionally, the student‘s own 
evidence included the claim that there was little oversight or proper assessment of the student‘s 
application by internal administrators at the time he came to enrol.
748
 There is no information as 
to whether the student‘s ex-partner or the relevant administrator(s) was called to give 
evidence.
749
 The inferred actions of the ex-wife and suggestions of maladministration are 
troubling aspects of this case.
750
 In the face of the possible consequences,
751
 the student was 
entitled to have the case heard rigorously, to a high standard of proof.
752
  
 
In Case 7 at University B a finding of misconduct was made against a student where he had 
received an SMS message from another student in the course of an examination and the 
message had assisted him with the exam. Case 8 is the converse case of the student sending the 
message. The students disputed that they had intended to cheat or that the timing of the message 
would have provided any advantage. In addition, they claimed animosity of the part of the tutor 
making the allegation. The charges against the students were heard separately, and neither 
student was called by give evidence in the other hearing despite the matters being inter-related. 
No record of evidence in one hearing was provided in the other. A ‗department representative‘ 
was present at both hearings, although it does not appear this was the tutor in question. In any 
case, they are only reported to have answered elementary questions regarding the conduct of the 
exam. On the same materials, the first student was found to have committed misconduct; the 
second student was not. In the proceeding minutes, references were made by both students to 
the need to make inquiries of the tutor as to his/her motivations for making the allegations. The 
tutor‘s report states that he was ‗suspicious about them before [the exam].‘ No evidence was 
adduced from the tutor as to the allegations or his ‗suspicions.‘  
 
In two cases at University B (3, 9), students were found guilty of misconduct on the basis of 
work similar to, or reproduced, from other students. These are cases of plagiarism or 
‗collusion.‘ The facts of Case 3 are reproduced above. In that case, no other students allegedly 
involved in the collusion (or alleged as the source of the material copied) provided evidence. In 
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Case 9 at University B, a student was found to have committed plagiarism by submitting an 
assignment on ‗web page construction‘ based on another student‘s work (coding). The work 
submitted was substantially the same. The student admits to poor referencing but denies 
appropriating the work of the other student. In the course of proceedings, the student notes an 
antagonistic relationship with the other student. That information is dismissed by the tribunal. 
Following an adjournment to allow the two bodies of work to be submitted to, and compared 
by, the tribunal, it appears further material was submitted electronically on the student‘s 
account. The student denies he was the person who submitted the material. No evidence is 
adduced from the student whose work is alleged to be the source of the plagiarism, nor in 
relation to the submission of the additional materials.  
 
In her critical examination of Administrative Appeals Tribunal practice, Dwyer
753
 advocates 
‗adoption of an inquisitorial role‘ for the Tribunal, presenting an interesting point of comparison 
to university tribunal practice. In comparison to Dwyer, typical intervention by a tribunal in 
university discipline proceedings occurs by direct examination and questioning of parties, 
principally the student. For Dwyer, the scope of intervention (or participation) is considerably 
wider, necessitating judicious and skilful action by the decision-maker at various points in the 
proceedings. The tribunal may take a role in the ‗formulation of the issues,‘ assistance to 
unrepresented parties, intervention in decisions about calling witnesses, and involvement in the 
conduct of investigations. The schema of functions articulated by Dwyer in inquisitorial conduct 
contrasts critically with the pattern of practice employed in student disciplinary actions, 
especially in what may be taken to be a selective and unsystematic adoption of inquisitorial 
methods. In particular, while student tribunals may be involved in the conduct of investigation 
at an oral hearing, there is little evidence, where it may be appropriate for such intervention to 
be employed (eg where issues are in dispute, or further argument or evidence may be 
warranted), of them actively ‗formulating the issues,‘ intervening in decisions about calling 
witnesses or adducing evidence, or assisting an unrepresented party. Inquisitorial procedure may 
well be open to university tribunals – and it may be well advisable for decision-makers to take 
this approach – but there is evidence that it is employed, at best, in an unsystematic manner, 
and, at worst, in an incoherent, even partial, manner.  
 
7.8 A Precarious Impartiality? 
 
The ‗second limb‘ of procedural fairness ensures a prohibition at law on a decision-maker acting 
partially, or by interests, conduct, association, or consideration of extraneous information,
754
 
                                           
753
 Joan Dwyer ‗Fair Play the Inquisitorial Way: A Review of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal‘s Use 
of Inquisitorial Procedures‘ (2002) 22 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 
81. 
754
 Webb v R (1994) 181 CLR 41, 74 (Deane J). 
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failing to approach a matter with a mind open to persuasion. Bias may be actual (prejudgement) 
or ostensible (reasonable apprehension of bias ‗on the part of fair-minded, informed lay 
observer‘755). The applicable test will vary depending on whether the decision-maker is 
exercising a statutory duty or giving effect to the rules of a private organisation. Although they 
bear certain characteristics of ‗domestic‘ tribunals,756 the test for bias in university disciplinary 
tribunals is absence of apparent as well as actual bias.
757
  
 
Problems of the ‗reasonable apprehension‘ of bias can be especially sensitive in the context of 
inquisitorial proceedings where active participation of the adjudicator in the proceedings is 
expected or required.
758
 Interventionist conduct by decision-makers in administrative review or 
adjudication has led to tribunal decisions being struck down for appearances of bias,
759
 although 
discretion to engage in active lines of inquiry has been advocated in other quarters.
760
  
 
In my assessment, the question of bias arises in seven cases, across both institutions, and 
questions regarding actual and apprehended bias arise. In addition, the observed (or in the case 
of University A, imputed) approach of the tribunals in adopting a limited inquisitorial procedure 
has the potential to raise questions of bias, if proceedings are not handled in a sufficiently 
prudent manner.
761
  
 
The student cases involve a range of potential, or even likely, circumstances of bias, in 
particular allegations of prejudgement, a decision-maker with a direct interest in the proceeding, 
and conduct by a tribunal that may bring its impartiality into question. In Case A10, an 
examination cheating case, the chair of the discipline tribunal would also appear to have been 
the examiner, among whose tasks it was to provide a written report on the allegation of 
misconduct. He provided a report tentatively in support of the invigilator‘s allegations. This 
case would appear to be a classic instance of a person acting as ‗a judge in their own cause,‘ that 
is, as having a direct interest in the proceeding over which he was presiding, a ground for 
automatic disqualification. It would not be arguable that the rule of necessity could be invoked 
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in this circumstance.
762
 In cases B3 and B10, the tribunal proceeded in the students‘ absence, in 
the former case against the protestations of the student‘s representative. The tribunal examined 
the representative from the academic department (the party ‗referring‘ the charge) in the 
students‘ absence. In the latter case, the tribunal summarised the proceedings to that point once 
the student have arrived. This type of conduct may be distinguished from that in case B13, 
where a tribunal proceeded in the student‘s absence after the student had been effectively given 
notice of the hearing on two occasions and failed to appear both times. The tribunal appears to 
have made inquiries as to whether the student would be participating. In the former 
circumstances, a claim might be made that a decision-maker is taking evidence ‗behind the 
back‘ of one party (the student), thus not affording him/her a fair hearing, although summarising 
the material (especially adverse elements) would tend to mitigate the possibility of unfairness. 
In respect of the bias rule, partiality may be attributable to the tribunal because of improper 
communications with a person effectively in the position of accuser, notwithstanding that their 
prosecutorial role is limited to bringing the charge and proffering evidence adverse to the 
student (or potentially doing so).
763
 That fact that this conduct occurred in the context of a 
hearing, albeit inquisitorial, is different to inquiries that a tribunal might reasonably conduct ex 
parte, on its ‗own motion,‘ or outside of the context of a hearing.764  
 
In cases B14 and B17 allegations of bias and ‗ill-will‘ are directed against primary decision-
makers at the School level. Subsequently, those decisions were taken on appeal. Case B14 is of 
limited value as the student withdrew from the University and the case not heard before the 
appeals tribunal. It is not possible to make any assessment of the allegations. In Case B17, the 
rather exceptional circumstances arise where patent claims of bias against a decision-maker are 
made and dealt with. In that case, a student was found to have committed exam misconduct by a 
‗local‘ (School) panel, specifically for taking an annotated sample exam paper into an 
examination. The student took the matter on appeal, and at the latter hearing was accompanied 
by a solicitor. In a rare outcome, the Appeals Board found for the student (by majority) on the 
ground inter alia that the primary decision-maker acted with bias and ‗ill-will.‘ On the materials 
available, two grounds of bias appear to be made out: first, that a remark by the original 
decision-maker that ‗Asian‘ students‘ handwriting all look alike gave rise to the apprehension of 
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bias on the decision-maker‘s part; secondly, on evidence adduced from a Student Rights‘ 
Officer in attendance at the original hearing, that it was apparent the decision-maker was 
already predisposed to a guilty finding. The appeals board, however, appears only to make a 
finding of bias in respect of the former circumstances. The board does not appear to deal with 
the latter claim in its recorded deliberations.
765
  
 
Finally, I think case A20, the Chinese student academic fraud case, presents some challenges on 
the question of bias. This case presents questionable conduct that may give rise to appearances 
of impartiality, but in addition it brings into relief problems of impartiality for those tribunals 
where they adopt inquisitorial procedures. Adoption of a limited, if not truncated, form of 
inquisitorial procedure may well present problems in the appearance of ‗disinterested‘ 
conduct,
766
 where the procedure (or some element of it) disadvantages one side or the other – in 
this case, the student.  
 
It may be recalled that in A20 the evidence on file suggested that the student‘s estranged wife 
made allegations and supplied evidence against him which were subsequently investigated but, 
it would appear, their source was not disclosed to him (although the complaint was disclosed to 
the tribunal). There is some inference that the complaint was motivated by malice, although it 
was also not without substance. The University‘s investigations principally went to immigration 
authorities, the relevant educational institution in China (undertaken by administrative sections 
of the University) and examination of the student himself (undertaken by the tribunal at 
hearing). The student supplied documentary evidence in support of his character and marital 
circumstances. There was no indication that the original complainant was interviewed, let alone 
examined before the tribunal. Additionally, there appear to have been irregularities in 
administration of the student‘s enrolment, and there is no suggestion that any evidence was 
taken from relevant administrative staff. The student appears to have been unrepresented.
767
  
 
The problem manifest here, I would submit, is that the procedure adopted at best lends itself to a 
charge of apparent bias. At worst, especially taking the anonymity and non-disclosure of the 
original complainant into account, there is an appearance of the tribunal conspiring against the 
student and effectively conducting itself as a partisan in the proceedings. In any case, the 
question of procedure adopted (and hence the decision-maker‘s conduct) raises the prospect of a 
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 For instance, there are no written submissions prepared on his behalf by a representative. 
  153 
reasonable suspicion on the part of a fair-minded informed lay observer that the tribunal has not 
brought an open mind to its task. This nexus between the procedure adopted by a decision-
maker and the appearance of bias arose in R v Optical Board of Registration; ex parte 
Qurban
768
 (‗Qurban‘) and has been considered since.769 In Qurban the decision of the tribunal 
was quashed for bias, as it had so actively engaged in the process of investigation its conduct 
amounted to assuming the role of prosecutor as well as adjudicator. If literal breach of the nemo 
judex rule can be achieved by the investigative zealotry of a disciplinary tribunal, then arguably 
a procedure that effectively amounts to abstention by a tribunal from considered fact-finding 
produces the same impartiality by different, indeed opposing, means.
770
 Such an effect might 
reasonably be alleged in the Chinese student‘s case. The tribunal‘s decision, on its face, reveals 
a mind not open to persuasion, and that appearance substantially derives from the procedure 
adopted in practice by the tribunal, whose operation constrained inquiry, effectively limited 
information available to itself (including any contradictory information put by the student to the 
original complaint), and thereby might be said to have closed its mind. Additionally, while it 
may or may not be the case that a common law duty to inquire applies to these circumstances, if 
it does a failure to observe the duty may also amount to a failure to maintain the appearances of 
impartiality; the ‗provenance‘ of the duty to inquire can be traced to the duty to accord 
procedural fairness.
771
 
 
Problems of reconciling procedure and impartiality in student disciplinary actions, I suggest, go 
beyond the particular circumstances (and failings) of this Chinese student‘s case.  As with the 
disciplinary schema at issue in Qurban and ex parte S,
772
 the student discipline procedures under 
investigation contain no formal provision for a separation of powers between preliminary 
investigator and adjudicator. In matter of fact, in A20 the preliminary investigations were 
handled (for good or ill) on an informal, ad hoc, basis by university administrators. Tribunals 
are therefore left to conduct the proceedings, including inquiries, as best they can in the course 
of a single, continuous hearing. In most cases, where extensive investigations do not appear to 
be required, this may be satisfactory. But that outcome is contingent on the circumstances of 
particular cases as much as (if not more than) on the design of procedure.  
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It is important to recall that, in practice, student disciplinary proceedings primarily consist of 
exchanges between the tribunal and the student (and his/her representative, as the case may be). 
This inquisitorial character of proceedings contains a substantial, if not inherent, tension 
between fairness and impartiality, notably in the propensity of an active adjudicator being seen 
to be acting in the role of ‗prosecutor,‘ or advocate for the case against the student. Precisely 
this issue arose in Simjanoski v La Trobe University,
773
 an academic misconduct case, but the 
claim of apparent bias failed because the interventionist conduct of the tribunal was held to be 
within its powers and interpretation of the proceedings as adversarial was rejected.
774
 Fairness 
does not require ‗non-intervention‘ by the decision-maker in the proceedings, but, as Professor 
Allars has remarked, ‗situations may arise where it is difficult for an umpire to comply with 
both the hearing rule and the bias rule at the same time, or at least an umpire must tread a 
narrow and dangerous path between infringing either rule.‘775 This type of inquisitorial 
procedure has been more roundly criticised in respect of US administrative appeal jurisdictions. 
Wolfe and Proszek
776
 have argued that the inquisitorial ‗judge‘ in ‗single-party‘ proceedings 
necessarily tends to conduct matters as a ‗moving party,‘ if not in a prosecutorial fashion. This 
conduct is a structural corollary of the need to engage in fact-finding and adduce evidence for 
the purposes of attaining the complete ‗administrative record,‘777 where an accusatorial party is 
absent. In resolution of these tensions, Professor Allars proposes that the concept of ‗non-
intervention,‘778 or ‗neutrality,‘ on the part of the decision-maker is the wrong way to approach 
the problem. Given that what is substantively at issue in administrative proceedings (and 
recognised in the doctrine of procedural fairness) are interests, the proper role of the adjudicator 
is ‗disinterestedness,‘ not neutrality.779 This may also been seen as synonymous with ‗even-
handedness.‘780 The treatment of Refugee Review Tribunal decisions, for instance, by 
Australian superior courts would indicate that active adjudication in ‗single-party‘ actions can 
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be accommodated within the bounds of impartiality and fairness.
781
 Wolfe and Proszek argue 
that the tendency to ‗predisposition‘ (ie bias) in administrative-inquisitorial proceedings cannot 
effectively be avoided, and a more sweeping reform of procedure in administrative 
adjudications in warranted. 
 
7.9 The Value of Representation 
 
As a general rule, representation in this type of hearing is not available as of right. However, at 
University B the right to representation exists under the rules; at University A, there is no such 
express right, although a student is entitled to an adviser. In the latter context, representation 
appears to be generally permitted in practice by discretion of the tribunal.  
 
The availability of representation for student ‗defendants‘ has a significant impact on the nature 
of a student‘s participation in the proceedings, if not in the outcome of a case. At University A, 
student representation is only indicated by written submissions (or appeal documents) presented 
on the student‘s behalf; at University B, it is, additionally, indicated by minuted account of their 
participation in the proceedings. Typically, representation is (or appears to be) provided by a 
student organisation. In one instance, representation was by a legal practitioner. The value of 
representation to a student is evident in the substance and detail of written submissions on the 
student‘s behalf in disputed cases, which includes the presentation of argument as to fact as 
well, on a number of occasions, as to law. Where the evidence is available it is clear also that 
student representatives may play an active role in oral argument before the tribunal, including 
contending with the tribunal on questions of interpretation of the rules (eg plagiarism), the 
burden of proof, procedural failings, and bias. In many instances, it is by way of submission 
and/or challenge on behalf of students that issues in the proceedings are on the record.  
 
The impact of student representation on the outcome of proceedings is more difficult to gauge, 
although research in the UK has identified that skilled representation before informal tribunals 
has a significant impact on the likelihood of success of applicants.
782
 Given the overall trend 
toward misconduct findings, the capacity of representatives to sway tribunal opinion toward the 
student appears to be limited in the present cases. An obvious departure from this pattern 
appears in relation to case B17, the sole case in which a student is known to be represented by a 
lawyer. In that case, a finding of misconduct was overturned on appeal (the student was 
represented at the appeal), on the ground that the original decision-maker had manifested bias 
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(in the form of racial prejudice). This case is the strongest indication that (legal) representation 
made a material difference to student outcomes in misconduct actions.  
 
7.10 Testing Evidence 
 
In respect of administrative tribunals charged with regulating their own proceedings, the general 
rule at common law is that the formal rules of evidence do not apply but that decisions made by 
those bodies must be based on evidence that is credible, relevant and logically probative.
783
 As it 
has been famously stated, administrative tribunals cannot ignore the rules of evidence ‗as of no 
account.‘784 They must be accorded at least some ‗persuasive value,‘785 depending on the 
circumstances, as they have evolved as a key mechanism for the testing of proofs and attainment 
of truth in adjudicative action.  
 
Empirical analysis supports the notion that there is some basis
786
 in evidence for findings of 
misconduct in student cases. This observation must necessarily be qualified by the limits of the 
materials available for analysis, in particular the absence of written reasons for decisions. The 
vast majority of cases considered led to findings of misconduct. In many exam cases, 
misconduct findings appear to be uncontroversial, based on written reports from invigilators and 
examiners, and the availability of confiscated materials (eg ‗unauthorised‘ materials taken into 
exams). In some cases, misconduct is not disputed (although penalty may be), and students may 
even exhibit contrition or mitigating circumstances.  
 
Yet, the general approach of these tribunals to questions of evidence and to proof of misconduct 
is susceptible to criticism on a number of grounds. There are particular cases where material 
facts are disputed (15 cases) and/or there is contest over the evaluation of evidence which may 
go in the student‘s direction. In addition, there are also circumstances in which further evidence 
may have been adduced by the student (or by the tribunal itself) but was not. The more systemic 
criticism lies in those cases where credibility or reliability of evidence would typically be at 
issue, especially where evidence is provided by witnesses or might reasonably be provided by 
witnesses. Exam misconduct cases
787
 and incidents of general misconduct are the obvious 
circumstances where credibility or reliability of witnesses would be at issue. Leaving aside 
School/Department evidence, the potential for witness evidence to be adduced and/or cross-
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examination to be conducted, in respect of incidents of alleged misconduct, appears relevant to 
7 cases. It is openly drawn into dispute in only 1 case. Yet in none of those cases was witness 
evidence adduced either by a student in support of their own case, a School/Department in 
support of their referred allegation, or a tribunal in the course of inquiry.  
 
The role of School/Departmental representative is ambiguous. On the face of it, they have a 
prosecutorial function (referring the case, presenting argument and/or evidence in support of the 
case for misconduct, etc). More often in practice they act as an ‗expert‘ witness788 for the 
tribunal, for example in considering assessment or pedagogical methods, or academic content. 
There is no evidence of formal cross-examination of those representatives by a student or a 
student‘s representative.789 The process of examination is conducted primarily, and led by, the 
tribunal. The tribunals possess their own ‗expert,‘ or at least ‗inside,‘ knowledge, which they are 
entitled to bring to bear on the investigation and on the tribunal‘s decision-making.790 This 
expert knowledge may include knowledge of academic procedure (eg assessment, teaching 
methods) or course content. However, this knowledge does not preclude disagreement and/or 
uncertainty over key academic concepts such as plagiarism.  
 
In short, issues arising on the treatment of evidence particularly concern problems of evidentiary 
practice and procedure, viz, the question of the testing of evidence, especially for reliability and 
in respect of witnesses.
791
 The cases do not advert to findings of misconduct made in the face of 
obvious ‗unreasonableness,‘ such as in the absence of any reliable, relevant and logically 
probative evidence. In some cases where ‗not guilty‘ findings are made, it would appear to be 
on the basis of ‗no evidence.‘ In other cases, where questions over, for instance, weight of 
evidence affect decision-making, it is not possible to assess the process of evaluation as no 
written reasoning is available. Limited evidence available from University B in written minutes 
would suggest, however, cursory evaluation of evidence before decision-makers and a general 
absence of deliberation taking into account appropriate standards or measures in that process of 
evaluation.
792
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cases of disputed facts, or attempts to systematically weigh one set of facts against other (disputed) facts. 
This is not say, however, that some such process of evaluation did not occur in the minds of individual 
decision-makers.  
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7.11 Penalty and Proportionality 
 
In a strict sense, disciplinary action taken by university decision-makers is not ‗penal‘ at all, but 
understood as a form of ‗protective‘793 sanction intended to maintain the order of the institution 
and the integrity of its academic affairs.
794
 It is significant then – if for no other reason than 
from the point of view of an institutional and disciplinary culture of practice – that the language 
of penalty is used, and, indeed, is used in combination with other language importing a ‗quasi-
criminal‘ flavour to disciplinary action.795 Penalties issued in these cases range from reprimand 
to exclusion from the university. They also include academic penalties (which may have 
financial implications), such as those affecting grades, and fines. Discretion over penalty is wide 
and relatively unregulated (at the ‗central‘ tribunal level). There is no reference to ‗precedent‘ or 
comparable cases. A decision-maker in this situation faces the immediate problem, on finding a 
student ‗guilty‘ of misconduct, of determining an appropriate or correct sanction. This task is, 
arguably, problematic for two reasons. First, a notable ground of appeal is for excessive or 
inappropriate penalty. Second, notwithstanding comparable patterns and forms of misconduct at 
the investigated universities, the pattern of sanction at University A is, in relative terms, 
consistently more severe than at University B. For comparable cases, the consequences at the 
former institution typically exhibit greater gravity than at the latter. Both of these circumstances 
raise the question of proportionality in the application of penalties for breaches of university 
discipline. The question of proportionality in Australian administrative law is not well-
advanced,
796
 although the test for proportionality of penalty in this context would have regard to 
the purposes of the university and its objects as expressed in its governing legislation.
797
  
 
7.12 Conclusions 
 
7.12.1 A Cross-Section of Fairness and Legality 
 
Investigation of student discipline case-files provides greater insight into the actual conduct and 
practice of decision-makers in these proceedings than is possible from mere scrutiny of rules or 
reported cases before the courts. This information is not without its limits – notably reliance in 
documentary records, which are occasionally incomplete – but it does present a microcosm of 
disciplinary practice and decision-making in this context. It was found that an arguable 
departure from various legal standards occurred in a significant minority of cases. Other 
problems of practice and procedure, outside of the scope of prima facie illegality, were also 
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 Compare New South Wales Bar Council v Evatt (1968) 117 CLR 177. 
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 See Patrick Quirk ‗An Australian Looks at German ―Proportionality‖‘ (1999) 1 University of Notre 
Dame Australia Law Review 39. 
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 Leask v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 579. 
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noted. Adherence to tenets of procedural fairness, in particular, appeared problematic in a 
number of discrete cases. In one aspect (provision of particulars at University A) in-house 
practice constitutes a systemic problem. It may be remarked that, on this evidence, there is room 
for improvement in disciplinary practices. Improvement might begin with greater education and 
training of decision-makers, but also needs to consider the role and training of ‗preliminary 
investigators‘ and, indeed, the structure and operation of disciplinary practice and procedure 
more generally. 
 
7.12.2 A Confused Model of Procedure? 
 
From what can be ascertained in university files, it is ordinarily the case that student discipline 
tribunals take an inquisitorial approach to the conduct of proceedings before them, an approach 
that is open to them. Following formalities regarding recitation of the charges by the tribunal, 
the student states their case and the tribunal embarks on the process of examination. The role of 
the representative may be significant, especially where questions of law or policy are concerned. 
In most cases, the role of the departmental representative is marginal, and reduced to answering 
relatively technical (eg pedagogical) questions put to him/her by the tribunal.
798
 The process of 
examination and questioning is led by the tribunal (under the direction of the chair), and to this 
extent the tribunal is the leading participant in the proceeding. There are no instances of 
witnesses called by the student, by the department, or by the tribunal itself. There is no evidence 
that the tribunal undertakes any investigations on its own motion, and it is rare for the tribunal 
to raise matters with either ‗party‘ before it that the tribunal believes warrants further inquiry.799 
The process of inquiry is substantially contained with the hearing itself, subject to the 
appropriate requirements of pre-hearing procedure such as notice.  
 
At the level of appearances, then, the proceedings before the tribunal bear similarities to the 
inquisitorial approach employed in other administrative/adjudicative jurisdictions such as the 
Refugee Review Tribunal,
800
 professional discipline and complaints‘ jurisdictions, or some 
administrative appeals jurisdictions.  
                                           
798
 On at least one occasion, a direct confrontation between the student and departmental representative 
occurred, which assumed the form more of a dispute between witnesses than any type of examination or 
cross-examination. The incident appears to have started at the instigation of the departmental 
representative and the tribunal appeared somewhat tardy in putting a halt to it.  
799
 In one case, the tribunal adjourned the proceedings in order to receive additional evidence from the 
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800
 See eg the description of procedure at the Refugee Review Tribunal (‗RRT‘) in Catherine Dauvergne 
and Jenni Millbank ‗Burdened by Proof: How the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal has Failed 
Lesbian and Gay Asylum Seekers‘ (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 299, 304: ‗In a typical RRT hearing 
there are only three people in the room: the decision-maker, the claimant and an interpreter. The claimant 
tells her story and the Tribunal decides if she is a refugee. Credibility is often an issue… Witnesses are 
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The situation regarding procedure in student discipline actions is distinguishable in a number of 
key respects. First of all, student discipline tribunals are not required to produce reasoned 
decisions, and there is no evidence in the investigated cases of those bodies being asked to 
produce reasons. Second, while certain avenues of external appeal from university decisions 
exist, these proceedings operate in-house and are relatively remote from judicial control. They 
are largely removed from public scrutiny. Third, they are an expression of an exceptionally 
broad, if not ‗peculiar,‘ statutory discretion. Fourth, as distinct from ‗purely‘ administrative 
adjudication, these actions are accusatorial, and have the overtones of ‗quasi-criminal‘ conduct. 
In this respect, it might seem reasonable to assume a greater relevance for adversarial method 
(than for example in RRT or planning disputes). Indeed if we give regard to general conceptions 
of the adversary system it is clear that important elements of adversary procedure do remain in 
the approach by these disciplinary tribunals. For instance, in his seminal critique of the 
adversary system, Sir Richard Eggleston
801
 proposes four features of the adversary system: the 
parties determine the conduct of the litigation up to the trial; procedure concentrates the judicial 
function into one continuous hearing; evidence is elicited by the parties; sanction for breach of 
the judicial body‘s rules is normally at the request of a party. In respect of university discipline 
proceedings, the first two of these features tend to be present, while the second two are 
generally absent. 
 
An important distinguishing feature of student disciplinary proceedings, therefore, is that the 
adversary-formulated approach of concentrating the decision-making process at a single, 
continuous hearing is combined with the inquisitorial method expressed in the leading, 
participatory role of the decision-maker. That is to say, the inquiry or investigative process is 
substantially limited to the oral hearing. There is no clear distinction to be made between the 
investigative component of the process and the adjudicative element. Preliminary procedure is, 
in this respect, minimal, and comprises principally of the process of ‗referral‘ of a matter to a 
disciplinary tribunal.
802
 In practice, preliminary investigation
803
 does occur, relatively ad hoc, 
and there is no formal requirement to determine whether a prima facie case exists.  
 
                                                                                                                           
rarely called, and most often the claimant does not have anything ―on paper‖ to support their story… 
Many of the accepted ways of establishing truth in a legal setting are absent.‘  
801
 Sir Richard Eggleston ‗What is Wrong with the Adversary System?‘ (1975) 49 Australian Law 
Journal 428, 429. 
802
 Preliminary investigations in disciplinary matters may be exempted from many of the safeguards built 
into the hearing rule of procedural fairness, under the assumption that the opportunity to be heard (and 
other accompanying standards as may be appropriate) will be afforded at a later stage of the proceedings: 
Velasco v Carpenter (1997) 48 ALD 22 (‗The rules of procedural fairness clearly applied to the inquiry 
and were to be adapted to the exigencies of an inquisitorial inquiry which was only in its formative 
stages.‘)  
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It is noteworthy by way of comparison that statutory schemes for professional complaint and 
discipline have increasingly moved toward a separation of the procedures and powers of 
preliminary investigation and adjudication, or of complaint-handling and discipline.
804
 This 
trend has been referred to as ‗co-regulation‘805 (between profession and government agency).  It 
has occurred as part of a move away from ‗peer review,‘ or in other words internal regulation 
and sanction within ‗autonomous‘ professional communities. Increased statutory control over 
professional conduct is, in this respect, in some contrast to continued ‗domestic‘ regulation by 
universities in respect of students‘ conduct – also under the rubric of autonomy.  
 
It is worth bearing in mind that reform of procedure and powers in these jurisdictions was 
prompted by, among other things, injustices or inadequacies in previous models of regulation. 
The rise of a ‗consumer‘-focused ethic has had a major influence on these new models of 
procedure. Consumerist discourse in higher education, by contrast, has seemingly led to little 
advance in models of individualised administrative justice. 
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 The distinction between preliminary investigations (to which an opportunity to be heard does not 
necessarily apply) and a hearing proper (where the duty to afford an opportunity normally will arise) is 
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(Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 27 October 2005, 1946 (Ms Pike, Minister for 
Health)). 
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 Thomas ‗Peer Review as an Outdated Model for Health Practitioner Regulation‘. 
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Chapter 8 
University Discipline and the ‘Higher Education Crisis’: Student 
Advocates’ Experiences and Perceptions of Quasi-Judicial Decision-
Making in the University Sector 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the third part of empirical investigations into disciplinary decision-
making. In this case, the focus is on the experiences, perceptions and opinions of student 
advocacy staff within the university system.  
 
8.2 Methodology  
 
In the first half of 2006, 13 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 14 student 
advocates/student rights officers (working at 13 different public universities). Each interview 
was approximately one-hour in length. The interviews included questions intended to 
investigate disciplinary practice and procedure, provide an overall assessment of decision-
making practices, and consider the impact of university commercialisation on this type of 
institutional action. The interviewees worked within a range of institutions, encompassing the 
spectrum of institutional types: ‗sandstone‘ to ‗new generation,‘ metropolitan and regional. 
Their experiences in the role also varied, with incumbency ranging from several months to 18 
years and disciplinary caseloads ranging from single figures to hundreds. A schematic overview 
of information and responses is presented in Table 8.1. Interviewees are coded by number. 
 
8.3 The Student Advocate 
 
In the university system, the student advocate finds analogy in the role of union representatives 
before industrial tribunals, or alternatively in the concept of the ‗McKenzie friend.‘806 In the 
context of domestic university tribunals or disputes handling, student advocates advise students 
of rights, obligations and courses of action available. Additionally, they may represent students 
in internal hearings or in the ‗prosecution‘ and/or resolution of complaints against university 
staff or decision-makers. University rules do not necessarily allow for a student to be 
represented before an internal tribunal, such as a disciplinary tribunal, although in practice it is 
commonly the case that direct representation by student advocates occurs.  
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 McKenzie v McKenzie (1970) 3 All ER 1034; Krstic v Australian Telecommunications Commission 
(1988) 16 ALD 751, 754. Compare interview with R13: ‗My main role is to offer support and advocacy. 
We‘re not recognised as advocates by [the university] when we enter the formal hearings; we are a 
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The role has emerged as a form of accessible, free, non-legal assistance to students, including in 
the performance of administrative justice within the institution. In respect of university 
discipline: 
 
What I do is upon approach from a student who has normally been contacted by the university in 
relation to some part of the discipline or misconduct process [is] provide a student with advice 
and assistance in responding to that, be that at the more informal stages or the panel stage. That 
could include written submissions and personal representation at the hearing. (R3) 
 
As one student organisation has succinctly put it: ‗In its essence, our casework revolves around 
problems – either the problems that students have with the university (grievances), or the 
problems that the university has with students (discipline, academic progress).‘807  
 
Student advocacy is typically a service supplied by student organisations.
808
 The role appears to 
have evolved in the 1980s and 1990s in Australian universities as a response to distinct, if inter-
related, needs. First, in welfare and academic support services for individual students; second, in 
the research and policy functions of the student organisations themselves and thereby in support 
of elected student representatives‘ engagement in (internal and external) policy-making 
processes. In many instances, the dual role – individual assistance and representation, and 
engagement in policy-based advocacy – is maintained.809 Introduction of federal Voluntary 
Student Unionism laws, aimed primarily at removing non-academic fees charged to students, 
has had a significant and detrimental effect on the operation of student advocacy in the 
university system.
810
 
 
The experience of student advocates in the present sample varies considerably in terms of time 
served in the role and the number of disciplinary cases handled. Advocates who indicated a 
response have served between 1 and 18 years. Numbers of cases handled range between ‗4-5‘ 
                                                                                                                           
―friend‖ or adviser. We can‘t actually be advocates. But as employees [of the student association] we are 
advocates. We just tip toe around that in the formal hearings.‘  
807
 Monash Student Association Annual Report (2006), 19. 
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 ‗Of all the student services any student organisation can provide, independent advocacy and 
representation is the most important': Council of Australian Postgraduate Associations (‗CAPA‘) The 
Impact of VSU on Postgraduate Students (2007), 19. CAPA continues at 20: ‗Students are much less 
likely to approach an organisation providing advocacy services where they do not perceive them to be 
impartial and separate to the university. This is especially the case for international students.‘  
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 CAPA The Impact of VSU on Postgraduate Students, 21: ‗While the advocacy function initially assists 
individual students, generally the outcomes have wider implications as they often lead to changes in 
university policy and procedure. The advocate role also contributes to university accountability by 
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able to provide advocacy following VSU. This appears to have had a disproportionate impact on 
international students. The authors note (at 20): ‗At universities with a relatively high international 
postgraduate student enrolment (over 30%) [international students] comprise approximately 90% of 
PGSA caseload.‘  
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and approximately 1000. It is not uncommon for advocates to have handled dozens of such 
cases. 
 
8.4 Nature of Disciplinary Proceedings 
 
The nature of student disciplinary proceedings has been considered at some length in Chapter 6, 
including the right to fair procedure, and the ‗quasi-judicial‘ and ‗inquisitorial‘ character of 
proceedings. The inquisitorial characterisation of procedure is acknowledged or indicated by all 
student advocate interviewees. An informal approach to proceedings is also noted in some 
instances, although elements of formality are noted in other circumstances. For example: 
 
A: The student is required to enter a plea. The prosecutor gives the case. The student, either by 
themselves or through their representative, is able to give a response. Then essentially what 
happens is that there is a discussion between the members of the panel, the prosecutor and the 
student and their representative. That discussion will generally deal with –  
Q: By discussion you mean drawing out information from all the parties? 
A: Yes there is a process of questioning, which is usually initially conducted through the chair 
but then usually degenerates into more informal type of discussion where members of the panel 
question the complainant and the student or their representative. But there is even the 
opportunity as part of that process for occasionally as part of the discussion process the student 
and their representative and the complainant will have direct interaction independent of the 
chair. (R3) 
 
Generalisation of disciplinary procedures is complicated by proliferation of rules and 
administrative (policy) instruments in addition to statutory codes. Disciplinary rules, 
nonetheless, have certain common characteristics:
811
 the disciplinary code of proscribed 
behaviours; primary decision-makers, often at first instance at a ‗local‘ Faculty or School level; 
a disciplinary tribunal for more serious incidents or for appeal hearings; a schedule of sanctions; 
rules of procedure; and occasionally provision for a misconduct register.  
 
8.5 General Assessments 
 
All interviewees expressed a greater or lesser degree of discontent with the decision-making 
process in disciplinary cases, and by extension a broader or narrower critique of the process. 
That outcome is partially captured in interviewees‘ response to a request for an overall 
assessment of disciplinary action: 7 out of 13 responded that the process of ‗unsatisfactory,‘ 6 
out of 13 responded that they found the process ‗satisfactory‘ or alternatively they provided 
somewhat more ambivalent responses. Weight of opinion generally may fall toward 
categorising the system as deficient, but this finding is qualified by a spectrum of critique, 
ranging from specific procedural problems at one end through to significant structural problems 
with disciplinary action at the other end. For instance, interviewee R8 was generally satisfied by 
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the process but raises a number of specific procedural problems, such as the low standard of 
proof employed by the disciplinary tribunal, possible appearances of bias and the technical 
difficulties of hearings by teleconference. By contrast, interviewee R9 is fundamentally critical 
of the function of disciplinary action per se:  
 
The way it was done… I‘ve seen it at other universities… there no real useful role for it. There‘s 
no way it would have increased the quality of the students‘ work. They always preface 
discussions any conversation about plagiarism with phrases like ‗integrity‘ but there was no 
actual impact on that [academic integrity]… by student discipline. (R9) 
 
The opinion of interviewee R11, alternatively, is that the quality of decision-making is uneven, 
depending in part on the nature of the procedure (general or academic misconduct) and who is 
handling the matter: ‗I find some people here are really good, other people (the same as any 
university) have more questionable practices.‘ (R11) 
 
8.6 Procedural Safeguards 
 
As a means of providing a measure of standards across institutions, certain questions put to 
interviewees sought to elicit their opinions and experience of legal (procedural) safeguards for 
students. These safeguards arise in the application of administrative law principles to 
disciplinary action against students. Across the sector application of the doctrine of procedural 
fairness in the construction of disciplinary schema is mixed, and indeed the content of the duty 
to accord procedural fairness in university cases in not entirely settled.
812
  
 
Key features of procedure considered include: provision of adequate particulars (as part of 
notice), whether disclosure of evidence or material to be relied on in decision-making was 
adequate, whether the onus to prove misconduct was placed on the ‗complainant‘ authority or 
officer, whether written reasons were supplied, and whether the advocate was entitled in 
practice to represent the student.  
Lines of questioning in regards to these legal standards sought, therefore, to inquire into the 
substance of those rules. For instance, in eliciting perceptions or opinions as to bias, 
interviewees might be asked whether they perceived a decision-maker had formed preconceived 
views or had not approached their task with an open mind. That line of questioning therefore 
tests for experiences of actual bias:  
Clearly a panel can take on an inquisitorial role and can be seen to be quite involved in the 
process, and that doesn‘t necessarily make it biased. In your opinion are there instance where a 
panel has a preconceived idea about what the outcome should be? (R6)  
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  166 
In respect of issues such as provision of particulars, it may be asked of interviewees whether 
notice includes details of rules allegedly breached, circumstances of the breach, and allegations 
of fact. In respect of provision of reasons, questioning may go to the explanatory value or 
contents of decisions:  
In your experience do you think the reasons are usually an adequate explanation of why the 
investigator‘s come to that decision… it may be for instance they don‘t adequately consider the 
facts…? (R10) 
 
8.6.1 Hearing 
 
All the institutions at which respondents work provide for a hearing at first instance for students 
alleged to have breached disciplinary rules, as well as an appeal facility.
813
 Where respondents 
raise concerns about hearing procedure it typically relates to the conduct of proceedings rather 
than access to a hearing per se: ‗[The disciplinary process] provides the opportunity for a 
hearing. There‘s no summary justice in that sense, there‘s no summary decision-making. It 
provides the opportunity for a hearing but I don‘t think it necessarily provides the opportunity 
for a fair hearing.‘ (R3, New Generation) 
 
8.6.2 Particulars And Disclosure  
 
The question of sufficient notice is fundamental to provision of a fair hearing.
814
 The issue of 
particulars (including allegations of fact or action) in the context of an accusatorial process 
allows the accused person to know the charge against him and the case he/she has to meet. 
Respondents were asked specifically about the provision or notice and particulars, and 8 out of 
12 considered the provision of particulars to be adequate. This rate of provision of adequate 
particulars is slightly lower than might be expected in an inspection of disciplinary rules across 
the sector.
815
 ‗Adequate‘ in the circumstances was viewed as including factual information. 
General satisfaction with particulars does not prevent dispute arising over the question of notice. 
In a minority of cases adequate particulars remain outstanding, but the issue of disclosure draws 
greater concern. Of the 9 respondents who contended with this issue, 5 identified university 
disclosure as inadequate. In one instance (R9) the situation was seen to improve over time. 
Disclosure may be seen as an extension of the duty to provide sufficient notice,
816
 and in 
university tribunals two circumstances of inadequate disclosure are raised. First, the university 
is generally obliged to provide to the student documentary evidence that is ‗credible, relevant 
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and significant to the decision to be made,‘817 or may be prejudicial to the student.818 Failure to 
provide documentary materials was a first point of concern. For example: 
 
A: …What we find is that often students aren‘t properly informed of their rights, they‘re not 
informed of what the suspicions are or what evidence there is, and it often seems to be 
approached on the assumption that the student has indeed cheated.  What then gets reported to 
the HOS is often only a partial take on things.  They‘ll report all the stuff that the student says to 
indicate that they might be guilty, none of the stuff about circumstances or other issues. 
A: The other important feature of that is that one thing that the schools really pushed for when 
the plagiarism procedure was being drafted, was students would not have access to evidence 
because they felt it would be prejudicial to finding the truth. 
Q: So under the current system they‘re required to give students evidence? 
A: There‘s no explicit outlining of what particulars the charge actually means.  Students were 
receiving in writing particulars of the charge, but we‘ve been having an ongoing battle with the 
University about the interpretation of that.  We did get it confirmed in writing from the 
Academic Registrar in the case of one particular school, but she refused that to be allowed to be 
generalised. (R1, 4) 
 
Secondly, shortcomings in disclosure concerned the conduct of inquiries by the decision-maker 
in the absent of the student; that is, adducing oral evidence with no opportunity for a student to 
know of its contents and/or meet it. Conceding that it is acceptable for evidence to be taken in 
this manner in preliminary inquiries,
819
 the problem arises where no opportunity exists for a 
student to know of potentially adverse information and deal with it prior to a decision being 
made. For example: 
 
Q: …when matters go on appeal, which is the only time there‘s actually a panel hearing, you 
mentioned before it‘s somewhat more of a formal process 
A: Yes 
Q: … by a panel, but that tends to be an inquisitorial process as well? 
A: Yes 
Q: Rather than an adversarial one 
A: Yes, yes, it‘s inquisitorial.  There‘s no applicant and respondent, it‘s just the applicant with 
the Board 
Q: And the student, or all the parties are not present at the same time? 
A: That‘s correct 
Q: They‘re interviewed separately? 
A: They‘re interviewed separately. 
Q: So there‘s no opportunity for each one to test statements by the other…? 
A: That‘s correct and, you know, in our view that‘s one of the big problems with the process. 
 
8.6.3 Written Reasons 
 
There is no general obligation at common law in Australia for administrators to provide reasons 
for decisions as a component of procedural fairness. In some jurisdictions, there may be 
obligations to provide reasons under statutory review schemes. It is not uncommon for 
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universities to require, in their rules, reasons for decisions to be provided.
820
 While there is not a 
neat correlation between the institutions surveyed for the former research and the institutions 
from which the present sample of advocates were drawn, the evidence from advocates suggests 
that written reasons are even more unlikely to be forthcoming in practice. Eight out of thirteen 
interviewees noted written reasons were not provided; in one instance reasons were provided in 
particular types of hearings (in specific faculties) (R5); in one instance, they were provided on 
appeal but not at first instance (R7), and two other interviewees noted they were supplied 
‗sometimes‘ or ‗occasionally.‘ In only one instance (R13) did the interviewee indicate adequate 
written reasons are supplied as a matter of course. The value of properly constructed reasons in 
student disciplinary proceedings, preferably supplied in writing, accords with those benefits 
relevant to fairness in administrative decision-making more generally: to provide better quality, 
more considered, decisions; to allow decisions to be scrutinised for correctness or propriety; and 
to show respect for the subject of the decision and allow him/her to understand the basis of it.
821
 
There are two other factors, which amplify these principles of fairness. First, university 
discipline proceedings typically take place in camera. There appears to be little in the way of 
record of many decisions, let alone explanation, especially at Faculty or School levels. Second, 
as an extension of the principle that a decision ought to be explicable to the person affected by 
it, there is educative value for students subject to disciplinary action in the reasons for university 
sanction. This proposition is not merely an alibi for greater scrutiny of decisions. The educative 
effect of disciplinary action is, in the context of many academic misconduct proceedings, an 
extension of the academic operation of the university. It was noted by several interviewees that 
an educational approach is often taken to the misconduct process, especially where plagiarism 
or poor referencing is involved, or alternatively that an educative approach ought to be taken. 
Indeed, in those institutions with ‗misconduct register,‘ a first breach of these rules may often be 
considered as expressly an educative problem; only subsequent breaches may be considered as 
truly disciplinary issues. 
 
8.6.4 Bias  
 
Absent written reasons or transcripts, or judicial review of disciplinary action in the courts, 
investigation of university hearings for bias is a difficult task. The perceptions of student 
advocates provide a useful, albeit indirect, means of assessing the ‗judicial style‘ of disciplinary 
decision-makers in respect of impartiality (or ‗disinterestedness‘822). The issue of a lack of 
impartiality on the part of decision-makers recurs in the course of the interviews, usually in 
                                           
820
 In respect of these points, see Chapter 6, section, 6.5.5 above.  
821
 See Galligan Due Process and Fair Procedures, 431-434.  
822
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perceptions of conduct or statements portraying preconception, or conduct exhibiting 
inappropriate associations.
823
  
 
In 8 of 13 interviews, the issue of bias arises. On the question of the ‗state of mind‘ of decision-
makers, there is a body of opinion among the interviewees that decision-makers approach their 
task, occasionally or commonly, with pre-formed ideas and preconceived outcomes. This 
response is impressionistic but repeated:  
 
Q: In those faculties, or any faculty, but those ones in particular, have you had situations where 
you‘ve had a relatively strong case that a student is not guilty of an offence and they‘ve been 
found guilty? 
A: Yeah, some. Some have got off though.  
Q: What I‘m trying to get at, in those situations that you‘ve explained, do committees disregard 
evidence -? 
A: They generally take what the student says with a grain of salt. I think what the problem I find 
with both those faculties is that they don‘t enter into the committee with an open mind. They 
enter the committee with an idea that the student is already guilty and their idea of what‘s 
already happened. No matter what the student says or what explanation they offer they just 
harass them about it and say ‗No what actually happened is this.‘ Even though the student says 
that isn‘t what happened.  (R13) 
 
… 
 
A: …When we walked in the room most of the time there was no question that a committee had 
a belief –  
Q: Had formed an opinion?  
A: Yep, Yep –  
Q: Beforehand -? 
A: Yep.  
Q: What sort of indications did you get for that? 
A: Because they had no follow up or no other way of further investigating the matter if the 
student had a reasonable explanation for the questions they were asking.  
Q: Where there‘s a dispute over the facts, for instance. Say for instance the student‘s disputing 
they committed plagiarism, the fact that they didn‘t do it –  
A: That‘s where hearings would go on for longer. Usually repetitive, back and forth, and 
members would ask the same questions. They were trying to wear the student down. (R9) 
 
… 
 
Q: An example that you gave before about the, even the Chair of that panel or investigator 
approaching the task not necessarily with an open mind that they might have a preconceived idea 
about what‘s happened here or who‘s in the wrong, does that occur? 
A: Yes, I think very much so, I mean I think that touches on you know people seeing what their 
role is and divorcing themselves from representing the University in those roles. 
Q: What sort of things would they say that would give you that impression? 
A: Well they just give more weight to say an academic that‘s made an allegation as opposed to a 
student.  You know, I think that‘s probably the best way to put it.  They simply give more weight 
to.  I mean the case that comes to mind the placement supervisor made various allegations.  
Now, you know as far as the investigator was concerned, the School reaffirmed those 
allegations, that was far more persuasive evidence than anything the student had to say and I you 
know I believe the process was begun that way really. 
Q: Does that happen in other cases too? 
A: Yeah, from time to time, yeah sure. (R10) 
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 Such as informality between the decision-maker and a ‗complainant‘ (compare Simjanoski v La Trobe 
University [2004] VSC 180), or a complaint directly ‗prosecuted‘ by a person with direct line-
management relationship to the decision-maker (see R v Cambridge University; ex parte Beg [1998] 
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Perceptions of prejudgment with respect to the treatment of international students is also noted 
by the interviewees: 
 
A: I just want to add – and this is not my subjective view – and probably many of us [advocates] 
will tell you, that if an international student is in a hearing or is accused of plagiarism usually, 
it‘s a low probability for him to get a soft outcome. 
Q: You mean for an international student, there is a likelihood that they‘re going to get treater 
more harshly because they‘re international students?  
A: Yes, and because it is identified that international students have more instances of plagiarism. 
But rather than dealing with it positively or progressively they tend to penalise them to send a 
message, and it‘s not my subjective view –  
Q: There‘s a pattern of it - ? 
A: There‘s a pattern of it.  
Q: Even if you had a domestic student at a hearing and then an international student going to the 
next hearing, and the circumstances were identical, you‘d say the international student is going 
to get treated more harshly? 
A: He‘s likely to have a harsher punishment, yes. In the same faculty for a similar sort of 
plagiarism, yes.  
Q: Is that across the board or in some faculties?  
A: Specific to some faculties. (R2) 
 
The other circumstance in which the problem of bias is manifest in the evidence of student 
advocates is in the conduct of proceedings, and in particular where the person bringing the 
accusation
824
 remains with the tribunal or decision-maker during their deliberations (or possibly 
participates in the deliberations), suggesting a quite literal breach of the nemo judex rule.
825
 The 
latter person may be an academic staff member or a more senior officer: 
 
Q: Can I go back to how they conduct the hearing? When you‘re in the meeting with the HoD 
and say the lecturer, have the lecturer and the HoD discussed the matter beforehand?  
A: I‘d say so.  
Q: When it‘s been discussed in the course of the hearing, is the lecturer asked to put their side of 
the case at that time? 
A: Oh yep. It depends. Sometimes it‘s clear-cut and the student will say ‗I did it.‘ The HoD who 
will explain it. The reason being because it gives the context of why it‘s severe and serious and 
they want it to be seriously regarded –  
Q: What I was trying to get was what the relationship between whoever the accuser is – the 
lecturer or tutor – and the HoD at the time. For instance, once the student has been able to put 
their side of the story, does the HoD and the lecturer or tutor discuss it subsequently when the 
student‘s not there?  
A: Yes. They usually ask us to leave the room.  
Q: The decision that‘s made, even if it‘s just a decision on penalty, is that made as a matter of 
consultation between the two of them? 
A: I‘d say so.  
Q: Not simply made by the HoD? 
A: No. (R16)  
 
The question of bias may be closely associated with another form of legal error perceived by 
interviewees, the tendency to impose the legal burden of the case on the student (accused) rather 
than on the ‗complainant.‘826 This is a common complaint or observation of advocates. When 
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 Compare Stollery v Greyhound Racing Control Board (1972) 128 CLR 509. 
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 See Chapter 7, section 7.5, above. 
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asked directly about it, 8 of 13 interviewees concluded that the burden of proof was placed on 
the student in disciplinary hearings.
827
  
 
8.7 Organisation of Procedure 
 
Reform of professional discipline jurisdictions over the past two decades in Australia has 
commonly resulted in a reorganisation of procedure and redistribution of powers within the 
disciplinary process. These changes have occurred by statutory prescription with an aim of 
producing greater transparency and accountability in decision-making, and with the effect of 
separating complaints-handling and investigations from disciplinary adjudication.
828
  
 
Subject, by comparison, to little public scrutiny or extended critique, university discipline has 
not tended to go down this path, notwithstanding certain tendencies toward autonomous (usually 
internal) complaints-handling bodies
829
 and statutory requirements for review of decisions.
830
 
University discipline procedures present analogies to the older ‗peer-review‘ model of 
professional conduct investigation and complaints-handling, especially with regard to absence 
of clear delineation between preliminary investigation, adjudication, and appeal. Problems with 
an obscure demarcation of investigative and determinative action also emerge periodically in 
truly domestic proceedings.  
 
For university discipline it is the distinction between, and transparency of, preliminary 
investigations and the adjudicative (therefore determinative) process that is commonly adverted 
to by student advocates. Each interviewee was asked to explain the disciplinary process. This 
explanation typically identified the cycle of procedural arrangements in place. In practice, 
several different models appear to operate. It is not uncommon that a process of preliminary 
investigation operates informally, with greater or lesser rigour, at the ‗local‘ (eg School or 
Department) level, from which a ‗referral‘ is made to a disciplinary body (whether a tribunal or 
an officer with powers to determine the matter). Alternatively, an informal process of inquiry 
and decision-making may occur, in which the process of informal investigation and formal 
hearing is obscured. A number of advocates were critical of this type of action for the lack of 
procedural safeguards, and the discretionary, if not arbitrary, nature of these ‗hearings.‘  
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 It was alternatively expressed in the interviews as a presumption of guilt falling on the student. Three 
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Ombuds: Issues for Fair and Equitable Complaints Resolution‘ (2003) 14 Australasian Dispute 
Resolution Journal 198. 
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 HEP Guidelines 2005, subss 4.5.2, 4.5.5; National Code, Standard 8. 
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Q: …what does happen when a student‘s charged?  When these matters are raised with a student 
even whether they‘re charged or not? 
A1: It can range. It depends on what School the student is in because some schools have a very 
good understanding of the procedure and other schools either have an understanding and ignore 
it, or don‘t have an understanding of the procedure. So you get lots of situations, really 
inconsistent, in the worst Schools you get situations where students are called in for informal 
discussions, get sent emails before any communication has been sent to them, students not 
receiving results for marks and then querying that and at that point being told informally, we 
caught you cheating, you‘ll be getting a letter ... 
A2: I reckon 70-80% of the time there‘s some sort of informal interview with the student or 
informal communication 
A1: Which is a procedural breach. (R1,R4) 
… 
 
A: The first instance is that the student meets the HoS and another person, such as the lecturer, 
the person who marked their paper.  
Q: Is that relatively informal? 
A: It‘s roundtable, very informal. Usually they say ‗we think you did this, you may or may not 
have done this is your opportunity to ‗fess up.‘ Then there‘s a more formal meeting, with a 
representative of the registrar. We call him the ‗dobber.‘ The ‗dobber‘ makes a report and that 
goes to the registrar. The report is –  
Q: At what point does it shift from one to the other?  
A: It tends to be up to the HoS to report it. They‘ll report it straight away if it‘s a second offence 
or if they think the person‘s being a bit cheeky about it.  
Q: So it‘s quite discretionary? 
A: Yeah. Absolutely. And that‘s one of the problems we‘re sort of looking at the moment. (R5) 
 
Discretionary or informal handling of disciplinary issues in the university sector may be 
problematic in terms of the proper application of legal standards,
831
 this ‗short-cut‘ approach is 
not solely explicable in terms of the workloads pressures involved. For academic misconduct 
cases, the issue may be genuinely educational and there may be the inclination or desire on the 
part of a ‗local‘ decision-maker to view disciplinary powers as a reasonable extension of a 
professional academic discretion. The problem is, of course, the student‘s interests may be 
adversely affected by the decision, even where this is an academic penalty; the disciplinary 
nature of the action can be difficult to avoid.  
 
In other circumstances, distinct mechanisms for preliminary investigation do appear to operate. 
This may be in the form of investigation by a ‗subject panel‘ (R9), or by a dedicated 
‗investigations officer.‘ (R10, R7) In the former circumstances, it would appear that the 
investigation is genuinely ‗preliminary‘ and not determinative. However, in the latter cases, the 
function of the investigator replicates elements of the ambiguity evident in other forms of 
‗local‘ (School or Departmental) decision-making. While such officers may function in the 
manner of ‗pre-hearing‘ investigators (eg conducting separate interviews with involved 
individuals), they appear also to possess limited discretion to apply penalties or sanctions. 
Again, it would appear there is a confusion of procedure in this approach, between ‗preliminary‘ 
and ‗final‘ (ie determinative) inquiries: 
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A: Yep, well, at the investigation, I mean I attend with the student, normally the investigator 
asks, you know, does questioning of the student about the matters concerned, you know, the 
student provides answers.  As an advocate I provide submissions, etc, to the investigating 
officer. Sometimes, we even give submissions to them on penalty if it‘s a case where that‘s 
appropriate, and then the investigating officer, writes up, writes up a decision with reasons and 
then provides, promulgates, those.  If we‘re not happy with that outcome then it goes to an 
appeal board… 
Q: With regard to how the investigation‘s conducted, it is not normally the practice that 
everyone is present during the course of the investigation, that is the student and yourself, 
whoever‘s bringing the complaint, any other people involved in the process, they‘re all 
interviewed separately. 
A: Yeah, that‘s correct.  That‘s absolutely correct. 
 
8.8 Discipline, Commercialisation and the University Crisis 
 
In light of these concerns, how might ‗domestic‘ administration of justice in student misconduct 
cases be affected by underlying social and economic conditions in the university sector?  
 
Student advocates were engaged in discussion about the impact of commercialisation of the 
universities on student discipline and disciplinary processes. They were also asked about the 
place of university discipline in university operations. It was to be expected that interviewees 
were familiar with relevant government policy settings and institutional responses. In part, this 
expectation arises because of the policy-research role advocates often maintain (or they work 
closely with specialist research staff); in part, experience in dispute handling would necessarily 
require knowledge of institutional conditions and general government policy arrangements for 
the sector.  
 
8.8.1 The Concept of Sectoral Crisis 
 
Long-term decline in public funding to higher education, ‗uneven development‘ within the 
sector, and ‗disengagement‘ of students with institutions are among the key factors giving rise 
to a discourse of ‗crisis.‘ 832 
 
It is a recurrent theme in analyses of higher education policy that government funding as a 
proportion of all revenues has fallen from around 90% in the early 1980s to approximately 40% 
in 2006.
833
 The balance has largely been made up by income from private sources, most notably 
student fees in the form of up-front payments or ‗deferred‘ fee arrangements.834 This trajectory 
has occurred under the influence of ‗market forces‘ in the sector, commodification of ‗education 
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 See, generally, Chapter 2, sections 2.2-2.4, above. 
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 Federal government grants to higher education providers were 41% of sectoral revenues in 2006: 
Department of Education, Science and Training Finance 2006: Financial Reports of Higher Education 
Providers (2007), 3. 
834
 In 2006, combined revenues from ‗deferred‘ loan arrangements and upfront fees from domestic and 
overseas sources comprised approximately 36.3% of sectoral revenues: Department of Education, Science 
and Training Finance 2006: Financial Reports of Higher Education Providers (2007). 
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services,‘ and commercialisation of the approach of institutions to the ‗delivery‘ of higher 
education and research.
835
 ‗Reinvention‘ has broadly led to emergence, with variations, of an 
‗enterprise university.‘836  
 
‗Crisis‘ has been viewed as a concomitant effect of the market-based approach and 
commercialisation. A watershed moment in public circulation of the concept was publication of 
the Senate Employment, Workplace Relations, Small Business and Education References 
Committee‘s 2001 Universities in Crisis report. That Report considered a wide range of causes 
and effects in the higher education sector‘s problems. Issues of austerity, the market imperative, 
commercialisation, lack of direction, and ‗erosion‘ of the pedagogic and intellectual base of the 
universities were central to their conclusions.
837
  
 
For present purposes, two manifestations of crisis are pertinent. The contradiction, as Marginson 
has put it, of ‗global enterprise‘ and ‗local squalor,‘838 or what I would term, following Andre 
Gunder Frank‘s analysis of development economics, 839 the ‗development of under-
development‘840 in teaching and learning, is symptomatic of unfolding conditions in the 
universities: 
 
The universities failed to maintain support for core teaching and research activities both because 
of absolute lack of finance and because the incentive structure created by policy propelled scarce 
expenditure in other directions, especially corporate and commercial development.
841
  
 
The second development is the changing circumstances of the student, both ‗objectively‘ in 
terms of the balance of education and other commitments (notably paid work), and 
‗subjectively‘ in terms of cultural dispositions and practices. These elements of ‗crisis‘ have 
been encapsulated in concepts of ‗disengagement‘ or ‗negotiated engagement‘ of students with 
the academy.
842
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 See generally Marginson Markets in Education; Marginson ‗Investment in the Self: The Government 
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Small Business and Education References Committee Universities in Crisis, [1.21]: ‗There was almost 
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diversity of core teaching and research functions.‘  
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 See Chapter 2, section 2.4, above. 
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8.8.2 The Impact of Commercialisation on University Discipline Generally 
 
These forces and developments are powerful factors bearing on the function and uses of 
university discipline, especially where the problem is associated with a ‗crisis‘ of academic 
standards,
843
 of integrity, and public reputation.
844
  
 
In the course of interviews, 11 out of 13 interviewees made reference to the impact of 
commercialisation. Of those, 8 unequivocally considered that it had had an impact on 
disciplinary processes at the university, one said it did not, another said it did not other than in 
one course, and another stated it was ‗possible‘ that commercialisation had an impact. Given the 
sweeping changes to higher education over two decades it is hardly surprising that the weight of 
opinion was that those changes had affected the character and uses of disciplinary action.  
 
8.8.3 What Role for University Discipline? 
 
When the relationship between academic standards and university discipline was raised with 
advocates the response was intriguing and complex. Even the more critical interviewees saw a 
role for disciplinary action. Grounds for ongoing legitimacy of university discipline may vary, 
however. Maintenance of academic standards is one reason.  
 
Q: Do you think student discipline procedures are appropriate in a highly consumerised 
university? Should they still be there? 
A: Yeah, I think it is important because it does maintain integrity of the award. Many students 
are accused of plagiarism because of skill gaps, but there are students, not many, who are doing 
it intentionally. Such a mechanism does help university to maintain integrity. (R2) 
 
But another, reason is the status of the student as a member of the university, which gives rise to 
(public) legal rights and obligations: 
 
I think there is a place for discipline because the student is a constituent of the university and I 
think that despite the shift to corporate service provision by the universities, students still retain 
– the concept of client or customer is not entirely reflective of the student role of experience. I 
think that there still are aspects of the student‘s membership of the university which give rise to 
rights and obligations that are dealt with some kind of due process. There is a role for a 
discipline process of some form. I‘d suggest it needs to be revised significantly… (R3) 
 
Interestingly, universities appear to be experimenting with new discourses of student 
subjectivity, in an attempt to navigate problems in the commercial model of student-university 
relationships. In part, these innovations are aimed precisely at combating rhetorical weaknesses 
in applying disciplinary controls and standards to the consumer-service provider model: 
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Universities in Crisis, [5.26]-[5.54]; Abelson ‗Surveying University Student Standards in Economics‘. 
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 See Chapter 4, section 4.4, above. 
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Q: In your opinion what do you think the role is for discipline processes is in the university? 
Does it shift the balance or affect the rights of students? They‘re paying a lot of money… 
A: [The University] is just starting to use the rhetoric of the university as not so much a service 
provider but as a stockbroker, a facilitator, that can provide a portfolio of experiences and 
portfolio of education. It‘s up to the individual to choose what they want. I have a feeling that 
that rhetoric is going to become quite well entrench, certainly at [this University], and it 
wouldn‘t surprise me if it started to spread to other institutions. It‘s kind of a tempting rhetoric to 
see the university as a facilitator rather than a service provider in that it gives the university 
scope to discipline students, to say you‘re paying for this but at the same time we‘re allowed to 
wrap you over the knuckles, we‘re allowed to do whatever because you‘re not buying a service 
from us, you‘re buying an opportunity. You‘re paying us to provide an opportunity. It‘s going 
one step beyond the simple service provider customer relationship; it‘s actually going to the next 
level. (R6) 
 
8.8.4 Administration of Discipline: First Point of Crisis? 
 
A persistent theme in the interviews is concern on the part of advocates with uneven standards 
applied by disciplinary bodies within institutions, often combined with concerns about highly 
discretionary approaches to decision-making, and a lack of understanding about the ‗judicial‘ 
nature of the role. The problem of unevenness of approach was stated by 9 out of 13 advocates; 
only 1 found this was not a concern. Unevenness in this context refers to inconsistency, notably 
between Faculties or Schools, but also over time. In practice, this may mean considerable 
variation on the part of decision-makers about how they approach matters, conduct proceedings, 
and apply penalties/sanctions. 
 
A distinction is often made between those Faculties whose approach is clearly punitive and 
others where the approach is ‗educative,‘ which may not be problematic as such but raises 
concerns, notably in the former circumstances, that the approach is symptomatic of 
prejudgement or infected by ulterior motive (eg facilitative of a general ‗campaign‘ against 
plagiarism). I consider these issues further below.  Appeal mechanisms had some effect in 
‗evening out‘ the standards of decision-making across institutions, such as where the procedures 
where more formalised (R1&4), or chaired by a lawyer (R6) or a person external to the 
University.
845
 A lack of training and/or comprehension of the quasi-judicial nature of the 
function are also noted by several interviewees.  
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8.8.5 Managing Tension and Contradiction: Disciplinary Control as a Response to Pedagogical 
Crisis 
 
Pedagogical crisis in the universities has a number of key signifiers. I use the term to mean 
‗rupture‘ or ‗deterioration‘846 of the educational cycle, in the relation of teaching and learning. 
Upward trends in student-to-staff ratios; high rates of casualisation of teaching; ‗disengagement‘ 
of students from class and campus; displacement of resources from educational delivery to 
administration and commercial projects; poor English-language competence
847
 are all 
representative of the phenomenon. These sociological indicators of crisis are reinforced by 
notions of cultural crisis in the academy, which may be seen to have its roots in the 
instrumentalisation of academic knowledge.
848
 
 
Interviewees considered, in some depth, the relationship between this academic crisis and the 
function of disciplinary controls. There is evidence from student advocates that resource 
austerity in teaching and learning and problems with pedagogical methods (often associated 
with resource pressures) directly contribute to growth in misconduct rates and consequently in 
disciplinary action. From this perspective, misconduct is symptomatic of the crisis in 
universities‘ ‗core business.‘ Thus, it is noted by various interviewees that quantitative 
indicators (eg growing class sizes, casualisation of teaching) signal an erosion in the quality of 
the pedagogical relationship (interaction of teacher and student), and that there is a necessary 
link between these factors and rates of disciplinary proceedings. Problems with academic 
methods and administration also constitute a source of strain on the pedagogical system, giving 
rise to disciplinary action. These two points (quantitative deterioration and various forms of 
qualitative stress) are clearly inter-connected. It may be broadly stated that, in respect of both 
qualitative and quantitative dimensions of the ‗crisis,‘ many student advocates, in their 
discussion on the impact of commercialisation (and otherwise), draw unambiguous connections 
between the conduct of institutions (and government), including their academic conduct, and the 
impugned conduct of students. For example: 
 
A2: The other area that commercialisation and privatisation has on this is that, take computer 
science for example, all those problems we were having with that school a few years ago, how 
many times we wished that the school had enough money to be able to run proper staff training 
days.  There was no staff training and most of the staff had never even read the procedures let 
alone understand them.  They haven‘t had them explained, they don‘t get any opportunity to 
reflect and provide feedback to the HOS, they don‘t get any opportunity to de-brief with each 
other about individual matters. 
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A1: And they had about a third of the plagiarism problem that they thought that they had.  The 
problem they had was because their assessment was boring as batshit and really poorly 
conceptualised.… 
Q: So are they the circumstances leading to a disproportionate volume of disciplinary cases. 
A2: Exactly.  That‘s what I‘m saying.  You‘ve got more students being picked up for plagiarism 
because there‘s 4 courses on, the exam hasn‘t been changed for the last 5 years, the exam paper 
was just sitting in the library just waiting for someone to memorise the answers. (R1, R4) 
 
… 
 
Let‘s say there were two students sitting next to each other in the lab to the wee hours of the 
morning. A full lab. They‘d be doing the same assignment and talking to each other a bot it, as 
you would. But because they were in a different group and there were similarities noticed – and 
it may be a sentence or something – that‘d be identified as plagiarism or misconduct. There was 
this sort of line where that would have been okay within the group and collaboration would have 
been encouraged. But it that set of circumstances it wasn‘t allowed. The committee would quite 
often try to get a student to admit that they‘d intentionally colluded. If there was a situation 
where a student had consistently higher grades they‘d try to imply that one student was trying to 
gain advantage at the other‘s expense…  
Q: Given the changes in universities, more commercialised, more concerned with things like 
plagiarism, resource pressures, in that context, what do you see as the role for these disciplinary 
procedures? 
A: Where things like vague referencing, or work in collaboration, those things really need to be 
dealt with. And just inadequate teaching, unavailable teachers. Those things could have been 
dealt with the school level. They probably made a decision that it cheaper to run a discipline 
campaign and if you put it in the constraints of a commercial university that‘s a possible 
explanation for why that‘s all happened. That didn‘t really work for them. (R9) 
 
Part of the prevailing critique of universities in their handling of disciplinary issues arises from 
concern and frustration that institutions have been overtaken by events, and that, in applying 
disciplinary controls, they are ignoring broader obligations as educational bodies: 
 
A: The whole playing field has changed. The way universities used to operate – You can‘t have 
the absent-minded professor any more. You‘ve got to have someone who‘s professional because 
people are paying thousands on thousands of dollars. They don‘t want some idiot, who‘ll turn up 
twenty minutes before the end of the lecture and say ‗Oh I‘m sorry, I‘ve got to have a lecture 
today,‘ which was what it was like when I went to uni. And that was great, but the expectation of 
students has changed… When you get money involved it‘s not like the students are buying a 
Mars Bar… It‘s like they‘re buying their education… The whole prevalence and rise of 
plagiarism – plagiarism detection software is often used to get out of plagiarism. I‘ve had 
students get someone else‘s essay and change the words, submit it to the plagiarism detection 
software and change the name… and then they have a report saying it‘s not plagiarised. So it‘s 
all changing. The problem is that when you‘ve got so much money, when students are under 
such pressure to pass… every dollar counts. They can find a fast-track… The university has to 
recognise that the plagiarism issue has changed, the pressures students are under, and the role 
misconduct plays…  
Q: What do you think the role of misconduct should be? 
A: Philosophically I still believe in free education… and I think education is the most important 
line. Plagiarism should be pulled up. I think it should be pulled up in a more educative role than 
the university is currently doing, and there is a role for misconduct… It also has to change with 
the way the university is changing.  
Q: For instance there needs to be a much more educative dimension to panel hearings? 
A: Yeah, and if you‘ve got a student who has got a hearing for plagiarism and they‘ve had no 
idea whether they were doing it, it comes back to… the university‘s got a responsibility to 
basically educate the student…  
Q: Misconduct processes are often used in the context of ensuring standards of education, at 
which point you may respond ‗Does the university have a responsibility to deal with that 
question when the students comes here?‘  
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A: I think that‘s something that‘s just been brought up at the plagiarism working group … The 
thing about academic standards… when you‘ve got lecturers with 400 students and you might 
catch one or two students… I think no one is under any misapprehension that plagiarism is rife. 
It clearly is, whether it‘s known or not known… And while the universities go for this really 
economic rationalist line and increase workloads – the whole system is just totally unbalanced. 
(R13)  
 
The dismissal of university discipline per se by Interviewee R9 (see above ‗General 
assessments‘) is merely an extension of this thinking: that the role of disciplinary sanction as a 
means of safeguarding academic standards has broken down.  
 
Short of this conclusion, there is a sense that institutions are misusing the disciplinary system, 
largely because they are unwilling or unable to deal with wider educational problems. One 
manifestation of this argument is the claim that disciplinary controls have become important for 
management of public perception of the university‘s academic standards:  
 
A: Well I‘ve even heard it said in hearings that the university has to be careful of its reputation... 
Reputation and the ability to market itself as one of the big universities in Australia. 
Q: The question of reputation, or the sensitivity to reputation, how does that affect how they 
approach the matter? Are they more severe about discipline or they‘re less? 
A: They‘re more severe. When it comes to plagiarism cases this is where it comes out most 
frequently. They‘re worried about letting people slip through the system and end up with an 
inferior [University] degree and thereby dragging the name of [the University] down in the 
outside world. I‘ve heard them say that in discipline hearings. That's the big concern of theirs… 
(R6)  
… 
 
Q: … when you‘ve got vast volumes of students going through and enormous resource 
pressure… and plagiarism is one of the growth problems, is it that the universities‘ tend to fall 
back on misconduct provisions to deal with that kind of matter…? 
A: Yeah, they probably do, I mean … I think that‘s probably a reasonable assumption … I 
suppose it‘s the easiest way for them to show there is some quality control there because you 
know the reverse way is they can you it is a bit of an advertisement advocating their standards… 
Q: Yeah, if not to students, to the government 
A: That‘s right (R10) 
 
… 
 
A 2: I think these are all the insidious effects of privatisation and commercialisation.  I think that 
it does really impact on the procedures.  The reason why the plagiarism procedure was written in 
the first place was to do with these things. 
A 1: Yes, it was to try and streamline things… catching and finding people guilty but… 
A 2: But also so that [the University] can present this image of itself to overseas markets, that we 
take plagiarism and we take cheating seriously, we‘re a good disciplinarian university and we 
will ensure that your money is well spent. (R1, R4) 
 
There was common perception among student advocates that commercial pressures had 
produced a contradictory response on the part of institutions to their handling of misconduct. 
Notably, institutions are seeking to impose academic standards (whether genuinely or for the 
purposes of public consumption) in the context of declining per student resources, and 
simultaneously they are compelled to maintain enrolments and thereby revenue streams. 
Interviewee R5 remarked, for example: 
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Q: With regard to commercialisation, do you think that has had a substantial impact on discipline 
processes? 
A: Yes.  
Q: Why‘s that? 
A: They‘ve got a different goal. The goal is no longer an educational one. It‘s a keeping people 
in seats one.  
Q: They‘re less inclined to use misconduct provisions -? 
A: Yes, but also the opposite. They‘re also inclined to use over the top misconduct provisions. 
Like that plagiarism case, that was clearly one of ‗We are [X] University, we are good‘ –  
Q: They use it maintain standards, as it were? 
A: Yes, some myth of greatness. It‘s the total opposite of keeping bums on seats and not using 
discipline standards. The pressure on the individual faculties to keep bums on seats to maintain 
their funding...  
Q: So there are substantial external policy issues that have an effect on how discipline processes 
are used? 
A: I believe so, yeah. I can‘t imagine that that amount of pressure could be exerted and have no 
influence on how people behave themselves. (R5)  
 
8.8.6 International Students 
 
Where these tensions and contradictions are exposed most prominently is in respect of 
international students. International students have come to play a critical role in the 
commercialisation strategy of the higher education sector, via revenues generated from market-
based fees. Growth in reliance on international student fee revenues (especially as a proportion 
of institutional budgets) has more recently become a source of concern to university 
administrators and the Federal Government.
849
 At the same time, public criticism has been 
raised regarding the effect of international student fee revenues on universities‘ academic 
standards – that is, the ‗reduction‘ of standards in exchange for income – including wilful 
ignorance of academic misconduct.
850
 International students, on the other hand, have taken 
direct action over what they view as poor academic practices or inadequate resources.
851
 It is 
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 Federal Education Minister Gillard is reported as referring to a ‗dangerous over-reliance‘ on 
international student fee revenues: Sushi Das ‗The Dollars and the Scholars‘ The Age (Melbourne) 
Saturday 26 July 2008, Insight, 3.  
850
 See Eg NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption Report On Investigation Into The 
Universrity Of Newcastle’s Handling Of Plagiarism Allegations (2005); Senate Employment, Workplace 
Relations, Small Business and Education References Committee Universities in Crisis, [5.46]-[5.54]. An 
example of this type of action is given by interviewee R10:  
Well I think, I mean the first thing that comes to mind with the disciplinary process and commercialisation 
is … a student‘s paying the University a lot of money and there‘s far less incentive to have found that 
they‘ve done anything wrong, … [This] brings to mind actually [a] soliciting case where the… a student 
had got someone else to do [an assessment] for them… so just straight up fraud… There was no 
disciplinary action…  it was discovered, it was investigated, and no disciplinary action was taken and that 
was an international student paying $25,000 a year... I mean there‘s a feeling… in this place that if you‘re 
paying up front money, then your disciplinary matter will be treated differently than if you‘re not… It‘s like 
the elephant in the room in this industry. 
An example linking commercialisation processes with allegations of corrupt conduct was also supplied by 
R11, although the context differed and did not involve international students. 
851
 One of the most dramatic collective responses by international students to local grievances occurred at 
Central Queensland University‘s ‗international‘ campuses in Melbourne and Sydney, where dozens of 
students commenced a hunger strike in pursuit of claims over teaching and grades in a Business course: 
see ‗Failed Uni Students Threaten Hunger Strike‘ Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 16 March 2006,  
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important to note that, although the fee base for domestic and international students differs, the 
‗delivery of services,‘ including teaching, are not differentiated. Simon Marginson crystallises 
the central role of international commercialisation strategy in the general academic crisis:
 
 
 
Problems of standards are bound to accumulate in a system in which there is consistent 
downward pressure on resources for teaching, and quality assurance runs as a branch of 
marketing, which slows recognition of standards problems. These limits affect both domestic 
and international students; though resources and capacities vary and matters are worse in some 
locations than others. However, there are special problems in the commercial market in 
international education. The commercial aim is to minimize costs and maximise market share 
and surplus revenues. Australia has become very good at the standardized processing of high 
volumes of Business and computing students. But standardized processing is in tension with the 
educational and cultural imperatives created by the nature of the clientele. Half our international 
students speak one or other Chinese language, not the language of daily use. Language testing at 
the point of entry does not guarantee an adequate preparation in academic English or for learning 
in the students‘ chosen discipline. But institutions are loath to provide a higher level of academic 
preparation and support because of costs. Nor have they redesigned pedagogies [to] account for 
the prior preparation of students in their home countries, the obvious educational strategy, and 
one that would enrich local programs. Such institutions are forced for economic reasons to take 
students marginal in educational and linguistic terms... The problem of standards is not easily 
dealt with. It cannot be eliminated by pathologizing extreme cases. It is endemic to policy 
settings.
 852
 
 
In academic terms, ‗standardised processing‘ and ‗marginality‘ are forces conspiring to subvert 
the capacity, if not the intention, of international students in particular to adhere to established 
academic norms. Such tendencies are acknowledged repeatedly by advocates – 9 out of 13 
identified treatment of international students as an issue – and in particular the issue of a lack of 
English-language proficiency.
853
 The logical (and in the experience of advocates, practical) 
consequence of these factors is the use of disciplinary powers as a response, directly or 
indirectly, to underlying pedagogical and resource crises visited relatively intensively on 
international students. This occurs notwithstanding attempts by institutions to deploy 
disciplinary instruments in an ‗educative‘ fashion. Interviewee R6 remarks:  
 
Q: Given so many international students in the university, is English proficiency an issue? 
A: There are certainly a lot that come up with plagiarism. A lot of the reasons they cite – and a 
lot of exam cheating – a lot of the reasons they cite are that they were so stressed because of the 
English standards. That they either used someone else‘s words because they thought the words 
were better or they were just stressed preparing for exams and they just didn‘t think they were 
going to be up to it. So they decided to take in a cheat sheet. 
                                                                                                                           
http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/failed-uni-students-threaten-hunger-
strike/2006/03/16/1142098582247.html (last accessed 14 August 2008) 
852
 Simon Marginson ‗Global Setting, National Policy and Higher Education in 2007‘ (Paper presented to 
Education, Science and the Future of Australia Public Seminar Series, Centre for the Study of Higher 
Education, 9 July 2007), 8-9:  
http://www.cshe.unimelb.edu.au/publicpolicyseminars/downloads/Marginson_09July07_paper.pdf  (last 
accessed 14 August 2008).  
853
 This concurs with other academic findings: Bretag ‗The Emperor‘s New Clothes‘; Anna Deumart, 
Simon Marginson, Chris Nyland, Gaby Ramia and Erlenawarti Sawir The Social and Economic Security 
of International Students in Australia: A Study of 200 Cases: Summary Report  (2005) Monash Institute 
for the Study of Global Movements, Monash University,  
http://www.education.monash.edu.au/centres/mcrie/docs/202interviewsupdated060605.pdf (last accessed 
14 August 2008).  
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Q: Do you think there are any cultural issues? 
A: With plagiarism, certainly. At least as the students tell me they come from different 
backgrounds where they have different standards…. Just in relation to non-western style 
learning, yes. That comes up a fair bit. It‘s hard trying to convince committee members of this 
though. Some faculties run orientation programs specifically targeting western standards of 
academia and academic standards. Some of the faculties try to run orientation programs for 
international students that specifically target this type of issue and what‘s required of western 
style academic… 
 
In the examples cited by advocates, the nature of misconduct undertaken by, or alleged against, 
international students often takes the form of poor citation (ie plagiarism), ‗collusion,‘ or exam 
cheating. Interviewee R2 characterised the real nature of the problem as ‗genuine skill gaps,‘ an 
observation reinforcing Marginson‘s comments above. Three interviewees expressly note that a 
key part of their function, especially in hearings, is to act as an ‗interpreter‘ – that is, to decode 
the process for the student, to act ‗as a facilitator of the whole thing.‘ (R13) 
 
A further observation made in respect of international students adds a more disturbing 
dimension to the critique of disciplinary controls. Two interviewees make reference to 
circumstances of bias in disciplinary proceedings, where decision-makers have expressed ethnic 
or cultural antagonism toward international students:  
 
Q: Even if you had a domestic student at a hearing and then an international student going to the 
next hearing, and the circumstances were identical, you‘d say the international student is going 
to get treated more harshly? 
A: He‘s likely to have a harsher punishment, yes. In the same faculty for a similar sort of 
plagiarism, yes.  
Q: Is that across the board or in some faculties?  
A: Specific to some faculties.  
Q: Which faculties would they tend to be? You don‘t have to name them but just give me a 
generality of what sort of discipline areas do you think are worse than others? 
A: In each university you would have a faculty or a school which would have higher 
international enrolments –  
Q: Like business or IT - ? 
A: Like business ofrIT. And in such faculties you are more likely to find this trend.  
Q: What you are saying is that the harsher the treatment of international students tends to be 
proportionate to where the numbers of international students are higher? 
A: Yes. Because probably they are too fed up with the frequency of plagiarism.  
 
In remarking on the variable standard of hearings across Faculties, R13 provides an example of 
one tribunal‘s approach to the ‗cultural‘ dislocation experienced by some international students: 
 
A: …we talk a lot about intent in the faculties, it‘s not so much talked about in the central 
committees because they know… that has a bit of weight, whereas at the faculties it‘s just like 
‗Oh come on we know it‘s plagiarism… don‘t come at us with that cultural bullshit.‘  
Q: Do they actually say stuff like that? 
A: We did have one guy say, ‗I‘ve actually worked in India and I know it‘s not like that.‘ This 
guy‘s [student] experienced. Telling them what his prior degree was, in the Indian University … 
really that‘s how it was. He was going ‗I‘ve been to India and it‘s not like that.‘ (R13) 
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8.8.7 Plagiarism: The New ‘War on Drugs’? 
 
The plagiarism question has been considered at length in Chapter 4, including critique of the 
disciplinary limits of that form of academic behaviour. In analysis of the disciplinary situation 
in the sector, interviewees viewed academic misconduct as an extension of the wider 
pedagogical crisis. Plagiarism was a recurrent theme throughout the interviews, not least 
because it was a form of misconduct advocates were dealing with constantly. Five interviewees 
expressly discussed the prevalence of plagiarism as a proportion of their total caseload: the 
consensus was that plagiarism was the largest single source of casework, if not a clear 
majority.
854
  
 
An essence of student advocates‘ critique was that disciplinary controls were being applied to 
primarily academic problems (especially lack of knowledge of academic conventions or their 
application). The distinction between ‗purely academic‘ matters and disciplinary matters may 
not be clear-cut or unambiguous. The experience of interviewees indicates that certain 
institutions have sought, in the construction and application of disciplinary rules, to produce in 
effect a spectrum of responses to academic misconduct to account for ‗inadvertent‘ acts: at one 
end, accommodating an ‗educative‘ approach. Yet, such an approach is not without controversy. 
It may be subject to variation and inconsistency across Faculties or Schools;
855
 typically some 
form of sanction, albeit minor, still applies;
856
 and the incident may invoke longer-term 
surveillance.
857
 Further, operation of ‗educative‘ approaches does not per se displace or temper, 
either over time or across the sector, a more unambiguously disciplinary approach, or as I argue 
below, a culture of academic ‗policing.‘ Indeed, there is some evidence that these approaches 
are cyclical, or transitory, over time. 
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 Responses included quantitative estimates – approximately 50% (R2), 50% (R6) and 75-80% (R15) – 
and qualitative assessments (cases are ‗mostly‘ plagiarism or ‗increasing‘ numbers are plagiarism).  
855
 Eg R9:  
Q: With the question of intention, did committees distinguish between questions that were academic or 
educational problems and disciplinary problems? Subsidiary to that, what sort of variations across schools 
was there? 
A: Where there was a bigger problem they had less variation in how they treated those kinds of distinctions. 
For instance a block of text hadn‘t been referenced they‘d treat that the same as a similarity between one 
person‘s piece of work and another. Pretty much approaches it the same way.  
Q: They dealt with all matters in a disciplinary fashion? 
A: Yeah. Other schools would sort of treat bad referencing examples as bad referencing. That‘s why they 
probably had fewer cases coming to them because they didn‘t see that as a case of misconduct.  
856
 Eg R7: 
Q: Are the most, most of the cases an educative issue rather than a disciplinary issue? 
A: Mostly educative, yeah. 
Q: Right.  So that, well, in those circumstances, how would most students respond to the allegation, would 
they seek to just admit what they‘ve done and seek an [academic] penalty or something like that? 
A: Well, if it‘s an educative thing, they‘ll generally accept that they‘ll look at it, and if it‘s a case that 
they‘ve not referenced properly, they‘ll generally see that… and they‘re quite happy go away, re-do the 
assignment, get assistance from our [Learning] Advisers… and then re-submit for a maximum amount so 
that you get a maximum of 50% on that assignment. 
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Q: In those circumstances where a student‘s disputed they‘ve done something wrong and the 
issue revolves around something like intention, in a situation where it would difficult to prove a 
student intended to cheat – what sort of attention did they pay to the question of intention? 
A: That changed over time. The first year I was there they sort of had this unspoken policy that 
they were going to stamp out plagiarism. At first they were trying to give punishments and they 
would treat it a bit like mandatory sentencing. What they saw as similar offences they would 
give a similar penalty. But over time committee had to find students not guilty of misconduct 
because of the other problems in the school. Over time they began to make the distinction 
between bad referencing and [plagiarism]… (R9) 
 
The pressures of commercialisation and ‗underdevelopment‘ of teaching and learning have 
combined with pressures to maintain or reinforce academic standards (or at least maintain the 
appearances of doing so). In analysis by advocates, these pressures and tensions are crystallised 
in an institutional anxiety over plagiarism in particular.   
 
There‘s been a real knee-jerk reaction to plagiarism… and it‘s been punitive… (R13) 
 
Q: Are academic misconduct cases more prevalent than general misconduct cases?  
A: Yes.  
Q: Are they quite prevalent here? 
A: Becoming more so. 
Q: Why would you say that? 
A: Just because of their [university] phobia about plagiarism and the loose interpretation of the 
all-encompassing things that constitute plagiarism these days. What would have been considered 
poor referencing in old times is now considered plagiarism. There have been lunatics where a 
whole class has been accused of cheating because of improper actions of the lecturer concerned. 
(R11) 
 
Consequently, plagiarism has found itself the focal point of concerted action by universities in 
response to perceptions of ‗crisis‘ in academic standards and the problems of students‘ 
(academic) behaviours. In the views of a number of student advocates disciplinary controls are 
central to the universities‘ response, and their deployment is part of a (semi) organised 
campaign, founded on the perceptions of threat, but in reality underpinned by sectoral 
conditions: 
 
What I see is one of the biggest factors at work is actually that all of the pressure on the sector, 
changes in their working lives, in student-staff ratios, the amount of teaching they have to do, 
their familiarity with classes and stuff, it gets quite easily projected onto and objectified in a sort 
of external threat – ‗they‘re plagiarists, they‘re cheats‘ – like all this stuff that you get now in the 
media and throughout the universities about the internet making it easier to cheat when 
personally I think the hey day of students cheating was probably when assignments were all 
hand-written and there was no record of what had been submitted last year.  So, from what I see, 
that is an effect of corporatisation.  The way I see it working is that the student gets quite sort of 
‗Othered‘ and the assumption is that there‘s some horrible, lurking menace to the University. 
Hence all that stuff about presumption of guilt, about why they want the student to show they‘re 
capable of being saved, or making a clean breast of it, picking up a highlighter and indicating 
their guilt. (R1, R4) 
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 In particular, students subject to disciplinary action, even primarily of an ‗educative‘ nature, will at 
certain institutions be placed on a ‗Misconduct Register‘ or an equivalent.  
  185 
From this viewpoint, the approach of the academy reproduces the mode of ‗crisis‘ or 
‗emergency‘ of the wider political society:  
 
A1: … plagiarism education is very John Howard, George Bush sort of war on drugs, George 
Bush Snr, you know: ‗don‘t inhale‘.  They‘ve got this poster that‘s everywhere – ‗beware of 
plagiarism and its penalties‘ without saying what this thing actually is… So you see them 
seriously attempting but you know, having a direct quote with an attributed reference but no 
quotation marks and that in the eyes of many academics is guilt. 
A2: The whole reason the plagiarism procedure was written as a corollary if the discipline 
procedure, we argued at the time that there was absolutely no necessity for it. It‘s like the terror 
laws, they don‘t need to make new terror laws, there‘s plenty of provision in the existing laws 
that allow them to detain people and all that sort of stuff, but plagiarism was about posturing, it 
was about presenting an image in a situation of crisis where the University is realising its 
funding is decreasing, we need to be seen as being serious about academic integrity because it‘s 
become a marketable catchphrase, we need to come up with something stronger, more war on 
drugs style. (R1, R4) 
 
At one level, then, disciplinary controls serve a public-relations‘ function, but also a policing 
function. The widespread problems experienced or perceived by interviewees in the conduct of 
disciplinary action is consistent as much with an ambivalence toward a ‗judicial‘ approach to 
academic discipline, and inclinations toward summary or ‗police‘ action (at least at the ‗local‘ 
level of Faculties or Schools), as insufficient training or preparation for the role. It appears from 
the interviewees that increased use of technology in academic surveillance also contributed to 
this approach. Use of ‗plagiarism detection‘ software, such as ‗Turnitin,‘ was reported by 5 
advocates. There is some evidence to indicate that these technologies had led to growth in 
substantial growth in numbers of misconduct proceedings.
858
 
 
8.9 Conclusion 
 
Combined with problems in the administration of discipline, dispositions within universities 
toward treating plagiarism as a ‗policing‘ problem go some way to explaining weaknesses and 
shortcomings in the practice and procedure adopted by disciplinary bodies and decision-
makers.
859
 There is a real concern that the ‗judicial‘ approach of the fair and unbiased hearing 
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 R2: 
Q: You referred to Turnitin. Do you think instances of misconduct, especially plagiarism, have increased 
substantially because of that - ? 
A: Oh yes! In last peak period, which was from Oct 2005 to Jan 2006 we had around 150 hearings from one 
faculty and they all had Turnitin involved as evidence.  
Q: And how does that compare with the same faculty in previous seasons? 
A: Less, very much less, probably 100% [sic] less. So around 75.  
859
 Eg R9:  
Q: … First of all, whether you consider the process to be satisfactory or not and if not, why not? 
A: It wasn‘t satisfactory. There was sort of a knee-jerk reaction during one period there. People were acting 
on perception not evidence; they won‘t sort of address what they thought the problems were. They should 
have gathered some evidence first. They should have dealt with what they thought were problems but what 
they did is take this policeman approach and in that approach a lot of things that were definitely not 
plagiarism got caught up into the net.  
Q: There was sort of a general campaign or crisis about misconduct and about plagiarism? 
A: Yep, especially plagiarism.  
Q: That tended to die away over time? 
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gives way to expediency, discretion, or at its limits, capriciousness. These qualities may be 
facilitated by the discourse of ‗crisis,‘ resource pressures, lack of training and/or specialisation 
in handling ‗quasi-judicial‘ cases, and institutional inertia, especially in the design and practice 
of disciplinary tribunals and procedure. Scope for the exercise of discretion is, of course, to be 
found in disciplinary rules, including in the conduct of proceedings and in application of 
sanctions in cases of misconduct. The concern arising in a ‗policing‘ or ‗prosecutorial‘ approach 
to academic misconduct is that discretion and expediency displaces (or erodes) basic tenets of 
administrative justice. If the problems of academic behaviour were purely educational, such as 
the failure to comprehend academic content or technique, then a generally unfettered exercise of 
academic (professional) discretion may be appropriate. But in the present circumstances 
disciplinary controls are at issue, entailing the prospect of sanction, ‗penalty,‘ and detrimental 
impact on students‘ interests, in which case discretion must be balanced with justice. 
Institutional campaigns against plagiarism may be warranted but they ought not to detract from 
the provision of justice to individuals caught within the scope of disciplinary powers.  
 
                                                                                                                           
A: It didn‘t really. What happened was that kind of reaction started to seep into other schools, because it 
started in the school of IT? It didn‘t change it because the way that school reacted – even though over time 
they got lobbied and they realised themselves it wasn‘t really helping them, their own situation. They 
realised they were putting students through a process they didn‘t need to go through because they hadn‘t 
done anything wrong basically. Most of them. That kind of initial knee-jerk reaction flowed onto the way 
the registrar‘s office operated and things like that.  
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Table 8.1: Student advocates, Australian higher education: responses to selected issues 
Interviewee Length of 
employment 
(yrs) 
No. of 
cases 
(est) 
% 
plagiarism 
(est) 
Adequate 
particulars 
Adequate 
disclosure 
Onus of 
proof on 
complain-
ant 
Act as 
represent-
ative 
Written 
reasons 
Uneven 
approac
h860 
Assess-
ment861 
Inter-
national 
students
862 
Commer-
cialisation 
impact863 
R1,R4 4, 8 60, 80 - N N N Y N Y U Y Y 
R2 - 500-
600 
50 Y - N Y N Y U Y Y 
R3 - 10-15 - N Y N Y N - U Y - 
R5 - 4-5 - Y - Y Y Y864 Y U Y Y 
R6 3 40-50 ‗large 
number,‘ 
50% 
Y Y N Y N Y G Y Y 
R7 6.5 45 per 
year 
(292) 
- N N ‗sometime
s‘ 
Y N N G - Y 
R8 1 7 - Y Y N Y N - G Y - 
R9 3 200 ‗mostly‘ Y N N Y N Y U - Y 
R10 2.5 25-30 - Y N N Y ‗sometim
es‘ 
Y U - Y 
R11 18 12-24 ‗increasing‘  Y - Y Y ‗occasion
ally‘ 
- S865 - N 
R13 ‗4-5‘ 1000 - - - N (on 
appeal, Y) 
‗mostly‘ Y Y G Y Y 
R15 - ‗100s‘ 75-80% N N N ‗in some 
circumstan
ces‘ 
N Y U Y Y 
R16 3 40-50 - Y ‗mostly‘ Y Y N Y S Y N 
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 Whether the approach to disciplinary proceedings was consistent or even across the various Schools, Faculties or relevant units of the institution. 
861
 Overall assessment of disciplinary procedures: whether satisfactory (S), generally satisfactory (G) or unsatisfactory (U) 
862
 Whether the treatment of international students specifically was an issue. 
863
 Whether commercialisation of the sector had had an impact on disciplinary processes at the institution. 
864
 In certain types (clinical) hearings only. 
865
 In general misconduct matters, satisfactory; in academic misconduct matters ‗50%‘ satisfactory. 
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Chapter 9: 
The Search for Administrative Justice in the University 
 
In discussion of the concept of ‗administrative justice,‘ Robin Creyke866 makes the point that, as 
well as being unsettled, the concept is historically novel. It rose to prominence in the 1970s in 
Australia, and has had a more recent renaissance. If this is the case generally, then its 
application to the university is even more novel, if not precarious. Although the term sits within 
the framework of administrative law, it is worth reiterating the long history of disquiet and 
unfamiliarity in control of higher education institutions by judicial or quasi-judicial authorities. 
In the US the scepticism is broadly retained in the rule of ‗deference‘ of the courts to university 
decision-making, especially where any academic content is concerned.
867
 In the UK, one source 
of such cultural and institutional reticence might be found in the law and fact of the 
eleemosynary corporation – where the ‗King‘s writ did not run‘868 – and perhaps in the quite 
specific character of leading universities historically possessing their own judicial powers. For 
centuries, authorities at Oxford and Cambridge could dispense justice, rather than being on its 
receiving end. In Australia, courts were loathe, in the ordinary course of statutory interpretation, 
to upset the ‗very wide discretion‘ conferred on university authorities for the purposes of 
administering higher education.
869
  
 
When ‗administrative justice‘ definitively arrived at the university‘s doors, in the 1960s – in the 
US as a result of Dixon v Alabama State Board of Education
870
 and in the UK and 
Commonwealth in decisions such as University of Ceylon v Fernando
871
 and R v Aston 
University Senate, ex parte Roffey
872
 – it was by way of judicial review for ‗due process‘ rights, 
and the development was not hailed but regretted. As Professor Wade remarked: ‗In the days 
when university discipline was a quasi-parental affair, it was administered without thought of 
legal consequence and students would accept it in the same spirit… Natural justice, separation 
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 Robin Creyke ‗Administrative Justice – Towards Integrity in Government‘ (2007) 31 Melbourne 
University Law Review 3 705, 705. 
867
 See generally Kaplan and Lee The Law of Higher Education, 465-474. 
868
 ‗There must be no Alsatia in England where the King‘s writ does not run‘: Czarnikow v Roth, Schmitt 
and Co (1922) 2 KB, 478, 488 (Scutton LJ), cited in R v Lord President of the Privy Council; ex parte 
Page [1993] 1 All ER 97. 
869
 Ex parte McFadyen (1945) 45 SR (NSW) 200, 204 (Davidson J). Halse-Rogers J remarks further: ‗I 
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 294 F.2d 150 (5
th
 Cir. 1961). Dixon concerned the application of ‗due process‘ rights guaranteed under 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution to publicly-funded educational colleges. It has been, 
and continues to be, influential on procedural rights available to students in US public colleges and 
universities: generally, see Kaplin and Lee The Law of Higher Education, 485-490.  
871
 (1960) 1 All ER 631. 
872
 (1969) 2 QB 538. 
   189 
of powers, tribunals of appeal, court orders – the whole legal paraphernalia must now be 
imported into academic life.‘873 
 
Professor Wade‘s lament now seems quaint, especially given the extraordinary expansion and 
transformation of the university sector in the meantime, including extensive and prescriptive 
regulation. Administrative government is well and truly entrenched on campus in Australia. In 
this context, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, ‗administrative justice‘ has progressed in fits and 
starts. Access to judicial review and ombudsmen are accepted parts of the institutional 
landscape, as indeed are wider sources of litigation, such as disputes in contract or tort. 
Universities not infrequently find themselves in administrative tribunals over matters such as 
discrimination complaints or freedom-of-information disputes.
874
  
 
In respect of its domestic jurisdiction – that is to say, the exercise of the university‘s wide and 
specialised authority – provision of ‗administrative justice‘ is problematic. This state of affairs 
is, I would submit, the result (among other things) of a need to accommodate a radically 
changing policy environment, and the need to balance administrative, legal and educational 
factors in university operations. The university has had limited success is achieving this balance 
in a manner that might be considered consistent with the provision of ‗administrative justice‘ to 
its students. This assertion accords with the evidence available from the foregoing empirical 
analysis of disciplinary decision-making in the university.  
 
9.1 Administrative Justice 
 
The scope of ‗administrative justice‘ might be said to encompass the ‗web‘ of institutions, 
practices, rules and procedures straddling the constitutional divide between executive power and 
judicial power, or between public administration (or, in the case of certain complaints or 
arbitrative arrangements, private administration) and adjudicative functions. The concept 
accounts for differences in approach and procedure, ranging from tribunals to public inquiries, 
to Ombudsman and inspectors, to judicial review by the courts. In general, the concept is 
understood to weld together, and balance, the exercise of discretion in the achievement of 
administrative and/or policy goals with accommodation of the treatment and concerns of 
affected individuals.
875
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 Wade ‗Judicial Control of Universities‘, 469.  
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The notion within English law that ‗justice‘ might be delivered by mechanisms other than the 
‗ordinary courts‘ was, to the 1960s, problematic. ‗Justice‘ in respect of Executive action was 
generally limited to control of government action by the courts or, alternatively, by petition to 
Parliament or by the actions of Members of Parliament, or perhaps by the determination of 
specialist tribunals.
876
 ‗Administrative justice,‘ in this respect, was influenced by the Diceyan 
concept of the rule of law and Parliamentary supervision of the Executive. Dicey asserted that 
English law contained no ‗administrative law‘ as such, and hence no ‗privileged‘ domain of 
‗administrative justice,‘ in contradistinction to ‗continental‘ law.877 For Dicey, ‗administrative 
justice‘ was indistinguishable from proper operation of the (British) Constitution:  
 
Modern legislation and that dominant legislative opinion which in reality controls the action of 
Parliament has undoubtedly conferred upon Cabinet, or upon servants of the Crown who may be 
influenced or guided by Cabinet, a considerable amount of judicial or quasi-judicial authority. 
This is a considerable step towards the introduction among us of something like the droit 
adminsitratif of France, but the fact that the ordinary courts of law can deal with any actual and 
provable breach of the law committed by any servant of the Crown still preserves the rule of law 
which is fatal to the existence of true droit adminsitratif. Nor… is it useless to bear in mind that 
impeachment is still part of the law of England, and that impeachment is the legal action of the 
High Court of Parliament.
878
 
 
The 1958 Franks Committee Report
879
 led to reform and overhaul of the UK administrative 
tribunal system, but the Australian reforms of the 1970s went further in establishing a 
‗comprehensive administrative law,‘ including merits review of administrative decisions by 
mixed legal-administrative tribunals.
880
 Other mechanisms, procedures and authorities of 
administrative justice followed, including establishment of a Commonwealth Ombudsman, 
reform of judicial review procedures through the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) 
Act 1977, and freedom of information legislation.  
 
This project of administrative justice – representing the ‗particular application of a general 
concept [ie justice]‘881 – incorporates not only issues of procedural propriety, lawfulness and 
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 See W A Robson Justice and Administrative Law: A Study of the British Constitution (Stevens and 
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 Justice Robert French ‗Administrative Justice in Australian Administrative Law‘ in Robin Creyke and 
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rationality, but additionally wider values of good government, including accountability,
882
 
efficiency and efficacy
883
 in decision-making, and norms of fair treatment in administrative 
action.
884
 Justice French (as he then was) correlates the ‗particular application‘ with the 
judicialised approach to public administration:  
 
The essential attributes of administrative justice do not, in my opinion, differ in substance from 
those of curial justice, albeit processes and trappings will differ as well as the formal effect of 
the decision.
885
  
 
In the context of the use of administrative tribunals as the vehicle for ‗administrative justice,‘ 
this description is apposite.
886
 Considering the ‗juxtaposition of ―administrative‖ and ―justice‖ 
… [as involving] balancing the distributive justice focus of public administration against 
individual interests,‘887 Creyke argues that the concept now coincides (not always neatly) with 
the ‗integrity arm of government,‘ and the new ‗separation of powers‘ articulated in that theory. 
The breadth of Creyke‘s conceptualisation does not limit ‗administrative justice‘ necessarily to 
the ‗judicialisation of administration‘ but includes wider models and procedures for the 
‗particular application‘ of justice to administrative power, such as the Ombudsman or Auditor-
General, which operate more in the mould of an inspectorate. Yet, where individualised 
application is concerned, investigative bodies such as Ombudsman must also operate on the 
adjudicative or ‗judicial‘ plane to some degree – that is, to the point of according fairness to 
affected parties, in both the procedural sense and the substantive sense.  
 
In any case, whether the vehicle of administrative justice is judicial and determinative or 
investigative and/or non-determinative, at the level of substance the concept denotes typically a 
                                           
882
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synthesis of law and discretionary decision-making distinct from the scope of judicial review by 
the ‗ordinary courts.‘ Provision of administrative justice remains formally a function of 
executive power, although having acquired an independent status.
888
 The most significant point 
in this regard is that it concerns the exercise of administrative discretion in a particular manner, 
including where appropriate, on questions of policy. ‗There is ample authority…‘ notes a former 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, ‗to suggest that the exercise of discretionary powers should be 
guided by concepts of ―consistency, fairness and administrative justice.‖‘889 In the form of the 
administrative tribunal, the judicial model is intended to supply those guiding values.  
 
The operation of administrative justice may exhibit a broad spectrum of characteristics, 
depending on the nature, purposes, powers and subject-matter of the decision under 
consideration and the decision-maker. Application of the judicial model may be greater or 
lesser, in particular where the policy or political content of the decision may vary, such as 
between a Ministerial decision on the one hand or arbitration on the other hand. That is to say, 
the judicial content of decision-making may vary,
890
 although within the established tribunal 
systems for administrative review the judicial model is given considerable prominence, 
qualified by the need to exercise the administrative discretion (‗stand in the shoes of the 
decision-maker‘) and on occasion contend with issues of policy.891 As the Federal court stated in 
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs:
892
  
 
The function of the Tribunal is… an administrative one. It is to review the administrative 
decision that is under attack before it. In that review, the Tribunal is not restricted to 
consideration of the questions which are relevant to a judicial determination of whether a 
discretionary power allowed by statute has been validly exercised. Except in a case where only 
one decision can lawfully be made, it is not ordinarily part of the function of a court either to 
determine what decision should have been made in the exercise of an administrative discretion in 
a given case or, where a decision has been lawfully been made in pursuance of a permissible 
policy, to adjudicate upon the merits of the decision or the propriety of the policy. That is 
primarily an administrative rather than a judicial function. It is the function which has been 
entrusted to the Tribunal… Even in a case, such as the present where the legislation under which 
the relevant decision was made fails to specify the particular criteria or considerations which are 
relevant to the decision, the Tribunal is not, however, at large. In its proceedings, it is obliged to 
act judicially, that is to say, with judicial fairness and detachment.  
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The distinguishing characteristic of ‗judicial fairness and detachment‘ has been variously 
considered and expressed in relation to administrative tribunals, although the need for 
consistency and predictability, equal treatment, reason, and impartiality in the ‗judicial mind‘ 
remain good guides.
893
 In the model sense, however, the judicial approach also requires 
identification and application of a standard, a form of measure, as distinct from the uncontrolled 
or ‗free‘ exercise of discretion.894 Administrative justice is a complex, even opaque, fusion, 
therefore falling somewhere in between.
895
 Minimal standards will tend to be adherence to fair 
procedure and simple intra vires requirements. Speaking extra-curially in respect of 
administrative review, Chief Justice Gleeson, as he then was, posited that ‗References to the 
judicial method are usually intended to embrace the requirements of procedural fairness, the 
openness of procedure, and giving of reasons for decisions.‘896 Significantly, His Honour also 
made the point that what may be required of the judicial approach in the supply of 
administrative justice is not static. Regarding the AAT, he commented: ‗The Tribunal is not 
bound to the judicial model as it existed in 1975.‘897 Necessarily, what is meant by incorporation 
of judicial method into administrative decision-making evolves as the judicial method and 
expectations of it also evolve. This will reflect the strengthening and development of ‗public 
law values‘ in administration and government generally, including judicial administration.898  
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9.2 University Discretion and Administrative Justice: Creeping ‘Judicialisation’ of 
University Affairs? 
 
As I have noted in Chapter 3, universities are at law administrative bodies. Notwithstanding the 
‗long march‘ of the ethic of consumerisation899 and the market900 in higher education, from the 
perspective of the ‗legal order,‘ the public law model remains the appropriate framework by 
which to scrutinise university administration.
901
 In the intervening decades subsequent to Ex 
parte McFadyen,
902
 the ‗very wide discretion‘903 of university action has been progressively 
constrained and/or codified by statutory means as well as by judicial controls. I have noted the 
breadth, complexity and content of legal controls in the student-university relationship in earlier 
chapters. The growth of sectoral legislative and administrative controls over university action in 
the past two decades, particularly relate to the ‗marketisation‘ program post-1988, together with 
the additional, complicating and ‗collateral‘ involvement of universities in immigration 
regulation via the ESOS Act. Administrative justice, in the form of merits review, only 
marginally enters into higher education law. 
 
If the public university is an administrative body, possessing discretion over matters such as 
admissions, academic performance, discipline, academic programs and research, and 
institutional administration and governance, its ‗peculiarity‘ may be explained by the 
exceptional nature of the corporation: the eleemosynary body, its purposes ad studendum et 
orandum,
904
 and its traditional and legal origins in self-government and public benefit. The 
exercise of discretion in the university, in respect of students and the ‗domestic‘ jurisdiction, is 
aimed at the provision of higher learning and engagement in research. Other basic objectives 
may be included in governing legislation, such as service to a particular region.  
 
Statutory interventions over the past two decades have served to regulate how this corporate 
machinery functions and organises itself. Likewise judicial intervention has served to temper 
and constrain university discretion, consistent with notions of individualised justice. Remarking 
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on the tension of fairness and managerialism in the higher education sector, Helen Fleming 
writes:
905
   
 
The vast majority of decisions in universities are made without resort to a formal process. 
Nevertheless, it is important, whether one subscribes to managerialism or not, to ensure that 
there are sufficient safeguards against excessive or wrongful decision-making. 
 
The university‘s wide powers to achieve its purposes encompass many classes of decision-
making, ranging from academic decisions to application for residential tenancies, fee-setting, 
letting of contracts and purchase of goods and services. Not all decision-making will be affected 
by a propensity for individualised modes of justice to be taken in to account in the exercise of 
power or authority, let alone that ‗judicialised‘ methods will be required in addition to expertise 
and/or expedience. Yet in respect of certain key areas of university action, involving students, 
some scope of ‗judicial fairness and detachment‘ will be required. That is to say, 
paradigmatically, administrative justice has crept into various forms of university action, to 
greater or lesser degrees. I will consider some of these briefly before embarking on discussion 
of how, or indeed whether, administrative justice is, on the available evidence, being delivered 
in respect of the discipline of students.  
 
9.2.1 Academic Decision-Making 
 
The exercise of an academic judgement is central to the university. The special character of 
universities owes a considerable amount to this particular content of discretion. This content is 
indivisible from the eleemosynary character of the university.
906
 Does the individualised, 
‗judicial‘ model of justice apply to this basic institutional exercise of academic judgement? 
Academic decision-making covers a range of circumstances, including undergraduate 
assessment, postgraduate thesis examination, and peer-review in research. The second and third 
examples may be more extended, rigorous and specialised exercises, while the former may 
combine both elements of professional judgement and mass decision-making.  
 
Surely, the specialist (if not esoteric) and ‗domestic‘ nature of decision-making places academic 
assessment outside of the scope of judicial or adjudicative methods! Galligan would suggest, 
‗not necessarily.‘ In considering the application of the hearing principle to ‗professional 
judgements,‘ he argues: ‗We may start with the proposition that the hearing principle should 
apply to processes based on professional standards in the same way it applies to standard 
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adjudication.‘907 The structure of professional judgment is not intrinsically antithetical to a 
wider notion of adjudication. On the contrary,  
 
…let us be clear that a professional judgement has the same elements, the same structure, as any 
other practical judgement, facts, standards, and the application of standards to the facts. It differs 
only in the nature of the standards, of it is the standards and their application which invoke 
expert knowledge. The danger to be guarded against is that the element of expert knowledge will 
overshadow other elements of the judgement and so that the whole appears impervious to 
scrutiny.
908
 
 
Arguably, the specialist nature of academic decision-making is, comparable to other forms of 
professional judgement, the appropriate balancing of the application of a professional or ‗higher 
order‘ body of knowledge, with the conduct and procedure of adjudication itself.  
 
If we may consider academic judgement as a form of primary decision-making – distinguishable 
from a circumstances in which academic expertise is supplied as form of opinion (as in the 
provision of expert evidence) – what adjudicative principles and methods might apply? What 
does justice require? Are notice, disclosure and hearing required?  
 
As Kirby J noted in Tang,
909
  
 
An appeal to ‗academic judgment‘ does not smother the duties of a university, like any other 
statutory body, to exhibit, in such cases, the basic requirements of procedural fairness implicit in 
their creation by public statute and receipt of public funds from the pockets of the people. 
 
Academic discretion does not absolve university decision-makers of a duty to observe certain 
tenets of justice, in particular in the conduct of academic judgement.  
 
There is a long history of ‗immunity‘ of academic decisions from interference by formal, curial 
justice. Sedley LJ in Clarke puts this type of decision in the same category as ‗religious or 
aesthetic questions.‘910 Until recently the rule at law was one of strict non-interference in 
anything that concerned academic judgement. This rule was famously stated by Diplock LJ in 
Thorne v University of London.
911
 In more recent times, performance of academic judgement 
has been qualified by interference in those decisions on grounds of unfairness and impropriety. 
The scope of ‗immunity‘ has narrowed, although ‗deference‘ to academic decision-makers tends 
to differ between North American, and UK and Australian jurisdictions.
912
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Procedural fairness has been crafted to the exercise of academic discretion in respect of the 
criterion of impartiality rather than the right to be heard. Unreasonableness or irrationality, such 
as in the form of irrelevant considerations, may also jeopardise an academic decision. Thus, in R 
v Universities Funding Council, ex parte Institute for Dental Surgery,
 
Sedley LJ held:
913
   
 
We would hold that where what is sought to be impugned is on the evidence no more than an 
informed exercise of academic judgment, fairness alone will not require reasons to be given. 
This is not to say for a moment that academic decisions are beyond challenge. A mark, for 
example, awarded at an examiners' meeting where irrelevant and damaging personal factors have 
been allowed to enter into the evaluation of a candidate's written paper is something more than 
an informed exercise of academic judgment. Where evidence shows that something extraneous 
has entered into the process of academic judgment, one of two results may follow depending on 
the nature of the fault: either the decision will fall without more, or the court may require reasons 
to be given, so that the decision can either be seen to be sound or can be seen or (absent reasons) 
be inferred to be flawed. But purely academic judgments, in our view, will as a rule not be in the 
class of case, exemplified (though by no means exhausted) by Doody,
914
 where the nature and 
impact of the decision itself call for reasons as a routine aspect of procedural fairness. They will 
be in the Cunningham
915
 class, where some trigger factor is required to show that, in the 
circumstances of the particular decision, fairness calls for reasons to be given. 
 
In the context of the Institute for Dental Surgery case, a court may scrutinise academic 
decisions for matters ‗extraneous‘ to the ‗informed exercise of academic judgment.‘ Justice may 
require the giving of reasons. Only a few years later, Sedley LJ left open potential to widen the 
grounds on which intervention may occur to ‗exercises of academic judgement, which though 
never patently aberrant, are nevertheless of sufficient importance to the individual to require that 
reasons be given for them.‘916 R v University of Portsmouth, ex parte Lakareber917 is authority 
for the further notion that decisions of academic judgement also need to be intra vires university 
regulations, or, that is, accord substantive as well as procedural fairness.
918
  Issues of bias or 
irrationality will, nevertheless, be distinguishable from disagreements over standards and the 
competence of academic decision-makers,
919
 and impropriety will not extend to claims of 
unsatisfactory academic experiences and assistance.
920
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 See also R v Leeds Metropolitan University; ex parte Manders [1997] EWHC Admin 852, [9]. 
919
 R v Cranfield University Senate, ex parte Bashir [1999] EWCA Civ 995. 
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 Gajree v The Open University [2006] EWCA Civ 831, [27]:  
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Application of justice in these circumstances might be said to be the shaping or coloration of a 
specialised method of ‗adjudication.‘ Effectively, academic judgement is adjudication on 
knowledge, intellectual performance and competence, as distinct from the (judicial) adjudication 
on rights and duties. Both might be claimed to be ‗―artificial‖ methods of thought employed by 
all who have to make sound judgements… The reasoning on which the judgement is to be 
formed becomes, as we say, impersonal.‘921 It is not especially surprising, in this light, that 
academic and judicial approaches to decision-making should coincide, if momentarily, on the 
exercise of the ‗technique of impartial [and rational] thought.‘922 The question of a right to be 
heard, as a function of administrative justice, is entirely less relevant in a context where 
academic adjudication inherently requires the student to ‗argue‘ their ‗case‘ for competence or 
learning by way of participation in the process of examination or assessment.
923
  
 
9.2.2 Academic progress 
 
We have also noted elsewhere that a further area in which forms of judicial method have 
evolved in the exercise of university powers is the restriction, exclusion or other interference 
with a student‘s enrolment (or status) on grounds of poor academic performance. Again, these 
tendencies to the control of university action have originated in courts and extension of common 
law principles over those institutions. The capacity of institutions to dismiss or otherwise affect 
students‘ enrolments on these grounds has been clear in Australian law since it was held in Ex 
parte Forster
924
 that  
 
It is essential to the proper performance by a university of its functions that it maintain and insist 
upon high standards of scholarship… It is difficult to conceive of an institution‘s being given the 
title of a university which has not power, amongst other things, to preclude or defer the further 
participation in a course of study a student whose past performance in that course has repeatedly 
proved unsatisfactory. 
 
Since Ex parte Roffey,
925
 it has been held a legal requirement that in such circumstances 
rudimentary justice applies. The content of the rules of fair procedure in these circumstances 
may be lower than for disciplinary action, in particular that there is no necessary requirement for 
an oral hearing. 
                                                                                                                           
Whether indeed one looks upon the complaint as being a marking complaint, as I have indicated it properly 
could be, or whether one looks on the complaint as going to a matter of allowing time for the re-submission 
of Miss Gajree's claim form, or whether one considers that the complaint goes, as it does at times, into a 
complaint as to adequate educational assistance from the old or the new tutor, and so forth, these are all it 
seems to me essentially complaints about academic matters: marking, course work allowance, educational 
assistance. As such, it seems to me that they are not a proper basis for judicial review. 
921
 Robson Justice and Administrative Law, 386-7. 
922
 Robson Justice and Administrative Law, 383-8. 
923
 Compare Ivins v Griffith University [2001] QCA 393, 8. 
924
 (1963) SR (NSW) 723, 728. 
925
 R v Aston University Senate, ex parte Roffey (1969) 2 QB 538. 
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9.2.3 Admissions 
 
Admission to university courses has been the subject of litigation before Australian courts,
926
 
and the principles at law that have tended to flow from such actions reinforce the notion that 
universities have a duty to maintain appropriate standards of scholarship, including through 
administrative controls on entry to university courses.
927
 Additionally, in dispute over questions 
of admission, courts are reluctant to make executive orders in respect of universities.
928
 At this 
point of the administrative cycle an applicant for admission to a university has no
929
 (or 
uncertain
930) status, and therefore there is much less in the form of ‗interests‘ to compel or direct 
the nature of the procedure institutions ought, or might, adopt in dealing with applications. 
Complaints mechanisms required of universities under the Higher Education Support Act do, 
however, oblige institutions to have some method of handling disputes arising from admissions 
decisions.
931
 Indeed, applications for admission will be commonly questions of ‗routine‘ 
administration.
932
 Primary decisions as to admission, where they are administered within the 
universities own rules and contain no factors that may enliven other sources of law,
933
 include 
no requirement for decision-making to be qualified by ‗judicial‘ principles of fair treatment.  
 
9.2.4 Complaints 
 
The scope of university decisions that may the subject of complaints, appeal, or disputes is 
extensive, and, by authority of higher education legislation, encompasses both academic and 
                                           
926
 See eg R v University of Sydney, ex parte Drummond [1943] HCA 11; (1943) 67 CLR 95; Harding v 
University of New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 325. 
927
 Harding v University of New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 325, [79].  
928
 Harding v University of New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 325, [96]. 
929
 See eg Deakin University Statute 05.01 - Admission Selection And Enrolment, ss 4-5: ‘A person who is 
eligible for admission to the University and has been selected into a course may enrol in that course 
leading to an award of the University… A person who is permitted to enrol for a course shall, upon 
enrolment, become a student of the University.‘ 
930
 Visitorial jurisdiction, it has been held, by contrast, extends to disputes concerning question of 
membership: Patel v University of Bradford Senate [1978] 1 WLR 1488. 
931
 Higher Education Support Act 2003 (Cth), subs 19-45(1): ‗A higher education provider must have: (a) 
a grievance procedure for dealing with complaints by the provider‘s students, and persons seeking to 
enrol in courses of study with the provider, relating to non-academic matters…‘ 
932
 See Galligan‘s distinction of ‗routine administration‘ from decision-making involving adjudication or 
policy-based discretion: Galligan Due Process and Fair Procedures, 235-236. This is not to diminish the 
fact that there will be cases where the exercise of academic judgement will be required in respect of 
applications for certain courses. See for example, Deakin University Selection to Undergraduate Awards 
(Higher Education – Procedure), para 7:  
Course selection committees will determine the level of performance, based on faculty rules of selection 
approved by the Academic Board, that enables a non-school leaver‘s academic merit to be compared with 
the ENTER score and conditions by which school leaver applicants have been ranked. Course selection 
committees will apply these equivalent performance standards to all eligible non-school leaver applicants to 
form a final rank order of all applicants. 
There is no sense in these rules that, although provision for interview may exist, they are in any respect 
quasi-judicial in their character, or require policy (political or legislative) decisions.  
933
 Such as, for example, unlawful discrimination. 
   200 
non-academic decisions.
934
 To that end, scope for potential redress is, under statutory schema, 
wider for Australian higher education students than for their UK counterparts. Australian higher 
education providers must have complaints and review mechanisms, including means of external 
review. Statutory requirements under higher education legislation do not specify or mandate the 
nature of procedure for resolving disputes or reviewing decisions. However, it is worth bearing 
in mind that deference and regard given to university decision-making by the courts typically 
include a requirement that a dispute between a student and university will not be entertained 
until internal procedures of complaint and/or appeal have been used and/or exhausted.
935
 This 
principle arguably raises the stakes for the significance of ‗internal review,‘ although it does not 
necessarily impose any particular standard on the manner in which such review ought to be 
conducted.  
 
Leaving aside appeals from disciplinary decisions, sources of complaint may include decisions 
on academic judgement or examination, academic performance, admissions, the administration 
of supervision or academic programs, fees, housing, student organisations or allegations of 
discrimination. Kamvounias and Varnham
936
 identify three broad categories of complaint by 
students in universities (in the consumerised university): representations prior to enrolment, 
quality of education, and adverse decision-making. The legal standard of procedural fairness to 
which a student is entitled in disciplinary cases is unsettled and likely variable according to the 
specific circumstances. It is unlikely that what is required in the standard of treatment of non-
disciplinary complaints would be higher. Indeed, ‗judicial‘ treatment beyond an impartial 
approach and proper adherence to the rules (observation of procedural and substantive fairness 
respectively) may be unwarranted in some circumstances of internal review; in other 
circumstances, a form of hearing, not necessarily oral, will be the correct approach.
937
  
 
Complaints in universities have led to debate over the merits of Ombudsman in individual 
institutions and sector-wide,
938
 as well as a growing propensity for such offices to be established 
in universities.
939
 The investigative function of the ombudsman model may lend itself to 
institutional preference for this approach over the use of tribunal models, with greater 
                                           
934
 Higher Education Support Act 2003 (Cth), s 19-45; see Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.4, above. 
935
 R v Dunsheath; ex parte Meredith [1951] 1 KB 127; Harelkin v University of Regina (1979) 2 SCR 
561. 
936
 Kamvounias and Varnham ‗Getting What They Paid For: Consumer Rights for Students in Higher 
Education‘, 309. 
937
 Compare Ivins v Griffith University [2001] QSC 86, [42]. 
938
 Consider, for example, the debate over the role of the Ombudsman in the Ogawa saga at the University 
of Melbourne: Megumi Ogawa ‗University Grievance Handling for Overseas Students: ESOS Act and the 
National Code‘ (2003) 10 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 3 162; Professor A D Gilbert 
‗Response from the University of Melbourne‘ (2003) 11 Australian  Journal of Administrative Law 44; 
Ogawa v Secretary, Department of Education, Science and Training  (2005) FCA 1472. 
939
 See eg Anita Stuhmcke ‗Grievance Handling in Australian Universities: The Case of the University 
Ombudsman and the Dean of Students‘ (2001) 23 Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management 
2. 
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adversarial features. In any case, ‗judicial‘ standards necessary for the execution of ‗fair 
treatment‘ will broadly be similar, depending on the precise circumstances of complaint or 
grievance. The standards of justice in such circumstances will function independently of the 
specific ‗machinery‘ of justice used. Further, it is likely that in many internal complaint 
handling jurisdictions, including disciplinary complaints against students,
940
 forms of 
‗alternative dispute resolution,‘ such as mediation, are integrated into procedures, prior to any 
kind of formal hearing.  
 
9.2.5 Legislative Action 
 
Primary university statutes consist of broad enabling legislation. Universities have wide powers 
for enacting secondary legislation for the regulation of internal affairs, including for domestic 
and academic affairs, as well as for corporate administration or ancillary activities. These 
legislative powers may take the form of by-laws, ‗statutes,‘ ‗regulation,‘ or ‗rules,‘ and the 
capacity for academic self-regulation is fundamental to the raison d’etre of the university. The 
university attains the status of a ‗political community,‘ as well as a corporation, and the analogy 
has been drawn between the university and the municipal community.
941
  
 
The boundary between legislative action and administrative action is not without some 
ambiguity. However, legislative action may be understood as ‗action in general, in that it is 
directed towards a class rather than towards a particular individual, and that it is policy-based, in 
the sense that it moves upon wider considerations of the public good rather than upon any 
factors specifically referrable to a given person.‘942 Craven additionally argues that these are 
substantive characteristics of legislative action, and, while most often statutory in form, may 
also apply to the use of discretionary powers.
943
  
 
                                           
940
 Compare, eg, Julia Pedley and Virginia Goldblatt ‗The Development Of A Student Contract And 
Improvement In Student Disciplinary Procedures At Massey University (2007) 12 Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Law and Education 1 73, 79:  
In line with the intention of seeking informal resolution wherever possible to complaints of misconduct, it 
is to be noted that, provided that at all times the requirements of natural justice are observed, all decision-
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mediate, or the mediation is unsuccessful is the matter referred back to the relevant body for resolution by 
other means.  
941
 For example, in Kerr The Uses of the University. 
942
 Greg Craven ‗Legislative Action by Subordinate Authorities and the Requirement of a Fair Hearing‘ 
(1988) 16 Melbourne University Law Review 3 569, 572. 
943
 Craven ‗Legislative Action by Subordinate Authorities and the Requirement of a Fair Hearing‘, 572-3. 
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Enactment of secondary legislation will not as a rule attract common law obligations of 
procedural fairness,
944
 and to that extent university ‗legislators‘ will not be required to ‗hear‘ 
affected parties in making, for example, decisions in fee-setting or changes to academic 
programs. Typically, these decisions would affect thousands of students and staff. Statutory 
schemes governing enactment and operation of secondary legislation may contain provisions for 
‗consultation‘ or forms of public participation in rule-making by governmental bodies, yet it is 
not necessarily the case that these schema encompass university rule-making. Consultation 
mechanisms in the case of statutory rule-making are viewed, however, as consistent with, if not 
analogous to, standards of justice embodied in the procedural fairness doctrine.
945
 Statutory 
requirements for participation or ‗hearing‘ vary across jurisdictions. For example, the 
Subordinate Legislation Act 1989 (NSW) expressly exempts universities from the statutory 
framework governing subordinate legislation.
946
 In Victoria, the Subordinate Legislation Act 
1994 provides for ‗guidelines‘ for consultation947 although university rules do not fall within the 
ambit of ‗statutory rules‘ under that enactment.948 In South Australia university rule-making is 
susceptible to the Subordinate Legislation Act 1978
949
 but consultation is not required under that 
legislation. In Queensland, by contrast, university legislative activity is susceptible to the 
Statutory Instruments Act 1992,
950
 and by s 45 of that Act a form of notification and 
consultation is required. Aside from issues of procedural fairness, university rule-making, as 
with delegated legislation generally, remains susceptible to judicial review on questions of 
substantive fairness, that is where legislative conduct departs sufficiently from the provisions of 
the primary statute as to be beyond power, improper or unreasonable.
951
 An arguable example of 
this sort of departure from governing legislation might occur in respect of the rules regulating 
the conduct of students off-campus.
952
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 ed, 
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9.3 Administrative Justice, the University and Discipline: Restating the Key Findings 
 
The practical application of administrative justice to disciplinary decision-making affecting 
university students has been the primary object of this study. Justice, in this sense, has been the 
main variable in investigating and assessing the quality of this decision-making in the exercise 
of disciplinary powers, and, more specifically, quality has been measured principally against the 
legal standard of procedural fairness. Other standards of legality have emerged as relevant in the 
course of the research. The focus on disciplinary decision-making arose because this form of 
institutional action is relatively formalised and structured and there are clear lines of application 
of the rules of natural justice to this form of action.  
 
The policy environment in which Australian universities have historically operated has been 
influenced by instrumental as well as cultural motivations on the part of governments. Over the 
past two decades, reconstitution of the university as an instrument of government policy has 
been explicit, and the prevailing trend has been toward use of the university as an extension of 
economic policy. Consequently, human capital theory has played a major role in higher 
education policy. Governments and higher education institutions themselves have fostered 
commercialised modes of behaviour (both institutional and individual). Among the key features 
of this operating context are the dominance of market or ‗quasi-market‘ relations on a range of 
levels, including between the university and student; the rise of new student subjectivities, 
dispositions and behaviours; and an internal ‗developmental‘ dialectic, leading to relative 
austerity in ‗core‘ pedagogical areas. Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests a rise in the 
significance of administrative-rational or bureaucratic modes of operation in the university. This 
development supports a hypothesis that forms and methods of ‗administrative government‘ have 
become more important and central to the operation of higher education.  
 
Given this policy context, I have considered the nature and function of student disciplinary 
action as an exercise of institutional power. Having regard to the domestic nature of the 
university‘s disciplinary jurisdiction, and the complex public-private legal context in which it 
operates, administration of university discipline over students has two primary purposes: the 
protection of internal order, and the ‗protection‘ of academic standards. The latter purpose has, 
arguably, become the preponderant focus of disciplinary action in contemporary times. The 
process of disciplinary action and the operation of disciplinary codes (either by statutory 
instrument or contractual terms, or both) include frameworks for the protection of people and 
property and codes of academic behaviour. The content of those codes may vary across 
institutions, although the broad framework will be constant, and at the margins the behaviours 
against which disciplinary powers are deployed may not be entirely settled. I have noted that the 
key disciplinary concept of plagiarism falls within this category of unsettled norms.  
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Disciplinary action by universities is a clear example in which individualised justice, in the form 
of fair treatment, is directly applicable, and attracts a broad complement of procedural 
protections. Other tenets of ‗administrative justice‘ arise, such as in the role of internal review 
of primary decisions, or of external review, such as by State of Federal Ombudsman or by other 
means. The question of external review of university decisions is, however, not easily 
‗navigable.‘ The exercise of disciplinary powers, in addition, has evolved in the context of rules 
expressly designed to account for the requirements of justice – most notably, procedural justice 
– which the courts have progressively imposed on the universities. Given these ‗judicial 
controls,‘ disciplinary rules and practices are particularly amenable to scrutiny for procedural 
justice.  
 
9.3.1 Rates and Forms of Disciplinary Action 
 
Information regarding volumes of disciplinary action by universities against students is patchy, 
and when read in terms of estimates of student misconduct it might be considered perplexing. 
The literature suggests high rates of transgression, especially in regards to academic misconduct 
(plagiarism, cheating, etc). Research on complaints and litigation suggests actions involving 
discipline or misconduct lie at 10% or less of university cases dealt with by the courts and 
tribunals and the OIA in the UK,
953
 and affect a small fraction of students in the university. 
These data are indirect and representative estimates of the volume of actual discipline cases 
handled by universities. They do not seek to quantify directly the number of discipline cases, 
but they do provide an indication of the actual caseload. These figures do suggest that the rate of 
disciplinary action is a fraction of the estimated rate of misconduct.  
 
Quantitative information on actual disciplinary proceedings was collected for the present 
research project. It poses rates of investigation and ‗prosecution‘ of misconduct that is even 
smaller than for other (indirect) samples. Collection of statistical information for this 
investigation places the figure of disciplinary action at a little under 1% of students in the 
universities surveyed. The overwhelming majority of these cases concern academic misconduct, 
with plagiarism being the single most prevalent (mis)behaviour of that category. Measured 
against estimates of student misconduct in the sector, the rate of disciplinary action is 
negligible. This correlation confirms the impression that overwhelmingly most student 
misconduct is undetected or unchallenged.  
 
Having said that, I would submit that the rate of formal disciplinary action is significant. In 
absolute terms, these figures amounted to more than 1600 instances of formal student 
                                           
953
 Chapter 5, section 5.3, above.  
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disciplinary action in the sample year (2006) at those institutions surveyed. Generalising these 
figures, it could be estimated that over 9,000 higher education students faced disciplinary action 
across Australia in that year. This volume of cases amounts not only to a substantial 
administrative burden on the universities but potentially many individuals sanctioned and 
careers jeopardised. Further, de Lambert et al‘s study954 of discipline in New Zealand tertiary 
institutions suggests that informal (and possibly illegal) disciplinary action taken by institutional 
staff or officers runs at a rate considerable higher than formal action. For whatever reason, if 
informal action and/or sanction (whatever its precise nature) were being applied in Australian 
universities at similar rates, students affected by some form of disciplinary intervention would 
run into the tens of thousands.  
 
9.3.2University Discipline, Law and Practice 
 
University discipline falls squarely within the institution‘s ‗domestic‘ or internal jurisdiction, 
which, as I have noted,
955
 has recently been the subject of legal reform both in Australia and the 
UK. It has clearly come to pass, as Professor Wade envisaged,
956
 that the ‗paraphernalia‘ of 
administrative law has been imported into the student-university relationship, and that in 
addition principles of contract law and tort have achieved refinement in student cases since the 
1990s.  
 
It is established law that in discipline cases universities are required to observe procedural 
fairness, and indeed that the standards required clearly import the ‗judicial‘ framework of a fair 
and impartial hearing. Summary or urgent action represents a limited exception to this rule. 
What precisely is required for fairness to be accorded, or what may be required be way of 
‗judicialisation‘ of procedure, is less certain. In Griffith University v Tang, the opportunity for 
the content of the rules of natural justice to be tested in a student case, before an Australian 
superior court, was never taken. Case law deriving from international superior courts supports a 
range of possible approaches, from proceedings analogous to trial to administrative adjudication 
absent any comparison to a lis inter partes.  
 
In principle, this spectrum of approaches is explicable given the variety of circumstances and 
allegations that may potentially arise under the aegis of university discipline. I have explored 
some of these above, ranging from minor transgressions and competent ‗defendants‘ to serious 
allegations against unrepresented (and confused) parties facing serious and lasting 
consequences. It would generally be the case, however, that disciplinary cases will be treated 
with more gravity than, for instance, academic disputes, and the minimum threshold of 
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 Chapter 3, subsections 3.3.4-3.3.5. 
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protections – the ‗bedrock safeguards‘ – available in discipline cases will include notice and the 
opportunity for an oral hearing. In many cases, fairness would require more. Unfortunately, 
there is evidence from the present investigations that in some instances even these basic 
standards are not being met satisfactorily.  
 
Applicability of the requirement for impartiality in decision-making may seem to be less 
problematic than the precise permutations and combinations of fair hearing procedures. For 
example, there is nothing in the way of ‗policy‘ decisions to be made. Yet allegations of bias do 
arise in judicial review applications to the courts. The more significant practical questions that 
emerge are the ‗village‘ atmosphere of university associations and insufficient appearance of 
‗independence‘ (a potential problem of ‗domestic‘ jurisdictions generally), and decision-
makers‘ use of their own expert knowledge in the conduct of investigations. Yet, as we have 
seen (and discuss below), issues of a failure to act impartially go further than these instances.  
 
9.3.2.1 Fairness and Rules 
 
The few empirical studies undertaken on university discipline interrogate disciplinary rules and 
written procedures, subjecting them to scrutiny against standards of procedural fairness (‗due 
process‘) at law. One component of my investigation sought to reproduce this research method, 
comparing rules at selected Australian universities against those legal norms. Having regard to 
differences in scale and context, this aspect of the research produced similar findings to the 
more recent US research, in particular that basic procedural protections are generally met in 
university rules. These include a right to be heard and receive notice. It may be of concern that, 
in regard to basic rights such as receipt of particulars and access to all evidence to be relied 
upon, that the selected rules are not universal in providing express entitlements. Yet, other 
procedural features that may be important, even critical, for students in university hearings, may 
not be available or may be circumscribed. I refer notably to rights to representation, cross-
examination in some circumstances, the provision of reasons, and internal review rights. Sector-
wide, there is ambivalence over providing these procedural features as of right.  
 
9.3.2.2 Fairness and Practice 
 
Analysis of discipline files and interviews with student advocates gave insight into university 
practice in disciplinary matters. The problem of higher education institutions affording 
procedural fairness as a matter of practice has received little attention in research literature, 
although it has been emphasised by one specialist body commonly dealing with such issues, the 
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UK Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education.
957
  I included express 
interrogation of key features of procedural fairness in regards to both of the above ‗data sources‘ 
(cases and interviews) precisely as a means of comparing and contrasting the results within each 
information source as well as with the results of the survey of rules. In each empirical study, 
there is no straightforward correlation of institutions investigated: there is, however, overlap. 
Consider the fundamental question of a right to a (oral) hearing. Evidence from all three studies 
supports the proposition that the right to be heard is universally observed in university discipline 
action. Subsequently, consider the equally basic entitlement to notice, including satisfactory 
particulars and disclosure of all material that may be adverse to the student. In the rules, there is 
some slippage from universality of approach: requirement for written notice is universal in the 
rules, requirement for particulars applies in 87.5% (14/16) of institutions, requirement for 
disclosure is expressly stated in 62.5% (10/16) of institutions. Concerns over adequate notice 
become amplified once evidence from the case-files and interview are taking into consideration. 
All case-files at one university under examination exhibit a ‗systemic failure‘ (as I have 
described it) to particularise allegations satisfactorily. There are six cases that exhibit problems 
in respect of adequate and fair disclosure of information to the student. On the question of 
notice, slightly more than a third of student advocates described particulars as inadequate 
(proportionately higher than appears from the rules), and a slight majority of those considering 
this issue thought disclosure to be unsatisfactory. On both issues, then, poor practical 
performance in regards to these standards is reiterated at a higher rate by advocates than is 
discernable from the written rules. In general, of 16 case-files exhibiting prima facie some error 
of law, 9 of those cases (or just under one-quarter) suggested evidence of procedural unfairness.  
 
Investigation of case-files and advocates‘ experiences allowed analysis to go beyond the 
formality of rules and deal with how decision-making actually unfolded. This approach gave 
some insight into the ‗state of mind‘ of decision-makers, including on the question of ‗open-
mindedness‘ or impartiality.958 Absent a written record of proceedings, preferably in transcript 
form, it is challenging to make an assessment of bias in these domestic proceedings. Case files 
at one university did provide a good written record of tribunal proceedings and deliberation, and 
at the other investigated institution inferential evidence of the tribunal‘s approach was available 
in some cases. In all, seven cases (approximately 18%) exhibited evidence prima facie of a 
failure to observe satisfactorily the rule against bias. Add to this assessment the unease 
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 Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education Annual Report (2005), 9:  
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 Interestingly, in their study of university rules, Berger and Berger did ask, in their survey instrument to 
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explain a university answering negatively to this question, nearly 10% of surveyed institutions did answer 
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expressed by a number of student advocates regarding the impartiality of decision-makers, and 
there is a sense that systemically, if in a minority of cases, the conduct and/or thought-processes 
of disciplinary tribunals are in issue.  
 
The performance of university tribunals in respect of other aspects of procedure and practice is 
mixed. For example, I raise concerns regarding the testing of evidence before these tribunals, 
especially where official written claims are made by witnesses (eg exam invigilators) who are 
not subsequently subject to oral examination or cross-examination. No effort appears to be 
made to assess the weighting of evidence in these circumstances. On the question of the 
provision of written reasons, although not necessarily obligatory at common law, slightly more 
than 40% of surveyed universities provide for reasons in their rules. Written reasons are not 
provided (or required under the rules) in the case-file universities, and, on the information 
supplied by student advocates, provision of written reasons at least ‗occasionally‘ occurs in only 
around 30% of institutions. No information regarding the content or quality of those reasons 
was available. While on these procedural points universities do not appear to perform especially 
well, a marked and valuable departure from applicable standards in the written rules occurs in 
respect of representation. An inflexible approach to representation was manifest in the rules, yet 
in the experience of student advocates an effective right to representation by these non-legal 
staff operates in nearly all institutions where they work. If evidence on the case-files is anything 
to go by, representation by a ‗professional advocate,‘ if not lawyer, significantly improves the 
quality of submissions and the capacity of the student to negotiate the proceedings. It does not, 
however, necessarily affect outcomes. 
 
9.3.2.3 Disciplinary Practice and Other Forms of Legal Error 
 
While procedural fairness has been the central object of scrutiny in the empirical study, other 
issues of legality in disciplinary practice arose in the course of analysis, compounding, I would 
argue, patterns of shortcoming in the handling of disciplinary cases. These other areas of 
potential legal error are more or less complex, arguable or difficult to contend with by ‗hybrid‘ 
tribunals. For instance, the issue of jurisdictional fact arising in Chapter 7, turning of the 
definition of a student, may not be immediately obvious and may require relatively 
sophisticated analysis of fact and law to be resolved.  
 
In respect of obligations on an accuser or the tribunal itself to discharge the onus of proof 
against a student facing claims of misconduct, guidance in the case law is rather clearer (that the 
burden lies with the accuser). Notwithstanding this situation, half a dozen case-files contain 
                                                                                                                           
negatively. It is not clear in that study what precisely that response may have meant: Berger and Berger 
‗Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair Process for the University Student‘. 
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information that this rule was not applied or indeed that the onus of proof was reversed and 
placed on the student. This unfortunate state of affairs is repeated in the information supplied by 
student advocates, where only 5 of 13 (38%) respondents assert that the ‗persuasive burden‘ is 
placed on the accuser or complainant either unambiguously or occasionally. In the remainder of 
institutions, it is the perception of advocates that students bear the onus of persuading a 
decision-maker of their case.  
 
Additionally, in five case-files there is evidence that decision-makers failed satisfactorily to 
inquire into or examine the facts of cases before them, which likely contributed to adverse 
findings against students. While there is legal authority and commentary to the effect that 
inquisitorial bodies have a duty to make inquiries, the precise content of the rule is more open to 
debate. Nevertheless, it is inferred in several of these case-files that decision-makers either 
unreasonably limited their investigations and/or analytical faculties, or alternatively failed to 
extend their inquiries to where available evidence might reasonably be said to take them.  
 
9.3.2.4 The Administration of Discipline 
 
The administration of discipline was not a central focus of the empirical study, and, for instance, 
interview of tribunal members and/or administrators was not undertaken (primarily for practical 
reasons of access to these personnel). I have noted that it would be reasonable to assume that the 
numbers of cases proceeding annually requires significant administrative effort on the part of 
institutions and their internal bodies. No doubt the burden of this effort is exacerbated by a 
particular confluence of forces relevant to disciplinary case-handling. First, tribunals are 
typically comprised of middle managers (eg Heads of School, Deans) or internal, ‗lay‘ members 
drawn from the academic staff, who undertake these duties in addition to their primary teaching 
and research work. Second, workloads on academic staff generally have steadily increased in 
recent years, and administration constitutes a growing proportion of that workload. Disciplinary 
decision-makers, then, commonly find themselves in a role additional to their existing, primary 
duties, consistent with the ‗collegial‘ model of university administration. The ‗collegial‘ model 
of university ‗village community‘ has come under sustained challenge from corporate 
management models. An uneasy co-existence between the two models appears to be the present 
norm. On the question of the administration of discipline, to the extent that generalisation is 
possible, current arrangements lead to at least two immediate points of critique, which arise 
from the empirical research.  
 
In the first place, commonly no clear demarcation occurs between the investigation process and 
the adjudicative (or determinative) process, either in terms of bodies or personnel charged with 
these functions or in terms of discrete procedures and rules operative in these distinct situations. 
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I have noted parallels in reform to regulatory frameworks in the professions, where separation 
of these functions occurred as a departure from ‗peer review‘ practices. Such parallels need to 
be approached cautiously in the university setting. In some institutions, there have been attempts 
formally to separate the roles of investigator and adjudicator, for example, by instituting the role 
of ‗investigation officers.‘959 Also, some circumstances of complaint and disciplinary action 
against students may be sufficiently minor, or remedial, or undisputed, that the need for separate 
machinery of complaint and investigation is unwarranted and excessive. The case-files 
investigated support this notion of a range of gravity and complexity in discipline cases. In 
addition, it is not unusual for university discipline rules at present to provide for various 
thresholds in the seriousness of cases and/or discretions to be exercised on the part of decision-
makers to refer matters to more senior official or bodies.  
 
A second manifest problem with administration is evidence from student advocates of an 
inconsistent or ‗uneven‘ approach to discipline within institutions. Of those who discussed this 
issue, concern was almost universal. As I note in Chapter 8, variability of approach, especially 
between Faculties and/or Schools, and as regards competence, may be such as to render 
decision-making arbitrary or capricious, with standards dependent upon which organisational 
area is handling a case. Appeals processes appear to have some benefit in mitigating this 
variability.  
 
9.3.2.5 The Impact of Commercialisation Policies on University Discipline 
 
I would place the concept of commercialisation (or ‗marketisation‘) as a subset of the broader 
neo-liberal policy agenda in higher education, with the latter including changes to roles and 
subjectivities of internal actors and also crisis-affected patterns of resource distribution and 
development. Having said that, the boundaries between these phenomena are not clear-cut, and 
they are obviously inter-related. Dynamics of commercialisation and crisis came in for 
particular discussion in research with student advocates in Chapter 8. It was widely perceived 
by student advocates that commercialisation pressures in higher education had had an impact on 
disciplinary systems and processes.  
 
At its most general, the critique of commercialisation was that it had intensified a systemic 
tension between the role of disciplinary systems in the guarantee of academic standards and 
integrity, and imperatives for revenues derived from students‘ fees. This tension is most keenly 
expressed in relation to international students. Further tensions in terms of outcomes were 
noted, including polarised approaches by institutions (and within institutions) to the treatment of 
                                           
959
 Yet even here the parallel to independent investigators in the professions is ambiguous, as 
‗investigators‘ in university faculties or schools may have some determinative (decision-making) powers: 
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misconduct allegations and use of disciplinary mechanisms, ranging from a punitive, even 
indiscriminate, approach (including for reputational purposes) to an ‗educative‘ approach. 
Elsewhere, commercial pressures on university staff have led to failures in the proper handling 
of misconduct amounting to corruption.  
 
A climate of austerity affecting ‗core‘ functions of teaching and learning was also viewed as 
having an impact on the use of disciplinary processes, especially where declining academic 
standards lead to a disciplinary response. That is, there was evidence from interviewees that 
disciplinary controls are emerging as default instruments contending with symptoms of 
‗pedagogical crisis.‘ In some instances (I refer to the treatment of plagiarism cases in particular) 
disciplinary policy appears to be used as a form of academic ‗policing‘ of student conduct. It is 
also evident that disciplinary action is not uniformally ‗punitive.‘ Rather there is significant 
evidence from advocates that universities are also using disciplinary proceedings as an 
‗educative‘ instrument, presumably in less serious cases. Given ambiguities surrounding the 
concept of plagiarism, this is likely to be one area where an educative approach is employed.  
 
Interestingly, I would suggest that commercialisation, and neo-liberal policy more generally, 
has presented the university with a new problem in regards to the legitimacy of disciplinary 
processes. This problem arises not from practical shortcomings (or not solely) but rather from 
the principal object of disciplinary action in the contemporary period: the maintenance of 
academic standards and integrity. While even critical student advocates supported a role for 
discipline in regulating standards, the view expressed by one advocate that ‗no real useful role‘ 
exists for disciplinary mechanisms because of the failure of disciplinary systems to impact on 
standards or ‗integrity‘ in any meaningful way cannot be dismissed out of hand. Disparities 
between reported rates of academic ‗dishonesty‘ and disciplinary proceedings support, on their 
face, such a criticism. However, I would view that response as expressing the need for a more 
fundamental critique of policy within and outside of the university than merely a call for the 
abolition of the existing disciplinary machinery. A sentiment expressed by certain student 
advocates was that university policy and conduct, in so far as it is manifest through the 
operation of disciplinary action, has lost sight of basic educational purposes, or is at risk of 
doing so: ‗They‘ve got a different goal. The goal is no longer an educational one. It‘s… keeping 
people in seats…‘960 I submit that it is (re) orientation of disciplinary policy toward the 
fundamental educational purposes of the university – as a corollary of those objects – that must 
represent a basic measure of substantive justice. It may be that wider policy changes are 
required: indeed re-founding the confused and confusing relationship between student and 
institution, in law and educational-economic policy. That is a bigger project than the present 
                                                                                                                           
see University of Wollongong Rules for Student Conduct and Discipline 2006. 
960
 Interviewee R5, cited in Chapter 8, sub-section 8.8.5, above. 
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one. Nevertheless, there is scope for reform of disciplinary policy and procedure in the 
university sector that may achieve a greater semblance of ‗administrative justice‘ in university 
decision-making.  
 
9.4 Conclusions: Validating the Hypothesis of Poor or Problematic Decision-Making 
 
‗Administrative justice‘ found a foothold in the university decades ago. Its application has been 
widening incrementally since that time. In most major classes of decision-making affecting 
individual students account is taken not only of the exercise of discretion – the enrolment, 
assessment and graduation of students – but that that exercise occurs fairly. Disciplinary 
decision-making has been a province of university affairs particularly susceptible to the legal 
doctrine of fair procedure, given its essentially adjudicative character and close proximity, even 
in earlier times, to forms of judicial decision-making.  
 
Despite these developments, little empirical information has been available on disciplinary 
decision-making by universities. This research has indicated that rates of disciplinary action are 
low as a proportion of the student body, but that significant numbers of individuals are 
nevertheless affected by university discipline in absolute terms. The research reiterates or 
confirms that, based on existing estimates of misconduct by university students, recourse to 
formal disciplinary action by institutions occurs in only a small fraction of instances.  
 
A principal objective of this research was to consider the quality of decision-making in 
disciplinary cases, using adherence to the legal standard(s) of procedural fairness as the main 
criterion of quality. Reference to this standard may also be viewed as consistent with 
considering how well, how rigorously or effectively, a concept of ‗administrative justice‘ has 
been imported into the university. The initial hypothesis of the study was that the quality of such 
decision-making was poor or exhibited shortcomings. This hypothesis originally arose from the 
author‘s practical experience in the university sector. The key hypothetical questions asked: Is 
the quality of university decision-making in respect of student disciplinary decisionmaking 
satisfactory? If we equate quality with fairness, do universities as a general rule meet legal 
standards of fairness in their conduct, practice and procedure? Generally, the hypothesis has 
been shown to be correct on empirical investigation against a range of data sources, On the 
available evidence, shortcomings in fair treatment and good practice are systemic. If they do not 
represent dominant trends in institutional conduct or approach, instances of unfairness, poor 
practice and potential illegality are nevertheless recurrent across the sector and identified by 
varying research methods. They manifest patterns of institutional (administrative) weakness, 
requiring concerted attention. The alternative might be the growing expense of litigation, even if 
only in exceptional cases. It might be, for a considerable number of individuals, an injustice 
   213 
done to them. The status quo is likely to continue to contribute to the substantial administrative 
burden of the universities and, above all, its staff. The limitations highlighted in this research 
are not insurmountable. It would be beneficial for the logic of reform, notably in respect of 
disciplinary procedure and practice, to be visited upon the halls of academia. For the sake of a 
semblance of justice, as well as potential efficiencies for the universities, the point of departure 
for disciplinary decision-making should be that disciplinary bodies are modelled on the ordinary 
(administrative) tribunal system, attracting the norms and standards of administrative justice as 
are expected elsewhere in the public (and parts of the private) sector. Beyond that principle, 
precise models, rules and standards may be negotiable. It is to this general question of reform I 
now turn.  
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Chapter 10  
Toward a Reform Program for Disciplinary Decision-Making in the 
University 
 
From the perspective of standards and practice, the structure of university decision-making in 
respect of student discipline has a three-tiered arrangement: primary decision-making, internal 
appeal, and external review. While rates of internal appeal are, relatively speaking, quite high, 
and resort to external action is growing, overwhelmingly the exercise of disciplinary powers 
occurs at the level of the original ‗proceedings‘ and goes no further. By dint of sheer numbers 
therefore it is reasonable to assume that any focus on reform and improvement to the quality of 
decision-making ought to prioritise the conduct and rules of initial proceedings and perhaps the 
nature and operation of internal appeals. I begin with these issues. The question of external 
review mechanisms in the sector has been the subject of specific debate, and, subsequent to 
discussion on domestic affairs, I engage that debate more fully below.  
 
10.1 Fair Procedure 
 
In respect of the ‗bedrock‘ of procedural safeguards, as well as more arguable legal 
entitlements, universities generally are not exemplary decision-makers. Various areas in which 
observance of the rules of procedural fairness is wanting have been noted. As a matter of reform 
to rules and practice, I make the following proposals for ‗model‘ procedures. While certain 
proposals of reform impact on the primary disciplinary instrument (rules), it would be a matter 
of good practice that, in other respects, rules of procedure or conduct are more better contained 
in ‗guidelines‘ or supporting instruments. These documents would be intended to inform 
decision-makers about the correct or preferred approach and read in conjunction with the 
primary instrument. This is the practice of several institutions presently: for example, Monash 
University provides comprehensive ‗guidelines‘ in support of primary rules.  
 
10.1.1 Notice 
 
Problems arising in the provision of sufficient notice concentrate on particularisation of 
allegations or ‗charges,‘ and disclosure of all information likely to be adverse to the student. 
Clarification of the content of these rules ought to be provided in the primary rules. For 
instance, provision of particulars ought to incorporate the requirement for notice not only of the 
rule(s) allegedly breached but also allegations of fact, act or omission on the part of the student. 
Rules of disclosure ought to articulate the common law standard in general terms, while 
providing greater detail and clarification to decision-makers in supporting guidelines (including 
rules and prohibitions on ex parte contacts with decision-makers). Allegations of fact, action or 
omission ought to be made in respect of each rule allegedly breached.  
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10.1.2 Summary Action  
 
While duties of fairness are highly circumscribed in the context of urgent action, it is reasonable 
and appropriate for the rules to provide for limited mechanisms of appeal or review of such 
action, where it adversely affects a student‘s interests or may significantly prejudice their 
education. This type of provision operates, for example, in disciplinary rules at the University of 
Queensland and may be considered a relevant model. Additionally, supporting documents ought 
to provide a more thorough explanation of the purpose and rationale of summary disciplinary 
action, notably its intention to maintain a status quo prior to a fuller hearing of the matters at 
issue.  
 
10.1.3 Cross-examination 
 
The primary rules ought to establish clearly the institution‘s approach to the taking of oral 
evidence by witnesses or involved parties (eg staff bringing allegations) and the testing of their 
evidence where this is necessary and/or appropriate. In particular, provision is needed in the 
rules for an entitlement, if qualified, to cross-examination by a student or their representative. In 
addition, guidance will likely be needed for the conduct of cross-examination and possibly 
evidence-in-chief. It is foreseeable that there will be circumstances in which a student may want 
to confront or test the statements of a witness or another party, or it may be necessary to do so. 
These circumstances may be exceptional rather than the norm. 
 
The right to cross-examination may be crucial to a student‘s ability to make their case and 
contradict evidence from witnesses or other participants. It may be an extension of their right to 
a fair hearing.
961
 There is a further benefit in that procedure: it may provide a context of 
structured confrontation of statements adverse to the student, limiting the potential for 
uncontrolled antagonism in the hearing. Yet, the gravity, seriousness and formality of hearings 
will vary, ranging from informal proceedings in which ‗cross-examination‘ may extend only to 
clarification of facts presented by a complainant, to substantial adversarial procedure 
accommodating features of a trial. Similarly, I would propose that the rules anticipate the 
exercise of a range of approaches, with discretion vested in the chair to adopt an appropriate 
procedural model. If it is necessary, then there may be a case for preliminary hearing to resolve 
the appropriate approach to take, or this question may be dealt with in the substantive hearing. 
To that end, the range of procedural models ought to be specified or prescribed in additional 
guidelines, and these might include: cross-examination conducted by the student or his/her 
                                           
961
 See Healey v Memorial University of Newfoundland [1992] CanLII 2756 (NL SCTD). 
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representative consistent with the ordinary rules of evidence;
962
 examination by leave of the 
chair, perhaps providing an indication of the line of questioning to be pursued; questions or 
lines of questioning submitted to the Chair to be pursued by the tribunal (with or without written 
notice). In any case, a tribunal will be prohibited from restricting or limiting arbitrarily a line of 
questioning that is relevant to the proceedings. Whatever approach is adopted in general, or in 
any particular case, ‗it is desirable for decision-makers to adopt a conscious, coherent, and 
consistent procedural strategy.‘963 
 
It may be that the tribunal, or another relevant person, is required to assist an unrepresented 
student with the concept and/or conduct of cross-examination.
964
 Guidelines in this respect 
would properly be aside from the text of the primary rules. Finally, the rules ought to require the 
tribunal to put to the student directly, in circumstances where adverse oral evidence is heard 
against them, whether the student wishes to put questions to the witness, notwithstanding the 
precise procedural strategy adopted. 
 
The cross-examination issue raises other questions of the powers of university tribunals. First, 
university tribunals will typically lack statutory powers to compel witnesses to attend the 
hearing, be subject to cross-examination, or take evidence on oath. Strictly speaking, cross-
examination will only arise as an issue where a witness has given evidence already and a party, 
including a student (or their representative), wishes to deal with it. Yet other circumstances may 
arise where a student wishes a particular witness to be available to be examined and presumably 
this cannot be arranged privately by the student. Scrutinising the evidence of an exam 
invigilator may be such an example. Provisions for the request of a witness operate, for 
example, under the procedures of the Refugee Review Tribunal. Powers to direct students or 
staff to attend a hearing and give evidence might be instituted under the rules and be considered 
a reasonable direction operating under contract or delegated legislative powers of the university. 
It is common presently, by way of comparison, for the disciplinary rules to include as a breach 
or ‗offence‘ the failure to follow a reasonable direction of an authorised officer or staff member. 
Leaving these rather convoluted mechanics aside, where evidence – especially oral evidence – 
cannot be tested, or there is a refusal to allow it to be tested, this factor ought to be taken into 
account in determining its weight or persuasive value in the decision-making process.
965
 
 
                                           
962
 See eg Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), Division 5. 
963
 Aronson, Dyer and Groves Judicial Review of Administrative Action, [8.404]. 
964
 See Santamaria v Secretary to Department of Human Services [1998] VSC 107. 
965
 See Aronson, Dyer and Groves Judicial Review of Administrative Action, [8.395]; compare Forbes 
Justice in Tribunals, [12.96]: ‗An even simpler device would be to adopt a rule that often, if not always, 
an absence of cross-examination so reduces the weight of disputed evidence that it is ―irrational‖ to rely 
upon it.‘ It may not necessary to go this far, but guiding principles as to the weight of disputed evidence 
in such circumstances would be productive.  
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10.1.4 Representation 
 
I have been particularly critical above of restrictions placed upon students seeking to be 
represented. It was also noted that, in practice, many if not most universities permit a student to 
be represented at least by a non-legal specialist. Most commonly this assistance is provided by 
professional staff from the student organisation. Empirical literature on the effect of 
representation in administrative proceedings points to clear advantages for a complainant or 
affected persons in having representation.
966
 There are likely benefits to the decision-making 
body also.
967
 A right to representation in hearings must be balanced against the desire not to 
‗legalise‘ proceedings excessively. In these circumstances, it appears appropriate to provide a 
right to non-legal representation to students at first instance. It may be that the discretion to 
allow legal representation in hearings is provided on internal appeal, as there is a general drift to 
greater formality in the latter proceedings. Representation provided by non-legal advocates from 
student organisations, or internal services, would lead to a range of benefits: more specialised 
advice and support than arguably may come from lawyers, a lesser tendency to ‗legalise‘ 
proceedings, and lesser need by a decision-maker(s) to guide and assist a student through the 
process.  
 
10.1.5 Reasons 
 
As a matter of routine procedure (as distinct for example from rights to cross-examination), it 
may be that the most controversial duty that may be imposed on the disciplinary decision-maker 
will be a duty to give reasons. At the same time, for a range of reasons, this particular duty is 
critical to raising the standards and quality of decision-making. The controversy is likely to arise 
in relation to the burden imposed on decision-makers. An ulterior motive may be a desire to 
avoid transparency and scrutiny in decision-making. The latter can be dismissed as 
unacceptable, but the former issue needs to be taken seriously, especially where decision-
                                           
966
 Eg H Genn and Y Genn ‗Expectations And Experience Of Tribunal Hearings‘ in Denis Galligan (ed) A 
Reader on Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, 1996), 466-476. See also Cowan and Halliday 
The Appeals of Internal Review, 192-197 (emphasis added): ‗Our qualitative data about the conduct of 
internal reviews with the HPU suggests that legal representation makes a positive difference to 
applicant‘s chances of success. It certainly affects the way in which internal review is handled.‘ The 
Australian Law Reform Commission has found that in various AAT jurisdictions success rates for 
represented applicants is between 17.2% and 27.2% higher than for unrepresented applicants: Australian 
Law Reform Commission Part One: Empirical Information About The Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
(1999), cited in Roger Douglas Douglas and Jones’ Administrative Law (Federation Press, 5th ed, 2006), 
263. See also Australian Law Reform Commission The Unrepresented Party Adversarial Background 
Paper No. 4 (1996), 
 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/bp/4/unrepresented.html#4.Federaltribunals-
Theeffectofrepresentation (accessed 8 March 2009).  
967
 See eg Administrative Review Council Internal Review of Agency Decision-Making Report No. 44 
(2000), [4.13]-[4.14]: ‗The right to representation is of particular importance when the applicant is facing 
educational, language or cultural barriers or is disabled… The agency may also benefit by being able to 
deal with an experienced person with an understanding of the relevant legislation.‘ 
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makers are not ‗professional,‘ or at least they must combine this administrative activity with 
their ‗core‘ tasks of teaching, research or (in the case of student tribunal members) study. I make 
further comment on means of striking efficiencies in the work of disciplinary tribunals to 
accommodate the task of reasons-writing.  
 
I would submit that is no longer, if it was previously, satisfactory for university disciplinary 
tribunals not to provide properly reasoned decisions as a routine part of their decision-making. 
The value of written reasons has been dealt with elsewhere.
968
 Added to these philosophical and 
jurisprudential grounds for written reasons, there are more practical and legal considerations. I 
have noted previously the case-law under which, even at common law, provision of reasons 
may be required on bodies such as university tribunals (bearing in mind that the law remains 
that at common law an administrator is not generally required to provide reasons). Notably, this 
might occur where a decision appears ‗aberrant.‘ In addition, in Victoria at least, a student must 
be provided with written reasons for such a decision where they request them.
969
 Universities in 
that State must also supply reports under the Supreme Court‘s admissions rules documenting 
any instances in which law students have been investigated for, or found to have engaged in, 
academic misconduct.
970
 While not amounting necessarily to written reasons for disciplinary 
decisions, these rules add pressure for greater documentation and explanation of disciplinary 
actions and decisions. Finally, if a student aggrieved by a disciplinary decision subsequently 
takes action through an institution‘s grievance procedures, the student can receive, on request, 
reasons of the institution‘s decision under that procedure (not necessarily the discipline 
procedure directly).
971
 
 
Finally, the form and content of written reasons would need to be considered in the rules. 
Standards of written reasons in administrative decisions have been the subject of investigation 
elsewhere.
972
 I would note the construction of provisions under the relevant review jurisdictions 
in migration legislation as instructive. Sub-section 368(1) of the Migration Act 1958, for 
example, establishes relevant criteria for written reasons supplied by the Migration Review 
Tribunal: 
 
                                           
968
 See eg Galligan Due Process and Fair Procedures, 429-437; Flick ‗Administrative Adjudications and 
the Duty to Give Reasons‘, 17-20; Administrative Review Council Commentary on the Practical 
Guidelines for Preparing Statements of Reasons (2002), 2-6. 
969
 Administrative Law Act 1978 (Vic), s 8. 
970
 Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2008 (Vic), r 5.02(c)(v): see Chapter 4, sub-section 4.6.1, above 
971
 See Higher Education Provider Guidelines 2007 (Cth), ssub 4.5.5(h): The higher education provider 
must… h) give reasons and full explanation in writing for decisions and actions taken as part of the 
procedures, if requested by the complainant and/or respondent.‘ 
972
 Eg Administrative Review Council Practical Guidelines for Preparing Statements of Reasons (2002); 
Administrative Review Council Commentary on the Practical Guidelines for Preparing Statements of 
Reasons (2002). 
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(1) Where the Tribunal makes its decision on a review, the Tribunal must prepare a written 
statement that: 
(a) sets out the decision of the Tribunal on the review;  
(b) sets out the reasons for the decision;  
(c) sets out the findings on any material questions of fact; and  
(d) refers to the evidence or any other material on which the findings of fact were based.  
 
10.1.6 Appeal Rights 
 
Although unusual, access to (internal) appeal rights may be restricted or discretionary for 
students. The more substantial issue is the scope of appeal allowed from primary disciplinary 
decisions. Bearing in mind that rights of appeal are common practice in university discipline, 
the question of provision of an appeal mechanism per se is not especially at issue. If the 
procedure is to be supplied, perhaps the more pertinent question is: will it have the scope and 
capacity, if conducted properly, to ‗cure‘ any defect arising from a first instance hearing? 
Further to this question, the issue of policy is whether the scope of appeal rights is restricted to 
particular types of questions or ‗defects‘ – and therefore whether, by providing for prescribed 
grounds of appeal cognisable by an appeals body, the scope of appeal is effectively codified in 
the rules – or whether a student‘s right of appeal is unrestricted. In either situation, the appeals 
panel may proceed by a re-hearing de novo or by more limited action. From what can be gauged 
in the analysis of cases in Chapter 7, instances arise where the scope of questions under re-
examination may be problematic and disputed. Data from Chapter 5 indicates that rates of 
internal appeal are not insignificant, and evidence from all three chapters reporting empirical 
information suggests that the risk of error in decision-making at first instance is sufficiently 
great as to warrant as wide, comprehensive and thorough machinery of internal appeal as may 
be possible in the circumstances. In ordinary circumstances,
973
 therefore, broad scope for appeal 
appears preferable. The threshold of ‗standing‘ for an internal appeal ought to be, as for many 
administrative review jurisdictions, merely that a student is ‗aggrieved‘ by the primary decision.  
 
If ‗codification‘ of grounds of appeal is desirable, this action should only occur as a matter of 
guidance to students, in respect of the more common or likely circumstances leading to appeal 
(eg claims of denial of procedural fairness, misapplication of the rules, error of fact on the part 
of a primary decision-maker, or availability of new and relevant evidence).  
                                           
973
 There is also the question of whether some kind of recourse ought to be available in circumstances of 
summary or urgent action. Given that potential for error or abuse in such situations is arguably no less 
than for any other instance of the administration of discipline, it seems reasonable that a form of appeal 
might be available against summary decisions. Balance would need to be struck between controls 
constructed so as not to frustrate the exercise of these powers and means to be heard in the interests of the 
proper administration of those powers. A good model and effective compromise can be found at 
University of Queensland Statute No. 4 (Student Discipline and Misconduct) 1999, subs 27(2):  
(1) The vice-chancellor may suspend a student on considering it necessary to avert a substantial risk of (a) 
injury to a person; or (b) damage to property; or (c) serious disruption of a university activity. (2) Before 
imposing the suspension the vice-chancellor must make a reasonable effort (having regard to the 
seriousness and urgency of the risk) to provide the student with an opportunity to explain why the 
suspension ought not to be imposed. 
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Additionally, as Forbes has remarked
974
 in respect of denial of natural justice:  
 
If an internal appeal is to ‗cure‘ an earlier breach of natural justice, it must afford the defendant 
the same opportunities to canvass the issues that the defendant would have had if the primary 
hearing had been fairly conducted. In practice, this means that the appeal must take the form of a 
rehearing de novo – a re-trial and a fresh decision reached without any restriction or presumption 
arising from the original adjudication. 
 
If such a ‗re-trial‘ is essential in instances of procedural error, it would be complex and ungainly 
to create alternative (and more restrictive) forms of review where error might alternatively 
concern issues of fact, rules of policy. A general policy of appeal by re-hearing is preferable.  
 
10.2 Efficient and Effective Procedure 
 
There is a need to balance fairness in disciplinary procedure against efficiency and effectiveness 
in the operation of disciplinary action. Hearing volumes suggest that internal disciplinary bodies 
may be under considerable pressure at certain times. Question of efficiency and effectiveness 
also appear to arise in relation to the organisation and structure of the disciplinary process, and 
in relation to the support and training given to decision-makers. In the latter situation, 
shortcomings may contribute both to inefficiencies and unfairness. I raise two areas of reform in 
this respect: the composition and competence of decision-making bodies, and the overall 
organisation of disciplinary procedure.  
 
10.2.1 The Composition and Competence of Tribunals 
 
In Chapter 7 I drew an analogy between university tribunals and older forms of ‗peer-review‘ 
discipline operating in the professions. Those older professional jurisdictions emerged at a time 
when ‗gentleman‘ professionals, such as doctors, were expected to administer their profession 
as an extension of service to that community. Under ‗lay‘ adjudicators, the model of ‗peer-
review‘ was, in essence, the administration of discipline by the ‗amateur‘ adjudicator, at arm‘s 
length from professional judges. Reform of these jurisdictions arguably moved this decision-
making toward a form of ‗professionalisation‘ of the administration of discipline.  
 
Extending my analogy, I would argue that university tribunals exhibit features of this ‗amateur‘ 
or self-governing ‗lay‘ jurisdiction. This situation has undoubted benefits, such as tying together 
the ‗village atmosphere‘ of the university, as Sullivan J put it in Ex Parte Beg,975 and providing 
a body with relevant experience and expertise to deal with disciplinary matters. Yet, this does 
                                           
974
 Forbes Justice in Tribunals, [14.10]. 
975
 R v Cambridge University ex parte Beg [1998] EWHC Admin 423, [60]. 
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not mean that such bodies exist in aspic. I would submit that certain features of 
‗professionalisation‘ are warranted and necessary. Professional disciplinary jurisdictions 
provide some guidance, but academic analysis of domestic university contexts is also of interest.  
 
Exercise of university disciplinary powers is commonly reposed in a range of decision-makers, 
depending on circumstances (eg type of conduct at issue, whether a form of summary authority) 
and potential severity of the consequences. Minor issues and penalties may be handled by 
‗local‘ administrators. For the sake of clarity, I consider here those circumstances in which a 
hearing is held before a collective body, which occurs at university-wide and School- and 
Faculty-level hearings.  
 
First, appropriate training ought to be provided to tribunal members, including training in issues 
of law as well as adjudication, tribunal procedure and the content and nature of the disciplinary 
code. The operation of a ‗pool‘ of trained members from which panels may be drawn is a 
common feature of disciplinary procedure currently and it is an important practice to continue 
for various reasons, including accommodating turnover and development of tribunal personnel. 
A further, fundamental issue spanning the domestic/‗professional‘ divide is recognition and 
remuneration of tribunal members, especially through the accounting of such ‗administrative‘ 
work in the scope of academic responsibilities (alongside teaching and research).  
 
Provision of guidelines as noted above would be of considerable benefit to members. In 
addition, where reported reasons for decisions are unlikely and, it is conceded, unwieldy, it 
would be valuable for ‗model‘ decisions to be published976 and/or summary reports on findings, 
decisions and penalties.
977
  
 
Second, it is common for university discipline tribunals to be large bodies of up to half a dozen 
or more members. It is my submission that this is unnecessary, unwieldy and inefficient, notably 
where members are properly trained and written reasons are required. Indeed, the requirement to 
provide reasons adds impetus, on grounds of efficiency, for smaller decision-making bodies 
that, from a larger pool, can meet, for example, concurrently. It seems reasonable, as a model, 
that tribunals hearing matters at first instance comprise two members.
978
 On appeal, I would 
submit that the model should include a Chair who is legally-qualified and a three-member panel. 
                                           
976
 See eg the OIA‘s practice at http://www.oiahe.org.uk/news.asp#cases.  
977
 See eg University of Queensland Statute No. 4 (Student Discipline and Misconduct) 1999, s 24: 
‗Publication – The secretary and registrar must record and publish details of findings of misconduct 
according to a scheme approved by senate. 
978
 Allowing for instance a combination of experienced and inexperienced members, relevant expertise 
and independence, or staff and student members. Presumably, administrative/secretarial support is in 
addition to this number. This ‗coupling‘ of members is relatively common in merits review tribunals, in 
order to balance expert and legal knowledge, for example.  
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This composition would be preferred given the potential for appeal actions to deal with issues of 
law, as well as scope for greater procedural formality.  
 
10.2.2 The Organisation of Procedure 
 
One of the most significant issues that arose in Chapter 7 concerning the work of disciplinary 
tribunals was the proper procedure to be adopted by the tribunal and subsequently how these 
bodies are to handle and to distinguish the process of investigation from the process of 
adjudication. They are necessarily adjudicative entities, yet in many situations they confront 
cases and circumstances where the basis of knowledge on which they are proceeding is 
inadequate or incomplete. In some circumstances, I have suggested, decision-makers appear 
uncertain as to the appropriate or correct mode of procedure to adopt, or at least which features 
of inquisitorial or adversarial procedure to adopt and how to integrate these features into a 
unified method of approach.  
 
My conclusion is that several problems are actually at work here, accumulating in the issue of 
procedural arrangements. The first of these problems is the proper place and role for 
investigative/inquisitorial procedure, as against adversarial modes of conduct. Second, there is 
an issue of how complaints against students, typical of disciplinary allegations, are handled by 
the university. Third, there is the issue of the point at which it is necessary for an adjudicative 
body, such as a disciplinary tribunal, to handle those matters and exercise its jurisdiction. In 
fact, therefore, this problem of procedure opens up wider issues of complaints handling in the 
university, consideration of disciplinary matters as disputes appropriate for forms of ‗alternative 
dispute resolution,‘ and the role of disciplinary tribunals in that architecture. The nature of 
disciplinary action as involving complaint- or dispute-handling has been noted by Pedley and 
Goldblatt
979
 in their valuable contribution on re-crafting universities‘ discipline policies. I have 
also noted above that forms of autonomous investigator have been established in some 
Australian universities. I return to these models below.  
 
The approach I would propose in general aims at distinguishing and clarifying complaints-
handling and investigative functions on the one hand and adjudication on the other hand – 
although this is a simplification. Complaints amounting to (or including) allegations of 
misconduct would be referred to an appropriate complaints-handling authority within the 
university.
980
 This authority may lie within the office of a relevant senior manager (Dean, Pro 
Vice-Chancellor, etc), or alternatively may be an extension of (and distinct function within) 
those separate complaints-handling bodies increasingly emerging within universities 
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 Pedley and Goldblatt ‗The Development of a Student Contract and Improvement in Student 
Disciplinary Procedures at Massey University‘, especially 78-9. 
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(Ombudsman, Dean of Students, etc). Classification of disciplinary complaints according to 
gravity of the allegations might be made at this point,
981
 and subsequently an appropriate 
approach to investigation and resolution (including the capacity for adjudication) of the matter 
determined.  
 
This approach provides the capacity for preliminary investigations to be handled, in an 
organised rather than ad hoc fashion, by a body other than the disciplinary tribunal. Rules and 
guidelines for the conduct of those investigations would, logically, need to accompany its role 
and functions. In addition, this arrangement would allow appropriate cases to be handled by 
consent (where, for example, misconduct is conceded), cases of minor infraction or those 
characterised primarily as educational (eg of ‗poor academic practice‘) to be dealt with 
accordingly, and more serious matters to be investigated and referred to a tribunal for 
adjudication. In each situation, procedural fairness will need to be afforded the student.
982
 In 
each situation, other than referral to a tribunal for hearing, recommendations on an outcome 
should be put before a tribunal for ratification, variation or rejection as appropriate.
983
 In the 
case of referral of serious allegations of misconduct to a disciplinary tribunal for hearing, the 
investigator‘s role then becomes, analogous to the ‗co-regulation‘ model of professional 
discipline, a form of ‗prosecutor‘ or at least ‗informant‘ to the proceedings.  
 
Where a matter goes to hearing before a disciplinary tribunal, I do not think the procedures 
outlined above necessarily remove an inquisitorial role for that body. Rather, the process above 
would provide a more substantive and organised footing on which the tribunal could pursue its 
own inquiries, as these are needed. Effectively, establishment of separate investigative 
machinery recognises the limits on any adjudicative body to undertake its own inquiries, as well 
as the need for that process nevertheless to be done thoroughly. A disciplinary tribunal ought to 
retain an inquisitorial function where it is necessary in the opinion of the tribunal to take this 
type of approach, and consequently powers to make inquiries (or require an investigator to make 
further inquiries) ought to be provided for in disciplinary rules.
984
 
 
                                                                                                                           
980
 Powers of summary action in ‗emergency‘ situations should remain with local staff or managers. 
981
 See Pedley and Goldblatt ‗The Development of a Student Contract and Improvement in Student 
Disciplinary Procedures at Massey University‘. 
982
 Consistent with the content identified above. See also Pedley and Goldblatt ‗The Development of a 
Student Contract and Improvement in Student Disciplinary Procedures at Massey University‘, 79. 
983
 Where an investigator‘s recommendations are rejected or varied, the matter would ordinarily have to 
proceed to some form of hearing before the tribunal.  
984
 Compare Administrative Review Council Better Decisions: Review of the Commonwealth Merits 
Review Tribunals (1995), [3.71]-[3.112] and especially [3.99]-[3.100]. 
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10.3 Elements of Policy in the Disciplinary Code 
 
10.3.1 Plagiarism 
 
In its broadest sense, university discipline policy comprises disciplinary machinery and 
procedure, on one side, and the disciplinary code (normative system of behaviours) on the other 
side. The disciplinary code is perhaps less a source of interest and reform than procedural 
arrangements. Nevertheless, I have signalled the need for reform, or, better, clarification, of one 
important aspect of that code: the concept of plagiarism. As inferred by the analysis in Chapter 
4, it is my submission that plagiarism should expressly be distinguished from ‗poor academic 
practice,‘ or, that is, problems that primarily concern academic competence and/or experience. 
Consistent with the case-law, etymology and ordinary use of the term, conduct caught within 
the framework of plagiarism ought exhibit characteristics of intention or ‗wrong‘ (eg failure to 
take reasonable care in preparation and production of academic work). These standards need to 
take into account, as Ex Parte Wild adverts, the educational context (eg academic experience) of 
the person against whom allegation of plagiarism is made. For the sake of efficiency, it would 
be preferable for the prohibition against plagiarism generally to be incorporated into the primary 
rules, and more specific codification of plagiarism rules to be incorporated into accompanying 
guidelines.  
 
10.3.2 ‘Bringing the University into Disrepute’ 
 
The charge of ‗bringing a university into disrepute‘ reproduces in the university rules a common 
‗general article‘ proscription985 found in domestic or statutory discipline codes. It may also be 
related to requirements on members or persons under the jurisdiction of the disciplinary code to 
be a ‗fit and proper person,‘ or refrain from ‗infamous‘ conduct. The latter phrases, if they ever 
operated under university rules, would likely not to have survived the decline of a ‗social club‘ 
approach to disciplinary matters. The issue of ‗disrepute‘ on the other hand remains live in 
university rules. In the prolific ‗charge list‘ at University A (Chapter 7), this charge was 
nominally presented in some cases. It may be that the rule surfaces in, for example, cases 
involving protest or political action on campus, cases concerning research fraud, or 
inappropriate behaviour in off-campus university activities. Universities are now large, 
commercial operations, deeply concerned with their public reputation. They are sensitive, 
among other things, to commentary that may be associated with them or expressed in their 
name. Academics now find their ability or duty to make public comment tightly regulated, and 
normally restricted to their nominal area of expertise. Postgraduate students may find 
themselves in a similar situation.  
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 See generally Forbes Justice in Tribunals, [6.18]. 
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Historic, and indeed structural, freedoms and openness on university campuses,
986
 combined 
with the ‗imprecise nature‘987 of disrepute provisions, make this type of prohibition potentially 
controversial and difficult to characterise. Martin Kosla has proposed a useful framework for 
establishing the content of conduct that may reasonably fall under this rule.
988
 As he notes, 
‗closer examination of the disrepute clause has revealed that the clause does have boundaries 
and limits and must, therefore, operate within a framework.‘989 Although constructed with a 
view to sporting organisations, the general principles are transferable to universities. Kosla 
argues for two primary criteria attributable to ‗disreputable‘ conduct: that the conduct ‗becomes 
common or public knowledge,‘990 and that the conduct is injurious (to the sport).991 Regarding 
the latter category, consistent with Kosla‘s scheme, it would be a requirement of any impugned 
conduct that it be injurious to the university, not merely to the student‘s interests or those of any 
other person affected. Such conduct may be where the academic standards of the university are 
brought into question. The criterion of public exposure represents perhaps a greater departure 
from the sporting context in which Kosla proposes his framework. Sport is commonly a public 
activity. Education at university does not have the same public gaze, and therefore there is 
perhaps a higher practical or factual threshold before misconduct and/or misbehaviour at 
university can be said to enter the ‗public domain‘ and bring disrepute upon the institution.  
 
10.4 External Review 
 
It would clearly be preferable to improve decision-making processes within universities than to 
rely upon forms of external review, appeal or complaint to resolve shortcomings in internal 
operations in any particular case, or systemically. Many deserving cases may not proceed to an 
external appeal, or the expense, time or effort in seeking outside recourse may be prohibitive or 
unjustified. Having said this, it appears from the foregoing analysis, as well as from other 
research on litigation against, and volumes of complaint/dispute in, universities, considerable 
scope for the exercise of an external review jurisdiction exists.
992
 Further, an independent 
review may be an important safeguard for fair and/or correct decision-making. Various rules 
and mechanisms now operate to which students have recourse. They ought to be considered and 
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 Kosla ‗Disciplined for ―Bringing a Sport into Disrepute‖. 
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 Kosla ‗Disciplined for ―Bringing a Sport into Disrepute‖‘, 678. 
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 Kosla ‗Disciplined for ―Bringing a Sport into Disrepute‖‘, 669-78. 
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 See Chapter 5, section 5.3, above. Between 2005 and 2007, the UK OIA has dealt with increase of 
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complaints accepted: Office of Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education Annual Report (2007), 18-
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complaints regarding academic matters. On increasing litigation in courts and tribunals involving 
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assessed. I have made reference to them in Chapter 3. Finally, there has been ongoing debate 
over the best mechanism for handling university disputes, and these remarks merely contribute 
to that debate.
993
 In these comments, I conclude, consistent with other commentators, that 
availability of specialist external review and dispute-settling is preferable for the higher 
education sector (indeed for the wider tertiary education sectors), and key issues lie in the 
machinery, procedures and powers that give effect to that kind of mechanism. The following 
remarks are not constrained solely to external review from disciplinary decisions in universities. 
That type of decision likely represents a small fraction of disputes to which students and 
universities are party.
994
 I make these remarks with the broader issues of complaints- and 
disputes-handling in the higher education sector in mind.  
 
10.4.1 Existing Arrangements and Models 
 
In the UK, the question of review and/or appeal from university decisions has gone a 
considerable way toward being settled, with establishment of the Office of the Independent 
Adjudicator for Higher Education (OIA). That body was instituted in replacement of the Visitor 
in chartered universities, as well as supplying a review body for non-chartered universities. The 
OIA is in effect a specialist ombudsman. In Australia, as I have noted in Chapter 3, review of 
university decisions is more uncertain and variable depending on State jurisdiction and the class 
of student affected. State Parliamentary Ombudsmen have reported on grievance handling and 
appeals at Australian universities.
995
 
 
As in the UK, disciplinary decisions (as with other forms of decision) may be the subject of 
some kind of review.
996
 Variously, review may be sought by petition to a University Visitor (in 
WA), complaint to an Ombudsman (public universities, under State, Territory or 
Commonwealth legislation), and a complaint made under external review schemes required 
under higher education legislation.
997
 In addition, depending on the nature of the dispute, it may 
be justiciable within the administrative tribunal system, or in a consumer claims jurisdiction, or, 
of course, at judicial review. This situation seems unwieldy, if not confusing and in some 
                                                                                                                           
universities, see Astor ‗Australian Universities in Court: Causes, Costs and Consequences of Increasing 
Litigation‘. Astor also notes the increasing complexity of this litigation pattern.  
993
 See eg Olliffe and Stuhmcke ‗A National University Grievance Handler?‘; Stuhmcke ‗Grievance 
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 The OIA, in its most recent Annual Report, found only 7% of the complaints it dealt with involved 
discipline: Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education Annual Report 2007, 19. 
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 Victorian Ombudsman Review of Complaint Handling at Victoria Universities (2005); NSW 
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 Other than by internal review procedures accompanying primary disciplinary decisions.  
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 Which may go to the relevant State or Territory Ombudsman in any case: compare Ogawa v Secretary 
of Department of Education, Science and Training [2005] FCA 1472. 
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instances unfair.
998
 Limitations remain with the UK system,
999
 but it does have the advantage of 
providing a single, centralised point of complaint and dispute resolution for matters involving 
students that cannot be resolved within the institutions,
1000
 as well as clarifying the respective 
roles of the OIA and the courts.
1001
 Argument has been made for development of a similar 
model of university ‗ombudsman‘ for Australian universities.1002 Alternatively, it could be 
contended that the various Parliamentary Ombudsman are a satisfactory source of complaint-
handling and redress. In a time when universities were subject far less to the tide of privatised 
funding and commercial operation, it was also argued that the jurisdiction of the Visitor ought 
to be reformed to conform with the methods and powers of merits review tribunals.
1003
 The 
present issue, it might be argued, is: what is the best model for review of university decisions, 
and what are the appropriate powers and procedures to be vested in the review body? 
 
10.4.2 Ombudsman 
 
It is feasible to identify three general models of recourse that may be applicable to review of 
university decisions. The first I would identify is the ombudsman model, which is probably the 
most accessible and used mechanism of external review of university decisions at present.
1004
 To 
briefly rehearse the concept of the Ombudsman, it is an office originally developed in 
Scandanavia, independent of executive power, charged with investigating and redressing 
grievances concerning the administration of government. In the Australian context, the office 
has wide jurisdiction typically to investigate a ‗matter of administration‘1005 and report to 
Parliament where government action has been illegal, unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, 
‗improperly discriminatory,‘ mistaken, or ‗wrong.‘1006 The Ombudsman has been viewed, in the 
context of the growing complexity and size of the administrative state, as a key means of 
scrutiny and remedy to maladministration, especially where the role, effective powers and/or 
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 For example, an international student has access to external review, from which any favourable 
outcome must be implemented by the institution: National Code, Standards 8.5. Domestic students, who 
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 See eg Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), subs 5(1)(a). 
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jurisdiction of other institutions are limited.
1007
 Growing debate and unease has emerged, 
however, in precisely what bodies or institutions ought to be nominated as ‗Ombudsman,‘ as 
distinct from other means of complaints-handling. In part, this concern has arisen with 
proliferation of bodies termed ‗Ombudsman,‘ especially private ‗industry‘ ombudsman, such as 
in banking, insurance, and utilities. Some universities have established internal ‗Ombudsmen.‘ 
The Commonwealth Ombudsman has raised concerns with use and abuse of the ‗brand,‘ 
notably where it may be employed as a marketing exercise or where its conditions, functions or 
powers diverge from the historic understanding of functions of the Ombudsman in public 
administration.
1008
 He identifies an Ombudsman as possessing certain ‗essential criteria‘: 
independence, jurisdiction, investigative powers, accessibility, procedural fairness, and 
accountability.
1009
  
 
The scope of powers, jurisdiction and authority under the ‗traditional‘ public-sector 
Ombudsman seems wide and impressive. Yet important limitations and particular characteristics 
of the Ombudsman model ought to be considered in applying such a model of review of 
university decisions. I note these limits not least because the UK OIA mechanism is effectively 
based on an Ombudsman model, notwithstanding the nomenclature of ‗adjudicator.‘ These 
limitations and characteristics are reproduced in the OIA framework. For instance, typically a 
‗traditional‘ Parliamentary Ombudsman has no powers to make determinations, substitute or 
vary original decision, or make binding decisions or orders. Their function is to form an 
‗opinion‘1010 regarding an administrative issue and report to Parliament on that matter, as well as 
report to the investigated agency and where appropriate seek redress (which may include 
systemic or policy change). Ombudsman may act on complaints or on their ‗own motion.‘ 
Significantly, private ‗industry‘ Ombudsman may exercise determinative powers, including 
imposing monetary awards.
1011
 The OIA possesses features of public and private Ombudsman 
models. This ‗hybrid‘ arrangement is perhaps not surprising given the ‗hybrid‘ public-private 
character of universities. Consistent with the ‗traditional‘ (public) Ombudsman, the OIA does 
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not exercise determinative powers; comparable to ‗industry‘ Ombudsman, the OIA is a 
corporate entity and funded by contributions from the ‗industry‘ itself (ie institutions), although 
the scheme has statutory support.  
 
While the Ombudsman‘s approach is self-evidently investigative or inquisitorial, this approach 
is clearly distinguishable from the ‗inquisitorial‘ role of administrative tribunals. Very few of 
the adversarial features commonly retained in the tribunal system extend to the Ombudsman 
model, in particular the participatory features of the adversary system do not operate. The 
complainant does not assume the position, for instance, of a ‗party‘ to a dispute: ‗Once the 
complainant gives the Ombudsman the facts, their [complainant] formal role is over.‘1012 While 
the complainant does not have to deal with rules and threshold of ‗standing,‘1013 they likewise 
do not determine the course or manner of the investigation or ‗proceedings.‘1014 This situation 
does add to the standing of the Ombudsman, at least in the public sphere, as a supervisory actor 
of the legislature, an officer of the Parliament formally overseeing the exercise of executive 
power.
1015
  
 
The Legislature‘s institution of a supervisory, albeit non-judicial and non-determinative, office 
also reflects the scope and nature of the Ombudsman‘s jurisdiction to investigate actions 
‗relating to a matter of administration.‘ Consistent with the separation of powers doctrine, the 
scope of ‗administration‘ is generally distinguishable from legislative or judicial power. On 
judicial review, it has been held that the Ombudsman‘s jurisdiction does not therefore extend to 
questions of government policy.
1016
 More pertinently for review of university decisions, 
‗administration‘ for the purposes of investigation by Ombudsman may extend to decisions that 
incorporate the exercise of professional or expert judgement as an ‗incident in an administrative 
process, and as of an administrative character.‘1017 On this reading, elements of the process and 
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context of academic decision-making, including examinations, fall within the wider rubric of 
administration.
1018
 It is arguable, then, that review conducted by an Ombudsman into university 
decision-making, where academic content plays a role in the decision-making, is confined and 
regulated by similar considerations and calculations applicable to judicial review. While 
decisions of ‗purely academic judgement‘ would retain immunity from scrutiny and criticism, 
features of the organisation and conduct of academic decisions would be susceptible to scrutiny 
and, as relevant, correction.  
 
In summary, aside from issues of accessibility, fairness and independence (and how these 
features may authentically be achieved), Ombudsman-type review can be generally 
characterised by non-determinative powers, centralised investigation with little participation or 
control by disputants or parties, and broad jurisdiction over ‗administrative‘ matters but without 
capacity to deal with complaints about policy or judicial action.  
 
10.4.3 The Visitor 
 
A second model of review is the University Visitor, a delegate of the institution‘s ‗founder‘ and 
‗special judge,‘1019 whose origins lie in the law of charities.1020 In a strict sense, the Visitor is not 
external to the university at all, but a necessary part of the domestic machinery of the university. 
In practice, nevertheless, exercise of the Visitor‘s jurisdiction is independent of other organs of 
university government. The office in Australia has commonly been vested in the relevant 
Governor and exercised by, or on advice of, a judge.  
 
It is highly unlikely that we will see resurgence of the office of University Visitor, not simply 
because it is a medieval relic. Indeed, it was not too long ago that the House of Lords held a 
notable and contrary opinion.
1021
 In the UK, human rights law
1022
 and consumer protection 
legislation
1023
 contributed to the Visitor‘s demise, and, although Australian jurisdictions may 
have ‗jumped the gun,‘ comparable legislation here1024 may eventually have led to the same 
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results of, examinations are, on any view, distinctly administrative, as are some aspects of conducting 
them… Plainly, [the Court] will not itself become involved in the examination process.‘ Compare New 
South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption Report on Investigation into the University of 
Newcastle's Handling of Plagiarism Allegations (2005),  
http://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/index.cfm?objectID=9D20D940-9A1D-8243-
78F0A3075C84F57E&flushcache=1 (accessed 7 March 2009).  
1019
 R v Lord President of the Privy Council, ex parte Page [1993] 1 All ER 97, 106 (Lord Browne-
Wilksinson). 
1020
 See, especially, Philips v Bury [1694] ER 53, 57-58. 
1021
 Most recently in R v Lord President of the Privy Council, ex Parte Page [1993] 1 All ER 97. 
1022
 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). 
1023
 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999 (UK). 
1024
 Eg Charter of Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic); Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic), Part 2B. Both 
bodies of legislation borrowed heavily from their UK counterparts.  
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result. Nevertheless, the Visitor had the benefit of providing a jurisdiction akin to a ‗specialist 
tribunal,‘1025 specifically associated with the university and its community. It also provided 
binding (and often, in Australia, reasoned) decisions. The other primary benefit of the Visitor‘s 
jurisdiction concerns the issues of powers and certainty: for the sake of carrying out the will of 
the founder, the Visitor exercises determinative powers. This feature is generally absent in the 
functions of the (public) Ombudsman.  
 
In theory and in respect of public universities in Australia, both the University Visitor and the 
Ombudsman are instruments of the Parliament, albeit in slightly different capacities and, 
arguably, with differing functions. In the case of the Visitor, it is to exercise the intentions and 
powers of the Founder, and apply and, where necessary, adjudicate on the ‗foundation 
instrument.‘ These elements of foundation are Parliament and the establishing enactment 
respectively. For the Ombudsman, the function is the proper administration of government. For 
the public university, the Visitor is a delegate of the Parliament; the Ombudsman an officer. 
Additionally, as tends to be absent from the ‗administrative‘ jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, it 
is arguably within the scope of the Visitor‘s powers to make findings and decisions on questions 
of university policy, at least in so far as this approach does not upset the terms of the governing 
enactment.  
 
10.4.4 Limits of Ombudsman and Visitorial Models 
 
With eclipse of the Visitorial jurisdiction, it appears that the non-determinative role of an 
ombudsman actually supplies less in terms of certainty of outcome than operated previously. If 
successful on review, a student may nevertheless be frustrated by an obdurate university. If that 
eventuality is unlikely, it is possible, especially if the matter were bitterly contested or opposed 
by the institution.
1026
 In such an instance, injustice may result. Other curiosities and anomalies 
now present themselves also. If a process of dispute or appeal by an international student, 
handled under the relevant provisions of the National Code,
1027
 were referred to a State 
Ombudsman as the review body, any recommendations benefiting the student would effectively 
be binding on the institution.
1028
 However, this benefit does not extend to domestic students.
1029
  
 
Inherent limitations present themselves in both the Ombudsman and Visitorial models. For the 
Visitor, it is redundancy. For the Ombudsman, the notable limits are absence of an intrinsic 
                                           
1025
 See Sadler ‗The University Visitor‘, 32.  
1026
 Compare the examples of notorious, expensive and protracted disputes noted in Astor ‗Improving 
Dispute Resolution in Australian Universities‘, 49. 
1027
  National Code, Standard 8.2. 
1028
 National Code, Standard 8.5: ‗If the internal or any external complaint handling or appeal process 
results in a decision that supports the student, the registered provider must immediately implement any 
decision and/or corrective and preventative action required and advise the student of the outcome.‘ 
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capacity for the reviewer to give effect to corrective action, and a general absence of 
participation by a complainant in the process of dispute.  
 
Given participation rates in higher education in Australia,
1030
 and the extent of the impact (or 
potential impact) of university decision-making on individual lives, it seems anomalous that the 
‗long march‘ of administrative review has substantially by-passed the university. In the face of a 
growing need for external adjudication on university decisions, these pressures are now handled 
by the courts, or by existing tribunals unsuited to the underlying or real complaint.
1031
 No doubt 
there is scope for students‘ substantive complaints against universities to be dealt with on 
judicial review, notwithstanding limits on the scope of this type of review.
1032
 Yet, when 
considered as whole, the ‗administrative law revolution‘ has only found its way into the halls of 
the university partially, ad hoc, with great reticence. As Professor Astor concludes in her study 
of university litigation:  
 
…students [are] litigating about the fairness of university decision-making. Further, these 
students appear to be struggling to find appropriate legal remedies for independent review of 
university decisions. Improved decision making and grievance handling by universities are 
suggested by the data.
1033
 
 
I think that, finally, there is a need to consider the role and (potential) nature of an adjudicative 
mechanism for external review, capable of some degree of ‗review on the merits‘ of university 
decisions. Notwithstanding the nomenclature of the OIA, ‗merits review,‘ as it commonly 
understood, has ostensibly by-passed the universities, and it has been little discussed. It is this 
model of review to which I now turn. 
 
                                                                                                                           
1029
 See subsection 10.4.1. above. 
1030
 In 2007, just under one million (976,786) students were enrolled in Australian public higher education 
institutions, and 1,029,846 students were enrolled in all Australia higher education providers: Department 
of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations Students 2007: Selected Higher Education Statistics 
(2008). 
1031
 See Astor‘s point that around half of student disputes brought before external fora involved 
discrimination complaints, yet ‗few of these cases are actually about conduct prohibited by discrimination 
legislation. Many of them involve students aggrieved about what they perceive to be unfair treatment or 
decision-making by a university.‘ Astor ‗Australian Universities in Court‘, 167. By way of comparison, 
the OIA reports that just under 65% of all complaints accepted concerned issues of ‗academic status‘ (eg 
exam results, academic appeals): Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education Annual 
Report (2007), 19. 
1032
 However, compare Peter Cane ‗Merits Review and Judicial Review – The Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal as Trojan Horse‘ (2000) 28 Federal Law Review 213.  
1033
 Astor ‗Australian Universities in Court‘, 169. 
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10.4.5 A University Appeals Tribunal? 
 
‗Review on the merits‘ provides for a matter to be re-heard and the capacity for the original 
decision to be substituted (or varied) by a decision of the tribunal.
1034
 To greater or lesser 
degrees, the hearing is adjudicative, containing features of adversarial and inquisitorial method. 
While the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) conducts itself in a 
relatively court-like fashion, other specialist tribunals such as the Social Security Appeals 
Tribunal or Refugee Review Tribunal proceed with less formality, and a more inquisitorial 
approach. The over-riding purpose of merits review has been described as achieving the ‗correct 
or preferable‘ decision on the materials available to the tribunal.1035 The general concept of 
merits review, especially as developed by the AAT (or by challenge to its decisions), includes 
de novo (re)consideration of a decision on the facts, requirement or capacity for review of 
administrative policy, consistency in decision-making, extent of application of the rules of 
evidence, and review of questions of law.
1036
 While the wide-ranging jurisdiction of the AAT 
provides for review of questions of fact, law and policy, review jurisdiction may be limited, 
especially in respect of application of government policy.
1037
  
 
In respect of application of ‗merits review‘ to university decisions affecting students, several 
key questions arise as to the propriety of this approach, the scope of review, and the approach 
and procedure required of a review body. Regarding propriety, a careful, if not cautious, 
approach is no doubt warranted. A certain body of practice and opinion militates for 
comprehensive merits review of university decisions. The effect of the National Code, as 
already noted, is to provide access to a form of external merits review. The scope of review in 
those circumstances does not exclude, on the face of the rule, decisions of an academic nature. 
Perhaps reinforcing this point, the Administrative Review Council (ARC) has advised, in 
respect of application of merits review in principle, that ‗an administrative decision that will, or 
is likely to, affect the interests of a person should be subject to merits review.‘1038 Its test is 
                                           
1034
 See eg Cheryl Saunders ‗Appeal or Review: The Experience of Administrative Appeals in Australia‘ 
(1993) Acta Juridica 88, 88: ‗… for present purposes it should be noted that [the review jurisdiction of 
the AAT] enables, and in fact requires, the decision to be remade…‘  
1035
 Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 60, 68. 
1036
 See John McMillan ‗Merits Review and the AAT – A Concept Develops‘. 
1037
 Eg Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 57; State Administrative Tribunal 
Act 2004 (WA), 28.  
1038
 Administrative Review Council What Decisions Should Be Subject to Merits Review? (1999), 
http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/arcHome.nsf/Page/Publications_Reports_Downloads_What_decisions_
should_be_subject_to_merit_review (accessed 12 March 2009), [2.1]. The Council continues:  
‗2.4. The Council prefers a broad approach to the identification of merits reviewable decisions. If an 
administrative decision is likely to have an effect on the interests of any person, in the absence of good 
reason, that decision should ordinarily be open to be reviewed on the merits. 2.5. If a more restrictive 
approach is adopted, there is a risk of denying an opportunity for review to someone whose interests have 
been adversely affected by a decision. Further, there is a risk of losing the broader and beneficial effects 
that merits review is intended to have on the overall quality of government decision-making. 2.6. The 
Council's approach is intended to be sufficiently broad to include decisions that affect intellectual and 
spiritual interests, and not merely property, financial or physical interests.‘ 
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wide. The ARC includes in those ‗factors that will not exclude merits review‘ circumstances in 
which the decision-maker is an ‗expert, or requires specialist expertise.‘1039 Presumably, this 
category might include academic decision-makers. That approach to review is, in respect of 
academic judgements, in conflict with established curial practice and authority providing for 
deference to academic decision-making, at least in so far as those decisions are of ‗purely‘ 
academic judgement. Those classes of decisions which the ARC advises are not ‗suitable‘ for 
merits review are decisions of a legislative nature and ‗automatic or mandatory‘ decisions, 
where no effective discretion operates.
1040
 Considerable (academic) discretion operates in 
respect of academic decisions. On this reading of the ARC‘s advice, it would appear all major 
classes of university decision ought to be amenable to merits review. Decisions of an academic 
nature are the most problematic category of decision. The ARC‘s approach might effectively 
subvert the dictum in Thorne v University of London:
1041
 ‗The High Court does not act as a court 
of appeal from university examiners…‘ 
 
On the authority of the ARC, external adjudication on decisions affecting students seems 
appropriate and viable. That situation would be less ambiguous than current arrangements. 
Academic judgement, however, ought to be recognised as an appropriate limit on the scope of 
review, distinguishing decisions of ‗purely‘ academic judgement (application of standards of 
competence to an object of ‗performance‘ of a specialised body of knowledge) from decisions 
where conduct of academic judgement (the ‗administrative‘ content of the decision-making) 
may be impugned, as indicated in Evans v Friemann and in Institute of Dental Surgery. Exercise 
of review jurisdiction ought not to remake decisions of academic judgement where academic 
(expert or disciplinary) knowledge is the sole determinant and basis of the decision, and where 
‗extraneous‘1042 factors are absent. This form of immunity and limit to review presently operates 
in appeals from academic decisions in policy and legislative instruments at certain 
universities.
1043
   
                                           
1039
 Administrative Review Council What Decisions Should Be Subject to Merits Review?, [5.16], my 
emphasis.  
1040
 Administrative Review Council What Decisions Should Be Subject to Merits Review?, [3.8]-[3.12] 
1041
 (1966) 2 QB 237, 243 (Diplock LJ). 
1042
 R v Universities Funding Council, ex parte Institute for Dental Surgery [1993] EWHC Admin 5. 
1043
 See eg University of Queensland Policy 3.40.11 – Appeals to Senate by Students, [1.4], 
http://www.uq.edu.au/hupp/index.html?page=25127&pid=25075 (accessed 12 March 2009): 
When considering a matter regarding an assessment result (including higher degree theses) or admission to a 
program not governed by the Admission rules, the grounds for appeal are limited to: 
 improper, irregular, or negligent conduct by a person involved; or  
 discrimination, prejudice, or bias against a student; or  
 failure to adhere to relevant published policies and procedures; or  
 failure to give sufficient consideration to a matter of specific relevance to the student.  
A judgement regarding the academic merit of any work or the grade assigned, based on reassessment of content, 
does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee. 
University of Melbourne Statute 12.2 – Assessment, paragraph 12.2.11,  
http://www.unimelb.edu.au/ExecServ/Statutes/s122.html (accessed 12 March 2009):  
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If limits on jurisdiction ought to apply to academic decision-making, how should the grant of 
jurisdiction for a review body fall on the question of handling matters of policy as they apply to 
particular cases. Ombudsman cannot typically deal with questions of policy, by constraint to 
‗matters of administration.‘ Although qualified, review tribunals commonly can, notably where 
‗the policy is unlawful or… its application tends to produce an unjust decision in the 
circumstances of the particular case.‘1044 The capacity of the AAT, for instance, to depart from 
ministerial or governmental policy will be qualified by its exceptionality, by consideration of 
propriety in particular circumstances, and the relationship of the policy to Parliamentary 
scrutiny and oversight.
1045
 While it is arguable that departure from university policy in any 
particular case may be cautious, consistent with the general, authoritative approach, deference to 
university administrators is not quite as imperative as deference to Ministers of the Crown 
There are principled and empirical reasons for the difference. In so far as questions of policy (or 
administrative rules) rather than delegated legislation are at issue, university administrators do 
not possess comparable authority to that wielded by Ministers. Parliaments generally do not 
scrutinise university rule-making. Empirically, shortcomings in university rules occur. Review 
of general policy by an appeal tribunal ought to be available, on the terms expressed in Drake 
(No 2). 
 
If a broad, qualified merits review is defensible as a matter of policy, a further question 
concerns procedure. As adjudication by specialist tribunal would suggest, minimal or basic 
features of adversarial method ought to apply, notably the requirement (and responsibility) for 
participation by the complainant and some element of control by them over the proceedings. As 
I have noted in Chapter 4, substantial features of adversarial procedure may be present in 
internal appeals. I do not advocate here court-like proceedings, or further escalation of 
confrontational and formal methods that may be employed for internal appeals. An informal and 
inquisitorial approach would be warranted. Further, by the inherent nature of the disputes, 
proceedings would tend to reflect a considerable disparity of power, knowledge and resources 
                                                                                                                           
The [Academic] Board may decide any dispute or question arising under this chapter other than a decision 
by an examiner or examination board in relation to the academic performance of a student in any 
component of assessment which is based solely on academic judgement. 
This type of appeal or review may be distinguished from procedures for ‗re-marking‘ or ‗re-assessment‘ 
at the School, Department or Faculty level, a relatively common provision at Australian universities, and 
which does provide for review of ‗purely‘ academic decisions by other academic staff, presumably within 
the same or comparable discipline. Compare University of Western Australia Senate Resolutions 49/04, 
68/05 – Appeals Process in the Case Where there is Dissatisfaction with an Assessment Result and/or 
Progress Status paragraph 7(1):  
Given the provisions of sub-Regulation (2), a student has the right to lodge, at school level, an appeal which 
challenges the school's academic judgement in arriving at an assessment but only has the right to pursue an 
appeal beyond that level if they have reason to believe that the process which led to the disputed academic 
judgement was unfair in their individual case. 
1044
 Re Drake And The Minister For Immigration And Ethnic Affairs (No. 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634, 645. 
1045
 On the last point, see Re Drake and the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No. 2) (1979) 2 
ALD 634, 644. 
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between complainant student and respondent university. In those circumstances, a leading and 
inquisitorial role for tribunal decision-makers would be appropriate.
1046
 The interventionist role 
of the tribunal may be modified to the circumstances, for instance, where a student is 
represented. As distinct from the common approach for internal proceedings, a university 
appeals tribunal would possess powers to take evidence on oath and compel information, 
especially from institutions. Such powers are normally at the disposal of administrative 
tribunals.  
 
It is worth considering the nature of engagement that an external review tribunal might have 
with the institutions whose decisions it would be called upon to review. At one level, 
‗engagement‘ is a matter of accommodating the latter of two general (and perhaps strained) 
purposes of administrative adjudication: justice in individual cases, and better administration.
1047
 
It is central to the ‗merits review‘ model.1048 Response by administrators and agencies to 
tribunal decision-making may be considered in terms of ‗bureaucratic impact.‘1049 Merits review 
and its ‗bureaucratic impact‘ does not necessary assume a ‗proactive‘ or strategic approach to 
engagement with reviewable agencies on questions of systemic practice, organisation or 
administrative policy. This type of approach is, however, typical of the Ombudsman model, 
through mechanisms such as ‗own motion‘ inquiries and reporting on administrative practices. 
The OIA reproduces this aspect of the Ombudsman.
1050
 It is preferable to maintain the 
requirement and capacity for a review body to make recommendations on ‗good practice,‘ in 
addition to powers of determination in individual cases, for the ‗strategic‘ value of ‗good 
practice‘ this capacity would bring to the sector. Given the general critique I have posed of 
                                           
1046
 Compare eg Refugee Review Tribunal Efficient Conduct of Review: Principal Member Direction 
3/2005; Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education Rules of the Student Complaints 
Scheme 2008, r 6. 
1047
 Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries Report of the Committee on Administrative 
Tribunals and Enquiries (1957), [20]-[22]; generally see Galligan Due Process and Fair Procedures, Ch 
8. 
1048
 See eg Stephen Skehill ‗The Impact of the AAT on Commonwealth Administration: A View from the 
Administration‘ in John McMillan (ed) The AAT: Twenty Years Forward (Australian Institute of 
Administrative Law, 1998). In particular, Skehill remarks, in light of the Administrative Review 
Council‘s Better Decisions report (at 61): ‗… the AAT should actively be seeking to work with agencies 
whose decisions it reviews to help them to develop decision-making systems and training and to enhance 
policies and processes with a view to minimizing the risk of further mistaken or inappropriate decisions. 
In a sense, administrative tribunals should be working with the other elements of the executive arm to so 
improve the quality of primary decision-making that the need for the continued existence of the tribunal 
becomes an issue in itself.‘  
1049
 See Linda Pearson ‗The Impact of External Administrative Law Review: Tribunals‘ [2007] University 
of New South Wales Law Research Series 53; generally, see M L M Hertogh and Simon Halliday (eds) 
Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact: International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
1050
 Reviewing individual cases and engaging with the university sector directly on systemic or policy 
issues are central to the OIA‘s approach. OIA Annual Report 2004, 3: 
Our aim is to resolve those student complaints that cannot be sorted out by the HEI itself, in an efficient, 
transparent and fair manner. In the last resort, we are an alternative to expensive and time-consuming 
litigation, so both students and HEIs will benefit. The scheme is free to students, with HEIs paying a 
modest amount to use our services. But as with all ombudsman-type schemes we do need a spirit of 
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university decision-making, in respect of the application of legal standards, a recommendatory 
role on university (perhaps also sectoral) practices would provide a systemic approach to 
contending with shortcomings, contribute to transparency and candour in higher education 
administration, and provide a central focus and point of coordination for this work.  
 
10.5 Conclusions 
 
What ought to be the appropriate standards and methods of adjudication in university 
discipline? How might universities reorganise the internal administration of disciplinary action 
so as to better achieve objectives of both justice and efficiency? What recourse ought to be 
available to a student aggrieved with university decisions? The posing of these questions is 
reasonable in light of the problems associated with disciplinary action that have been posed in 
the foregoing chapters. In response to those issues and shortcomings, reform and improvement 
to university decision-making is warranted. Disciplinary decision-making is a relatively 
formalised and ‗judicial‘ affair. In that context, reform and improvement ought to take the 
course of bringing university conduct, generally speaking, into line with the ‗relaxed formality‘ 
and the ‗proper and structured sense of purpose‘ characteristic of certain administrative 
tribunals.
1051
 Forbes‘ 1970 warning against ‗judicialisation‘ of these domestic tribunals remains 
apposite in important respects. It is inappropriate to impose court-like standards on these bodies. 
Unlike the major administrative review tribunals, no judges sit on university discipline 
matters.
1052
 In most instances, even under my proposals, lawyers would not sit on these 
tribunals. Arguably, it would be more impractical under the resource and administrative 
pressures of the university today, as distinct from 1970, to impose forms of trial on the exercise 
of internal discipline. Nevertheless, the internal operations of the university were, by and large, 
by-passed by the administrative law ‗revolution‘ of the 1970s, which are now deeply entrenched 
in other domains of public administration, as well as certain areas of corporate administration. It 
has become an uncontrovertible reality that decision-making by public (and indeed private) 
tribunals has become more conscious of law, more affected by the reason, if not the styling, of 
law. Given emphasis at law for substantive principles of fairness, openness, rationality, and 
consistency in decision-making, it is invaluable that a certain element of ‗legalisation‘ impart 
                                                                                                                           
openness and co-operation from the parties in order to maximise our effectiveness. An added bonus of the 
scheme is that we will be making good practice recommendations. 
1051
 The term is Martin Partington‘s: see Martin Partington ‗Taking Administrative Justice Seriously: 
Reflection on the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal‘ in John McMillan, ed. The AAT – Twenty 
Years Forward (Australian Institute of Administrative Law, 1998), 147, 150. He writes at 147-48: ‗to me 
this implies what happens in practice: that while tribunals do not follow vastly complex, pre-determined 
rules of procedure, they do not stand on ceremony, they do not dress up in wigs and gowns – all those 
essential features of the British judicial system. Nevertheless, they go about their business with a proper 
and structured sense of purpose.‘ He nominates the SSAT as typical of this approach and comparable to 
the approach of many UK tribunals.  
1052
 The only exception to this rule that I have found is the composition of the Student Discplinary 
Appeals Committee at the University of Sydney: University of Sydney By-Law 1999, s 78(1). 
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these types of values on the conduct of university tribunals, that is, any person or body required 
to exercise disciplinary powers in a ‗quasi-judicial‘ fashion. As Sir Gerard Brennan, the first 
President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, said of the early years of that body: ‗The 
AAT was charged with the responsibility of blowing the winds of legal orthodoxy through the 
corridors of administrative power.‘1053 On a rather smaller scale, it is time to apply properly and 
effectively what has been learnt from the recent history of administrative law to disciplinary 
decision-making in the university, and, of course, to adapt those principles sensitively to the 
academy‘s ‗peculiarities.‘  
                                           
1053
 Sir Gerard Brennan ‗Twentieth Anniversary of the AAT: Opening Address‘ in John McMillan, ed. 
The AAT – Twenty Years Forward (Australian Institute of Administrative Law, 1998), 11. 
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Appendix 1: Survey of Student Disciplinary Proceeedings 
 
Student Discipline Survey 
 
Name of institution 
 
 
 
Student misconduct/discipline proceedings 
 
How many student misconduct/discipline matters were commenced in the 2005 academic 
year in each of the following categories (state NA for Not Available):
1054
 
 
Academic misconduct 
 
School, Faculty, or comparable internal level of decision-making (eg a Faculty Discipline 
Committee) 
 
Total:_______________________ 
 
Plagiarism:__________________ 
 
Exam misconduct:___________ 
 
Other:______________________ 
 
University, or central, level of decision-making (eg. a University Discipline Committee) 
 
Total:_______________________ 
 
Plagiarism:__________________ 
 
Exam misconduct:___________ 
 
Other:______________________ 
 
                                           
1054
 Including all matters that commenced in 2005 and may not have been dealt with on appeal or review 
until 2006.  
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University appeals (eg. a  Discipline Appeals Committee) 
 
Total:_______________________ 
 
Plagiarism:__________________ 
 
Exam misconduct:___________ 
 
Other:______________________ 
 
If practical, please provide a breakdown of student discipline proceedings by School, Faculty or 
other internal unit.  
 
General/nonacademic misconduct 
 
How many student misconduct/discipline matters were commenced in the 2005 academic 
year in each of the following categories (state NA for Not Available): 
 
School, Faculty, or comparable level of decision-making (eg a Faculty Discipline Committee or 
Faculty Officer) 
 
Total:_____________________________ 
 
University, or central, level of decision-making (eg. a University Discipline Committee) 
 
Total:_____________________________ 
 
University appeals (eg. a Discipline Appeals Committee) 
 
Total:_____________________________ 
 
Summary action: 
 
Total:_____________________________ 
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Comments 
 
Has there been a change in the volume and/or nature of student discipline cases in the last 5 
years? 10 years? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please feel free to make any other comments you think relevant: 
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Appendix 2: Schedule of Questions, Student Advocates 
 
Interview schedule,  
Student advocates in student organisations (or comparable positions) 
 
1. Initial information 
 
 What is your name?  
 What organisation do you work for, and what is your position?  
 What is your role in misconduct/student discipline cases. 
 When were you most recently involved in a misconduct/discipline case? What were the 
circumstances of that case? 
 How many discipline/misconduct cases have you been involved in?  
a. <5 
b. 6-10 
c. 11-15 
d. 15-20 
e. >20 
 
2. The discipline process 
 
 In what sort of circumstances are student charged with disciplinary 
breaches/offences? What are the more common allegations/offences? (eg cheating, 
plagiarism, general misconduct) 
 Could you please explain in general the discipline process? (To start with, what are 
the misconduct rules? When and how would a student be charged with an 
offence/breaching those rules? What happens when they are?) 
 In relation to a formal hearing: 
a. When is there a formal hearing? 
b. What procedures are used by the panel in hearing the matter? Ie how does a 
panel/committee go about it task? 
c. What sort of information is presented and/or what information does the panel 
rely upon in making a determination/finding/decision? 
d. Is the onus on the student to prove his/herself ―not guilty‖? 
e. Who speaks or in entitled to speak? 
f. Does the committee explain its decisions? Are these made public in any way? 
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3. Evaluating the discipline process 
 
 Is the hearing process satisfactory in your opinion? Why/why not? 
 What is the role of the student disciplinary process in the university, especially in light 
of: 
The growing commercialisation of higher education; 
The tendency to treat students as consumers/customers; 
The resource pressures on staff and students 
Apparent public concerns with academic standards and cheating and the introduction of 
technologies such as ‗plagiarism detection software.‘ 
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